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EDITOR'S NOTE
I will freely admit that this, writing the Editor's Note, is
the most terrifYing part of the entire publication process. vVriting the first Editor's Note has done nothing to lessen the terror
of writing this second one. Only the small consolation that this
will be the last one I write allows me to plow-on. Unfortunately,
this makes it bittersweet. But, I will do my best!
First, I want to thank the authors of the fine works in this
publication. In this publication, you will find an article by Mr.
Robert McCarthy, which discusses the current state of affairs at
the International Boundary Waters Commission between the
United States and Mexico. You will also find two articles in this
issue discussing Utah Water Law. In her article, Ms. Jamie Carpenter discusses the administration of pre-statutory water rights
in Utah. Our other Utah article, by Mr. Jeremiah Williamson,
discusses the ongoing dispute regarding the public's right to recreationally use waterways in Utah. Finally, we have an article
jointly written by Mr. vVilliam Shutkin of the Rocky Mountain
Land Use Institute, and Mr. Matthew Brodahl (next year's Editor-in-Chief of the Water Law Review), which discusses sustainable
municipal water use practices.
The Water Law Review is also proud to present another collection of fine poetry by Justice Hobbes. Incidentally, this issue
also has a book review by Professor Romero of the University of
Denver, Sturm College of Law, on Justice Hobbs's new book. I
suggest that you read the review, and then read the book.
In addition to this material, the Water Law Review has an
abnormally large collection of student written work in this publication. Between the court reports, conference notes, and book
notes, you may be reading this publication all summer. However,
I would like to draw your eye to our case notes in this issue. J amie Luckenbill wrote an excellent narrative regarding the Colorado Supreme Court's visit to the University of Denver Sturm
College of Law, when it heard oral arguments in the FRICO case.
Also, John Hedges has written short article about developments
in groundwater laws in California.
Finally, I want to thank the Water Law Review, its staff, and
its editors, for the hard work they have done this year. And, to
Volume 15 of the Water Law Review, good luck!
Ryan McLane
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INTRODUCTION
A.

AN ANACHRONISTIC AGENCY

Conceived as a nineteenth century outpost of Manifest Destiny' to

1. "Manifest Destiny" was a term that gained popularity in the 1840s to justify the
United States' westward expansion, including the appropriation of Mexican lands. See,
e.g., Richard Griswold del Castillo, Manifest Destiny: The Mexican-American War and the
Treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo,5 Sw.J.L. & TRADE AM. 31, 32 (1998).
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demarcate and guard expanded U.S. borders against erosion by
meandering rivers;' re-engineered in the mid-twentieth century in
order to impound and develop the boundary waters;' its friends and
critics alike say the International Boundary and Water Commission,
U.S. - Mexico (IBWC) has become a dangerous anachronism, left
behind by twenty-first century social, environmental, and political
issues that it is unwilling or unable to address.'
Scholars routinely catalogue the alleged failings of the IBWC's
dominant U.S. Section (USIBWC):' secretive;' beholden to regional
agricultural interests;' indifferent to disappearing water sources;8

2. The IBWC traces its institutional roots to the Convention of 1889. Convention
to Avoid the Difficulties Occasioned by Changes in the Beds of the Rio Grande and
Colorado Rivers, U.S.-Mex., Mar. 1, 1889, 26 Stat. 1512 [hereinafter Convention of
1889].
3. The 1944 Water Treaty, which ushered in the modern age of the IBWC,
allocated boundary waters and provided for joint construction of international dams,
canals and other facilities. Treaty Relating to the Utilization of Waters of the Colorado
and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 3, 1944, 59 Stat. 1219
[hereinafter 1944 Water Treaty].
4. See generally Helen Ingram & David R. White, InternationalBoundary and Water
Commission: An InstitutionalMismatchfor Resolving Transboundary Water Problems, 33 NAT.
RESOURCESJ. 153 (1993); Alberto Szekely, How to Accommodate an Uncertain Future into
InstitutionalResponsiveness and Planning: The Case of Mexico and the United States, 33 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 397, 399-400 (1993); Vivienne Bennett & Lawrence A. Herzog, U.S.Mexico Borderland Water Conflicts and Institutional Change: A Commentary, 40 NAT.
RESOURCEsJ. 973, 974 (2000); D. Rick Van Schoik et al., Water Issues in the U.S.-Mexican
Border Region, 1-4 Dynamics of Human-Environment Interactions, in THE U.S.-MEXICAN
BORDER ENVIRONMENT: DYNAMICS OF HUMAN-ENVIRONMENT INTERACTIONS 123, 130
(Edward Sandalla ed., 2005) ("the treaty and the commission [...] are thought of by
critics and friends alike as anachronistic and unable to deal with today's problems")
available at http://www.scerp.org/pubs/m 1/chapter 1-4.pdf.
5. See generally Mark A. Sinclair, Note, The Environmental Cooperation Agreement
Between Mexico and the United States: A Response to the Pollution Problems of the Borderlands,
19 CORNELL INT'LL.J. 87, 113-14 (1986); Stephen P. Mumme, New Directions in United
States-Mexican Transboundary Environmental Management: A Critique of Current Proposals,
32 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 539, 545 (1992) [hereinafter Mumme, New Directions]; Geoffrey
Land, North American Free Trade and the Environment: Border Environmental Groups and the
available at
108-109
(1993)
NORTE
99,
FRONTERA
NAFTA,
5
http://aplicaciones.colef.mx:8080/fronteranorte/articulos/FN1 0/3fl0 Nafta and-the-future-ofMexicoUS-border.pdf; Stephen P. Mumme, Managing
Acute Water Scarcity on the U.S.-Mexico Border: Institutional Issues Raised by the 1990's
Drought, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 149, 156-57 (1999) [hereinafter Mumme, Managing
Acute Water Scarcity]; Stephen P. Mumme, The US-Mexico International Boundary and
Water Commission in the Sustainable Development Era, 9 IBRU BOUNDARY & SECURrIY
BULLETIN 117, 122 (2001) [hereinafter Mumme, Sustainable Development Era] available
at http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/ibru/publications/full/bsb9-2_mumme.pdf; Mark
Spalding, Addressing Border EnvironmentalProblems Now and in the Future: Border XXI and
Related Efforts, in THE U.S.-MEXICAN BORDER ENVIRONMENT, 105, 118 (Sw. Ctr. for Envtl.
Research & Policy et al eds. 2003) available at http://scerp.org/pubs/m1c6.pdf;
Stephen P. Mumme & DebraJ. Little, Leadership, Politics, and AdministrativeReform at the
United States Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and
Mexico, 47 Soc. ScI.J. 252, 260 (2010).
6. See generally Roberto Sanchez, Public Participationand the IBWC: Challenges and
Options, 33 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 283, 284, 292 (1993); Robert D. Hayton, The Matter of
Public Participation,33 NAT. RESOURCEsJ. 275, 277, 279 (1993).
7. See, e.g., M.H. Jamail & S.J. Ullery, International Water Use Relations Along the
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apathetic about associated ecological crises;' abusive to its employees;'o
lacking essential diplomatic and professional skills;" unresponsive to
the needs of a growing population;' 2 and hamstrung by a too-timid
Proposals for abolition or radical
reading of treaty language.'"
reformation of the USIBWC are legion. 4
The boundary and water treaties are also criticized as archaic and
inequitable, in part because they give the United States a
disproportionate share of boundary waters.'" In addition, the 1944
Sonoran Desert Borderlands, in ARID LANDS RESOURCE INFORMATION PAPERS 1, 17-18 (Ariz.
Univ. Office of Arid Lands Studies ed. 1979); Stephen P. Mumme, State Influence in
Foreign Policy Making: Water Related Environmental Disputes Along the United States-Mexico
Border, 38 W. POL. Q 620, 635 (1985) [hereinafter Mumme, State Influence]; Mary E.
Kelly, Commentary, 33 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 299, 301-02 (1993); Stephen P. Mumme,
Advancing BinationalCooperation in TransboundaryAquifer Management on the U.S.-Mexico
Border, 16 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 77, 89-90 (2005) [hereinafter Mumme,
Advancing Binational Cooperation]; Nicole Ries, Note, The (Almost) All-American Canal:
Conseo De DesarrolloEconomico De Mexicali v. United States and the Pursuit ofEnvironmental
justice in TransboundaryResource Management, 35 Ecology L.Q. 491, 524-26 (2008).
8. See, e.g., Szekely, supra note 4, at 399-400; Stephen Mumme, Minute 242 and
Beyond, Challenges and Opportunities for Managing Transboundary Groundwater on the
Mexico-U.S. Border, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 341, 34142 (2000); Robert E. Hall,
Transboundary Groundwater Management: Opportunities Under International Law for
Groundwater Management in the United States-Mexico Border Region, 21 ARIZ. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 873, 907, 910 (2004).
9. See, e.g., Charles R. Johnston, Jr., Comment, Effluent Neighbors: The Mexico-United
States Water Quality Dilemma, 3 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 152, 164 (1972); Michael Gregory,
Environment, SustainableDevelopment, Public Participationand the NAFTA: A Retrospective, 7
J. ENVTL. L. & LMG. 99, 165 (1992); Spalding, supra note 5, at 120; Jennifer Pitt,
Dredgingfor Diplomacy? Colorado River Management at the United States-Mexico Border, 19
PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 47, 53-54 (2006); Developments in the LawInternationalEnvironmental Law, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1550, 1578 (1991).
10. See, e.g., Mumme & Little, supra note 5, at 262-63.
11. See, e.g., Bennett & Herzog, supra note 4, at 974; Jurgen Schmandt, Bi-National
Water Issues in the Rio Grande/RioBravo Basin, 4 WATER POLICY 137, 150, 152-53 (2002);
MARY KELLY & ALBERTO SZEKELY, CTR. FOR LATIN AM. STUDIES, MODERNIZING THE
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND WATER COMMISSION 2-3 (Feb. 2004), available at
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/4hj9d7nw.pdf.
12. See e.g., Sinclair, supra note 5, at 113-114; John Altomare, Comment, Stemming
the Flow: The Role of InternationalEnvironmental Law in Seeking a Solution to the Sewage
Treatment Crisis at the Tijuana-San Diego Border Region, 21 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 361, 390
(1990); Sanford E. Gaines, Bridges To A Better Environment: Building Cross-Border
InstitutionsForEnvironmental Improvement In The U.S.-Mexico BorderArea, 12 ARIz.J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 429, 442 (1995).

13. See, e.g., Barbara G. Burman & Thomas G. Cornish, Needed: A Ground-Water
Treaty Between the United States and Mexico, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 385, 399 (1975);
Sinclair, supra note 5, at 113-114; Steven G. Ingram, In a Twenty-First Century "Minute,"
44 NAT. REsoURCESJ. 163, 164 (2004).
14. See, e.g., Sinclair, supra note 5, at 114, 116-17; Gregory, supra note 9, at 165;
Mumme, New Directions, supra note 5, at 545; Ingram & White, supra note 4, at 174;
Szekely, supra note 4, at 399; Kelly, supra note 7, at 301-02; Gaines, supra note 12, at
442; Bennett & Herzog, supranote 4, at 974; KELLY & SZEKELY, supra note 11, at 2-3.
15. The 1944 Water Treaty and an earlier agreement entitled the United States to a
disproportionate share of boundary waters. See 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, art. 4
(Lower Rio Grande), art. 10 (Lower Colorado River); Convention Providing for the
Equitable Distribution of the Waters of the Rio Grande for Irrigation Purposes, U.S.Mex., May 21, 1906, 34 Stat. 2953 [hereinafter, Convention of 1906]; see, e.g., Melissa
Lopez, Border Tensions and the Need for Water: An Application of Equitable Principles to
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Water Treaty has been criticized for giving preference to irrigation
while ignoring groundwater and ecological uses,'" and also for its
which privileges
of "Engineer-Commissioners,"'"
designation
construction expertise over essential management skills." Although
some have called for a new treaty to be administered by a new
institution, 9 others, doubting the political viability of such proposals,
suggest that amendments to treaties, combined with a thorough
housecleaning of inept leadership in the U.S. Section, and an infusion
of badly-needed professional and diplomatic talent, can salvage the
IBWC. 20
B.

CAN'T SEE THE STATUTES FOR THE TREATIES

Notwithstanding this crescendo of criticism, the IBWC literature is
strangely devoid of reference to U.S. domestic law, including statutes
that implement the boundary and water treaties, 21 serve as the
enabling legislation of the USIBWC," place the agency under the
supervision and control of the U.S. State Department, 2' and make its
duties subject to reassignment by the President.24 In addition to these
statutes, and even the treaties themselves endowing executive
authority,25 the U.S. Constitution gives the President vast executive
powers over foreign affairS26 and administrative agencies. 27 Indeed,

Determine Water Allocationfrom the Rio Grande to the United States and Mexico, 9 GEO. INT'L.
ENVrL. L. REv. 489, 498-99 (1997).
16. See, e.g., Stephen P. Mumme, Revising the 1944 Water Treaty: Reflections on the Rio
Grande Drought Crises and Other Matters, 45 J. Sw., 649, 651-52 (2003); Allie Alexis
Umoff, An Analysis of the 1944 US.-Mexico Water Treaty: Its Past, Present, and Future, 32
ENVIRONs ENVTL. L. & POL'YJ. 69, 84-87, 97.(2008).
17. The 1944 Water Treaty designates five officials for each section: an "EngineerCommissioner," two principal engineers, a legal adviser, and a secretary. 1944 Water
Treaty, supra note 3, art. 2.
18. See, e.g., Sanchez, supra note 6, at 283; Schmandt, supranote 11, at 152-53; Kelly
& Szekely, supranote 11, at 2-3.
19. See, e.g., Burman & Cornish, supra note 13, at 397; Mumme, New Directions,supra
note 5, at 545.
20. See, e.g., Mumme, New Directions,supra note 5, at 545; Stephen P. Mumme, The
Case for Adding an Ecology Minute to the 1944 United States-Mexico Water Treaty, 15 TUL.
ENvTL. L.J. 239, 246, 255 (2002); Kelly & Szekely, supra note 11, at 2-3; Mumme &
Little, supra note 5, at 266-67.
21. See 22 U.S.C. §§ 277-277h (2010).
22. See id. § 277.
23. See, e.g., id. § 277a.
24. See id., §§ 277, 277b(a) (1), 277b(a) (2), 277c(a). See also infra note 32 and
corresponding text.
25. The 1944 Water Treaty itself recognizes the right of each nation to construct
treaty works through any public or private agency in accordance with domestic laws.
See 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, art. 24 and Protocol. The Treaty also specifies that
the State Department handle any joint action or agreement on the part of the United
States. Id. art. 2.
26. See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (authority to -appoint ambassadors); U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 1 (authority to "receive ambassadors and other public
ministers"); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (authority as "commander in chief,").
27. Article II, section 1, clause 1, commonly referred to as the "Vesting Clause,"
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scholars debate whether the President has nearly exclusive powers in
certain foreign" and domestic matters.'
Eschewing any reference to this body of law, critics and
government agencies alike focus exclusively on intricate treaty
language that supposedly makes the USIBWC an autonomous
agency." This myopia begins with the USIBWC, which "considers
itself an independent federal government agency whose leader is
answerable only to the President."" Even the IBWC website, which
provides the full text of the boundary and water treaties and hundreds
of additional international agreements, somehow avoids any mention
of statutory authority."
Many prominent academic scholars have a different view of the
agency's alleged autonomy, confidently claiming that "the U.S. IBWC
was structured, in effect, as a congressional agency."" The Legal
Adviser's office at the State Department, presumably agnostic as to
whom the USIBWC should report, if anyone, acknowledges
responsibility for giving foreign policy guidance, as specified in the
treaties but believes "there is sufficient independence provided for in

states that "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America." Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. Section 2 establishes the executive departments, stating
that "[the President] may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in
each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their
respective offices." Id. § 2, cl. 1. Section 2, clause 2, commonly referred to as the
"Appointments Clause", states the President may "nominate, and by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States,
whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be
established by law." Id. § 2, cl. 2. Finally, the "Take Care Clause," at Article II, section
3, states that the President "shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed." Id. §
3.
28. It has been argued that the president has "unilateral authority" to interpret or
reinterpret treaties, notwithstanding their domestic law effect. SeeJohn Yoo, Politics as
Law?: The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Separation of Powers, and Treaty Interpretation,89
CALIF. L. REv. 851, 868-870, 878 (2001); but see, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, TheJudicial
Power and Treaty Delegation,90 CALIF. L. REv. 1263 (2002).
29. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President'sPower to
Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 549-50 (1994); Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2245, 2247 (2001); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer or "The
Decider"? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 696, 697 (2007);
Cynthia R. Farina, False Comfort and Impossible Promises: Uncertainty, Information Overload,
and the UnitaryExecutive, 12 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 357, 359 (2010).
30. The 1944 Water Treaty appears to vest expansive powers in the IBWC and its
U.S.and Mexican sections; but, a careful reading discloses that exercise of those
powers is made subject to approval by the respective governments. 1944 Water Treaty,
supra note 3, passim. In addition, Congress has enacted a comprehensive statutory
scheme to implement the 1944 Water Treaty and other boundary and water treaties.
See 22 U.S.C. § 277 (2011).
31. U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT OF INSPECTION, U.S.
SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND WATER COMMISSION 10 (2005)

OIG,

[hereinafter

2005

REPORT],

available

at

http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/44344.pdf.
32.

See

U.S.

INTERNATIONAL

BOUNDARY

&

http://www.ibwc.gov/home.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2011).
33. Mumme & Little, supranote 5, at 256.

WATER

COMMISSION,
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administrative matters that it cannot be considered as an
The State Department's
organizational part of the Department."'
"It is not within
similarly
contends:
Office of Inspector General (OIG)
or desire) to
(or
competence
jurisdiction
OIG's or the Department's
35
the OIG
Ironically,
operations."
provide oversight of USIBWC
Congress
and
the
agencies
government
U.S.
acknowledges "that most
that
no other
agency
and
view the [State] Department as the parent
"36
exists.
choice
logical
C. GROSS MISMANAGEMENT, IMMINENT CATASTROPHE, AND PLAUSIBLE
DENIABILITY

A limited investigation of USIBWC headquarters in 2005, during
which no attempt was made to inspect levees or "follow up each
allegation of neglect,"3 nevertheless led the State Department OIG to
warn: "Internal management problems have engulfed USIBWC,
threatening its essential responsibilities for flood control and water
management in the American Southwest." 3 Among other things, the
investigation found that the U.S. Commissioner "feels he can fire and
hire, set salaries including his own, and generally run his agency
without reference to other authority."" A follow up report in 2006
stated that, while there is no immediate crisis, a major storm or flood
could cause considerable damage and "usher in bouts of finger
[d]epartments, agencies, and jurisdictions
pointing between
concerned."4 0
In response, the State Department insists that legislation would be
needed to give it control over the USIBWC, yet still refuses to seek the
mythical missing mandate.4 1 Ironically, however, the Department
jealously guards its supposedly small patch of bureaucratic Astroturf.4 2
34. Stephen P. Mumme & Scott T. Moore, Agency Autonomy in Transboundary
Resource Management: The United States Section of the International Boundary and Water
Commission, United States and Mexico, 30 NAT. REsOURCESJ. 661, 679-80 (1990).
35. U.S. DEP'T. OF STATE, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT OF INSPECTION, U.S.
SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND WATER COMMISSION 10 (2006)
at
available
REPORT],
2006
OIG,
[hereinafter
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/83888.pdf.
36. Id. See also, e.g., U.S. - Mex. Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Act, Pub. L.
109-448, § 3, 120 Stat. 3328, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1962 (2006) (defining the IBWC
as "an agency of the Department of State.").
37. OIG, 2005 REPORT, supranote 31, at 31 (noting that the OIG found "disturbing
evidence ... that maintenance of infrastructure is falling behind").
38. Id.at3.
39. Id. at 5, 11 (noting that the U.S. Commissioner set his own salary at a level
equivalent to that of an armed forces secretary, even though the USIBWC has fewer
than 300 employees).
40. OIG, 2006 REPORT, supranote 35, at 4; see also Press Release, Public Employees
for Environmental Responsibility, Obscure Border Agency Worst in Federal
Government (Aug. 10, 2009), http://www.peer.org/news/news-id.php?row-id=1228.
41. SeeOIG, 2006 REPORT, supranote 3535, at 5.
42. See, e.g., Mumme & Moore, supra note 34, at 678-79 (describing the USIBWC's
success in resisting "predatory initiatives of other domestic Agencies", through the
support and political influence of the Secretary of State).
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Watching from the sidelines, the State Department thus preserves
"plausible deniability" that it should be held responsible for the
ensuing devastation. " The State Department's cloak of plausible
deniability, however, does not shield the President, who is extremely
ill-served by such gamesmanship. 4
Meanwhile, the White House shuffles Commissioners in and out of
the U.S. Section on an almost yearly basis, making little effort at
substantive reform and , at times dramatically increasing the agency's
budget, 6 thus rewarding gross malfeasance. This all-too-familiar
pattern of incentivizing failure 7 results in still more reports of fraud,
waste and abuse," leading one prominent environmental group to

43. The State Department may hope to hide among the alphabet soup of agencies
implicated in other recent disasters, such as the British Petroleum (BP) oil spill or
Hurricane Katrina, where the "finger pointing" implicated the former Minerals
Management Service (MMS), or the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), respectively. See, e.g., Sandra Zellmer, A
Tale of Two ImperiledRivers: Reflections from a Post-KatrinaWorld, 59 FLA. L. REV. 599, 60001, 600 n.5 (2007) (regarding agency blame for failed levees and weak emergency
response). The State Department is well-schooled in plausible deniability. See, e.g.,
David Barnhizer, Waking from Sustainability's "Impossible Dream": The Decisionmaking
Realities of Business and Government, 18 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 595, 657-658 (2006)
("One need only recall the account given by former Terrorism Czar Richard Clarke
concerning when the second Bush administration and National Security Advisor
Condoleeza Rice had information concerning possible terror attacks prior to 9/11.
Rice demonstrated as clearly as possible during her statements the ways that imprecise
record keeping allows plausible deniability as part of a strategy to avoid
accountability.").
44. No one knows this better than President Obama's pick to head the State
Department's Office of Legal Advisor, former Yale Dean and long-time international
human rights advocate, Harold Hongzu Koh. Indeed, one would expect Mr. Koh to
waste no time pursuing comprehensive reform throughout the State Department,
having dendunced its most recent decade of depredations. See generally Harold
Hongju Koh, Restoring America's Human Rights Reputation, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 635
(2007).
45. See OIG, 2005 REPORT, supra note 31, at 11 ("There have been five
commissioners, permanent or acting, in the past five years, contrasting dramatically
There have been three more U.S. Section
with the stability of the past.")
Commissioners since 2004. History of Section Commissioners, U.S. INTERNATIONAL
BOUNDARY

&

WATER

COMMISSION,

http://www.ibwc.gov/AboutUs/CommishHistory.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2011).
46. See generally SEC'Y OF STATE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION 683-696
at
available
BUDGET
2011],
STATE
DEP'T
[hereinafter
(2011)
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/136355.pdf;
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT OF 2009 31, 36, 56 (2010) [hereinafter
available
at
ARRA
Plan
20091,
STATE
DEP'T
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/126110.pdf.

47. See Zellmer, supra note 43, at 600-01 (regarding increased agency budgets in
the wake of Katrina malfeasance).
48. See, e.g., Memorandum from Robert McCarthy, USIBWC General Counsel, to
Inspector General, Department of State (July 28, 2009) [hereinafter McCarthy Memo
at
available
OIG],
to
http://wv.peer.org/docs/tx/09_29_9_McCarthy-IG-complaint.pdf. See also 5 C.F.R.
§ 2635.101(b) (11) (2011) ("Employees shall disclose waste, fraud, abuse, and
corruption to appropriate authorities"); Laura D. Francis, Bureau of National Affairs,

Inc., MSPB Appeal Claims General Counsel Firedfor Making Protected Disclosures, 47 GOV'T
EMPL. REL. REP. 1124 (Oct. 6, 2009).
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proclaim the USIBWC "arguably the most incompetent and abusive
agency in federal service"."9
Today, the USIBWC oversees a boundary region on the cusp of
calamity, as polluted aquifers threaten to run dry,o irrigation gobbles
up nearly all available water," ecological devastation spreads,52 and
the flow of sewage imperils border communities. In addition, flood
control levees are beginning to crumble, 4 while millions of dollars are
wasted on projects having nothing to do with the agency's mission. 5
Furthermore, the USIBWC employs special interest advisory
committees that mimic public participation, 6 whereas agency
environmental regulations that were adopted without public input
exclude a vast array of agency projects from significant review.
Meanwhile, inside the agency, deeply disillusioned employees rate

49. Press Release, Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, Obscure
Border Agency Worst in Federal Government (Aug. 10, 2009),
http://www.peer.org/news/news~id.php?rowid=1228. (As a matter of full disclosure,
PEER attorneys have represented the author in a whistleblower retaliation appeal to
the MSPB).
50. See, e.g., FAR WEST TEXAS PLANNING WATER GROUP, FAR WEST TEXAS WATER PLAN
at
available
Plan],
2011
FWTWPG
1-71
(2011) [hereinafter
1-47,
http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/wrpi/rwp/3rdRound/201 1_RWP/RegionE/PDF's/Comp
leteFinalReport.pdf; PAUL WESTERHOFF ET AL., DRINKING WATER QUALITY IN
THE US-MEXICO BORDER REGION NUMBER W-03-19 35-36 (2004), available at
scerpfiles.org/cont-mgt/doc-files/W-03-19-final.pdf.
51. See, e.g., LOWER Rio GRANDE REGIONAL WATER PLANNING GROUP, NRS
CONSULTING ENGINEERS FINAL PLAN: REGION M 2011 REGIONAL WATER PLAN 2-14 ( 2010)
at
available
Plan],
2011
LRGRWPG
[hereinafter
http://www.riograndewaterplan.org/waterplan.php (follow "Chapter 2: Current and
Projected Population & Water Demand for the Rio Grande Region" hyperlink).
52. See, e.g., Once a Mighty Delta:History, ENVT'L DEF. FUND,
ttp://www.environmentaldefense.org/article.cfm?ContentlD=2642 (last updated June
20, 2003).
53. See e.g., Wren Abbott, State Orders IWBC to Clean up Dischargeinto River,
NOGALES INT'L,
http://www.nogalesinternational.com/articles/2010/10/27/news/doc4cc6flc82f37c8
25012667.prt (Oct. 26, 2010, 10:42 AM).
54. See, e.g., David Crowder, Losing Money on the Levees, EL PASO, INC..
http://elpasoinc.com/readArticle.aspx?issueid=300&xrec=5583 (last visited Jan. 29,
2011, 2:12 PM); McCarthy Memo to OIG, supranote 48, at 2-3.
55. See, e.g., McCarthy Memo to OIG, supra note 48, at 3-4 (regarding subsidies to
Department of Homeland Security for a barrier portion of ajoint levee-border barrier
structure).
56. See Federal Advisory Committee Act (1972), Pub. L. No. 92-463, § 5, 86 Stat. 770
(as amended (1997)) (prohibiting special interests from inappropriately influencing
the advice and recommendations of the advisory committee). See generally Press
Release, USIBWC Seeks Applicants For Colorado River Citizens' Forum (May 20,
2009), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/PressRelease_052009.pdf; Lower Rio
Grande Citizens'ForumMeeting, INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM'N,
(last visited Jan. 29,
http://www.ibwc.gov/CitizensForums/CFLower_RG.html
2011).
57. See Operational Procedures for Implementing Section 102 of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 46 Fed. Reg. 44083, 44086 (Sept. 2, 1981)
[hereinafter, USIBWC NEPA Procedures].
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their leadership as among the worst in the federal government.58 And,
most alarming of all, the agency conceals essential information, and
downplays the threat of imminent catastrophic dam failures and
disastrous flooding.59
D.

EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY AND ADAPTIVE TREATY INTERPRETATION

Due to the State Department's pusillanimous refusal to live up to
its statutory responsibility for oversight of the agency, and its admitted
lack of competence or desire to do so, both it and the USIBWC should
be stripped of responsibility for all but the diplomatic aspects of treaty
administration. All other treaty projects, personnel, and funds should
be turned over to more competent domestic agencies.
Not
coincidentally, this would also permit the IBWC to eliminate the
antiquated treaty requirement that engineers dominate agency
leadership, rather than an array of competent professionals from a
variety of appropriate disciplines. The agency would thus be free to
focus on adaptive treaty interpretation, pursuant to treaty provisions
giving the IBWC the authority to interpret the treaty and adopt new
binding international agreements, 0 and to pursue new policy
initiatives, with maximum public participation, in areas such as water
conservation,
water
quality,
groundwater
protection,
and
environmental restoration.'
Admittedly, whether the USIBWC can or should survive, even as a
diplomatic institution, is open to question. Even without a conscious
policy to divest the USIBWC of responsibilities, the agency's role is
increasing secondary to other agencies and institutions, such as the
Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC). 6 Even more

58. , Partnership for Public Service and American University's Institute for the
Study of Public Policy, BEST PLACES TO WORK 2010, (last visitedJan. 29, 2011, 2:37 PM),
availableat http://www.bestplacestowork.org/BPTW/rankings/detail/GW00/pdf.
59. See, e.g., Emma Perez-Trevino, Deficiencies Remain at Two Dams, BROWNSVILLE
HERALD, Aug. 1, 2010, http://www.allbilsiness.com/government/government-bodiesoffices-us-federal-government/I14877090-1.html.
60. See 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, art. 25; c.f, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine,
Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 687, 705-713 (1998) (discussing
constitutionally-implied judicial powers for dynamic treaty interpretation among
private parties).
61. Although the IBWC has been loath to exercise its power to interpret and
extend the treaty to adapt to changing circumstances, critics have recognized the
wasted potential. See, e.g., Ingram & White, supra note 4, at 164-165. The United
States has also been unwilling to risk an unfavorable outcome by referring disputes to
impartial mediation in the IBWC. Note, The InternationalJoint Commission (United StatesCanada) and the International Boundary and Water Commission (United States-Mexico):
Potentialfor Environmental Control Along the Boundaries, 6 INT'L L. & POL. 499, 516
(1973).
62. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/NAISD-00-26, U.S.-MEXIcO BORDER 16
(2000) ("With the creation of the Border Environment Cooperation Commission and
North American Development Bank, the role of the Boundary Commission in
transboundary environmental infrastructure issues has been reduced."), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA374250&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf). See also Michael
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likely to displace the USIBWC, by dint of their size, powerful
constituencies, technical competence- and record of remarkable
engineering accomplishments, are the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
and the U.S. Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation.'
Unfortunately, both also have dismal records of environmental
destruction, secrecy, wasteful spending, and allegiance to regional
special interests. 6 The best hope for U.S.-Mexico boundary water
relations to achieve enlightened national and international policies is
to separate diplomacy from the money-driven, regionally-controlled
agenda of such institutions.66 This is also the last best hope for the
salvation of the USIBWC, and it can be accomplished without new
legislation or treaties, by exercise of executive authority and adaptive
treaty interpretation.
II. THE BOUNDARY AND WATER TREATIES
A. TREATY SOURCES
The word "treaties" refers to agreements made "by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate." 67 International agreements that
are not submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent may be
concluded solely on the basis of presidential authority or on some
form of legislative authorization, including authority derived from a
treaty to which the Senate has already given its advice and consent.'
Robins, The North American Free Trade Agreement: The Integration of Free Trade and The
Environment, 7 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 123, 134 (1993) ("The IBWC, however, has
not been effective in addressing the major environmental problems on the border.").
63. See, e.g., Water Resources Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-541, 114
Stat. 2572 (2000) (authorizing the Secretary of the Army to manage various projects
for flood control including the Nogales Wash and its tributaries).
64. See, e.g., BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION (2000),
http://www.usbr.gov/history/BRIEFHist.pdf (recounting the construction of the
Hoover Dam, the Central Valley Project, the Colorado River Storage Project, and the
Central Arizona Project).
65. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, A First Look at a Modern Legal Regime for a "Post-Modern"
United States Army Corps of Engineers, 52 U. KAN. L. REv. 1285, 1285-87 (2004);
Christine A. Klein, On Dams and Democracy, 78 OR. L. REv. 641, 679-82 (1999);
Zellmer, supra note 43, at 602; William deBuys, Navigating the River of Our Future: The
Rio Poco-Grande,41 NAT. RESOURCES J. 265, 269 (2001) ("Through the post-war years
the Bureau and the Army Corps of Engineers, in one of the unhealthiest bureaucratic
competitions of all time, sought to outdo each other in building dams and reservoirs
throughout the West. The Rio Grande did not escape their attention.").
66. See, e.g., A. Dan Tarlock, Four Challenges for International Water Law, 23 TUL.
ENVTL. L.J. 369, 374-376 (2010) (International water law assumes "that transboundary
rivers should be shared in such a way that allows each riparian state a realistic
opportunity to make an equitable and reasonable utilization of this water.. . . All
current formulations of equitable apportionment derive from the 1966 Helsinki Rules
and the refinement of the Rules in the July 8, 1997, United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses").
67. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
68. See MICHAELJOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32528 INTERNATIONAL LAw
AND AGREEMENTS: THEIR EFFEcr UPON U.S. LAw 1, 3 (2010), available at
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Pursuant to the 1944 Water Treaty, the IBWC has entered into
numerous such international agreements in the form of "Minutes,"
which serve to implement or extend treaty provisions.'
The State Department is responsible for compliance with statutory
reporting and publishing requirements for international agreements
other than treaties submitted to Congress. These authorities provide
that an international agreement may not be concluded on behalf of
the United States without prior consultation with the Secretary of
State, and that reportable agreements must be transmitted to Congress
within sixty days of entry into force.7 o The Department's Office of
Legal Adviser delegates this responsibility to the Office of Treaty
Adviser, which in 2003 acknowledged with "shock and chagrin" that it
had failed to comply with this responsibility with respect to over 600
agreements between 1996 and 2003."
The IBWC treaties and selected Minutes are included in "Treaties
in Force," a list maintained by the State Department,72 and (since
1945) in the "Treaties and Other International Acts Series" (TIAS),
also published by the State Department.n Citations to IBWC treaties
and Minutes in this article are to one of the above sources, if available,
or to another U.S. Treaty source,74 if available. In the case of many
IBWC Minutes not published elsewhere, the text of the Minutes may
be found on the IBWC website.75
B. TREATY OF GUADALUPE HIDALGO AND GADSDEN TREATY
The creation of the IBWC -

and perhaps its karma -

was

foreshadowed by the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo7 and the

http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL32528.pdf.
69. See 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, art. 25; see also Minutes Between the United
States and Mexican Sections of the IBWC, INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM'N,
http://www.ibwc.gov/Treaties Minutes/Minutes.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2011).
70. Case-Zablocki Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-403, 86 Stat. 619 (1972).
71. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., REPORT No. ISP-C-05-01, REVIEW OF TREATY
MANAGEMENT RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE OFFICE OF TREATY AFFAIRS 2 (2004), available at
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/146709.pdf.
72. UNITED STATES STATE DEP'T ,TREATIES IN FORCE A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE 178-79 (2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/1/treaty/tif/index.htm.
73. Treaties and Other International Acts Series (TIAS), U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/tias/index.htm.
74. United States Treaties and Other International Agreements (UST) (19501982); Executive Agreement Series (EAS) (1928-1945); Treaty Series (TS) (17951945); U.S. Statutes at Large (Stat.) (until 1948); Treaties and Other International
Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949, compiled under the direction
of Charles I. Bevans (Bevans); United Nations Treaty Series (UNTS).
75. Minutes Between the United States and Mexican Sections of the IBWC, INT'L BOUNDARY
& WATER COMM'N, http://www.ibwc.gov/TreatiesMinutes/Minutes.html (last visited
Mar. 10, 2011).
76. See Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Limits, and Settlement with the Republic of
Mexico, U.S.-Mex., art. 5, Feb. 2, 1848, 9 Stat. 922, [hereinafter Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo].
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Gadsden Treaty of 1853," which established temporary joint
commissions to survey, map, and demarcate with ground landmarks
the United States and Mexico boundary. The Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo ended the war between the United States and Mexico,
designated the Rio Grande as the Texas border, reduced the size of
Mexico by more than half, and doubled the territory of the United
States, including parts of present-day Arizona, California, New Mexico,
The Gadsden Treaty
Texas, Colorado, Nevada, and Utah."
reestablished the southern boundary of New Mexico and Arizona to
enable the United States to construct a railroad to the west coast along
a preferred southern route, and transferred an additional twenty-nine
million acres from Mexico to the United States." Shamefully, the
State Department attempts to foster collective American amnesia
about this imperialist conquest of Mexico,so the basis for a continuing
neocolonial relationship.8
C. CONVENTION OF 1884

As lands adjacent to boundary rivers were settled and developed
for agriculture into the late nineteenth century, questions increasingly
arose as to the location of the boundary when the rivers changed their
courses and transferred tracts of land from one side of a river to the
other. The two Governments established from time to time temporary
commissions to resurvey and demarcate the boundaries. One such
temporafy Commission was established pursuant to the Convention of
1882, which specified that each nation appoint a "surveying party,
77. See Treaty of Boundary, Cessation of Territory, Transfer of Isthmus
Tehuantepec, U.S.-Mex., art. I, Dec. 30, 1853, 10 Stat. 1031' [hereinafter Gadsden
Treaty].
78. Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, supra note 76; See, e.g., The Treaty of Guadalupe
OURDOCUMENTS.GOV,
Hidalgo,
(last visited Jan. 11,
http://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc,php?flash=true&doc=26
2011); See generally, Symposium: Understanding the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo on its
150th Anniversary, 5 Sw.J.L. & TRADE AM. 1 (1998).
79. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-59, TREATY OF GUADALUPE
HIDALGO, FINDINGS AND POSSIBLE OPTIONS REGARDING LONGSTANDING COMMUNITY LAND
at
(2004), . available
32
NEW
MEXICO
CLAIMS
IN
GRANT
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0459.pdf. See also Treaty Terminating Article VIII of
the Boundary Treaty of December 30, 1853 (Gadsen Treaty), U.S.-Mex., April 13,
1937, 52 Stat. 1457.
80. For example, a recent "Background Note" on Mexico describes the country's
demographics, economy, geography, political history, and foreign relations, with
specific reference to the "decade-long struggle for independence from Spain"
between 1810 and 1820, and "the invasion of French forces in 1862," but cynically
skips over the Mexican-American War without mention. See Background Note: Mexico,
U.S. STATE DEP'T (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35749.htm.
81.

See, e.g., MICHAEL PARENTI, AGAINST EMPIRE 33, 38-39 (1995)

(discussing the

impacts of United States global domination); SIDNEY WEINTRAUB, UNEQUAL PARTNERS:
THE UNITED STATES AND MEXICO 2 (2010); Gilbert G Gonzilez & Ratil Fernandez,
Empire and the Origins of Twentieth-Century Migrationfrom Mexico to the United States, 71
PAC. HIST. REV. 19, 19 (2002).
82. United States-Mexico Convention Providing for an International Boundary
Survey to Relocate the Existing Frontier Line Between the Two Countries West of the
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consisting of an Engineer-in-Chief, two Associates, one of whom shall
be a practical astronomer, and such number of assistant engineers and
Meeting together, the two
associates as it may deem proper.""
surveying parties were deemed the International Boundary
Commission (IBC)." By adoption of the Convention of November 12,
1884, the two nations agreed to maintain as the boundary the center of
the normal channels of the Rio Grande and Rio Colorado,
notwithstanding "slow and gradual" changes in the courses of those
rivers.
D. CONVENTION OF 1889
By the Convention of March 1,. 1889, the Governments of the
United States and Mexico re-established the IBC, which was intended
as another temporary body to apply the boundary principles previously
agreed upon." This time, however, its life was extended indefinitely,
first by agreement in 1900, " and again by article 2 of the 1944 Water
Treaty." The Convention of 1889 vested exclusive jurisdiction over
boundary questions along the Rio Grande or Colorado Rivers in the
IBC.8 ' The convention specifies the appointment of a Commissioner,
a Consulting Engineer, Secretaries, and Interpreters by each nation to
compose the IBC.9 o The IBC was empowered to investigate any
changes to the river boundary caused by avulsion or erosion and to
apply the respective principles of the 1884 Convention." The IBC was
to determine whether any works constructed in the rivers were
permitted or prohibited by prior treaties," subpoena witnesses," and
The Banco Convention of 1905
make binding determinations.
modified the Convention of 1884 to retain the Rio Grande and the
Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., art. II, July 29, 1882, 22 Stat. 986 [hereinafter Convention of
The
available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/TREATYOF_1882.pdf.
1882],
Convention was renewed on Dec. 5, 1885, 25 Stat. 1390, and again on February 13,
1889, 25 Stat. 1493.
83. Convention of 1882, supra note 82, at art. II.
84. Id.
85. Convention Between the United States of America and the United States of
Mexico Touching the International Boundary Line Where it Follows the Bed of the
Rio Grande and the Rio Colorado, U.S.-Mex., art. I, Nov.12, 1884, 24 Stat. 1011
[hereinafter Convention of 1884].
86. Convention of 1889, supra note 2, at art. I.
87. Convention Between the United States of America and the United States of
Mexico, Extending for an Indefinite Period the Treaty of March 1, 1889, Between the
two Governments, Known as the Water Boundary Convention, U.S.-Mex., Nov. 21,
1900, 31 Stat. 1936. There were numerous temporary extensions: Aug. 24, 1894, 28
Stat. 1213; Nov. 6, 1896, 29 Stat. 857; Oct. 29, 1897, 30 Stat. 1625; Dec. 2, 1898, 30 Stat.
1744.
88. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 2.
89. Convention of 1889, supranote 2, at art. I.
90. Id. at art. II.
91. Id. at art. IV.
92. Id. at art.V.
93. Id. at art.VII.
94. Id. at art. VIII.
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Colorado River as the international boundary.
E. CONVENTION OF 1906

The Convention of May 21, 1906, provided for the distribution
between the United States and Mexico of the waters of the Rio Grande
above Fort Quitman, Texas for the eighty-nine-mile international
boundary reach of the Rio Grande through the El Paso-Juirez Valley.
This Convention allotted to Mexico 60,000 acre-feet annually of the
waters of the Rio Grande to be delivered in accordance with a monthly
schedule at the headgate to Mexico's Acequia Madre just above Juirez,
To facilitate such deliveries, the United States
Chihuahua.
constructed, at its expense, the Elephant Butte Dam in New Mexico.
of
The Convention includes the proviso that "[iin case ...
extraordinary drought or serious accident to the irrigation system in
the United States, the amount of water delivered to the Mexican Canal
shall be diminished in the same proportion as the water delivered to
lands under said irrigation system in the 'United States," downstream
of Elephant Butte Dam."
F. CONVENTION OF 1933
At the Convention of February 1, 1933, the two governments
agreed to jointly construct, operate, and maintain, through the IBC,
the Rio Grande Rectification Project, which straightened and
stabilized the 155-mile river boundary through the highly developed El
Paso-Juirez Valley. The project further provided for the control of
the river's floods through this Valley."
G. 1944 WATER TREAIY
The Treaty of February 3, 1944 for the "Utilization of Waters of the
Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande" marks the
modern era of the IBWC." Article 1 defines various terms used in the
treaty. Article 2 indefinitely extends the Convention of 1889; changes
the name of the IBC to the IBWC; specifies a structure comprising a
United States Section and a Mexican Section; requires that each
section designate an "Engineer Commissioner ... two principal
engineers, a legal advisor and a secretary"; entrusts the IBWC with
authority for "settlement of all disputes" that may arise under the
95. Convention Between the United States and Mexico for the Elimination of the
Bancos in the Rio Grande from the Effects of Article II of the Treaty of November 12,
1884, U.S.-Mex., arts. I, II, Mar. 20, 1905, 35 Stat.1863.
96. See Convention of 1906, supra note 15. A 1987 agreement provided for rediversion of Rio Grande waters allocated to Mexico under the Convention of 1906.
Boundary Waters Agreement Between the United States of America and Mexico, June
24-Nov. 10, 1987, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. 11,549.
97. Convention for the Rectification of the Rio Grande, U.S.-Mex., Feb. 1, 1933, 48
Stat. 1621 [hereinafter Convention of 1933].
98. See 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3; see also Mexican Water Treaty Reservations:
HearingBefore thw S. Comm. on ForeignRelations, 79th Cong. 3 (1945).
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treaty; provides that the IBWC "shall in all respects have the status of
an international body"; and specifies that "wherever .. . Treaty
[provisions call] for joint action or joint agreement by the two
[g]overnments, or for the furnishing of reports, studies or plans to the
two [g]overnments, or similar provisions ... [such] matter[s] ... shall
be handled by or through the Department of State of the United
States and the [Secretariat] of Foreign Relations of Mexico."'
Article 3 sets forth a "guide" for the joint use of international
waters, with the following order of preference: "(1) Domestic and
municipal uses, (2) Agriculture and stock-raising, (3) Electric power,
(4) Other industrial uses, (5) Navigation, (6) Fishing and hunting, (7)
Any other beneficial uses which may be determined by the
Commission." In addition, the treaty provides that "[a]ll of the
foregoing uses shall be subject to any sanitary measures or works which
may be mutually agreed upon by the two [g]overnments, which hereby
agree to give preferential attention to the solution of all border
sanitation problems."

100

Article 4 of the 1944 Water Treaty allocated the waters of the Rio
Grande from Fort Quitman to the Gulf of Mexico, between the United
States and Mexico. The treaty allocates to Mexico: (1) "all of the
waters reaching the main channel of the Rio Grande from the San
Juan and Alamo Rivers"; (2) "[t]wo-thirds of the flow [in] the main
channel of the Rio Grande from the Conchos, San Diego, San
Rodrigo, Escondido and Salado Rivers and the Las Vacas Arroyo,"
subject to certain provisions; and (3) "one-half of all other flows ...
occurring in the main channel of the Rio Grande" downstream from
Fort Quitman.
The treaty then allocates to the United States: (1) "[a]ll of the
waters reaching the main channel of the Rio Grande from the Pecos
and Devils Rivers, Goodenough Spring and Alamito, Terlingua, San
Felipe and Pinto Creeks"; (2) one-third of the flow reaching the main
channel of the river from the six named measured tributaries from
Mexico and provides that "this third shall not be less, as an average
amount in cycles of five consecutive years, than 350,000 acre-feet
annually"; and (3) "[o]ne-half of all other flows .. . occurring in the
main channel of the Rio Grande" downstream from Fort Quitman.'o
Article 4 also provides that if an "extraordinary drought" prevents
Mexico from being able to deliver the 350,000 acre-feet annual average
required from the Mexican tributaries to the Rio Grande, "any
deficiencies existing at the end of the .. . five-year cycle shall be made
up in the following five-year cycle with water from the ... measured
tributaries" to which the United States has the right to a one-third
share. The term, "extraordinary drought," is not defined.'o2
99. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, arts. 1-2. Article 2 also terminated the
Convention of November 21, 1900 between the United States and Mexico. Id. at art. 2.
100. Id. at art.3.
101. Id.atart.4.
102. Id. at art. 4.
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Article 5 provides for the two Governments to jointly construct
dams on the main channel of the Rio Grande, for the conservation,
storage and regulation of the river's flow.'0 3 Articles 6 and 7 provide
for the IBWC to study, investigate and report to the governments on
such flood control works, including levees, floodways, works for
canalization and rectification, and hydroelectric facilities that the
IBWC finds should be built on the boundary rivers.o4
Article 8 provides for regulations to be adopted, subject to
amendment, providing that dams above the lowest on the Rio Grande
maintain the maximum quantity of water in storage consistent with
irrigation use, flood control, and power requirements.'o Article 9
provides that in the event of "extraordinary drought," which again is
not defined, "water stored in the international storage reservoirs and
belonging to the country enjoying. . . abundant water supply may be
of the [IBWC], for use of the country
withdrawn, with . . . consent
106

undergoing the drought."
Article 10 provides that a guaranteed annual quantity of 1.5
million acre-feet of the waters of the Colorado River are allotted to
Mexico. In the event of "extraordinary drought" (again not defined)
deliveries to Mexico are reduced proportionately to the reduction in
U.S. consumption.1o' Article 11 provides for timelines, places, and
methods of delivery of Mexican water, including by use of the AllAmerican Canal.'
Article 12 allowed Mexico to divert its allocation of water by
providing Mexico the authority to construct a main diversion structure
in the Colorado River, below the California-Baja California boundary
line. It further provides Mexico with the authority to build, at its own
expense, within the United States, any works it may need to protect
Mexican lands from floods and seepage that the construction and
operation of the diversion structure might cause.'"
Article 13 provides that the IBWC will study the need for
construction of flood control works on the Lower Colorado and to
make recommendations to the two governments for construction of
such works as are deemed necessary."'0 Article 14 provides that in
exchange for use of the All-American Canal to deliver Mexican waters,
Mexico shall pay a share of the cost of construction and operation of
the Imperial Dam and a section of the canal."' Article 15 concerns
schedules for delivery of Mexico's share of Colorado River waters."'

103. Id. at art. 5.
104. Id. at arts. 6-7.
105. Id. at art. 8.
106. Id. at art. 9(f).
107. Id. at art. 10.
108. Id. at art. 11.
109. Id. at art. 12(a).
110. Id. at art. 13.
111. Id. at art. 14.
112. Id. at art. 15.

214

WATER LAWREVIEW

Volume 14

Article 16 calls for the IBWC to investigate and make
recommendations to the two governments for equitable distribution of
the waters of the Tijuana River system and for construction of flood
control works and works to promote "domestic, irrigation and other
feasible uses of the waters.""
Article 17 concerns general provisions allowing use of
international river channels for discharge of flood waters."' Article 18
makes international reservoirs formed by IBWC dams free for use by
residents of both countries and prohibits their use for military
Article 19 provides for adoption of regulations
purposes."'
concerning international power plants."' Article 20 specifies that each
country is free to construct its share of works through any public or
private entity, not limited to the IBWC itself, with the portion of works
located in each country being subject to its respective laws.' 17
Article 21 provides that the international boundary shall not be
affected by the creation of reservoirs pursuant to construction of
international dams."' Article 22 provides that the Convention of 1933
shall govern boundary matters where canalization or rectification
works are carried out on the Rio Grande or Colorado River."' Article
23 provides that where private property is required for construction of
treaty works, the country in which such property is located will bear
the cost of acquiring such property and that joint works or portions
thereof shall be subject to the jurisdiction of the country in which they
are located.o20
Article 24 provides the IBWC with the authority to "to initiate and
carry on investigations and develop plans for the works which are to be
constructed ... in accordance with the provisions of this and other
treaties or agreements"; to construct, operate and maintain such works
"in accordance with the respective domestic laws of each country";
and "[t]o settle all differences that may arise between the two
[g]overnments with respect to the interpretation or application of this
Treaty, subject to the approval of the two [g] overnments." 121
Article 25 empowers the IBWC to interpret and apply the
provisions of the treaty through the "Minute" system. The decisions
of the U.S. and Mexican Sections are to be recorded as Minutes and
sent to each government within three days of signature by the
Commissioners. Each government, the Department of State of the
United States and the Secretariat of Foreign Relations of Mexico must
approve the Minute within thirty days of receiving it. If there is no

113. Id. at art. 16.
114. Id. at art. 17.
115, Id. at art. 18.
116. Id. at art. 19.
117. Id. at art. 20.
118. Id. at art. 21.
119. Id. at art. 22.
120. Id. at art. 23.
121. Id. at art. 24.
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objection, the Minute becomes a binding agreement and extension of
the treaty between the two countries. 22
Articles 26 and 27 of the 1944 Water Treaty are transitory
provisions for implementation of the treaty, and Article 28 provides for
ratification of the treaty.12 ' The Protocol, which is made a part of the
treaty, re-emphasizes that where public works are located wholly within
one country and used only partly for meeting requirements of the
treaty, jurisdiction and control over such works will remain with the
designated federal agencies of that country, and such agencies are to
coordinate with its section of the IBWC. International works and those
constructed exclusively for treaty purposes are to remain under the
jurisdiction of the IBWC, in accordance with the treaty, although each
government may utilize the services of any public or private entity
pursuant to its respective domestic laws.12 1
H. 1963 CHAMIZAL CONVENTION
The Chamizal Convention of August 29, 1963, resolved the
Chamizal dispute, a nearly 100-year-old boundary problem at El PasoJuirez. The dispute arose in the late nineteenth century when the
course of the Rio Grande river moved, and in the process transferred
some six hundred acres of territory to the north side of the river. The
dispute grew increasingly bitter after the United States refused to
abide by a 1911 arbitration award in favor of Mexico.'12 The 1963
Convention provided for the relocation of 4.4 miles of the channel of
the Rio Grande, thereby transferring over four hundred acres to the
south side of the river.126
1. 1970 BOUNDARY TREATY
The Boundary Treaty of November 23, 1970 provides that the Rio
Grande and the Colorado Rivers would remain the international
boundaries, and also resolved other pending boundary disputes.12 7
The treaty also recognizes the necessity for implementing legislation in
each country.128 It then provides for restoration and preservation of

122. Id. at art. 25.
123. Id. at arts. 26-28.
124. Id. at Protocol.
125. See Convention for the Arbitration of the Chamizal Case, U.S.-Mex., June 24,
1910, 36 Stat. 2481; Supplementary Protocol to the Chamizal Arbitration, U.S.-Mex.,
Dec. 5, 1910, 33 Stat. 2487. See, e.g., SHELDON B. LIss, A CENTURY OF DISAGREEMENT: THE
CHAMIZAL CONFLICT 1864-1964 33-36 (1965).
126. See Convention for the Solution of the Problem of the Chamizal, U.S.-Mex.,
Aug. 29, 1963, 15 U.S.T. 21.
127. Treaty to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio Grande
and Colorado River as the International Boundary, U.S.-Mex., art. VIII, Nov. 23, 1970,
23 UST 371 [hereinafter 1970 Boundary Treaty] (terminating the Convention of 1884
and any inconsistent provisions of prior agreements, including the Convention of
1889, the Convention of 1933, the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and the Gadsden
Treaty).
128. See id. at 374-75.
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the character of the Rio Grande as the international boundary, in
order to minimize changes in the channel, and resolve potential future
sovereignty issues that might occur as a result.'29 The treaty further
provides for a procedural framework that attempts to prevent the loss
of either country's territory due to future changes in the river's
course.'s It specifically recognizes the right of each Government to
protect its banks from erosion, and its responsibility to avoid
construction in the Rio Grande channel that may cause deflection or
obstruction of normal or flood flows."' Finally, the treaty establishes
132
maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific Ocean.
As a result of the 1970 Boundary Treaty, together with earlier
agreements:
[T]he [international] boundary extends 1,954 miles, excluding the
maritime boundaries of 18 miles in the Pacific Ocean and 12 miles in
the Gulf of Mexico. Beginning at the Gulf of Mexico, the U.S.Mexico continental boundary follows the centerline of the Rio
Grande a distance of 1,255 miles from the Gulf to a point in El Paso,
Texas and CiudadJudirez, Chihuahua. From this point, the boundary
follows a westward alignment marked by monuments and markers
overland below New Mexico and Arizona a distance of 534 miles to
the Colorado River. The boundary continues northward along the
centerline of the Colorado River for 24 miles, where it once again
follows a westward alignment marked by monuments and markers
overland below California to the Pacific Ocean a distance of 141
miles.13 3

II. THE IBWC MINUTES
A.

ADAPTIVE TREATY INTERPRETATION UNDER THE 1944 WATER TREATY

Some argue that the power to interpret treaties, at least those
governing relations among private actors without the direct
involvement of states, is implicitly delegated to the judiciary under
constitutional principles.'3 4 According to this view, the doctrine of
"dynamic treaty interpretation" permits the judiciary to fashion new
substantive law as normative gaps emerge in a treaty's express
provisions, thus preventing rapid obsolescence under constantly
changing technological and social conditions. ' The constitutional
basis for such a judicial delegation has been challenged; the opposing
argument is that the president has "unilateral authority" to interpret

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 381.
Id. at 383.
Id. at 390-91.
Id. at 393-94.
See The InternationalBoundary: United States and Mexico, INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER
COMM'N, http://www.ibwc.gov/AboutUs/AboutUs.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2011).
134. See Alstine, supra note 60, at 690-92.
135. Id. at 761-84.
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or reinterpret treaties, notwithstanding their domestic law effect."'
There is general agreement that the president may interpret treaties
that are not "self-executing," and thus do not have the force of federal
law absent statutory implementation.1 7
Luckily, the 1944 Water Treaty largely evades this debate by
explicitly placing authority for treaty interpretation with the IBWC.'"
The Treaty similarly provides the IBWC with the authority to make
decisions that arguably could extend the. provisions of the treaty
through the "Minute" system, subject to the right of the respective
Governments to timely disapprove such agreements.' Unfortunately,
the IBWC has been reluctant to use the latter power, leading to a static
reading of a sixty-five-year-old treaty, as if time stood still and the vast
growth and development of the border region never happened. The
USIBWC celebrates the "Minute" process, even posting on its website
the full text of pre-1944 decisions of the Commission, but an
examination of all 318 Minutes adopted by the IBWC since 1906
indicates there have been only a few occasions when IBWC Minutes
even hint at the promise of adaptive treaty interpretation.140
B.

PRE-1944 MINUTES

Although the application of the term "Minute" to mean a joint
decision of the Mexican and American sections would not be
referenced in a Treaty until 1944,'' the IBC nevertheless adopted 140
Minutes between 1906 and 1933. The character of these Minutes,
however, is more in line with the traditional meaning of the term, as
applied to a record of a meeting rather than a new binding agreement.
Several of the Minutes, for example, merely record the exchange of
credentials of members of both Sections of the Commission.142
136. Yoo, supranote 28, at 868-70, 878; contraAlstine, supra note 28, at 1263.
137. See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence
and a Call for Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1942-44 (2005) (distinguishing the
presidential power concerning treaties that are not "self-executing" from the exclusive
and final authority that the federal courts have to interpret "self-executing" treaties);
see also Alstine, supra note 28, at 1267-68.
138. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, at 1222, 1255-56. The IBWC's unique status as
a non-judicial body able to resolve treaty disputes has been widely admired, even if its
application has been somewhat exaggerated. See, e.g., Steven R. Ratner, Land.Feuds and
Their Solutions: FindingInternationalLaw Beyond the Tribunal Chamber, 100 AM. J. INT'L L.
808, 826 (2006) (citing only the IBWC's own publication, unfortunately, to support
the claim that "the commission has successfully managed many aspects of the
border-typically, very technical work involving demarcation, sanitation, dam
management, and water-quality control").
139. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, at 1258.
140. See Minutes Between the United States and Mexican Sections of the IBWC, INT'L
BOUNDARY & WATER COMM'N, http://www.ibwc.gov/TreatiesMinutes/Minutes.html
(last visited Mar. 12, 2011).
141. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, at 1258.
142. International Boundary Commission [IBC], Minute 97: Credentials of Lawrence
M. Lawson Presented as Commissioner, Study to be Made of an International Convention for
Rectification of Rio Grande, at 1 (June 4, 1927), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min97.pdf; IBC, Minute 38: Credentials ofJoaquin
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Although many Minutes record decisions taken in apparently routine
IBC meetings, these were mostly mundane, such as directions given to
IBC engineers to inspect and report on various works or obstructions
in the river channels."' The thirty-six Minutes adopted pursuant to
the Convention of 1933 are mostly indistinguishable in character from
the earlier Minutes, except they include numerous references to
rectification works.1"

C. BustamantePresented as FirstEngineerof Mexican Section, at 1 (May 9, 1924), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min38.pdf; IBC, Minute 12: Gustavo P. Serrano
Presented Credentials as Commissioner and Presented Armando Santacruz, Jr., as Consulting
Engineer (Nov. 27, 1923), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl2.pdf; IBC, Minute 1: Exchange of Credentials
of Members of both Sections of the Commission (Oct. 3, 1922), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl.pdf.
143. E.g., IBC, Minute 138: Elimination of El Morilo Banco, at 1 (Feb. 25, 1932),
available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl38.pdf; IBC, Minute 129: Report
on Rio Grande Rectification, at 1-2 guly 31, 1930), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl29.pdf; IBC, Minute 118: Levee for Protection
of Town of Guadalupe, Chihuahua,at 1 (Dec. 30, 1929), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min118.pdf; IBC, Minute 111: Preliminary Report
on Stabilization of the Boundary Line and Rectification of the Rio Grandeby the Commissioners,
at 1 (Dec. 21, 1928), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minlll.pdf;
IBC, Minute 96: Brownsville, Texas Re-survey and Inspection of 40 Alleged Bancos, at 1 (Apr.
22, 1927), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min96.pdf; IBC, Minute 70:
Consulting Engineers Instructed to Make Survey of Colorado River and Investigate Changes,
Aerial Survey Suggested, at 1 (an. 14, 1926), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min70.pdf; IBC, Minute 57: Report of Consulting
Engineers Submitted Relative to Construction of Revetment on Rio Grandenear Matamoros,at 1
(May 27, 1925), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min57.pdf; IBC,
Minute 32: InstructionsGiven ConsultingEngineersfor Constructionand Placingof Markers in
English and Spanish on Gaging Stations, at 1 (Mar. 11, 1924), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min32.pdf; IBC, Minute 19: Consulting Engineers
Requested to Report in Writing if ObstructionsPlaced in River nearBrownsville Have Been Fully
Removed, at 1 (Dec. 7, 1923), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl9.pdf; IBC, Minute 8: Channel of Rio Grande
at Point Called "ElMulato" OrderedMarked by Stakes, at 1-2 (Oct. 16, 1922), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min8.pdf; IBC, Minute 3: Consulting Engineers
Instructed to Investigate Case or Construction of Dam in Rio Grande Opposite Colonia "El
at
1922),
available
16,
1
(Oct.
Porvenir",
at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min3.pdf; IBC, Minute 2: Mexican Commissioner
Requested Investigation of Certain Bank and Obstruction Cases, American Commissioner
Suggested Their Submission in Writing for Consideration, at 1 (Oct. 3, 1922), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min2.pdf.
144. IBC, Minute 172: Monumentation ofNew Bridge over the Rio GrandeBetween Hidalgo,
Texas and Reynosa, Tamaulipas,at 1 (Aug. 30, 1941), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl72.pdf; IBC, Minute 168: Works Which Each
Government Should Undertake on Account of Existing Conditions in the Channel of the Rio
Grande at El Paso, Texas, and Ciudadjuarez, Chihuahua,at 1-2 (Dec. 20, 1939), available
at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl68.pdf; IBC, Minute 158: Plan of Location
of the Rectified Channel of the Rio Grande in the El Paso-Juarez Valley, at 1 (June 14, 1937),
IBC, Minute 145:
available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl58.pdf;
Regulations Pertaining to Elimination of Tracts Segregated by the Rio Grande Rectification
Works, Pursuantto Convention ofFeb. 1, 1933, at 1-2 (June 11, 1935), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl45.pdf; IBC, Minute 144: Plans of Final
Location of Rectified Channel of the Rio Grande in the El Paso-Juarez Valley, at 1 (June 14,
1934), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min144.pdf.

BOUNDARY WATER COMMISSION, US-MEXICO

Issue 2
C.

219

MINUTES ADOPTED PURSUANT TO THE 1944 WATER TREATY

Article 25 of the 1944 Water Treaty imbues the term "Minute" with
extraordinary powers, stating, in part:
Decisions of the Commission shall be recorded in the form of
Except where the specific approval of the two
Minutes ....
Governments is required by any provision of this Treaty, if one of
Governments fails to communicate to the Commission its approval or
disapproval of a decision of the Commission within thirty days

reckoned from the date of the Minute in which it shall have been
it
pronounced, the Minute in question and the decisions which
145
contains shall be considered to be approved by that Government.

Notwithstanding the seminal "minute" language in the 1944 Water
Treaty, the vast majority of the one hundred forty-two additional
Minutes adopted since 1944 are again mostly indistinguishable from
earlier Minutes, except for the emphasis on new works to be
constructed under the Treaty, such as international storage dams and
water treatment facilities, as well as arrangements for water
deliveries.146 The scale of many of these decisions and projects,
however, suggests that the considerable power delegated to the IBWC
has been exercised to some extent.
In a 1958 Minute, the IBWC agreed to joint operation and
147
maintenance of the Nogales International Sanitation Project, for the
first time breathing life into the sanitation clause of the 1944 Water
Treaty.1 4 ' A 1967 agreement followed, to enlarge the international
149
facilities for the treatment of Nogales sewage,' and in 1988, the two
governments adopted a joint report concerning the "conveyance,.
treatment and disposal of sewage from [Ambos Nogales (both
Nogales)] exceeding the capacities previously allocated to [the United
States and Mexico] at the Nogales International Sewage Treatment

145. 1944.Water Treaty, supra note 3, at 1257-58.
146. E.g., IBWC, Minute 304: Joint Grant Contribution Programfor Drinking Water and
Wastewater InfrastructureProjectsfor Communities in the United States - Mexico BorderArea, at
1 (Oct. 26, 2000), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min304.pdf; IBWC,
Minute 216: Operation and Maintenance of the International Plant for Treatment of Agua
Prieta, Sonora, and Douglas, Arizona Sewage, at 1 (Mar. 18, 1964), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min2l6.pdf; IBWC, Minute 187: Determinations as
to Site and Required Capacitiesof the Lowest MajorInternationalStorage Dam to be Built on the
Rio Grande, in Accordance with the Provisions of Article 5 of the Treaty Concluded Feb. 3, 1944,
at 1 (Dec. 20, 1947), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl87.pdf;
IBWC, Minute 185: Proposing Agreement Relative to the Emergency Use of the All-American
Canalfor the Delivery of Waterfor Use in Mexico During the 1947 IrrigationSeason, at 1 (Jan.
25, 1947), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl85.pdf.
147. IBWC, Minute 206: Joint Operation and Maintenance of the Nogales International
SanitationProject, at 1 (Jan. 13, 1958), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min206.pdf.
148. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, at 1225.
149. IBWC, Minute 227: Enlargement of the International Facilitiesfor the Treatment of
Nogales, Arizona and Nogales, Sonora Sewage, at 1 (Sept. 5, 1967), availableat
7
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min22 .pdf.
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Plant."' 5 o Similarly, a 1964 Minute provided for joint "operation and
maintenance of the international plant for treatment of Agua Prieta,
Sonora, and Douglas, Arizona sewage," 5 1 and in 1965, the IBWC
agreed to improve and expand the Douglas - Agua Prieta international
sewage treatment plant.'52
A similar evolution of Minutes led to the development of
additional sanitation works elsewhere along the border, pursuant to a
1979 Minute in which the IBWC agreed to develop plans for the
solution of sanitation problems all along the border.'
In 1985, the
IBWC approved plans for construction of a first stage treatment plant
near Tijuana,15 followed in 1990 by a conceptual plan for joint
construction of a secondary treatment plant,'15 and in 1997 by
recommendations for construction of sewage treatment works near
Tijuana.15 1 In 2004, the IBWC made further recommendations for
secondary treatment in Mexico of Tijuana River area sewage, in a
Minute that is especially notable because Congress had specifically
requested the Secretary of State to negotiate such a Minute.5 7 The
IBWC made tentative recommendations in 1980 "for solution of the
150. IBWC, Minute 276: Conveyance, Treatment and Disposal of Sewage from Nogales,
Arizona and Nogales, Sonora Exceeding the CapacitiesAllocated to the United States and Mexico
at the Nogales InternationalSewage Treatment Plant Under Minute No. 227, at 1 (uly 26,
1988), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min276.pdf.
151. IBWC, Minute 216: Operation and Maintenance of the International Plant for
Treatment of Agua Prieta, Sonora and Douglas, Arizona Sewage, at 1 (Mar. 18, 1964),
available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min216.pdf.
152. IBWC, Minute 220: Improvement and -Expansion of the InternationalPlant for the
Treatment of Douglas, Arizona, and Agua Prieta, Sonora Sewage, at 1 (uly 16, 1965),
available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min220.pdf.
153. IBWC, Minute 261: Recommendations for the Solution to the Border Sanitation
Problems,at 1-2 (Sept. 24, 1979),
availableat http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min261.pdf.
154. IBWC, Minute 270: Recommendations for the First Stage Treatment and Disposal
Facilitiesfor the Solution of the Border Sanitation Problem at San Diego, California-Tijuana,
Baja California,at 4 (Apr. 30, 1985), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min270.pdf. The IBWC had earlier provided for
emergency connection of the sewage system of the city of Tijuana to the metropolitan
sewage system of the city of San Diego. See IBWC, Minute 222: Emergency connection of
the sewage system of the city of Tijuana, Baja California, to the Metropolitansewage system of the
city of San Diego, California,at 1-2 (Nov. 30, 1965), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min222.pdf.
155. IBWC, Minute 283: Conceptual Plan for the International Solution to the Border
SanitationProblem in San Diego, California/Tijuana,Baja California,at 1-3 (uly 2, 1990),
availableat http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minute283.pdf.
156. IBWC, Minute 298: Recommendationsfor Constructionof Works Parallelto the City of
Tijuana, B. C. Wastewater Pumping and DisposalSystem and Rehabilitation of the San Antonio
de los Buenos Treatment Plant, at 7-8 (Dec. 2, 1997), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min298.pdf.
157. IBWC, Minute 311: Recommendationsfor Seconday Treatment in Mexico of the Sewage
Emanatingfrom the TijuanaRiver Area in Baja California,Mexico, at 2, 5 (Feb. 20, 2004),
available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min311.pdf,
see also Act of Nov. 7, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-457, 114 Stat. 1957, (codified as amended
at 22 U.S. C. § 277d-45(b) (2006)) (encouraging the restoration of estuary habitat
through more efficient project financing and enhanced coordination of Federal and
non-Federal restoration programs).
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New River border sanitation problems at Calexico, California Mexicali, Baja California Norte.""' A plan for joint funding of sewage
treatment operations in Mexicali followed in 1987,'"' with another
report in 1992 concerning Mexico's sewage treatment operations,'6
and ultimately an agreement to monitor pollution in the New River.16 '
Since then, Mexico has built wastewater treatment plants known as Las
Arenitas and Mexicali 11.162
In 1987, the IBWC adopted recommendations for the solution of
the border sanitation problem at Naco, Arizona-Naco, Sonora, which
essentially assigned responsibility for the problem to Mexico."' A 1989
Minute recommended joint construction of sewage treatment facilities
at Laredo, Texas/Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas.'" The Nuevo Laredo
International Wastewater Treatment Plant (NLIWTP) was constructed
In 1998, the IBWC provided for cooperative
in the 1990s.' 61
agreements with the Border Environmen t Cooperation Commission
(BECC) in development of projects for the solution of border
sanitation problems, thereby implicitly acknowledging BECC's
leadership role.'66
Pursuant to Article 4 of the 1944 Water Treaty, which distributed
6
.the waters of the Lower Rio Grande between the two countries,' 1 the
IBWC adopted numerous Minutes concerning the storage,
158. IBWC, Minute 264: Recommendations for Solution of the New River Border Sanitation
Problem at Calexico, California - Mexicali, Baja California Norte, at 5 (Aug. 26, 1980),
available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min264.pdf.
159. IBWC, Minute 274: joint Projectfor Improvement of the Quality of Waters of the New
River at Calexico, California-Mexicali, Baja California, at 3-4 (Apr. 15, 1987), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min274.pdf.
160. IBWC, Minute 288: Conceptual Plan for the Long Term Solution to the Border
Sanitation Problem of the New River at Calexico, California - Mexicali, Baja California, at 2
(Oct. 30, 1992), available at http://wv'w.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min288.pdf.
161. Id., at 9.
162. INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND WATER COMMISSION UNITED STATES AND MEXICO,
2006 ANNUAL REPORT 15 (2006), http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/2006_Annualreport.pdf
[hereinafter 2006 ANNUAL REPORT].
163. IBWC, Minute 273: Recommendationsfor the Solution of the Border Sanitation Problem
at Naco, Arizona-Naco, Sonora, at 1-2, 4 (Mar. 19, 1987), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min273.pdf (amended on Sept. 19, 1996). See
IBWC, Minute 295: Recommendations to Incorporate into Commission Minute No 273, the
Project Proposed by the State of Sonora for Conveyance and Treatment of Naco, Sonora Sewage
Certified by the BECC on April 30,1996, at 2 (Sept. 19, 1996), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min295.pdf.
164. IBWC, Minute 279: joint Measures to Improve the Quality of the Waters of the Rio
Grande at Laredo, Texas/Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas, at 2, 4 (Aug. 28, 1989), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min279.pdf.
165. 2006 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 162, at 17.
166. IBWC, Minute 299: International Boundary and Water Commission Support to the
Border Environment Cooperation Commission in Development of Projects for the Solution of
available at
1998),
3,
(Dec.
2-3
at
Border Sanitation Problems,
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min299.pdf; see also IBWC, Minute 304: joint
Grant Contribution Program for Drinking Water and Wastewater Infrastructure Projects for
Communities in the United States - Mexico Border Area, at 1 (Oct. 26, 2000), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min304.pdf.
167. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, at 1225-28.
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conveyance, and delivery of waters of the Rio Grande, including
several dealing with drought-induced water shortages.'6 Pursuant to
Article 5 of the 1944 Water Treaty, which provided for joint
construction of dams on the Rio Grande," the IBWC adopted a
Minute in 1946 approving the construction of the largest of these,
Falcon Dam.170 In 1960, the two Governments agreed to proceed with
construction of Amistad Dam upstream from Falcon."' The IBWC

168. See IBWC, Minute 309: Volumes of Water Saved with the Modernization and Improved
Technology Projectsfor the IrrigationDistricts in the Rio Conchos Basin and Measures for their
Conveyance to the Rio Grande,at 1 (July 3, 2003), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min309.pdf (minutes dealing with drought);
IBWC, Minute 308: United States Allocation of Rio Grande Waters During the Last Year of the
Current Cycle, at 1-5 (June 28, 2002), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minute308.pdf;
IBWC, Minute 307: Partial
Coverage of Allocation of the Rio Grande Treaty Tributary Water Deficit from Fort Quitman to
Falcon Dam, at 1-3 (March 16, 2001), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min307.pdf;
IBWC, Minute 293: Emergency
Cooperative Measures to Supply Municipal Needs of Mexican Communities Located Along the
Rio Grande Downstream of Amistad Dam, at 1-5 (Oct. 4, 1995), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min293.pdf; IBWC, Minute 234: Waters of the Rio
Grande Allotted to the United Statesfrom the Conchos, San Diego, San Rodrigo, Escondido and
Salado Rivers and the Las Vegas Arroyo, at 1-3 (Dec. 2, 1969), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min234.pdf; IBWC, Minute 201: Regulations for
Storage, Conveyance, and Delivery of Waters of the Rio Grandefrom Ft. Quitman, Texas, to the
Gulf
of
Mexico,
at
1
(Oct.
13,
1954),
available
at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min201.pdf.
169. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, at 1228-30.
170. IBWC, Minute 182: Approval of 'Joint Report on Engineering Conference on Studies,
Investigations and Procedures for the Planning of Works to be Built in Accordance with the
Treaty
of
February
3,
1944
(Sept.
23,
1946),
available
at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl82.pdf;
see also IBWC, Minute 205:
Improvment of Generation of Hydroelectic Energy at the Falcon Plant (May 21, 1956),
available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min205.pdf; IBWC, Minute 202: Basis
for Joint Operation and Maintenance of the Falcon Dam and Hydroelectric Plant and for
Division
of
Costs
Thereof
(Jan.
11,
1955),
available
at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min202.pdf; IBWC, Minute 199: Establishment of
jurisdictional Line in Falcon Reservoir (Dec.
15,
1953),
available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl99.pdf; IBWC, Minute 192: Plans and
Proceduresfor Construction of Falcon Dam and Recommendations for Construction of Falcon
Hydroelectric
Plants
(Sept.
7,
1949),
available
at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl92.pdf; IBWC, Minute 190: Allocation to the
Two Sections of the Commission of Remaining Items of Work Preparatory to Construction of
Falcon
Dam
(Aug.
13,
1948),
available
at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl90.pdf; IBWC, Minute 187: Determinations as
to Site and Required Capacitiesof the Lowest Major InternationalStorage Dam to be Built on the
Rio Grande, in Accordance with the Provisions of Article 5 of the Treaty Concluded February 3,
1944 (Dec. 20, 1947), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl87.pdf.
171. Agreement Concerning the Utilization of Boundary Water: Construction of
Amistad Dam on the Rio Grande River, U.S.-Mex., Oct. 24, 1960, 11 U.S.T. 2396; see
IBWC, Minute 292: Works of an Emergency Nature that Should be Undertaken Promptly for
Treatment of Sinkholes that have Developed in the Reservoir at Amistad Dam (Apr. 28, 1995),
available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min292.pdf (containing the first
report of troubling defects in Amistad Dam); IBWC, Minute 235: Division of Operation
and Maintenance Costs of Amistad Dam (Dec. 3, 1969),
available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min235.pdf (illustrating additional agreements
with respect to Amistad over the decades); IBWC, Minute 232: Demarcation of a
jurisdictionalLine in Amistad Reservoir (May, 9, 1968), available at
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also approved a variety of diversion dams pursuant to the 1944 Water
Treaty, including Retamal Diversion Dam on the Rio Grande,"12
Anzalduas Weir and Dam on the Rio Grande,"' and Morelos Diversion
Dam on the Colorado River.174 The IBWC has also undertaken to
address a problem of salinity in the Lower Rio Grande with
construction and maintenance of the Morillo Drain Pumping Plant."'
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min232.pdf; IBWC, Minute 215: Design and
Proceduresfor Construction ofAmistad Dam (Sept. 28, 1963), availableat
IBWC, Minute 213: Foundation
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min215.pdf;
Drillingand GroutingProgramfor Amistad Dam (Apr. 26, 1963), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min213.pdf; IBWC, Minute 210: Recommendations
RegardingConstructionofAmistad Dam (Jan. 12, 1961), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min21O.pdf; IBWC, Minute 207: Consideration of
Joint Report of the PrincipleEngineers on Site, Capacitiesand Type ofDam for the Second Major
InternationalStorageDam on the Rio Grande (June 19, 1958), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min2O7.pdf.
172. IBWC, Minute 254: Operation and Maintenance of Retamal DiversionDam (Sept. 24,
1976), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minute254_w-JR.pdf; IBWC,
Minute 238: Improvement of the International Flood Control Works of the Lower Rio Grande
at
available
1970),
10,
(Sept.
Minute 186:
IBWC,
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minute-238wJR.pdf;
Approval of the Construction by Mexico of a Temporary Diversion Dam.Across the Rio Grande
Below Retamal Heading(May 26, 1947), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl86.pdf.
173. IBWC, Minute 265: Installation of Stoplogs at Anzalduas Diversion Dam, at 1 (Dec.
13, 1980), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min265.pdf; IBWC, Minute
203: Plans and Proceduresfor Construction of the Anzalduas Diversion Dam, at 1 (Dec. 23,
1955), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min203.pdf; IBWC, Minute
198: Temporary Weir Across the Rio Grande at the Anzalduas Dam Site, at 1 (June 2, 1953),
availableat http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl98.pdf.
174. IBWC, Minute 221: Final Liquidation of Costs Allocable to Mexico of Construction of
the South Gila Levee and Determination of the Part of its Operation and Maintenance Costs
available at
1965),
29,
1
(Nov.
at
Country,
that
to
Allocable
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min221.pdf; IBWC, Minute 211: Manner of
Payment of Mexico's Share of Cost of Construction of Group II Colorado River Levees Upstream
from Morelos Diversion Dam, at 1 (May 12, 1961), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min211.pdf; IBWC, Minute 209: Portion Allowable
to Mexico of Costs of Operation and Maintenance of the Group I Levees on the Colorado River
Upstreamfrom Morelos Diversion Dam, at 1 (Nov. 21, 1958), available athttp://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min209.pdf- IBWC, Minute 208: Final Liquidation
of Costs Correspondingto Mexico for Group I Levee Works Required Upstreamfrom the Morelos
Diversion Dam to Protect Lands Within the United States Against Damagesfrom Such Rise in
Rood Stages of the Colorado River as Might Result from Construction, Operation and
available at
1958),
(Nov. 14,
1
Maintertance of that Structure, at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min208.pdf; IBWC, Minute 197: Adoption of Rules
for the Operation and Maintenance of the Morelos Diversion Dam on the Colorado River, at 1
(June 30, 1951), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl97.pdf; IBWC,
Minute 195: Works Required Above the Morelos Diversion Dam to Protect Lands Within the U.S.
Against Damages from Such Floods as Might Result from the Construction, Operation and
Maintenanceof that Structure, at 1 (May 6, 1950), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl95.pdf- IBWC, Minute 189: Determinations as
to Site and Design Features of the Main Diversion Structure to be Constructed by Mexico on the
Colorado River and Work Necessitated Thereby for Protection of United States Lands, Pursuantto
the Provisions of Article 12(e) of the 1944 Water Treaty, at 1 (May 12, 1948), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl89.pdf.
175. IBWC, Minute 303: Operation and Maintenance of the jointly-Financed Works for
Solution of the Lower Rio Grande Salinity Problem, at 1-2 (May 15, 2000), available at

224

WATER LAWREVIEW

Volume 14

Referencing Article 13 of the 1944 Water Treaty, the IBWC
undertook clearing of the Colorado River channel downstream from
Morelos Dam.'
Under Article 15, which concerns schedules for
delivery of Mexico's share of Colorado River water, the IBWC adopted
Citing Article 16, the IBWC
numerous Minutes adjusting deliveries.'

http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min303.pdf; IBWC, Minute 282: Rehabilitation of
the Saline Waters DisposalSystem for Solution of the Salinity Problem in the Waters of the Lower
Rio Grande,at 1 (Mar. 26, 1990), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min282.pdf; IBWC, Minute 269: Replacement of
Pumps at the MorilloDrain PumpingPlant, at 1 (Nov. 9, 1984), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min269.pdf; IBWC, Minute 224: Recommendations
Concerning the Lower Rio GrandeSalinity Problem, at 1 (Jan. 16, 1967), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min224.pdf; IBWC, Minute 223: Measures for
Solution of the Lower Rio Grande Salinity Problem, at 1-2 (Nov. 30, 1965), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min223.pdf.
176. IBWC, Minute 291: Improvements to the Conveying Capacity of the International
Boundary Segment of the ColoradoRiver, at 1-3 (July 16, 1994), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min291.pdf; IBWC, Minute 217: Clearing of the
ColoradoRiver ChannelDownstreamfrom Morelos Dam, at 1 (Nov. 30, 1964), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min217.pdf.
177. IBWC, Minute 314: Extension of the Temporary Emergency Delivery of Colorado River
Waterfor Use in Tijuana,Baja California,at 1 (Nov. 14, 2008), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minute_314.pdf; IBWC, Minute 310: Emergency
Delivery of Colorado River Water for Use in Tijuana, Baja California, at 1-2 (July 28, 2003),
available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min310.pdf; IBWC, Minute 287:
Emergency Deliveriesof ColoradoRiver Waters for Use in Tijuana, Baja California,at 1-2 (Oct.
6, 1992), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min287.pdf; IBWC, Minute
280: Disposal of Equipment Installed at the Expense of Mexico in United States Territory to
Enable Emergency deliveries of Colorado River Watersfor Use in Tijuana, Baja California, at 1
(Mar. 6, 1990), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min280.pdf; IBWC,
Minute 267: Extension of the Effect of Minute No. 266 Relating to the Emergency Deliveries of
Colorado River Water for Use in Tijuana, at 1 (Aug. 13, 1982), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min267.pdf; IBWC, Minute 266: Extension of the
Effect of Minute No. 263 Relating to the Emergency Deliveries of Colorado River Waterfor Use in
at
available
3,
1981),
1
(Aug.
at
Tijuana,
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min266.pdf; IBWC, Minute 263: Extension of the
Effect of Minute No. 260 Relating to the Emergency Deliveries of ColoradoRiver Waterfor Use in
available
at
1980),
(Aug.
6,
at
1
Tijuana,
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min263.pdf; IBWC, Minute 260: Extension of the
Effect of Minute No. 259 Relatingto the Emergency Deliveries of ColoradoRiver Waterfor Use in
at
available
1979),
11,
(Aug.
1
at
Tijuana,
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min260.pdf; IBWC, Minute 259: Extension of the
Effect of Minute No. 256 Relating to the Emergency Deliveries of ColoradoRiver Waterfor Use in
Tijuana, at 1 (July 27, 1978), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min259.pdf; IBWC, Minute 256: Extension of
Minutes Nos. 240, 243, 245 and 252 Regarding Emergency Deliveries of ColoradoRiver Waters
for Use in Tijuana, at 1 (Feb. 22, 1977), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min256.pdf; IBWC, Minute 252: An Amendment to
Minutes Nos. 240 and 245, Relatingto Emergency Deliveries of ColoradoRiver Watersfor Use in
Tijuana, at 1 (Aug. 31, 1976), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min252.pdf; IBWC, Minute 243: An Amendment to
Minute No. 240 Relating to Emergency Deliveries of Colorado River Waterfor Use in Tifuana, at
1 (Sept. 25, 1973), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min243.pdf;
IBWC, Minute 240: Emergency Deliveries of Colorado River Waters for Use in Tijuana, at 1
(June 13, 1972), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min240.pdf; IBWC,
Minute 194: Agreement Relative to the Emergency Use of the All-American Canalforthe Delivery
of Waterfor Use in Mexico During the Portion of the Calendar Year 1950 Until Articles 10, 11,
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approved ajoint flood control project for the Tijuana River in 1967.178
Additional Minutes were adopted pursuant to provisions of treaties
and conventions subsequent to the 1944 Water Treaty. The IBWC
adopted Minutes between 1963 and 1993 to implement the Chamizal
Convention.17 ' The 1970 Boundary Treaty was implemented through
numerous international agreements, such as those relating to
execution of the changes in location of the Rio Grande stipulated in
the Treaty; 80 "the international plan for the protection of the
Presidio-Ojinaga Valley against floods of the Rio Grande"; s' the
potential relocation of occupants of lands the United States will
transfer to Mexico under the Treaty;'
the demarcation and
and 15 of the Water of Treaty of 1944 Become Effective, at 1 (Mar. 3, 1950), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl94.pdf; IBWC, Minute 191: Agreement Relative
to the Emergency Use of the All-American Canal for the Delivery of Water for Use in Mexico
During the 1949 IrrigationSeason, at 1 (Mar. 8, 1949), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl91.pdf; IBWC, Minute 188: Agreement Relative
to the Emergency Use of the All-American Canalfor the Delivery of Water for Use in Mexico
During the 1948 Irrigation Season, at 1 (Mar. 12, 1948), available at
IBWC, Minute 185: Proposing
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl88.pdf;
Agreement Relative to the Emergency use of the All-American Canalfor the Delivery of Water for
Use in Mexico During the 1947 Irrigation Season, at 1 (Jan. 25, 1947), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl85.pdf.
178. See IBWC, Minute 258: Modification of the United States Portion of the Plan for the
Channelizationof the Tijuana River, at 1-2 (May 27, 1977), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min258.pdf; IBWC, Minute 236: Construction of
Works for Channelizationof the TijuanaRiver, at 1 (July 2, 1970), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min236.pdf; IBWC, Minute 225: Channelization of
the TijuanaRiver, at 1 (June 19, 1967), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min225.pdf.
179. See Act Approving Minute No. 228 of the International Boundary and Water
Commission, U.S.-Mex., Oct. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2836 (concerning demarcation of
new international boundary between the United States and Mexico); see also IBWC,
Minute 290: Replacement of the International Cordova-Bridge of the Americas over the Rio
Grande at El Paso, Texas-CiudadJudrez, Chihuahua, Mexico, at 1, 3-4 (Sept. 21, 1993),
available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min290.pdf; IBWC, Minute 219:
Bridges to be Constructedover the New Channel of the Rio Grande Between El Paso and Ciudad
Judrez, and Their CorrespondingInternational Inspection Facilities, at 1 (July 16, 1965),
available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min219.pdf; IBWC, Minute 214:
Engineering ConsiderationsRelating to Relocation of the Rio Grande at El Paso, Texas, and
CiudadJuarez,Chihuahua,at 1 (Aug. 28, 1963), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min214.pdf.
180. IBWC, Minute 262: Recommendations for Works to Preserve for the Rio Grande its
Character as the International Boundary in the Reach from Cajoncitos, Chihuahua to
Haciendita, Texas, at 1-4 (Dec. 26, 1980), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min262.pdf; IBWC, Minute 257: Completion of the
Relocations of the Rio GrandeStipulated in Article I of the Treaty of November 23, 1970, at 1-2
(May 18, 1977), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min257.pdf; IBWC,
Minute 246: Recommendations for Execution of the Changes in Location of the Rio Grande
Stipulated in Article I of the Boundary Treaty of 1970, at 1 (Jan. 28, 1975), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min246.pdf; see also Act Approving Minute 257 of
the International Boundary and Water Commission, U.S.-Mex., May 26, 1977, 28
U.S.T. 5256 (concerning the relocation of the channel of the Rio Grande).
181. IBWC, Minute 247: InternationalPlanfor the Protection of the Presidio-OinagaValley
againstFloods of the Rio Grande, at 1-3 (Feb. 7, 1975), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min247.pdf.
182. IBWC, Minute 255: Consideration of Possible Property Rights of the Residents and
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monumentation of the land boundary'" and international bridges; 8 4
the creation of maps;' "recommendations for establishing a restricted
use zone on lands adjacent to the main channel of the Rio Grande in
the vicinity of Brownsville, Texas";" and the ongoing maintenance of

Occupants of the Horcon Tract and of Beaver Island, at 1-2 (an. 28, 1977), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min255.pdf; IBWC, Minute 251: Occupants of the
Horcon Tract, at 1 (Apr. 28, 1976), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min251.pdf.
183. IBWC, Minute 277: Location, Permanency and Visibility of InternationalMonument
No. 123-A, at 1 (Aug. 29, 1988), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min277.pdf; IBWC, Minute 272: Installation of
Monument 13-R, at 1 (Oct. 24, 1986), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min271.pdf; IBWC, Minute 271: Markers Installed
on the InternationalBoundary, at 1 (Sept. 9, 1986), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min271.pdf, IBWC, Minute 249: Placement of
Markers on the Land Boundary, at 1 (uly 14, 1975), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min249.pdf; IBWC, Minute 244: Maintenance of
the International Land Boundary Monuments, at 1 (Dec. 4, 1973), available at
IBWC, Minute 230: Additional
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min244.pdf;
Monuments 244A and 244B on the Land Boundary, Between InternationalMonuments Nos.
available
at
1968),
1
(May
8,
245,
at
244
and
IBWC, Minute 226: Additional
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min230.pdf;
Monuments on the Land Boundary Between InternationalMonuments Numbers 2 and 3, at 1
(une 23, 1967), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min226.pdf; IBWC, Minute 180: Reestablishment of
the Western Land Boundary at Monument No. 118, at 1-2 (an. 11, 1946), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Minl80.pdf.
184. IBWC, Minute 305: Demarcation and Monumentation of the InternationalBoundary
on the Bridges over the Rio Grande at Eagle Pass, Texas - PiedrasNegras, Coahuila II; Laredo,
Texas - Colombia, Nuevo Leon; Laredo, Texas IV- Nuevo Laredo, TamaulipasIII Pharr, Texas Reynosa, Tamaulipas; Los Indios, Texas - Lucio Blanco, Tamaulipas; and Veterans,
Brownsville, Texas - Matamoros, Tamaulipas III, at 1-2 (Dec. 4, 2000), available at
IBWC, Minute 302: Enhanced
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min305.pdf;
Demarcation and Monumentation of the International Boundary at International Boundary
River Bridges and Land Boundary Ports of Entry, at 1 (Dec. 13, 1999), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min302.pdf; IBWC, Minute 286: Demarcation and
Monumentation of the InternationalBoundary on the New InternationalYsleta/Zaragoza Bridge
and Demolition of the Old Bridge, at 1 (Nov. 29, 1991), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min286.pdf; IBWC, Minute 275: Demarcation of the
International Boundary and Monumentation of the New InternationalBridges over the Rio
Grande between Del Rio, Texas and Cd. Acuna, Coahuila and between Hidalgo, Texas and
Reynosa, Tamaulipas,at 1 (Nov. 4, 1987), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min275.pdf.
185. IBWC, Minute 315: Adoption of the Delineation of the InternationalBoundary on the
2008 Aerial Photographic Mosaic of the Rio Grande, at 1-3 (Nov. 5, 2009), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min315.pdf; IBWC, Minute 278: Delineation of the
InternationalBoundary on Aerial PhotographicMosaics of the Rio Grande, at 1-3 (Mar. 31,
1984), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min278.pdf; IBWC, Minute
268: Modification to Minute No. 253 "Maps of the InternationalBoundary in the Rio Grande
available at
1984),
(July
26,
and in the Colorado River", at 1-2
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min268.pdf; IBWC, Minute 253: Maps of the
InternationalBoundary in the Rio Grande and in the ColoradoRiver, at 1-2 (Sept. 23, 1975),
available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min253.pdf.
186. IBWC, Minute 285: Recommendationsfor Establishinga Restricted Use Zone on Lands
Adjacent to the Main Channel of the Rio Grande in the Vicinity of Brownsville, Texas/
Matamoros, Tamaulipas,at 1, 3 (Nov. 8, 1991), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min285.pdf.
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the Rio Grande as the international boundary. 8 7
C.

MINUTES ADDRESSING GROUNDWATER AND ECOLOGICAL ISSUES

Although the enormous impact of many post-1944 Minutes makes
it remarkable that the U.S. and Mexican governments entrusted the
IBWC with the authority to short-circuit what would otherwise, no
doubt, be elaborate approval processes for those governments, still it
must be said that few of the Minutes wandered far from the explicit
mandates of the 1944 Water Treaty. Two remarkable exceptions to the
foregoing, both concerning the Colorado River, mark occasions when
the IBWC appears to have explored the use of the power of the Minute
to extend the provisions of the 1944 Water Treaty in an adaptive
application to evolving environmental conditions.
The first of these occasions came in 1973 with the adoption of
Minute 242 and its ambitious proclamation for "a permanent and
definitive solution to the international problem of the salinity of the
Minute 242 contemplates "a comprehensive
Colorado River." 88
agreement on groundwater in the border areas," and provides for
mandatory consultation prior to either country further developing the
groundwater resources, something addressed nowhere in the 1944
Water Treaty.s18 The second landmark use of the Minute system to
suggest an expansion of the 1944 Water Treaty came only after
another three decades had passed. In 2000, the IBWC adopted
Minute 306, which promised cooperation by the United States and
Mexico in the development of studies and recommendations
concerning the riparian and estuarine ecology of the lower Colorado
River and its associated delta.'90
Unfortunately, neither Minute 242 nor 306 has produced any
substantive changes in how the IBWC manages the boundary waters,
and an examination of the circumstances surrounding their adoption
187. IBWC, Minute 313: Maintenance in the Rectified Channel of the Rio Grande, at 1
(Feb. 5, 2008), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min313.pdf; IBWC,
Minute 262: Recommendations for Works to Preservefor the Rio Grande Its Chatacteras the
InternationalBoundary in the Reach from Cajoncitos, Chihuahua to Haciendita, Texas, at 1-4
(Dec. 26, 1979), availableat http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min262.pdf.
188. Agreement Confirming Minute No. 242 of the International Boundary and
Water Commission, U.S.-Mex., Aug. 30, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 1968, 1971.
189. IBWC, Minute 242: Permanentand Definitive Solution to the InternationalProblem of
the Salinity of the Colorado River, at 3 (Aug. 30, 1973), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min242.pdf.
190. IBWC, Minute 306: ConceptualFrameworkfor United States - Mexico Studies for Future
Recommendations Concerning the Riparian and Estuarine Ecology of the Limitrophe Section of
the Colorado River and its Associated Delta, at 2 (Dec. 12, 2000), available at
The IBWC adopted a third
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min306.pdf.
agreement, Minute 289, that called for establishment of a water monitoring program
and database to observe surface and groundwater quality in the lower Rio Grande,
however, this was not an IBWC initiative, but rather a response to the Integrated
Border Environmental Plan that directed the IBWC to take such action in cooperation
with EPA and other agencies. Minute 289: Observation of the Quality of the Waters Along
the United States and Mexico Border, at 2 (Nov. 13, 1992), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min289.pdf.
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suggests little reason for optimism. The impetus for Minute 242 arose
in the early 1960s, when actions by U.S. irrigators caused a sharp
increase in the salinity of Colorado River Water delivered to Mexico,
Mexico protested
making it unsuitable for agricultural use.
strenuously, but the Colorado River Basin States prevailed upon the
State Department and the Bureau of Reclamation to block any
resolution that would result in loss of U.S. irrigation water to dilute the
Mexico's President
salinity of the water delivered to Mexico.
Echeverria paid a state visit to Washington in 1972, made a compelling
address to Congress, and persuaded President Nixon to appoint a
special representative to negotiate a solution to the problem."' The
resulting agreement formed the basis for Minute 242, guaranteeing
Mexico that the salinity of its water would not exceed that of U.S.
irrigators.'
The purpose of including the groundwater provision in Minute
242 was to raise the possibility of reaching a subsequent agreement to
limit "protective pumping" on both sides of the border, and following
the adoption of Minute 242, the State Department gave the USIBWC
the green light to seek such a groundwater agreement with Mexico.' 93
The proposal developed by the USIBWC, which heavily favored the
United States, would apportion groundwater with protection of
existing groundwater uses (a provision favored by Mexico), but permit
U.S. recovery of seepage losses from the All-American Canal and other
U.S. irrigation works (a provision insisted upon by California and
Arizona; Texas apparently opposed any groundwater agreement)."'
An alternative more favorable to Mexico described as "an approach
along the lines suggested by academicians in the United States and in
Mexico," was summarily eliminated due to opposition from Basin
States. 9 5
191. Letter from U.S. State Dep't, to Joseph Friedkin, USIBWC Commissioner, The
Diplomacy of the International Colorado River Salinity Problem, at 15, 17 (Dec. 17, 1982)
(draft) (on file with the University of Texas at El Paso ("UTEP") Library system).
192. Id. at 17-18; see also, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, STATE 173820, THE WHITE HOUSE
PRESS CONFERENCE OF AMBASSADOR HERBERT BROWNELL, SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
PRESIDENT FOR RESOLUTION OF THE SALINIT PROBLEM WITH MEXICO (1973) available at

http://aad.archives.gov/aad/createpdf?dt=2472&rid=49800&dl=1 345.
193. Letter from William H. Luers, Deputy Assistant Secretary for International
Affairs, U.S. State Dep't, to Joseph Friedkin, USIBWC Commissioner (Sept. 30, 1976)
(on file with the UTEP Library system).
194. See Memorandum from K. Scott Gudgeon, U.S. State Dep't, to T. Frank Crigler
(Nov. 29,1982) (on file with the UTEP Library system) [hereinafter Gudgeon Memo];
Letter from Joseph F. Friedkin, USIBWC Commissioner, to T. Frank Crigler, U.S. State
Dep't (Oct. 15, 1982) (with Draft Preliminary Report on Whether the United States
Should Seek an Agreement with Mexico on the Unapportioned Waters Along the
International Boundary) (on file with the UTEP Library system); see also Unsigned
Letter to "Joe" (presumably Joseph Friedkin) (Dec. 8, 1982) (on file with the UTEP
Library system).
195. Draft Preliminary Report on Whether United States Should Seek an Agreement
with Mexico on the Unapportioned Waters Along the International Boundary
(attached to Letter from Joseph F. Friedkin, USIBWC Commissioner, to T. Frank
Crigler, U.S. State Dep't (Oct. 15, 1982)) (on file with the UTEP Library system). The
documents included in UTEP Library's Friedkin papers do not describe this
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The possibility of reaching an agreement to resolve the closely
related problems of salinity, groundwater, and Mexican water
deliveries was looked at "with pessimism" by the State Department,
due to opposition from California and Arizona."' Eventually, in 2000,
the IBWC adopted Minute 306, which promised cooperation by the
United States and Mexico in the development of studies and
recommendations concerning the riparian and estuarine ecology of
Finally, Congress
the lower Colorado River and its associated delta.'
acted in 2006 to take the groundwater issue out of the hands of the
IBWC by designating the Department of the Interior as the lead
agency for establishing a program to characterize, map, and model
priority transboundary aquifers.'9 8
The IBWC has recently adopted Minutes that signal a renewed
interest in addressing groundwater and related ecological issues, but
once again, there is more to this development than is apparent on its
face. Minute 316 would permit the temporary use of water conveyance
infrastructure in the United States to provide substitute water to
sustain the Santa Clara Wetlands during a trial run of the Yuma
Desalting Plant (YDP). 19 The YDP would treat surplus water too
saline to count as treaty water, and which currently sustains the
Once treated, fresh water would be available for
wetlands. 20
consumption in the United States, but the water would no longer be
available for the wetlands.20 ' While Minute 316 depends entirely on
the ability and willingness of NGOs to supply 10,000 acre-feet of
substitute water during the YDP pilot run, and on Mexico and the
United States to supply like amounts, the IBWC still has not agreed
that any treaty waters would ever be made available for ecological uses.
Minute 317 establishes a binational "Consultative Council" to
continue to explore and make recommendations concerning
development of projects and initiatives to promote water conservation,
use of water for environmental purposes, and development of new
water sources through investment in desalinization facilities.20 ' The

disfavored alternative any further.
196. Gudgeon Memo, supra note 194.
197. IBWC, Minute 306: ConceptualFrameworkfor United States - Mexico Studiesfor Future
Recommendations Concerning the Riparian and EstuarineEcology of the Limitrophe Section of
the Colorado River and its Associated Delta, at 2 (Dec. 12, 2000), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min306.pdf.
198. United States-Mexico Transboundary Aquifer Assessment Act, Pub. L. 109-448,
120 Stat. 3328 (2006) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1962).
199. IBWC, Minute 316: Utilization of the Wellton-Mohawk Bypass Drain and Necessary
Infrastructure in the United States for the Conveyance of Water by Mexico and NonGovernmental Organizations of Both Countries to the Santa Clara Wetland During the Yuma
DesaltingPlantPilot Run (Apr. 16, 2010), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/TreatiesMinutes/Minutes/Min316.pdf.

200. Id.
201. Id.
202. IBWC, Minute 317: Conceptual Framework for U.S. Mexico Discussions on Colorado
at
available
2010),
17,
(June
3
at
Cooperative Actions,
River
http://www.ibwc.gov/TreatiesMinutes/Minutes/Min3l7.pdf.
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language of Minute 317, however, goes no further than that of Minute
306 which in some ways was even more explicit, with references to
"preserving the Colorado River Delta ecology," "use of water for
ecological purposes," and "equitable distribution of resources. "203
Even Minute 317's creation of a binational council appears merely to
replicate the "binational technical task force" under Minute 306.204
The IBWC says adoption of Minute 317 is intended to facilitate USMexico cooperation related to the Transboundary Aquifer Assessment
Act, under the leadership of the Department of the Interior.205
Perhaps suggesting more substantial developments ahead, is the
adoption of Minute 318 in December 2010, which delays delivery of
water allotted to Mexico as a result of irrigation infrastructure damage
caused by the April 2010 earthquake in the Mexicalli Valley, Baja
California.206 Minute 318 was written in close collaboration with the
Bureau of Reclamation, the agency "responsible for managing and
administering the waters of the Lower Colorado River on behalf of the
U.S. Secretary of the Interior," and the approval of Minute 318
coincided with a meeting of the Interior Secretary with Mexico's
Secretary of the Environment. 20 7 Interior Secretary Salazar trumpeted
completion of Minute 318 during his visit to Mexico, saying it "lays
important groundwork for a much-needed comprehensive water
agreement with Mexico on how we manage the Colorado River," as
desired by the seven Colorado River Basin States.20 s In a prepared
statement, Salazar said that in cooperation with the Bureau of
Reclamation, "the IBWC plans to commence negotiations of this
comprehensive water agreement immediately in January, 2011." 209
203. IBWC, Minute 306: Conceptual Frameworkfor United States - Mexico Studies for Future
Recommendations Concerning the. Riparian and EstuarineEcology of the Limitrophe Section of
the Colorado River and its Associated Delta, at 2 (Dec. 12, 2000), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Minutes/Min306.pdf.
204. Id.
205. IBWC, THE BOUNDARY MARKER 3 (2010),
availableat http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/BMWinter_2010.pdf.
206. IBWC, Minute 318: Adjustment of Delivery Schedules for Water Allotted to Mexico for
the Years 2010 Through 2013 as a Result of InfrastructureDamage in IrrigationDistrict 014,
Rio Colorado, Caused by the April 2010 Earthquakein the Mexicalli Valley, Baja California, at
2-3 (Dec. 17, 2010), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/TreatiesMinutes/Minutes.html.
Although Minute 318 has
been represented as a humanitarian gesture, the agreement to store Mexican water in
a depleted Lake Mead also serves the short-term interests of drought-stricken Western
states.
207. Press Release, IBWC, Commission Signs Colorado River Agreement in
Response to April 2010 Earthquake Damage in the Mexicali Valley, at 2 (Dec. 20,
2010), available at http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/Press Release_122010.pdf
208. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, Leaders Lay Groundwork for
Comprehensive U.S.-Mexico Water Agreement on Colorado River (Dec. 20, 2010),
available at http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/Salazar-Elvira-Announce-WaterAgreement-to-Support-Response-to-Mexicali-Valley-Earthquake.cfm.
209. Joint Media Availability with Secretary Elvira on Water Agreement, U.S. DEP'T OF THE
INTERIOR
(Dec.
20, 2010),
http://www.doi.gov/news/speeches/Joint-MediaAvailability-with-Secretary-Elvira-English-and-Spanish.cfm; see also, Joan DeLuca, U.S. Mexico Water Agreement: The US. and Mexico, and the Seven Colorado River Basin [U.S.]
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The Basin States will attempt to dictate the U.S. position on any
new water agreement, as they did the 1944 Water Treaty and the illfated negotiations surrounding adoption of Minutes 242 and 306. 210
That the- Bureau of Reclamation is now leading the charge for
negotiation of a new agreement, through the IBWC, suggests d6ja vu
all over again. Neither the Basin States nor the Bureau has evinced
If
much interest in equity, ecology, conservation, or diplomacy.'
insanity is doing the same thing over and over again, while expecting
different results, then the best hope for a sane solution to the
ecological crisis at the border is to elevate diplomacy over regional
special interests and to limit the Bureau of Reclamation strictly to
technical implementation of any new agreements.
IV. STATUTORY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TREATIES
A. THE USIBWC ENABLING ACT
Legislative authorization of the IBC in its early years consists
merely of line items in annual appropriation acts. 2 12 On April 29,
1890, Congress passed a Joint Resolution authorizing an investigation
of concerning the use of waters of the Rio Grande for irrigation and
for the construction of a dam and reservoir near El Paso.21 ' The duties
were not assigned to the IBC, however, because its jurisdiction at that
time was limited to boundary matters. Instead, the U.S. Secretary of
State and the Mexican Minister at Washington signed a Protocol in
1896, establishing a new International Water Commission (IWC) with
U.S. and Mexican sections. The IWC held its first meeting in El Paso
that same year and shortly thereafter issued a joint report of its
investigation. In 1914, the U.S. Comptroller General signed an
opinion that resulted in the dissolution of the U.S. Section of the
IWC.214
The Act of May 13, 1924, authorized the President to appoint three
special commissioners to explore the potential for an agreement with
Mexico for the equitable use of the waters of the Lower Rio Grande,

States Are Bringing Resources Together, VOICE OF AM. (Dec. 29, 2010),
http://www.voanews.com/policy/editorials/US-Mexico-Water-Agreement112654619.html.
210. The Basin States dominated Congressional hearings on the 1944 Treaty. See
generally 91 CONG. REc. 2805-2833 (1945).
211. Id.; see also Zellmer, supra note 43, at 615-16, n. 127.
212. See S. Rep. No. 81-2095 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3734, 3735, 1950
WL 1829; see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 81-3018 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3744, 1950 WL 1830.
213. See 51 Cong. Rec. H3977 (1890) (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1890) (not printed in the
Statutes at Large); see also IBWC U.S. SECTION, CHRONOLOGICAL OUTLINE OF THE
ORGANIZATIONS OF THE VARIOUS INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND/OR WATER COMMISSIONS,
UNITED STATES AND MEXICO: WITH AN INDEX TO PERTINENT TREATIES - 1848-1970 33-34

(R. P. Daguerre eds., United States Section of The Commission, 1972), available at
University of Texas at El Paso, UTEP Special Collection Reference F781.1594C357f.
214. IBWC U.S. SECTION, supra note 213, at 35.
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again bypassing the IBC.215 The Secretary of State directed that the
title of the Commission would be "Commission on the Equitable Use
of the Waters of the Lower Rio Grande."2 1 A Joint Resolution of
March 3, 1927, authorized adding the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers to
the IWC mandate.21' The Secretary of State directed that under its
enlarged powers the title of the Commission would be the
"International Water Commission."a21 Finally, by the Act of June 30,
1932, Congress transferred the powers, duties, and functions of the
IWC to the IBC, thereby abolishing the IWC.21 1
Still, the duties assigned to the IBC were of a limited nature,
encompassing boundary maintenance matters and the newly delegated
exploratory duties with respect to water. This changed dramatically in
1935, with the passage of the U.S. Section's "Enabling Act", which
amended the 1924 Act and authorized the Secretary of State, acting
through the USIBC:
to conduct technical and other investigations relating to the defining,

demarcation, fencing, or monumentation of the land and water
boundary between the United States and Mexico, to flood control,
water resources, conservation, and utilization of water, sanitation and
prevention of pollution, channel rectification, stabilization, drainage
of transboundary storm waters, and other related matters upon the
international boundary between the United States and Mexico; and
to construct and maintain fences, monuments and other
demarcations of the boundary line between the United States and
Mexico, and sewer systems, water systems, and electric light, power
and gas systems crossing the international border. 220

Congress authorized the President "to construct, operate, and
maintain on the Rio Grande River below Fort Quitman, Texas, any and
all works or projects which are recommended to the President as the
result of such investigations and by the President are deemed
22
necessary and proper." '
The 1935 Act authorized the President:
to construct, operate and maintain any project or works which may be
provided for in a treaty entered into with Mexico ... subject to such
rules and regulations for continuing supervision by the said American
Commissioner or any Federal agency as the President may cause to be
promulgated, to turn over the operation and maintenance of such
project or works to any Federal agency, or any State, county,
215. Act of May 13, 1924, ch. 153, 43 Stat. 118 (providing for a study regarding the
equitable use of water in the lower Rio Grande in cooperation with the United States
and Mexico) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 277 (2011)).
216. See id.; IBWC U.S. SECTION, supra note 213, at 35.
217. Act of Mar. 3, 1927, ch. 381, 44 Stat. 1403 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 277 (2011)).
218. IBWC U.S. SECTION, supra note 213, at 36.
219. Act of June 30, 1932, ch. 314, § 510, 47 Stat. 417 (codified at 22 U.S.C § 277a
(2011)).
220. Act of Aug. 19, 1935, ch. 561, 49 Stat. 660 (codified at 22 U.S.C § 277a (2011)).
221. Id. § 277a.

Issue 2

BOUNDARY WATER COMMISSION, US-MEXICO

233

municipality, district, or other political subdivision within which such
project or works may be in whole or in part situated, upon such
terms, conditions, and requirements as the President may deem
appropriate.
The 1935 Act also authorized:
the President, or any Federal agency he may designate . . . to enter
into agreements with political subdivisions ... [granting] the United
States, gratuitously, lands or easements in lands necessary for the
construction, operation, and maintenance ... of any such project or
works, or for the assumption by one or more of any such political
project or
subdivisions ... of the operation and maintenance of such
223
works in whole dr in part upon the completion thereof.
The Congress further authorized the President "to acquire by
purchase, exercise of the power of eminent domain, or by donation,
any real or personal property which may be necessary" for such
projects or works. 224 A final proviso authorizing. the President to
withdraw from sale, public entry or disposal of public lands "under the
mining laws or any other law relating to the public domain" of the
United States was repealed in 1976.
Further amendments in 1935 and thereafter generally authorized
the Secretary of State, through the USIBC, to dispose of unneeded
226
lands and to issue revocable licenses for use of project lands;
authorized and made appropriations for the construction, operation
and maintenance of the -Rio Grande Canalization Project; 227 and
provided for reconstruction or replacement of bridges as necessitated
by the Rio Grande Canalization Project. 228 Additional legislation in
the 1940s authorized the Secretary, through the USIBWC, to
reconstruct the. Rio Grande Valley Gravity Canal and Storage
Project;229 authorized the Rio Grande Bank Protection Project; 230 and
authorized the construction of hydroelectric generating facilities at
Falcon Dam.
Further amendments in 1996 authorized the Secretary of State,
acting through the USIBWC, to make improvements to the Rio
Grande Canalization Project to stabilize the Rio Grande in the reach
between the Percha Diversion Dam in New Mexico and the American

222. Id. § 277b(a) (1)-(2).
223. Id. § 277c(a).
224. Id. § 277c(b).
225. See 22 U.S.C. § 277c (c) (2011).
226. Act of Aug. 27, 1935, ch. 763 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 277e (2011)).
227. Id. § 277b(d).
228. Act of Apr. 22, 1940, ch. 129, 54 Stat.151.
229. Act of June 28, 1941, ch. 259, § 1, 55 Stat. 338 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 277f
(2011)).
230. Act of Apr. 25, 1945, 59 Stat. 89 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 277b(b) (2011)).
231. Act of Oct. 5, 1949, ch. 593, 63 Stat. 701.
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Diversion Dam in El Paso.232
B. THE AMERICAN-MEXICAN TREATY ACT OF 1950
The American-Mexican Treaty Act of 1950233 enacted § 277d-1 to
277d-9 of 22 U.S.C. §. 277. The Act authorized the Secretary of State,
acting through the USIBWC, "to purchase, or condemn, lands, or
interests in lands, for relocation of highways, railroads. . . telephone,
or electric transmission lines," or any other properties deemed
necessary for the construction or operation and maintenance of any
project; and to convey or exchange Government properties so
acquired or improved or to grant easements therein, by instruments
executed by the Secretary of State.
The USIBWC was further authorized to construct, operate, and
maintain all roads, highways, railways, power lines, buildings, and
facilities necessary in connection with any such project, and ... to
provide housing, subsistence, and medical and recreational facilities

for the officers, agents, and employees of the United States ...

engaged in the construction, operation, and maintenance of any such
project.

The 1950 Treaty Act also authorized. appropriations to be
expended for treaty and statutory purposes, including for
construction, operation, and maintenance of stream gaging stations;
personal services and rent; services of attorneys, appraisers, and others;
travel expenses; acquisition of real and personal property; purchase of
firearms and ammunition for guard purposes; and other such
231
purposes."The American-Mexican Treaty Act also authorized the USIBWC to
acquire, "by purchase or by proceedings in eminent domain," certain
properties owned by the Imperial Irrigation District of California, and
to "reconstruct, operate and maintain such properties in connection
with the administration of" the 1944 treaty."
The Act further authorized the Secretary of State to enter into an
agreement with Mexico for the IBWC to operate the Douglas-Agua
Prieta sanitation project, subject to agreement by the city of Douglas,
Arizona that it contribute an equitable proportion of the costs of such
The Act
operation and maintenance allocated to the United States.
similarly authorized such agreement for the construction, operation,
and maintenance of a sanitation project for the cities of Calexico,

232.
U.S.C.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

Act of Oct. 19, 1996, Pub. L. 104-319, § 104, 110 Stat. 3866 (codified at 22

§ 277b(d) (2011)).
American-Mexican Treaty Act of 1950, ch. 948, 64 Stat. 846.
American-Mexican Treaty Act of 1950, 22 U.S.C. § 277d-1 (a) (2011).
Id. § 277d-2.
Id. § 277d-3.
Id. § 277d-4.
Id. § 277d-6.
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California, and Mexicali, Mexico, with a similar requirement for
equitable financial participation by the city of Calexico.m
In 1953, Congress authorized a similar agreement for the
operation and maintenance of the Nogales sanitation project, located
at Nogales, Arizona, with a similar requirement for financial
participation by the city of Nogales.240 That same year Congress
provided funding for the Anzalduas Diversion Dam,"2 ' and the next
year provided for the transmission and disposition of electric power
from Falcon Dam.242
In 1960, Congress authorized the Secretary of State, acting
through the USIBWC, to join with Mexico to construct, operate, and
maintain the Amistad international storage dam on the Rio Grande,
above the previously built Falcon Dam.m Concurrently, Congress
authorized the construction of facilities for generating hydroelectric
energy at Amistad Dam.244 Congress provided further that releases of
the United States' share of waters from Amistad for domestic,
municipal, industrial, and irrigation uses in the United States, shall be
made pursuant to order by the appropriate authority of the State of
Texas. 245 A 1963 law added arrangements for power distribution and
use from Amistad.m
In 1964, Congress approved a settlement for flood damage claims
resulting from the Falcon Dam construction.24 ' Additionally, Congress
authorized the USIBWC to enter into agreements with local
organizations for the maintenance of flood and arroyo sediment
control dams to be constructed in the Rio Grande watershed between
Caballo Dam and El Paso, Texas, and facilitate and implement the
operation and maintenance of the Rio Grande canalization project.2
A 1966 Act of Congress authorized the Secretary of State, acting
through the USIBWC, to conclude an agreement with the Government
of Mexico for the construction, operation, and maintenance of a
drainage canal through Mexican territory for the discharge of waters
of El Morillo and other drains into the Gulf of Mexico.2 " The law also
addressed joint solutions for the salinity problem in the Lower Rio

239. Id. § 277d-8.
240. Act ofJuly 27, 1953, ch. 242, § 1, 67 Stat. 195 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 277d-10
(2011)).
241. Act of Aug. 5, 1953, Pub. L. No. 195, 67 Stat. 370.
242. Act ofJune 18, 1954, ch. 310, 68 Stat. 255.
243. Act ofJuly 7, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-605, § 1, 74 Stat. 360 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §
277d-13 (2011)).
244. Id. § 277d-14.
245. Id. § 277d-15.
246. Act of Dec. 23, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-137, 77 Stat. 475.
247. Act of Aug. 19, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-447, 78 Stat. 481.
248. Act of Sept. 18, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-600, 78 Stat. 956 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §
277d-29 (2011)).
249. Act of Sept. 19, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-584, § 1, 80 Stat. 808 (codified at 22 U.S.C.
§ 277d-30 (2011)).
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C. THE AMERICAN-MEXICAN CHAMIZAL CONVENTION ACT OF 1964
The American-Mexican Chamizal Convention Act of 1964 enacted

§ 277d-17 to 277d-25 of Title 22 of the U.S.C,51 which implemented
the Chamizal Convention that was signed August 29, 1963. The act
authorized the Secretary of State, through the USIBWC, to investigate
construction of a new river channel, and "to acquire by donation,
purchase, or condemnation, all lands requiredfor transfer to
Mexico as provided in [the Chamizal Convention] ... for relocation of
highways, railroads, electric transmission lines, bridges, or other
facilities, [as needed]." 5
The 1964 Act further authorized: 1) the construction of various
works, including replacement of the Bridge of the Americas that
crosses the Rio Grande between El Paso and Ciudad Juarez, and 2)
turning "over the operation and maintenance of any such works to any
Federal agency, or any State, [or local government] within which such
project or works [is situated]".5

It also authorized compensation for

owners and tenants of lands affected by relocation.25' Later legislation
concerning Chamizal established the Chamizal National Memorial,25 5
and provided for the Chamizal Border Highway.2 56
D. TIJUANA RIVER FLOOD CONTROL PROJECT
In 1956, Congress expanded the authorization for emergency
flood control on the Rio Grande to also include the Colorado and
Tijuana Rivers. 5 Congress also, authorized taking emergency actions
"to protect against health threatening surface and ground water
pollution problems along the United States-Mexico boundary."2 5
A 1964 law authorized the Secretary of State, acting through the
Government of Mexico,
USIBWC, "to conclude with the ...

250. Id.
251, American-Mexican Chamizal Convention Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-300, 78
Stat. 184 (codified at .
252. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-17(a-b) (2011).
253. Id. § 277d-18(a-b).
254. Id. § 277d-19(a).
255. Act ofJune 30, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-479, 80 Stat. 232.
256. See Act of Nov. 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-795, 80 Stat. 1477.
257. Act ofJune 20, 1956, ch. 414, § 101, 70 Stat. 302 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 277d12 (2011)). A 1990 amendment authorized emergency actions to protect against
health threatening sanitation problems by repairing or replacing existing capital
infrastructure along the border. SeeAct of Feb 16, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-246, § 412(a),
104 Stat. 69. A further 1994 amendment replaced the 1990 language by specifying
authority to take emergency actions, "consistent with the emergency provisions of the
Safe Drinking Water Act, to protect against health threatening surface and ground
water pollution problems" along the border. Act of Apr. 30, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103236, § 423(b), 108 Stat. 457.
258. Act ofJune 20, 1956, ch. 414, § 101, 70 Stat. 302 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 277d12 (2011)).
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agreements for emergency flood control measures ... in the reaches
of the lower Colorado River between Imperial Dam and the Gulf of
California," including actions to clear brush and guard against
sedimentation of the river channel."'
In 1966, Congress authorized the Secretary of State, acting
through the USIBWC, to conclude an agreement with the Mexican
Government for "joint construction, operation, and maintenance" of
the Tijuana River flood control project.2"
A later statute made
acquisition of lands for construction of the project contingent upon
the City of San Diego providing an appropriate share of funds."'
E.

THE AMERICAN-MEXICAN BOUNDARY TREATYACT OF 1972

The American-Mexican Boundary Treaty Act of 1972, which
enacted § 277d-34 to 277d42 of Title 22, implemented the 1970
Boundary Treaty.6 2 The Act authorized the Secretary of State, acting
through the USIBWC, to investigate matters relating to:

"(A) ... the preservation of the river boundaries between the United
States and Mexico; (B) the establishment and delimitation of the
maritime boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico and in the Pacific Ocean;

(C) water resources; and (D) the sanitation and the prevention of

pollution."2 6 3 The Act also authorized the Secretary of State, acting
through the USIBWC, to acquire by donation, purchase, or
condemnation, all lands ... required ... (A) for transfer to Mexico as
provided in the treaty; (B) for construction of... new river channels
and the adjoining levees in the territory of the United States; (C) to
preserve the Rio Grande and the Colorado River as the boundary by
preventing the construction of works which may cause deflection or
obstruction of the normal flow of the rivers or of their floodflows; and
(D) for relocation of any structure or facility. . . necessitated by the
project.
Lastly, the Act authorized the Secretary of State, acting through
the USIBWC, "to remove, modify, or repair the damages caused to

Mexico by works constructed in the United States. "265
The 1972 Boundary Treaty Act further directed that administration
of nearly five hundred "acres of land acquired ... from Mexico near
Hidalgo-Reynosa ... be assumed by the Department of the Interior,

259. Act of Aug. 10, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-411, § 1, 78 Stat. 386 (codified at 22 U.S.C.

§ 277d-26(a-b) (2011)).

260. Oct. 10, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-640, § 1, 80 Stat. 884 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §
277d-32 (2011)).
261. Sept. 28, 1976, Pub. L. 94-425, 90 Stat. 1333 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 277d-33
(2011)).
262. American-Mexican Boundary Treaty Act of 1972, Pub. L. 92-549, § 101, 86 Stat.
1161 (codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 277d-34 to 42 (2011)).
263. 22 U.S.C. §277d-34(1) (2011).
264. Id. § 277d-34(2).
265. Id. § 277d-34(3).
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United States Fish and Wildlife Service . . , as a part of the national
wildlife refuge system."" The Act further authorized "international
flood control works for protection of lands along the international
Section of the Rio Grande in the United States and in Mexico in the
2"
However, the Act prohibited the use of
Presidio-Ojinaga Valley."m
appropriated funds "for flood control works on any land, site, or
easement, unless ... acquired under the treaty for other purposes or
by donation."'
F.

THE RIO GRANDE POLLUTION CORRECTION ACT OF 1987

The Rio Grande Pollution Correction Act of 1987 enacted § 2 7 7 g
to 2 7 7 g-3 of Title 22 of the U.S.C. 6 9 This act directed the Secretary of
State, through the USIBWC, to' conclude agreements with the
Government of Mexico:
for the purpose of correcting the international problem of pollution
of the Rio Grande caused by discharge of raw and inadequately
treated sewage and other wastes into such river from the border cities
including but not limited to Ciudad Acuna, Nuevo Laredo,
270 - and
Reynosa, Mexico, and Del Rio, Laredo, and Hidalgo, TexaS
The Act further authorized the construction of facilities approved
by the two Governments.'

In the 1990 Amendments, Congress authorized operation of the
interceptor system, which was "constructed to intercept sewage flows
from Tijuana from selected canyon areas.""' It further authorized

operation of the Rio Grande bank protection project; as well as the
operation of the Anzalduas diversion dam for irrigation or water
supply purposes, which is subject to payment by water users for
portions of the dam as allocated by the Secretary of State.
Amendments to another statute authorized emergency actions
"consistent with the emergency provisions of the Safe Drinking Water
Act, to protect against health threatening sanitation problems by
repairing or replacing existing capital infrastructure along the

border."

266.
267.
268.
269.

274

Id. at § 277d-39.
Id. at § 277d-41.
Id. at § 277d-42.
Rio Grande Pollution Correction Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-465, § 1, 102 Stat.

2272 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 2 77g to 277g-3 (2011)).
270. 22 U.S.C. § 2 7 7g(a) (2011).
271. Id. § 27 7 g-1(1-2).

272. Id. § 277b(a).
273. Id. § 277b(b-c). Another act extended authority for construction of works on
the Rio Grande to include drainage of transboundary storm waters. Id. § 277a.
274. Id. § 277d-12.
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G. TIJUANA RIVER VALLEY ESTUARY AND BEACH SEWAGE CLEANUP ACT
OF 2000

In the Tijuana River Valley Estuary and Beach Sewage Cleanup Act
of 2000, Congress acted "to authorize the United States to take actions
to address comprehensively the treatment of sewage emanating from
the Tijuana River area, Mexico, that flows untreated or partially
treated into the United States causing significant adverse public health
The Act directed both the USIBWC
and environmental impacts."'
and the Administrator of the EPA to take action to ensure the
secondary treatment in the United States or Mexico of effluent from
the South Bay International Wastewater Treatment Plant (IWTP) and
"of additional sewage emanating from the Tijuana River area,
Mexico. "276

V.

CRITICISM OF THE USIBWC

A.

PRAISE GIvEs WAY TO CRITICISM

The U.S. Section of the IBWC is headquartered in El Paso, Texas,
and is one of few Federal agencies headquartered outside Washington,
D.C., which may partially account for its aura of independence, as well
as the absence of oversight.277 Its Mexican Government counterpart
(La Comisfon Internacional de Limites y Agua, or "CILA") is located
across the Rio Grande at Ciudad Juarez, in the Mexican state of
Chihuahua.2 7' The juxtaposition of conditions in the two cities today
sadly reflects the continuation of a neocolonial relationship that is not
limited to land and water.279

275. Tijuana River Valley Estuary and Beach Sewage Cleanup Act of 2000, Pub. L.
106-457, § 802, 114 Stat. 1977 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 277d-43 (2011)).
276. 22 U.S.C. § 277d-44(a) (1) (A-B) (2011).
277. The InternationalBoundary and Water Commission, Its Mission, Organization, and
Proceduresfor Solution of Boundary and Water Problems, INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM'N,
http://www.ibwc.gov/AboutUs/AboutUs.html (last visited Mar. 15, 2011). One
irony of the State Department's disavowal of responsibility for the USIBWC is that it
leaves the agency without headquarters in Washington, D.C., a requirement applicable
to all executive departments, absent statutory waiver. See 4 U.S.C. §§ 71 and 72 (2011).
278. Id.
279. Ciudad Juarez is one of the deadliest cities in the world, having experienced
3,000 murders in 2010 alone. See Nick Valencia, Juarez Counts 3,000th Homicide of 2010,
CNN (Dec. 15, 2010, 6:02 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/americas/12/15/mexicojuarez.
homicides/index.html. El Paso, on the other hand, celebrates its claim to be the safest
major city in the United States. El Paso Called the Safest Big City in the U.S.,
ALBUQUERQUE J. (Nov. 23, 2010, 6:30 AM), http://www.abqjournal.com/abqnews/
abqnewseeker-mainmenu-39/2539-630am-el-paso-called-safest-big-city-in-the-us-.html.
Meanwhile, the United States supplies eighty seven percent of the illegal guns used in
Mexican murders. See, e.g., VIVIAN S. CHU & WILLiAMJ. KROUSE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40733, GUN TRAFFICKING AND THE SOUTHwEsT BORDER 1-2 (2009),

available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40 7 33_20090729.pdf. The United States
also pays Mexican crime lords billions of dollars annually in return for a steady flow of
illegal drugs.

Id. at 1; OFFICE OF NAT'L DRUG CONTROL POLICY, NATIONAL DRUG
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Notwithstanding its creation in the wake of conquest, and the
uneasy alliance between victor and vanquished, the IBWC generally
won high praise throughout the twentieth century for its engineering
expertise and ability to diplomatically resolve difficult transboundary
water issues. 2 so The IBWC engaged in aggressive technological
initiatives designed principally to secure a reliable source of water for
development on both sides of the border region, and for building
canals, flood control projects, dams and wastewater treatment plants
located along the Rio Grande, Colorado and Tijuana Rivers."'
Various authors have referred to the IBWC as "one of the most
prestigious international resource management agencies in the
world,"2 2 and "the finest example of functional cooperation in
transboundary resources management between highly dissimilar
Of course, such -unabashed
countries anywhere on the globe."2
admiration for diplomatic accomplishments fails to reflect the reality
that, even in the absence of war, conflict and unequal power define
binational relations.8
Actually, many such tributes are offered as a preface to criticism, or
at least in presentation of competing perceptions of the IBWC. For
example, the IBWC has been labeled both "the most venerable
binational water management agency in North America," and "an
institutional dinosaur, a stodgy brick and mortar agency, dominated by
engineers, intractable, defensive," with a "reputation as a
monopolistic, secretive agency with a penchant for controlling and
hoarding vital data on border water dynamics. "285
Such a mixture of praise and criticism is to be expected, for the
IBWC's projects, however meritorious, have always had some

CONTROL STRATEGY DATA SUPPLEMENT 2010, 63 (2010), available at
www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcsIO/ndcslOdata_supl/ 10dat
asupplement.pdf. Of course, the U.S. government itself does not sell the guns and
purchase the drugs, however, federal, state, and local laws enable the continuation of
the exploitative relationship. CHU & KROUSE, supra note 279, at 2-3.
280. See, e.g., OIG, 2005 REPORT, supra note 31, at 7 ("USIBWC has a long history of
quiet, acknowledged technical competence. For over 100 years, the American and
Mexican Commissioners of the IBWC - civil engineers - found appropriate solutions to
most of the water and sanitation issues affecting both sides of the border. In other
words, the commission worked as the treaties intended. More recently, USIBWC has
gone through several years of internal management turmoil.").
281. See INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM'N, U.S. SECTION, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2008 FY 2013 3-4, 7-9 (2010), availableat http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/StrategicPlan.pdf.
282. E.g, Mumme & Moore, supra note 34, at 661.
283. Stephen Mumme, Innovation and Reform in TransboundaryResource Management:
A Critical Look at the International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and
Mexico, 33 NAT. REsOuRcEsJ. 93,93 (1993).

284. See generally, e.g., Mark Zeitoun & J. A. Allan, Applying Hegemony and Power Theory
to Transboundary Water Analysis, 10 WATER PoucY (Supplement 2) 3, 5-6 (2008),
availableat
http://www.iwaponline.com/wp/010S2/wp010S20003.htm
(discussing
the
implications of power disparities in the management and allocation of transboundary
water).

285.

Mumme, SustainableDevelopment Era, supra note 5, at 117, 122.
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detrimental impacts. For example, the Rio Grande Channelization
Project, completed by the USIBWC in 1943, destroyed between 12,000
and 20,000 acres of riparian wetlands along the one hundred-mile
reach of the Rio Grande from Caballo Dam in New Mexico to the
Texas State line."*
Yet the IBWC's reputation is typically redeemed, at least in part, by
its technical engineering accomplishments:
Criticism of the IBWC is almost as old as the Commission itself. Over
the past sixty years, the Commission, particularly its U.S. Section, has
been attacked for numerous grievances. Complaints include U.S.
intrusion on national sovereignty, unnecessary duplication of
functions of domestic water management agencies, the adoption of
an overly technical and politically narrow interpretation of treatybased responsibilities, use of an ad-hoc approach to dealing with
problems and disputes falling within the scope of its official mandate,
and failure to respond to local constituencies. By contemporary
standards, the IBWC is deficient in various areas, ranging from the
adequacy of its mandate to administration and operational
procedures. Centered on the task of protecting national treaty water
endowments, the IBWC was, and arguably remains, poorly positioned
to address contemporary water management concerns or to promote
an agenda of sustainable development of border water resources.
The Commission, however, is also praised as a model of
institutionalized bi-national cooperation. It is the lead agency for
of bilateral
transboundary water management and the settlement
disputes relating to managing shared water resources.2 8 7
Ironically, even USIBWC shortcomings, such as its lack of oversight

and accountability, insulation from public input, and allegiance to
elite interests, are also viewed as assets. Accordingly, its "complete
independence in administrative matters," is credited to the agency's
"conservatism," 288 and to its need to keep a "low profile with the
general public along the border [in order to] effectively cultivate [] the
support of the elite political clientele that is crucial to
decisionmaking. "289
Beginning in the 1970s, rapid growth and development along the
2,000-mile long border coincided with a rising tide of public
consciousness about water quality, water shortages, pollution, and

sanitation, as well as a growing demand for public participation in
government decisions.290 A law review Comment in 1971 suggested
286. See U.S. DEP'T. OF THE INTERIOR, Chapter 4: Water Development and Management
Programs,in THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL PROGRAMS ON WETLANDS, VOL. 11 (1996) available at
http://www.doi.gov/oepc/wetlands2/v2ch2.html.
287. Stephen P. Mumme, Developing Treaty Compatible Watershed Management Reforms
for the U.S. - Mixico Border: The Casefor Strengtheningthe InternationalBounday and Water
Commission, 30 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 929, 930 (2005).
288. Mumme & Moore, supra note 34, at 672-73.
289. Id.at675.
290. See Sanchez, supra note 6, at 283, 285-86, 288-90; see also U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, What is Border 2012, People Along the Border, U.S. - MEXIcO BORDER 2012 (Oct.
12, 2010), http://www.epa.gov/Border2012/framework/people.htmi (stating that the
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that the IBWC was institutionally incapable of addressing complex
ecological issues and condemned the IBWC for its narrow technical
focus, describing the purportedly diplomatic institution as an
"international Army Corps of Engineers."2 9 ' The authors of a 1979
paper opined that, " [b] ecause of the limited scope of its authority, the
IBWC is somewhat inadequate to bring about a definitive resolution of
issues in an area where political considerations take precedence over
sound water management.""'
Such concerns were increasingly
One observer
expressed or acknowledged throughout the 1980s. 2
listed the IBWC's shortcomings:
[T]he IBWC has attributed minor significance to the Treaty's
concern with border sanitation. The IBWC has construed narrowly
the Treaty's mandate for "solution of all border sanitation
problems." The IBWC has limited its sanitation responsibilities to the
development of sewage disposal projects, refusing to address the
more complex and hazardous problems of industrial discharges, toxic
wastes, groundwater mining and contamination, and air pollution.

Apparently, the IBWC wishes to avoid political controversy over its
jurisdictional authority.

The IBWC also refuses to use its clearly defined Treaty powers to
their fullest extent. The Commission has authority to initiate
investigations and to make decisions involving the utilization of the
international waters. These decisions, referred to as "Minutes," are
binding on the nations unless one of the governments objects within
thirty days. These informal decision-making powers give the IBWC
tremendous discretion to focus both nations' attention on
environmental problems and to make recommendations for their
solution. The apolitical Commission, however, has denied itself any
role in the fashioning of environmental policy, relying on the
uncertain initiative of executive levels of government to bring an
issue before the Commission. The IBWC consistently avoids political
controversy, preferring to concern itself only with data-gathering,
acting as a liaison between the two foreign offices, and completing
assigned water projects."9 (citations omitted)

B.

PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS

Criticism of the IBWC heated up in the 1990s, as an increasing

border population boom was sparked, in part, "by the maquiladora program, begun in
1965 to provide economic incentives to foreign (mostly U.S.-owned) assembly plants to
locate in the border region. The rate of industrial development increased further
after the North American Free Trade Agreement. . . removed most barriers to trade . .
. among Canada, the United States and Mexico."); see generally M. ANGELES VILLARREAL,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32934, U.S.-MExICO ECONOMIC RELATIONS: TRElNDS, ISSUES,
7 (2011) availableat http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL32934.pdf.
291. Johnston, supra note 9, at 164.
292. Jamail & Ullery, supra note 7, at iv.
293. See, e.g., Mumme, StateInfluence, supranote 7, at 625, 633.
294. Sinclair, supranote 5, at 113-14.
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number of scholars and environmental critics took up the charge. The
growing hostility toward the IBWC led one of the leading voices
concerning transboundary water management to observe: "For the
environmental groups, the Commission could be considered public
enemy number one." 295
this widespread
reflected
A 1993 scholarly monograph
IBWC:
disillusionment with the
The [IBWC] has been questioned by many border scholars and
activists who criticize the IBWC for its inability to act as an
independent border institution, and for the lack of transparency in
its decision-making processes. The IBWC is infamous for being an
old-fashioned, engineering driven institution that focuses on large,
capital-intensive brick and mortar projects. The IBWC has also been
too bureaucratic and for being a
criticized for being too slow and
296
nonpublic oriented institution.
Critics argued that the IBWC is biased towards construction
projects, and lacks diplomatic and management skills."' Scholars
partially attribute this problem to Article 2 of the 1944 Water Treaty,
which requires that the Commissioners of both the U.S. and Mexican
Sections must be licensed engineers. 298 The antiquated requirement
has ill-served the Commission in modern times, and, at times, both
sections have disregarded it.299
Overall, the IBWC was simply seen as not having an interest in
environmental projects.
With regard to border environmental infrastructure, the IBWC has
completed a number of projects in its over fifty-year history. An
examination of the total list of IBWC projects, however, reveals that
only a few constitute real environmental infrastructure. If items such
as bridges and the various flood control projects are eliminated from
the list, then there are not many truly environmental infrastructure
projects."o
A Harvard Law Review Comment summarized the USIBWC's
environmental default this way: "A lack of [a community of
professionals committed to progressive environmental policies] within
the [USIBWC], which almost always defers to the judgment of the
Army Corps of Engineers, precludes extensive involvement and input
3 1
by environmental organizations and NGOs." 0

295. Albert E. Utton, Protectingthe Environment in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region, 1 U.S.MEX. L.J. 211, 212 (1993).
296. Spalding, supranote 5, at 118.
297. See, e.g., Sanchez, supranote 6, at 283, 290, 297.
298. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 2.
299. See infra notes 628, 629.
300. Spalding, supranote 5, at 120.
301. Developments in the Law- InternationalEnvironmentalLaw, supra note 9, at 1578 n.
143.
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Equally toxic to its critics was the IBWC's resistance to public
participation. As one author wrote in 1993:
Public participation is perhaps the best evidence of the growing
distance between the border community and the IBWC. The
reluctance of the Commission to accept public participation in those
issues under its jurisdiction for decades is becoming more intolerant

to the affected public.

The demands for broader public participation, mistakenly perceived
by the Commission as antagonistic or 'interference in their affairs,'
are no more than the response of those communities to a new reality
of the border. The truth is that border problems, particularly water
issues, have outgrown the jurisdiction of the Commission. Their
solution can no longer depend on the limited technical skill of the
they require an integrated and
Rather,
IBWC engineers.
302
interdisciplinary approach.
Comparing public participation policies of the Canada/United
States International Joint Commission (IJC) with those of the IBWC,
another author noted that the ICJ "is justly renowned for this aspect of
its activities ... in rather stark contrast to the public participation
situation of the IBWC."3 3 The author noted that the IBWC had
"grave shortcomings in the field of public participation ...":so4"Not
only is little substantive public information made available, but the
tradition of hearings, open meetings, workshops, and briefings,
bringing interested persons and groups into interaction with the
Commission and its staff, is lacking. The IBWC clearly evolved in a
quite different binational context." 0
As one of many observers to occasionally summarize the charges
made against the IBWC, a leading supporter of the agency conceded
that the charges "certainly have merit, at least by degrees, and deserve
to be taken seriously."o30 The supporter continued:
302. Sanchez, supra note 6, at 283.
303. Hayton, supra note 6, at 277-78. The IBWC has frequently been compared
unfavorably to the IJC. See, e.g., Richard K. Paisley et al., Transboundary Water
Management: An Institutional Comparison Among Canada, the United States and Mexico, 9
OCEAN & COASTAL L.J. 177, 189-91 (2004); Keith A. Henry, The Internationaljoint
Commission and the InternationalBoundary and Water Commission, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J.
305, 306 (1993).
304. Hayton, supra note 6, at 279.
305. Id. at 278. Indeed, the two are very different types of organizations. Whereas
the IBWC comprises a U.S. Section and a Mexican Section, each pursuing its own
interests as distinct parts of an international institution, the IJC exists only as an
international body, and has no respective national sections. Thus, the IJC is a truly
"binational" institution, whereas the IBWC is more properly termed a "bilateral"
body. See Lee Botts & Paul Muldoon, Using the Boundary Waters Treaty for the 21st
Century: Revitalizing the Great Lakes Governance Regime, 54 WAYNE L. REv. 1553, 1559
(2008); see generally, The Boundary Waters Treaty CentennialSymposium, 54 WAYNE L. REV.
1417 (2008).
306. Mumme, ManagingAcute Water Scarcity, supra note 5, at 156.
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Analysts drawn to administrative concepts like "ecosystem
management" or "drainage basin management" have long chaffed at
the more limited jurisdiction of the Commission, viewing it as a
political creation, mired in sovereignty, and mismatched to modem
management challenges raised by ecological zones and hydrological
cycles. The Commission's mandate, to build and operate joint works
and resolve such disputes as may arise related to the treaties under its
jurisdiction, is seen as essentially reactive and ad hoc rather than
proactive and capable of addressing problems in a systematic,
Finally, the
comprehensive, and future-oriented fashion.
Commission's diplomatic structure is criticized as insular, secretive,
and unresponsive to public concerns, factors conceived for the
purpose of defending sovereign entitlements rather than forging
consensual grassroots solutions to transboundary problems. 3o7
Another critic put it more succinctly: "The IBWC's most
commonly cited shortcomings include its limited scope and unclear
mandate (narrow focus on water quantity, rather than quality, issues,
for example) as well as its 'cumbersome' institutional structure, which
hinders prompt responses to environmental problems and obstructs
30
any public participation element."o
C.

GROUNDWATER POLLUTION AND DEPLETION

The upsurge in criticism of the IBWC in recent decades has
coincided with explosive growth along the border and a growing
awareness that a variety of water management issues have reached a
point of crisis: groundwater pollution and depletion; water shortages
and drought; untreated sewage; salinity in the Colorado River;
pervasive pollution of the region's rivers; and deteriorating
international relations.
Mexico and the United States share underground aquifer basins
connected to the Rio Grande, and the Colorado, Tijuana, Santa Cruz,
Although a number of federal laws indirectly
and New Rivers.'
protect groundwater, there is no comprehensive federal regulatory
State laws regarding groundwater ownership and
scheme.s1 o
exploitation vary among the U.S. border states, but all vest expansive
rights in the owner of the surface to reasonable use of the water."' A
major criticism of the IBWC is that its scope and jurisdiction exclude
related
and
quality,
water
of groundwater,
consideration
environmental, conservation and distribution issues, at least as

307.
308.

Id. (citations omitted).
Land, supra note 5, at 108-09 (citing MARY KELLY, FACING REALITY' THE NEED FOR

FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT ALONG THE U.S./MEXICO
BORDER (1991)).

309. See M. Diane Barber, The Legal Dilemma of Groundwater Under the Integrated
Environmental Plan for the Mexico-United States Border Area, 24 ST. MARY'S L.J. 639, 680
(1993).
310. See Adrienne Paule, Undergound Water: A Fugitive at the Border, 13 PACE ENVTL. L.
REV. 1129, 1131 (1996).
311. See generally Barber, supranote 309, at 667-78.
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traditionally construed under the 1944 Water Treaty. 12
Groundwater provides a significant source of water used all along
the border. The Mexicali-Imperial Aquifer is "a significant source of
drinking water" for Mexicali, Mexico, and a "significant source of
irrigation water" for farmers in Northern Baja."' In Far West Texas,
the Hueco Bolson and the Mesilla Bolson Aquifers provide
approximately half of the municipal water supply for the City of El
Paso, with nearly one million residents. The Hueco Bolson Aquifer
also serves as the principal source of municipal supply for Ciudad
Juarez, a city of 1.5 million residents. Large-scale groundwater
withdrawals have caused significant declines in the water table, and
water-quality degradation due to lateral brackish water intrusion into
In addition to salinity, groundwater
the fresh water zones."
contamination is endemic in the border region, "' particularly by
arsenic that both occur naturally and results from industrial pollution,
and by phosphates and nitrogen from agriculture run-off."'
Although Texas law permits the Texas Water Commission to
regulate groundwater, the agency has been reluctant to do so. 31' The
State requires joint planning in management areas among
groundwater conservation districts. According to the Texas Water
Code:

"Groundwater

Conservation

Districts . ..

are

the

state's

preferred method of groundwater management .. . "31 Among other
things, the Water Code requires that, "[n]ot later than September 1,
2010, and every five years thereafter, the districts shall consider
groundwater availability models and other data or information for the
management area and shall establish desired future conditions for the
As of October 1,
relevant aquifers within the management area."'
2009, desired future conditions had not been adopted for any aquifers
in the state, and were not expected for several more years."
Neither groundwater nor ecological concerns are specifically
included in the 1944 Water Treaty's Article 3 list of IBWC priorities,
although there is a catch-all category for "other beneficial uses. "321
While the IBWC took a tentative step toward addressing the omission
312. See, e.g., Mumme, Advancing Binational Cooperation, supra note 7, at 88-89. See
generally Stephen P. Mumme, The U.S.-Mexican Conflict over TransboundaryGroundwaters:
Some Institutional and Political Considerations, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 505, 506-07
(1980); Hall, supra note 8, at 907 ("Despite the seemingly inescapable connection
between population growth, industrial development, and groundwater demand, the
IBWC has managed largely to avoid addressing the issue of transboundary
groundwater management throughout its nearly 114 years of combined operation.").
313. Paul Stanton Kibel, A Line Drawn in Water: Aquifers Beneath the Mexico-United
States Border, 12 U. DENv. WATER L. REv. 191, 193-94 (2008).
314. FWTWPG 2011 Plan, supra note 50, at 1-47 and 1-71.
315. See WESTERHOFF ET AL, supra note 50, at 4-5.
316. Id.
317. Barber, supra note 309, at 676.
318. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.0015 (2011).
319. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 36.108 (d) (2011).
320. FWTWPG 2011 Plan, supra note 50, at 1-6.
321. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 3.
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of groundwater management with the adoption of Minute 242 in 1973,
which provides for mandatory consultation on any construction that
would affect groundwater, nothing more has been done to extend the
3 2
jurisdiction of the IBWC concerning groundwater management.
One critic observed with alarm in 1993, that
[S]ince 1973 and approval of Minute 242, the IBWC has had general
rules for establishing a bilateral regime to conserve, manage, and
distribute transboundary groundwaters. Despite the fact that this
regime was urgently needed 18 years ago, practically nothing has
been done in this respect by the Commission to date. This is viewed
already be
as a most desperate situation, and some grave disputes may
323
on the horizon as a result of the Commission's passivity.
After another dozen years, nothing had changed, resulting in "a

324
race to the bottom in various localities along the border."
Some have long suggested that only a new groundwater treaty will
force the IBWC to act.325 A regional agreement between Mexico and a
state or local government that shares the aquifers is both a "reasonable
and constitutional alternative for managing groundwater on the
border."32 1 In any event, even IBWC supporters who once hoped the
agency might play a role in negotiating such a treaty have' been
disappointed.32 1

322. See Mumme, supra note 8, at 341-42 ("Today the goal of Minute 242 remains
unfulfilled. Despite a train of intermittent discussions and localized problems, little
progress has been made since 1973. The inevitable result is the current unsustainable
yet escalating race amongst parties on both sides of the border to drain these vital
resources."); see also Hall, supra note 8, at 908 ("The clear anticipation of and call for a
'comprehensive agreement on groundwater in the border areas' found in paragraph 5
of the Minute was never realized, and little progress in developing a formal agreement
has been recorded to date, thirty years after the signing of Minute 242.").
323. Szekely, supranote 4, at 399.
324. Mumme, Advancing Binational Cooperation,supra note 7, at 83-84.
325. See Burman & Cornish, supra note 13, at 397, 400; Philip Dunlap, Comment,
Border Wars: Analyzing the Dispute over GroundwaterBetween Texas and Mexico, 12 L. & BUS.
REV. AM. 215, 239-241 (2006); Robert C. Gavrell, The Elephant Under the Border: An
Argument for a New, Comprehensive Treaty for the Transboundary Waters and Aquifers of the
United States and Mexico, 16 COLO. J. INT'L ENvTL. L. & POL'Y 189, 214, 217, 219, 221,
224-27 (2005); Amy Hardberger, What Lies Beneath: Determining the Necessity of
InternationalGroundwaterPolicy Along the United States-Mexico Border and a Roadmap to
an Agreement, 35 TEX. TECH L. REv. 1211, 1237 (2004); Robert D. Hayton & Albert E.
Utton, Transboundary Groundwaters: The Bellagio Draft Treaty, 29 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 663,
663, 665 (1989); Mumme, The U.S.-Mexican Conflict over Transboundary Groundwaters,
supra note 312, at 506-07; Marilyn C. O'Leary, The Bellagio Draft Treaty as a Tool for
Solving Border GroundwaterIssues, 11 U.S.-MEx. L.J. 57, 58 (2003); Paule, supra note 310,
at 1133; Ann Berkeley Rodgers & Albert E. Utton, The Ixtapa Draft Agreement Relating to
the Use of Transbounday Groundwaters,25 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 713, 713,717,721 (1985).
326. Jennifer Evans, TransboundaryGroundwaterin New Mexico, Texas, and Mexico: State
and Local Legal Remedies to a Challenge Between Cities, States, and Nations, 30 WM. & MARY
ENvrL. L. & POLY REv. 471, 473 (2006).

327. See, e.g., Stephen P. Mumme, Advancing Binational Cooperation in Transboundary
Aquifer Management on the U.S.-Mexico Border, 16 COLO.J. INT'L ENvrL. L. & POL'Y 77, 85
(2005) (suggesting it may be unrealistic to expect the IBWC to aggressively promote
groundwater management given the lack of support among border state governments,
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WATER SHORTAGES AND DROUGHT

As for surface water, irrigation uses account for more than eighty
percent of the U.S. share of water in the Rio Grande, and more than
fifteen percent is consumed for municipal uses; industrial use is
negligible, amounting to less than 0.4 percent.2 8 With the U.S. border
population projected to triple by 2060, municipal use is projected to
double. 2 Nearly all water use in the Lower Rio Grande Valley is
derived from Amistad and Falcon Reservoirs, the two major
international reservoirs that are located on the Rio Grande. "These
impoundments provide controlled storage for over 8 million acre-feet
of water... . .3' The United States owns 58.6 percent of the useable
storage in Falcon Reservoir and 56.2 percent of the total conservation
storage capacity in Amistad Reservoir. Mexico owns the balance in
each."'
Beginning in the early 1990s, severe drought prevented Mexico
from meeting its obligations to deliver water quantities specified by the
1944 Treaty.332 The flows in the Rio Grande during the 1990s-2000s
were "the lowest experienced during the last half century."3 3 As a
result, farmers and ranchers in the Rio Grande Valley of Texas and
their congressional representatives became hostile towards Mexico. 4
Texas's U.S. Senators introduced a rather belligerent demand that
"[t]he President of the United States should promptly utilize the full
power of his office to bring about compliance with the 1944 Treaty on
Water Utilization in order that the full requirement of water be
available for United States use during the next full crop season" and
"[t] he United States Section of the International Boundary and Water
Commission should work to bring about full compliance with the 1944
notwithstanding the resultant "race to the bottom.")
328. See LRGRWPG 2011 Plan, supra note 51, at ES6.
329. LRGRWPG 2011 Plan, supra note 51, at 2-11. The U.S. population in the Lower
Rio Grande Valley is projected to increase from 1.62 million people at present to 3.94
million by 2060. Id. at 2-2. Approximately ninety-seven percent (833,640) of the
border population in west Texas reside in El Paso County, one of the fastest growing
regions in Texas. FWTWPG 2011 Plan, supra note 51, at ES2.
330. LRGRWPG 2011 Plan, supra note 51, at 3-7.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 3-125.
333. Id., at 3-32.
334. See generally, STEPHEN R. VIfJA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22085, THE UNITED
STATES - MEXICO DISPUTE OVER THE WATERS OF THE LOWER RIO GRANDE RIVER CRS-3 and
-6 (2005), available at http://www.whprp.org/nle/crsreports/05mar/RS22085.pdf. See
also, e.g., Susan Combs, The Mexico Water Debt, 67 TEx. B.J. 198, 201 (2004) (the author,
a Texas Agriculture Commissioner, charged, "Mexico's failure to abide by its treaty
obligations and address its accumulated debt has caused an estimated $1 billion
economic loss to the Rio Grande Valley."); Jill Warren, Mexico's Compliance with the
1994 Water Treaty Between the United States and Mexico: A Texas Perspective, 11 U.S.-MEX.
L.J. 41, 44-45 (2003) ("Texans and their elected officials are rightfully frustrated by
this course of events. The United States and Mexico reach agreements, but Mexico
does not fulfill the terms of those agreements. The Texas leadership team is running a
full-court press on officials of the United States and Mexico to attempt to force a
solution to this devastating problem.").
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Treaty on Water Utilization and not accept any water debt or deficit
repayment plan which does not provide for the full repayment of water
owed."335
The 1944 Water Treaty stipulates rationing rules for periods of
"extraordinary drought," but does not define the term. 3 6 Amid
increasing political tensions on both sides of the border, the IBWC
issued several Minutes attempting to balance scheduled amounts due
against the fact of water shortages,3 " and although these allowed the
IBWC to muddle through the impasse, they ultimately did little to
resolve tension between the United States and Mexico over water
distribution and binational management.3 8 Again, these problems left
observers to look for answers beyond both the IBWC and the 1944
Treaty.339
A 2005 Report to Congress noted: "Many have also stated that the
structure and role of the IBWC-a role traditionally rooted in the
protection of national sovereign interests-should be reevaluated to
reflect the growing need for cooperation and assign a stronger
commitment to forming policy on the River's sustainable
development. "40
E.

ENDANGERED RIVERS,

FLORA AND FAUNA

The IBWC has long been criticized for being so narrowly focused
on water quantity that it neglects water quality issues, including
environmental mitigation for its own construction projects, and the
boundary waters are anything but pristine. The storied Rio Grande
(known in Mexico as the Rio Bravo del Norte), which extends 1,900
miles from its headwaters in the Rocky Mountains of Colorado to its

335. 157 CONG. REc.25,658 (2000).
336. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, at art. 4; see also Mumme, Revising the 1944
Water Treaty, supranote 16, at 653-54.
337. See, e.g., IBWC Minute 309, supra note 168; IBWC Minute 308, supra note 168;
IBWC Minute 307, supra note 168; IBWC Minute 293, supra note 168.
338. Texas irrigators invoked Chapter 11 of NAFTA, which allows a foreign investor
to challenge host nation actions that are tantamount to nationalization or
expropriation; however, Mexico and the State Department obtained a dismissal
because NAFTA applies only to host nation investments and all the lost investment was
in Texas, not Mexico. See, e.g., Paul Stanton Kibel & Jonathan R. Schutz, Rio Grande
Designs: Texans' NAFTA Water Claim Against Mexico, 25 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 228, 229, 26567 (2007). In 2005, Mexico agreed to a repayment schedule. See also Gregory F.
Szydlowski, The Commoditization of Water: A Look at CanadianBulk Water Exports, the Texas
Water Dispute, and the Ongoing Battle Undei NAFTA for Control of Water Resources, 18 COLO.
J. INT'L ENVTL. L & POL'Y 665, 679-80 (2007).
339. See Ingram, supra note 13, at 190-91; Lopez, supra note 15, at 500-08; Mumme,
ManagingAcute Water Scarcity, supra note 5, at 155-57; Barbara J. Morehouse et al., The
Implications of Sustained Droughtfor TransboundaryWater Management in Nogales, Arizona,
and Nogales, Sonora, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 783, 784 (2000); Mumme, supra note 16, at
655-58; See Craig J. Pritzlaff, The Tragedy of Another Minute: IBWC Minute 308's Failure to
Mend the Rio GrandeRiver, 9 L. & Bus. REv. AM. 617, 624 (2003).
340. STEPHEN R. VlflA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22085 THE UNITED STATES - MEXICO
DIsPuTE OVER THE WATERS OF THE LOWER Rio GRANDE RIVER CRS-6 (2005), available at
http://ncseonline.org/nle/crsreports/05mar/RS22085.pdf.
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delta in the Gulf of Mexico, is the fourth longest river in the United
States."' The entire Rio Grande/Rio Bravo watershed covers an area
approximately 335,000 square miles, with approximately half the
watershed in the United States and the other half in Mexico. 4 The
USIBWC is responsible for monitoring and coordinating efforts to
improve the quality of water within the Rio Grande in its 1,254-mile
international boundary section, partially pursuant to contract with the
state of Texas.
The Rio Grande flows freely for 175 miles in Colorado before its
nearly 500 mile journey through New Mexico is impeded by Elephant
Butte and Caballo dams. 4' The river dries up by the time it reaches El
Paso/Ciudad Juarez and does not resume significant flows for another
250 miles downstream, at the confluence with the Rio Conchos (with
headwaters in Mexico), a stretch deemed the "Forgotten Reach of the
Rio Grande."1 5 Revitalized by the Rio Conchos, the Rio Grande is
designated as a Wild and Scenic River for the nearly 200 miles that it
winds through Big Bend National Park in Texas."' The river is once
again impounded at Amistad Dam, and then again by Falcon Dam,
before it flows into the Gulf of Mexico.
The Elephant Butte Dam and Reservoir in New Mexico is
approximately 125 miles north of El Paso and can store over two

million acre-feet of water. Water in the reservoir is stored to meet
irrigation demands in [southern New Mexico and the] El Paso and
Juarez Valleys and is released in a pattern for power generation.
Above El Paso, flow in the River is largely controlled by releases from

341. Jean W. Parcher, et al., U.S. Geological Survey, A Descriptive Overview Of The Rio
Grande-Rio Bravo Watershed, 1 J. OF TRANSBOUNDARY WATER RESOURCES 159, 159-60
at
available
(2010),
U.S.
http://wrri.nmsu.edu/publish/journal oftransboundary/Parcher.pdf;
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER FACT SHEET, LARGEST RIVERS IN THE UNITED STATES,

Various
available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/ 1987/ofr87-242/pdf/ofr87242.pdf.
lengths have been reported for the Rio Grande, all near 1,900 miles, and the river is
sometimes reported as the fifth longest in the United States. The St. Lawrence River is
similar in length, although half is located in Canada. As discussed in the Water Fact
Sheet, length calculations are imprecise due to natural variability over time and
problems of measurement and definition.
342. USIBWC, TEXAS CLAN RIVERS PROGRAM, 2010 BASIN HIGHLIGHTS REPORT FOR
THE RIO GRANDE BASIN IN TExAS 2 (2010), available at
http://www.ibwc.gov/CRP/documents/BHR2010-final.pdf.
343. About the Texas Clean River Program,INT'L BOUNDARY &WATER COMM'N,
http://www.ibwc.gov/CRP/about.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).
344. For the history and legal developments surrounding operation of dams, see
Susan Kelly et al., History of the Rio Grande Reservoirs in New Mexico: Legislation and
Litigation,47 NAT. RES.J. 525 (2007).
345. See Parcher, supra note 327 at 159-60. See generally U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS
ALBUQUERQUE DIsT., FORGOTTEN REACH OF THE Rio GRANDE, FORT QUITMAN TO
PRESIDIO, TEXAS (2008), availableat

http://www.tceq.state.tx.us/assets/public/comm-exec/pubs/as/200.pdf.
346. Parcher et al., supra note 341 at 165.
347. Id. at 164-65.
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Caballo Reservoir located below Elephant Butte.348
The Bureau of Reclamation manages both Elephant Butte Dam
and Caballo Reservoir, controlling all downstream releases.'
From El Paso to Fort Quitman, flow consists of treated municipal
wastewater from El Paso, untreated municipal wastewater from Juarez,
and irrigation return flow. " From Presidio downstream to the
Amistad Reservoir, "the Rio Grande often lacks sufficient flow to
adequately support minimum recreational, environmental, or
agricultural needs; and during dry periods, may fall significantly short
of supplying such needs."35 1
The Pecos River is the largest Texas river basin that flows into the
Originating in New Mexico, "the Pecos River
Rio Grande. 35
contributes an average of 11 percent of the annual streamflow into the
Rio Grande near Amistad Reservoir.... [but] contributes more than
29 percent of the annual salt loading into the reservoir."3 3
American Rivers, a national non-profit organization, has declared
the Rio Grande an Endangered River three times since 1993."4 In
2007, the World Wildlife Fund ranked the Rio Grande among the
world's top ten rivers at risk, citing severe threats from water
diversions, widespread alteration of the floodplain, dams and
pollution." "Heavy metals and pesticides have been identified along
the course of the Rio Grande. Elevated fecal coliform and nutrient
levels occur -in the River downstream of border cities, primarily
because of untreated wastewater from Mexico."356
The Colorado River originates in the mountains of Colorado and
Wyoming, and flows more than 1000 miles before it reaches the
Colorado River Delta, which is located entirely within the borders of
Mexico. 57 Over the course of the last century, the flows in the Delta
have fallen by nearly seventy-five percent," and when combined with
land use changes, result in a ninety-five percent loss of Delta wetlands

348. FWTWPG 2011 Plan, supra note 50, at ES8.
349. Id. at 1-75.
350. Id. at ES8.
351. Id. at 3-10.
352. Id. at ES8.
353. Id. at 3-19.
354. America's Most Endangered Rivers Report: 19861995, AMERICAN RIVERS,
available at
http://www.americanrivers.org/our-work/protecting-rivers/endangeredrivers/background/past-reports.html (listed in 2003, 1994, and 1993).
355. VWFs Top 10 Rivers at Risk, Rio Grande Makes List, WORLD WILDLIFE FUND
(Mar. 19, 2007), availableat
http://www.worldwildlife.org/who/media/press/2007/WWFPresitem925.html.
356. FWTWPG 2011 Plan, supra note 50, at 3-15.
357. Jennifer Pitt et al., Two Nations, One River: ManagingEcosystem Conservation in the
ColoradoRiverDelta, 40 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 819, 822 (2000).
358. Id. at 824.
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and riparian areas.159 The Delta hosts numerous threatened and
endangered species."' Aside from exploring solutions to the problem
of salinity on the Colorado River, the only IBWC actions to even
tentatively raise the issue of the disappearing Colorado River
ecosystem is Minute 306, adopted in 2000, which authorized a
binational investigation of the ecology of the Colorado River Delta,
and its restatement in Minute 317, adopted in 2010.361
The problem of salinity in the Colorado River means that
Colorado River water reaching Mexico is so saline as to render it
virtually unusable, and the IBWC has been heavily criticized for the
IBWC Minutes adopted in 2010
way it has handled the problem.6
indicate that proposed operation of the Yuma Desalting Plant (YDP) in
Yuma, Arizona, would treat agricultural wastewater now delivered to
Mexico as surplus.16 1 Once treated, the water could be counted as
treaty water, and thus increase a like amount of fresh water available
for use in the -United States. Unfortunately, this would cut off the
supply of wastewater that has historically drained into Mexico and now
sustains the Santa Clara Wetland, an integral part of the Upper Gulf of
California and Colorado River Delta Biosphere Reserve, the highest
category of protection that Mexico assigns to a wetland, in addition to
being declared a protected wetland under the RAMSAR Wetlands
Convention.3" Proposed alternatives such as water leasing and water
banking have been proposed to avoid operation of the YDP."'
The Tijuana River watershed spans the U.S.-Mexico international
border as it flows from its headwaters between the Laguna and Juarez
Mountain Ranges to the Pacific Ocean. The River's main stem runs
through a number of major industrial Mexican cities before reaching
Tijuana and eventually entering the United States at the San Ysidro
International Border Crossing. Rapid urbanization and growth in the
San Diego-Tijuana trans-border region in the last fifty years has led to
significant changes in regional land use."'
The implementation of the Maquiladora Program to spur border
trade in the 1960s led to rapid industrialization and subsequent
359. Id.
360. Id. at 829-30.
361. See Minute No. 306, supra note 190; Minute No. 317, supra note 202.
362. See, e.g., Note, Nicole Ries, supra note 7, at 523-24 ("the IBWC ... appears
institutionally incapable of negotiating bilateral decision-making when domestic
politics mandate incompatible solutions"). See also, Pitt, supranote 9.
363. See Minute No. 316 IBWC, supranote 199; Minute No. 317, supranote 202.
364. See generally Kara Gillon, Environmental and Other Implications of Operating the
Yuma DesaltingPlant, 19 PAc. McGEORGE GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. L.J. 129, 130, 13941
(2006). See also Minute No. 316 IBWC, supra note 199; Minute No. 317, supra note
202.
365. See Gillon, supra 364; Tarlock, supra note 66, at 389-90. See also U.S. BUREAU OF
RECLAMATION, RECLAMATION: MANAGING WATER IN THE WEST (2009), available at
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/yuma/environmental-docs/ydp/appa_b_c_d.pdf (including
public comments on Draft EA).
366. See TED Case Studies: Tijuana River Pollution,AM. UNIV. (2007), availableat
http://www.american.edu/TED/TIJUANA.HTM.
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population growth."' Problems worsened with NAFTA and further
rapid population growth and development in the 1980s and 1990s."
Lack of sewers and insufficient wastewater treatment capacity in
Tijuana have contributed to elevated pathogen and nutrient levels in
the waters crossing the border." Extensive agriculture and industrial
operations have also contributed to high concentrations of pesticides,
heavy metals, and PCBs.s"o Pollution in the Tijuana River is so
excessive that many beaches have been closed to swimming, and there
have been alarming reports of a rising incidence of infant brain
anencephaly near Tijuana and San Diego."'
The IBWC's perceived mismanagement of the sewage problem was
summarized this way twenty years ago:
Through the years, mounting criticisms of IBWC suggest that it is
nonresponsive and perhaps even counterproductive in solving
problems. IBWC has demonstrated a history of being uncooperative
with other agencies and not being diligent in solving problems for
which it was expressly commissioned to address in the 1944 Water

Treaty.372

F.

NEW BORDER INSTITUTIONS

Many critics believe the. IBWC as an institution has simply been
surpassed by the complexity of transboundary water management in
the twenty-first century. As one expert observed in 1993,
The apolitical nature and technical expertise of those who are
directly responsible for the work of the Commission, and which
constituted the keys to its successes, has apparently dwindled or
perhaps even vanished. More importantly, there are those concerned
with the fact that, even if the Commission maintained the degree of
excellence it showed during the past century, the enormity of the new
capacity, as it was
challenges ahead go well beyond its management
not designed to deal with such situations.373
Many observers have noted that when the IBWC was established by
the 1944 Water Treaty it was one of the only federal agencies working
for binational cooperation on the U.S.-Mexico border, a situation that
Over the past few decades many new institutions
no longer exists.

367. See John H. Minan, Recent Developments in Wastewater Management in the Coastal
Region at the United States-Mexico Border,3 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 51, 56 n.13 (2002).
368. Id. at 56-57.
369. Id. at 57.
370. See id. at 56-58, 61; Peter Smith, The Watershed Economy: Legal Challenges Facing the
TijuanaRiver, 11 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 337, 344-n.57 (2008).
371. Smith, supra 370, 337-38..
372. Altomare, supra note 12, at 390.
373. Szekely, supra note 4, at 399.
374. Bennett &'Herzog, supra note 4, at 974 ("The truth is that the management of
water in the U.S.-Mexico borderland has become a much more complex problem than
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have been established on the border to manage binational resources
and work for greater cooperation between the two countries, including
the Border 2012 Program, Border Environment Cooperation
Commission (BECC), North American Development Bank (NADB),
Good Neighbor Environmental Board (GNEB), and many others.3 75
In addition, state governments, 3 76 and increasingly local
governments,3" traditionally play a dominant role in water

the creators of the IBWC could ever have imagined.").
375. See generally, State Department, supra note 80 ("The 1983 La Paz Agreement to
protect and improve the border environment led to Border 2012, a 10-year . . .
environmental program for the U.S.-Mexico border region. The Border 2012
Program is the latest multi-year, bi-national planning effort to be implemented under
the La Paz Agreement and succeeds Border XXI, a 5-year program that ended in
"The 1993 North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation
2000."
(NAAEC) created the North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation . .
. by the U.S., Mexico, and Canada, to improve enforcement of environmental laws and
"A November 1993 agreement
to address common environmental concerns."
between the U.S. and Mexico [established] the North American Development Bank
(NADBank) and the Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC) under
the auspices of NAFTA, in order to address border environmental problems. The
NADBank uses capital and grant funds contributed by Mexico and the U.S. to help
finance border environmental infrastructure projects certified by the BECC. The
BECC works with local communities to develop and certify environmental
infrastructure projects, such as wastewater treatment plants, drinking water systems,
and solid waste disposal facilities." Each institution originally had its own Board of
Directors, but they merged into one entity in 2005). See also, e.g., Agreement Between
the United States of America and the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the
Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area, U.S.-Mex., Aug.
14, 1983, 35 U.S.T. 2916 (the La Paz Agreement stipulates that "[n]othing in this
Agreement shall prejudice or otherwise affect the functions entrusted to the
International Boundary and Water Commission in accordance with the Water Treaty
of 1944"); Agreement Concerning the Establishment of a Border Environment
Cooperation Commission and a North American Development Bank, U.S.-Mex., Nov.
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1545; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 62; Eileen Zorc, The
Border 2012 US. Mexico EnvironmentalProgram:Will a Bottom-Up Approach Work?, 16 GEO.
INT'L ENvTL. L. REV. 533, 536 (2004); Christopher P. Brown & Stephen Mumme,
.Applied and Theoretical Aspects of Binational Watershed Councils (Consejos de Cuencas) in the
U.S.-Mexico Borderlands, 40 NAT. RESOURCES J. 895, 912 (2000); David A. Gantz, The
North American Development Bank and the Border Environment Cooperation Commission: A
New Approach to Pollution Abatement Along the United States-Mexican Border, 27 LAW &
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1027 (1996).
376. See Robert Haskell Abrams, Interstate Water Allocation: A Contemporary Primerfor
Eastern States, 25 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L. REV. 155, 156 (2002) ("[D]espite the
combination of the commerce power and the Supremacy Clause that together allow
the national government to propound a meaningful water policy with allocative
features, the national government has not done so and is unlikely to do so any time
soon."). See also Colorado River Compact, ch. 42, 45 Stat. 1057, art I, III (1928)
(dividing the waters of the Colorado River between the basin states), available at
http://www.usbr.gov/lc/region/gl000/pdfiles/crcompct.pdf Rio Grande Compact,
ch. 155, 53 Stat. 785 (1938) (providing for the distribution of the U.S. share of the
waters of the Rio Grande among Colorado, New Mexico and Texas, above Fort
Quitman, Texas); see Jose Ramon Cossio Diaz, Constitutional Framework for Water
Regulation in Mexico, 35 NAT. RESOURCESJ. 489, 490 (1995).
377. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Potential Role of Local Governments in Watershed
Management, 20 PACE ENvrL. L. REv. 149, 149-50 (2003) (addressing the evolving role
of local government in watershed conservation).
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The State of Texas, for example, has created sixteen
management.'
local bodies to coordinate long-range water supply planning
throughout the state. Two of these regional groups cover the entire
Rio Grande in Texas. The Rio Grande Regional Water Planning
Group (LRGRWPG) covers an eight-county area of south Texas
The other Rio Grande
comprising the Lower Rio Grande Valley.'
regional planning group is the Far West Texas Water Planning Group
(FWTWPG), which comprises seven counties in far west Texas solely
within the Rio Grande River Basin.so
G. REFORM OR REPLACE THE IBWC
The IBWC has been given some credit for belated progress in
collaborating with other agencies along the border. 81 Yet the
overwhelming sentiment is that the agency should be replaced or
radically reformed. 8 1 Some critics believe the IBWC is no longer up to
the task of managing the boundary waters, and should be replaced by
a modern twenty-first century binational institution, either one like the
BECC or an altogether new institution."' Others believe the IBWC
can be salvaged, but only through radical reforms.
Two leading scholars recommended in 1993 that the governments
of Mexico and the United States move toward "meeting the challenge
of sustainable development by creating a new institution or changing
or reconstituting the present International Boundary and Water
Commission to move toward the ecosystem management needs of the
boundary region."3

A similar ambivalence

about the IBWC's

potential for reform was expressed in the following manner: "It seems
doubtful that regulatory solutions and planning can be avoided if
border environmental health is to be protected, and yet the United
States Section is unlikely to change, "38 the authors observed, yet
378. The U.S. Supreme Court has fostered a perception of "purposeful and
continued deference to state water law by Congress." California v. United States, 438
U.S. 645, 653 (1978). See also United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 701 (1978)
(stating that Congress has historically almost "invariably deferred" to state water law
with regard to the power of federal entities). But see, e.g., Reed D. Benson, Deflating the
Deference Myth: NationalInterests vs. State Authority Under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use,
2006 UTAH L. REv. 241, 243, 312 (2006).
379. See LRGRWPG 2011 Plan, supra note 50, at 1-2, 1-5.
380. Id. at ES-1.
381. Mumme, Advancing BinationalCooperation,supra note 7, at 99-101.
382. See, e.g., Gregory, supra note 9, at 165 (noting IBWC and the La Paz Agreement
Coordinators both "have been strongly criticized for their historic failures in
addressing border pollution problems. Consequently, many NGOs argue that these
groups should be replaced, restructured, or subordinated to EPA or SEDUE, or in the
alternative, a new binational agency should be created.")
383. See, e.g., Sinclair, supra note 5, at 112-15, 122-24, 132, 134, 136 (finding the
IBWC "has denied itself any role in the fashioning of environmental policy," however,
the author concludes that the La Paz Environmental Agreement is largely symbolic in
nature, offering neither established rules of conduct nor enforcement mechanisms to
safeguard shared resources).
384. Dworsky & Utton, supranote 12, at 449.
385. .See, e.g., Ingram & White, supranote 4, at 173.
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"[t]he proposal to alter the design and mission of the IBWC, as
opposed to establishing entirely new institutions, certainly deserves
more debate.""
Others have no such uncertainty, as demonstrated by the Executive
Director of the Texas Center for Policy Study in a 1993 publication: "I
do not agree that the IBWC should be the agency which is given
broader responsibilities for pollution control in the border region. It
is an unacceptably closed structure that has little accountability and is
responsive only to entrenched interests.""'
A 1992 review of several proposals for reform of the IBWC
discussed a similar range of views: "The most radical solution is
advanced by TCPS [Texas Center for Policy Studies] which
recommends 'removal of IBWC's lead jurisdiction on water quality
problems in border area rivers and underground water and transfer of
that jurisdiction to a new binational agency that is open to public
participation and accountable to border area governments.'" 388
Other critics have suggested a more moderate path with specific
recommendations.
The time has come for the U.S. and Mexico to modernize the
Commission. This does not mean renegotiating the 1944 water treaty
in any significant respect.
In our view, however, effective
modernization will require that the countries confront the long-held
fiction that controversial water issues can be resolved, out of the
public eye, solely through the application of what is traditionally
viewed as the commision's technical expertise. As a first step,
changes are required to ensure that the commissioners have the full
range of stature and skills necessary to address the political and
diplomatic aspects of controversial transboundary water management
issues. In this regard, the current limitation of an "engineercommissioner" is no longer useful.

Effective modernization will also require the two federal government
elevate the priority of border water issues within their respective
foreign relations secretaries; more fully intergrate the U.S. and
Mexican sections of the commission; significantly expand the
resources available to the commission; and develop clear procedures
to avoid the type of crises [i.e. water shortages] confronting us now
along the Rio Grande.38 9

H. POTENTIAL TREATY AMENDMENTS
Some proposals to reform the IBWC insist on the need to amend
the 1944 Water Treaty, although it is far from clear that any such

386.
387.
388.
389.

Id. at 175. See also, Gaines, supra note 12, at 446.
Kelly, supra note 7, at 301-02.
Mumme, New Directions, supra note 5, at 545.
KELLY & SzEKELY, supra note 11, at 2-3.
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amendment is needed to accomplish substantial change in the
institution, at least in the U.S. Section. Whereas most critics propose
amendments to the Treaty to deal with the issues of drought and
groundwater management,"' other proposals are as seemingly
mundane as removing the requirement that the Commissioners be
engineers, making room for a broader pool of qualified professional
managers and water experts.
Others question the wisdom or even the need to amend the 1944
Water Treaty. Any attempt to amend any provision of the Treaty, the
argument goes, even something as seemingly innocuous as the
engineer-commissioner requirement, will inevitably lead to calls for
amendments regarding more substantive provisions regarding water
allocation, water quality, groundwater management, and overall
institutional reform, pitting entrenched interests against one another
in a battle with highly uncertain outcomes."'
Perhaps surprisingly, however, a recent survey of 172 local Texas
government officials that manage water resources in the U.S.-Mexico
border region found strong support for amending the 1944 Water.
Treaty.'
Two-thirds of respondents agreed that "[t]he 1944 Treaty
should be amended to address the allocation of groundwater," and
eighty-one percent of survey respondents agreed that "the Treaty
should be amended to define the term extraordinary drought."39 4 A
majority agreed that "the 1944 Treaty should be amended to include
ecological and environmental uses of international waters as a top
priority." "
It seems that support for amending the Treaty may come from
other unexpected places, as well, even growing out of concern for
United States national security.
The treaty produced an enduring American advantage in terms of
maintaining a water status quo with Mexico.

dividends

for American

interests,

Despite paying large

the treaty

now produces

considerable tensions between the two countries and contributes
towards increased instability in Mexico. This paper shows how the
United States used the treaty to protect domestic interests while
hindering sustainable development on the Mexican side of the
border. In today's environment this situation is counter-productive

390. See, e.g., Lopez, supra note 15, at 496, 498, 508; Mumme, supra note 16, at 655;
Umoff, supranote 16, at 98.
391. See Sanchez, supra note 6; see also Schmandt, supra note 11, at 152-53(suggesting
a second, non-engineer Commissioner who is responsible for integrated river
management).
392. Mumme, supra note 5, at 552 ("This, of course, does not mean that a revision
to the 1944 Water Treaty, stripping IBWC of its water quality management functions, is
inconceivable."); see also Mumme, supranote 283, at 101.
393. OLIvIA N. THOMPSON, BINATIONAL WATER MANAGEMENT: PERSPECTIVES OF LocAL
TEXAS OFFICIALS IN THE U.S.-MExIco BORDER REGION, at i (2009), availableat
http://ecommons.txstate.edu/arp/313.
394. Id. at 65.
395. Id. at 66.
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for regional security. This paper addresses the consequences of our
adherence to the treaty, potential impacts from climate change, poor
infrastructure investments in Mexico, population growth, the North
American Free Trade Agreement and implications for future policy
considerations related to Mexico and its internal stability.396
Yet amendment of the Treaty may be entirely unnecessary, given
the authority of.the IBWC to interpret its requirements through the
adoption of Minutes."' In this view, the Minute process is seen as an
avenue for addressing in detail subjects that are dealt with only in the
broadest terms in the 1944 Water Treaty, thus actions such as the
adoption of Minute 242 dealing with groundwater and Minute 306
dealing with the Colorado Delta ecosystem permit the IBWC to
expand its scope without the need for a Treaty amendment. One
scholar observes that the IBWC has hamstrung itself by its slavish
adherence to an outdated construction of the 1944 Water Treaty, "an
historically entrenched focus on physical borders and the sovereign
delimitation of a shared natural resource.""' This critic urges the
IBWC to work on the development of a "twenty-first century Minute"
stating a commitment to "modern international principles of
watercourse law."' 99
VI. NEGLIGENT STATE DEPARTMENT OVERSIGHT
A.

STATE WARNS GROSS MISMANAGEMENT IMPERILS BORDER REGION

A 2005 investigation of the USIBWC by the State Department
Office of Inspector General revealed a shocking level of
mismanagement and resultant threats to the agency's mission, even
though the investigation was narrowly limited to personnel matters
and did not even touch upon issues of policy, procedures, or the state
of dams, sanitation plants or other infrastructure. 400 A Report issued as
a result of the investigation warned that "[i]nternal management
problems have engulfed USIBWC, threatening its essential

396. MARK A. ANSPACH, UNITED STATES ARMY RESERVE, KLEPSUDRA: How THE RIo
GRANDE TREATY INCREASED INSTABIITY IN MEXICO (2008), availableat
http://www.dtic.mil/cgibin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA486548&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf.
397. Mumme, supra note 5, at 555-57.
398. Ingram, supra note 13, at 165 (proposing that the 1944 Treaty language can be
salvaged and citing the United Nations Convention on the Law of the NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses, Report of the 6th Committee, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/51/869 (1997)).
399. Id. at 164 (proposing the adoption, as a guide, of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses,
Report of the 6th Committee, U.N. Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/869 (1997)).
400. OIG, 2005 REPORT, supra note 31, at 23 ("The inspection did not and could not
survey levees, measure water depths, or follow up each allegation of neglect [yet]
[tihere is disturbing evidence . . . that maintenance of infrastructure is falling
behind.").
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responsibilities for flood control and water management in the
American Southwest."4 0 1 The .2005 Report included findings that
"management actions have undermined the morale of the agency, led
to an alarming departure of key personnel, and raised fundamental
questions about the lack of U.S. government oversight of the

USIBWC." 402

Among the wide range of problems identified by the 2005 OIG
Report was that the Commissioner set his own salary (at a level
equivalent to that of an armed forces secretary) and "feels he can fire
and hire, set salaries including his own, and generally run his agency
without reference to other authority."40 s The Report notes with some
consternation that "[alppointment by the President of the U.S.
Commissioner does not [even] require the advice and consent of the
The Report condemns inaction by the .USIBWC
Senate." 404
concerning the health and safety of its employees, describing a Field
Office that "lies immediately below the abandoned plant and grounds
of a metals smelting and refining company. For over a century, this
plant spewed out smoke and slag over the area, leaving toxic waste
piles looming over the USIBWC facility."405
The Report notes that "while personal doctors in some cases
warned their patients to leave their employment on the site," and
"[t] he city of El Paso evacuated a residential area next to the site some
years ago on the grounds that pollution levels were too high for
safety," the "USIBWC does not appear to have been adequately
responsive."4o6
B.

STATE DISAVOWS AUTHORITY OR RESPONSIBILITY FOR

USIBWC

A follow-up report in 2006, addressing the USIBWC's pledges of
reform, offered little reason for optimism, stating: "The U.S. Section is
out of the national limelight, but a major storm and flood could
overwhelm the barriers and cause considerable damage. This would
usher in bouts of finger pointing between Departments, agencies and
jurisdictions concerned."0 7 The 2006 Report concludes, "The agency
is simply too small, too isolated, and too vulnerable to management
abuse to continue without the protection and oversight of a major
government department."4 08
By all accounts, the U.S. Department of State has maintained a
hands-off policy toward the IBC-IBWC for most of its 120-year
existence.

401. Id. at 3.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 11.
404. Id. at 13.
405. Id. at 29.
406. Id.
407. OIG, 2006
408. Id.

REPORT, supra note

35, at 4.
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The agency has an unusual relationship with the Department. While
its budget is included within the Department's budget request to
Congress, issues of oversight, and who might exercise that oversight
in areas apart from foreign policy, have never been adequately
defined. Over the years, USIBWC has been largely independent in
terms of internal management and operations.
The Department seems to share the view of the USIBWC, which
"considers itself an independent federal government agency whose
leader is answerable only to the President.""'o Indeed, the Department
"has been unwilling or unable to claim full responsibility for the
agency despite the fact that most U.S. government agencies and the
Congress view the Department as the parent agency and that no other
logical choice exists. "411
Notwithstanding the apparent exasperation of the OIG with the
Department's hands-off policy, the OIG itself questions even its own
authority to investigate the USIBWC, stating:
[E]ven the jurisdiction of OIG over the U.S. Section remains subject
to dispute. While the Department of State, the Department ofJustice,
and the White House have supported OIG's oversight, and the
current leadership of USIBC has accepted it, there is no clear
legislative authority. A future Commissioner could challenge OIG
oversight, as did the most recent permanent Commissioner, forcing
the same scramble to find "derivative" authorities. 412
Whereas the OIG has at least drawn official attention to the
problems at the USIBWC, it does not claim to have conducted an
exhaustive investigation, and it seemingly lets even the Department off
the hook for anything beyond foreign policy concerns, stating: "It is
not within OIG's or the Department's jurisdiction (or competence or
desire) to provide oversight concerning the dams, levees, power plants,
sewage treatment plants, and other facilities administered by the joint
commission."4 13
The 2006 OIG report explains that " [o]ptions such as integration
of the U.S. Section into the Department of the Interior or the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers have been considered in the past and

409. OIG, 2005

REPORT supranote 31, at 5-6.
410. Id. at 10.
411. OIG, 2006 REPORT, supra note 35, at 4.
412. Id. at 12. Belated as it was, the State Department is not the only government
agency to comment on USIBWC mismanagement over the years. See, e.g., U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
OPERATIONS NEED MORE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT 4-5

AND

WATER

COMMISSION:

U.S.

(1998), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1998/ns98238.pdf.
413. OIG, 2006 REPORT, supra note 35, at 4. The OIG goes on to claim, with no
support in its report and in contradiction to its own 2005 Report, discussed above, as
well as contrary to virtually every published report that exists anywhere, as discussed in
Part V, "By all accounts, USIBWC's professionals have done well to maintain the
organization's infrastructure on a barebones budget." Id.
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discarded for good reason (such as conflicts with treaty provisions). "414
Although the OIG Reports do not go into any further detail about
these decisions, this is likely a reference to State Department's
successful defeat of recommendations to transfer the U.S. Section's
operational functions to the Bureau of Reclamation, which the Bureau
of the Budget made in 1947, the Hoover Commission made in 1949,
the Rockefeller Committee (President's Advisory Committee on
Governmental Organization) made in 1953, and as President
Eisenhower initially approved in 1953.15
The 1953 dispute, which appears to have been primarily a power
struggle between State and the Interior Department,4 16 was belatedly
backed up by a State Department legal opinion acknowledging that
the U.S. Section "is not sufficiently independent to be classed as an
'independent agency' in the sense that term is used in statutes and
Executive Orders, yet there is sufficient independence provided for in
administrative matters that it cannot be considered as an
organizational part of the Department.""
Thus, the Department is unwilling to accept responsibility for
oversight of the USIBWC, even acknowledges that it is not competent
to do so, and goes so far as to claim it has no authority over the agency,
yet it fights to defend such allegedly artificial bureaucratic turf. The
2006 OIG Report states that the Department believes it is foreclosed by
treaty and statutory language from managing the USIBWC,
notwithstanding the contrary language set out in this article that
appears to assume State Department oversight.
The Department and other key U.S. government elements have
interpreted treaty provisions and other laws and regulations to give

them derived authorities over the U.S. Section, but these are not

414. Id. Generally, the Department of the Interior's Bureau of Reclamation
manages reservoirs that provide water for irrigation projects and power generation,
whereas the Army Corps of Engineers maintains waterways for navigation purposes,
undertakes flood control projects, builds and operates hydropower facilities, and
operates irrigation and flood control projects. See generally Bureau of Reclamation: About
Us, BUREAU OF RECIAMATON, http://www.usbr.gov/main/about/index.html (last
updated Feb. 17, 2011) (stating that the Bureau of Reclamation manages reservoirs for
irrigation projects and power generation); Civil Works Mission, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
ENG'RS,
http://www.usace.army.mil/CECW/Pages/index.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2011)
(stating that "Civil Works programs include water resource development activities
including flood control, navigation, recreation, and infrastructure and environmental
stewardship.").
415. See Mumme & Moore, supra note 34, at 678; see also Roger Lee Eldridge, A
Comprehensive Approach to U.S.-Mexico Border Area Water Management, 4 S.W. REV. MGMT.
& EcoN. 89, 91 (1985) (stating that in 1947 the Hoover Commission recommended
that the "project construction and management function ... be transferred to the
Bureau of Reclamation.").
416. See Mumme & Moore, supra note 34, at 678 (referring to State Department and
USIBWC success in resisting "predatory initiatives of other domestic Agencies");
Eldridge, supra note 314, at 91 (describing similar reversal of Truman administration
proposal).
417. Mumme & Moore, supra note 34, at 680.
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clearly defined or universally accepted. No one in the Department or
elsewhere has taken the lead in resolving the issue.
Again without specifying what statutory or treaty provisions are
affected, the OIG concludes: "The Department of Justice, the
Department of State, and the OIG team all agree that integrating the
U.S. Section into the Department of State will require legislation." 419
The OIG Report leaves no doubt about the need for oversight but
buys into the notion that this requires legislation, without specifying
exactly what statutes need to be amended or what that would
accomplish, and at the same time imagining great bureaucratic
hurdles by making comparisons to completely non-analogous agencies.
Current USIBWC management prefers a limited relationship
rather than full integration into the Department, believing it can
benefit from the Department's oversight and protection of its
personnel system while enjoying maximum flexibility in its
operations. Some Department offices share this view. The OIG
inspection team does not believe that measures short of full
integration of the agency into the Department will resolve the
oversight issue, based on its observations of the experience of recent
years in USIBWC history. Attempts to define the meaning of "report
to" inevitably lead to the conclusion that legislation would be needed
in any event. It is unclear what a memorandum of understanding
would provide for and with what legal authority. The agency is simply
too small, too isolated, and too vulnerable to management abuse to
continue without the protection and oversight of a major government
department. The Department was asked in early 2005 to provide its
own solution to the oversight problem and could not do so.

The optimal solution is to bring the USIBWC into the Department
of State. This would clear away legal ambiguities frustrating rational
management and oversight of personnel, administrative, and security
operations. This solution would mirror the position of the Mexican
Section of the IBWC, which falls under the Mexican Ministry of
Foreign Relations. The integration of the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency and the U.S. Information Agency into the
Department indicate that the difficulties attached to integration of
the USIBWC are not beyond the Department's ability to overcome.
The Department of Justice, the Department of State, and the OIG
team all agree that integrating the USIBWC into the Department of
State will require legislation.42
Ironically, the State Department's claims of limited authority are
inconsistent with even its own actions, which suggest the Department
feels it has just as much authority as it chooses to exercise. For
example, detailed reports on the USIBWC's implementation of its
$220 million in Recovery Act projects are found not on the agency's
418.
419.

OIG, 2006 REPORT, supra note 35, at 17.
Id.at5.

420. Id.
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According to the 2006 OIG

With the growing complexity, sensitivity, and importance of
border issues affecting the agency, as well as a history of management
problems in recent years, the Department has necessarily exercised
oversight of some USIBWC functions beyond the mandated foreign
policy aspect. In so doing, the Department's oversight authority for
foreign policy and its implied responsibility for budget matters have
been interpreted by the Department to justify OIG's assertion of
authority over USIBWC, to require the agency to "coordinate" major
personnel actions with the Department, and to permit the Bureau of
to question and influence
Western Hemisphere Affairs (WH)
.
USIBWC budget levels and priorities.
The State Department's relationship to the USIBWC suggests that
it wants control without responsibility, especially with the very real
possibility of a major disaster. The Department seems much less
concerned about the boundary ecosystem, the health, and safety of
millions of residents on both sides of the border, and the pocketbooks
of U.S. taxpayers than it is about the blame game. 2
C. EXEMPT EMPLOYEES PRETEXT
Whatever the bureaucratic motives for its reluctance to manage the
USIBWC, the State Department alleges that legislation is needed to
give it explicit authority over personnel matters. In a profound
misunderstanding of Federal personnel laws, or pretext for abdication
of responsibility, the OIG and the State Department both imagine
nonexistent obstacles due to the fact that USIBWC employees are in
In
the "excepted service" rather than the "competitive service". 2
both its 2005 and 2006 reports on the USIBWC, the OIG goes on at
length about the imagined obstacles to State Department oversight
presented by this excepted service status.
USIBWC has been something of an orphan agency, left to its own
resources except for guidance on foreign policy issues and some
limited financial oversight. It has experienced, professional human
resources specialists, but they have not had the freedom to administer

421. See U.S. Department of State Information Related to the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/recovery
(last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
422. OIG, 2006 REPORT, supra note 34, at 3. This type of informal influence may be
worse than nothing, since it gives an isolated mid-level bureaucrat in Washington a
surprising degree of control over the USIBWC "priorities."
423. See note 43, supra.
424. "The Office of Personnel Management (OPM), following an OPM audit
conducted in 2003, directed the USIBWC to convert employees from competitive Civil
Service to 'excepted service.' OPM determined that the agency is exempt from the
competitive provisions of Title V of the United States Code because its appointment
authority is derived from the treaties and conventions establishing the agency." OIG,
2006 REPORT, supra note 34, at 14.
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procedures in keeping with normal federal practice. The result has
been confusion, some abuse, and certainly a severe morale impact.
The personnel of USIBWC are in limbo, with questions on all sides as
to their status and rights, if any.

Given the complex statutory authorities relied on by the USIBWC to
carry out its work, it is possible that legislation would be required to
permit the Department to take on personnel administration for the
U.S. Section. Legal steps needed to transfer personnel authority, and
to protect the interests of USIBWC employees, should be reviewed by
lawyers at relevant agencies, including the Department of State,
Department ofJustice, Office of Special Counsel, Office of Personnel
Management (OPM), and Office of Government Ethics. 425

Ironically, the 2005 OIG Report cites a 1998 OPM report on
eighteen exempt agencies, which include the State Department itself,
that found "few differences from nonexempt agencies in the exempt
agencies' recruitment, hiring, and promotion practices."4 2 1 It is
completely unclear, then, what concerns the State Department has

about USIBWC employee rights, "if any." 427
The 2006 OIG Report repeats these nonspecific concerns, noting
that because "USIBWC personnel are in an excepted Civil Service,"
they are "not subject to all the protections afforded to competitive
employees." 2 "If the USIBWC became part of the Department, or if
OIG had confirmed statutory authority," the OIG concludes, "there
would be routine oversight, opportunities for appeals of personnel
actions, and advice and support available to the agency and the

Commissioner."4 29
The State Department's misplaced concerns may be allayed by
reference to the relevant statutory authorities and an improved
understanding of what it means to be an excepted service employee
(although, being an excepted service agency, the State Department
surely should be under no misconceptions such as those expressed in
the OIG Reports). Title 5 of the U.S. Code defines "employee" as ". . .
an individual in the competitive service. . ." or ". . . an individual in

the excepted service . . ."430 Excepted service includes "all positions in
the executive branch of the Federal Government which are specifically
excepted from the competitive service by or pursuant to statute, by the
President, or by the Office of Personnel Management, and which are
not in the Senior Executive Service. "431

425. Id.; OIG, 2005 REPORT, supranote 30, at 12.
426. OIG, 2005 REPORT, supra note 30, at 38-39.
427. Id. at 12.
428. OIG, 2006 REPORT, supra note 34, at 3.
429.
430.
431.

Id. at 15.
5 U.S.C. § 7511(a), (c) (2011).
Id. § 2103(a); 5 C.F.R. § 213.101 (2011).
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The Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) has explained the
difference.
The above definition distinguishes between the "competitive" and
the "excepted" service. The executive branch of Government that is
governed by Title 5 of the United States Code is composed of the
competitive service, the excepted service, and the Senior Executive
Service. Most of the executive branch's civilian positions are part of
the competitive civil service. Such positions are filled through
competition among applicants under competitive examining
procedures administered by OPM.
The competitive examining
process is characterized by rating and ranking applicants and
referring to selecting officials only the top ranked or high-quality
applicants. Qualified applicants who have been rated and ranked are
placed on a list known as a register. Under the competitive
examining process, either the top three candidates under the "Rule
of Three," or all candidates in the highest quality category under the
Category Rating procedures, are referred for selection. Positions
filled through the competitive examining process are referred to as
the competitive service.

On the other hand, there are some positions in the Federal civil
service that are excepted from OPM's competitive examining
procedures. In addition, there are positions that would ordinarily be
in the competitive service but are in the excepted service while
occupied by individuals who are appointed under an excepted
appointing authority or programs established by law, the President,
or OPM. Individuals appointed through these latter authorities or
programs are trainees who can be converted to the competitive
service upon successful completion of the program. For excepted
service positions, agencies develop and establish their own examining
procedures within the guidelines of the merit system principles and
veterans' preference rules. These positions are collectively referred
to as the excepted service. 432
The difference between competitive and executive employees,
then, is in the hiring procedure, a procedure also used by the State
Department. Indeed, although the name "excepted service" implies
otherwise, it actually accounts for about half of all federaljobs. * Both
are still covered by merit system principles, as acknowledged by the
01G. As for having fewer rights, "if any," excepted service employees
are explicitly guaranteed the right to appeal adverse personnel actions
respecting: 1) removal, 2) suspension for more than fourteen days, 3)

432. U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., NAVIGATING THE PROBATIONARY PERIOD AFTER VAN
WERSCH AND MCCORMICK 6 (2006),
available at http://www.mspb.gov/studies/browsestudies.htm (follow "Navigating the
Probationary Period After Van Wersch and McCormick" hyperlink).
433. See U.S. GENERAL. AccouNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-97-72, THE EXCEPTED
SERVICE: A RESEARCH PROFILE 1 (1997); see also U.S. MERIT Sys. PROT. BD., REFORMING
FEDERAL HIRING: BEYOND FASTER AND CHEAPER 31 (2006) (looking at the decline in
competitive examining).
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reduction in grade or pay, or 4) furlough for thirty days or less.434
Indeed, the MSPB had rejected just such a myopic interpretation
of employee rights, "if any," as expressed by the OIG, and did so prior
to publication of the 2006 OIG report that repeated the
interpretation; this rejection occurred in a case that not coincidentally
involved the retaliatory dismissal by the IBWC of its General
Counsel."' The IBWC decision demolished the State Department's
feeble claim that IBWC employees are in some special class with few,
"if any," rights. Mr. Wilcox, the agency's General Counsel, alleged
that he was removed in retaliation for protected whistle blowing. The
agency contended Wilcox had no appeal rights, arguing that
USIBWC's hiring authority derives not from Title 5 of the U.S. Code,
as is the case with other Federal agencies, but from Article 2 of the
1944 Water Treaty.' The agency also contended that the USIBWC is
not even a federal "agency" as defined by Title 5, but a subdivision of
an international organization.
The MSPB rejected these claims, noting that "the IBWC is deemed
an international organization, but that designation does not extend to
the U.S. Section as to matters within its exclusive control, supervision,
orjurisdiction."43 The MSPB also ruled the USIBWC is an "executive
agency," which means an Executive department, a Government
corporation, or an independent establishment. 439
The agency also relied both on 1) a February 2, 1950 letter from
the Civil Service Commission's Chief of the Personnel Classification
Division stating that "[T]he IBWC was not subject to the provisions of
the Classification Act of 1949", and 2) a February 12, 2003 letter in
which "OPM's Office of Merit Systems Acting Assistant Director
transmitted the findings of a review, and concluded that the IBWC was
established by treaties and conventions, and therefore its 'HRM
program' is not covered by Title 5."440 The MSPB did not rule on
those claims, but held that numerous other provisions of Title 5 cover
the USIBWC, all of which rely on the same definition of "agency.""'
D. WISHFUL THINKING

Perhaps surprisingly, the OIG reports have drawn almost no
comment from scholars or others, amid the unfortunately insular
academic debate about whether to reform or replace the IBWC. In a
unique departure from the standard critique, however, a recent article

434. Civil Service Due Process Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-376, 104 Stat.
461 (guaranteeing such employees the right to appeal a reduction in grade or a
removal to the Merit System Protection Board).
435. Wilcox v. Int'l Boundary Water Comm'n, 103 M.S.P.R. 73, 77-79 (2006).
436. Id. at 75.
437. Id. at 76-77.
438. Id.
439. Id. at 77.
440. Id.
441. Id.
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cites the 2005 OIG report and then focuses on the role of USIBWC
leadership, or lack thereof, in the agency's failing performance.4 4 2 The
authors briefly revisit two of the well-worn arguments: first, that the
USIBWC is a captive of parochial regional interests that conflict with
its twin roles of water management and diplomacy, and second, that
increasingly complex environmental issues necessitate accommodation
of new constituencies and collaboration with new agencies, requiring
technical, diplomatic and professional talents lacking in the politicallyoriented leadership of the USIBWC." 3 Then, taking note of the OIG
reports, they go on to assess the failed leadership of the agency,
arguing that in addition to traditional theories of leadership that
emphasize leadership traits and skills, heightened politicization
associated with a changing operational environment and mission,
together with a lack of executive branch oversight, increased the
structural risks of executive failure, resulting in "what can only be
regarded as a profound administrative failure in the management of
the IBWC's U.S. Section." 44 4
Rather than offering solutions, however, the article ends on an
inexplicably Pollyanna-ish note, seeming to hope against all evidence
to the contrary that, "[t]he U.S. Section's new management appears
ready to learn from the past and take advantage of new opportunities
to strengthen binational water management on the U.S.-Mexican
border."" The authors offer no evidence to support their optimism
about new leadership at the USIBWC (not even a self-serving interview
with the new Commissioner) and, as discussed below, there is none to
be found in recent events either.
VII. CURRENT CHAOTIC CONDITION OF THE USIBWC
A.

USIBWC EMPLOYEES SAY LEADERSHIP WORST IN NATION

Perhaps nothing is as telling about the current chaotic condition
of the USIBWC than the fact that the morale of its employees, long on
a downward trajectory, has reached a new low. USIBWC employees
have repeatedly rated it among the worst places to work in the entire
federal government, with the very worst leadership."' The USIBWC
perennially ranks at the very bottom of all small Federal agencies when
it comes to employee morale, and dead last when it comes to trust in
Agency leadership. Employee satisfaction with the agency and agency
leadership has fallen steadily since 2007, the first time the agency
participated in a national survey, popularly known as "Best Places to
Work" in the Federal Government.4 47

442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.

Mumme & Little, supranote 4, at 253-55.
Id. at 255-56.
Id. at 253, 263-66.
Id. at 267.
BESTPLACESTOWORK.ORG, supra note 58.
Id.; see also, David Crowder, IBWC Ranked Second-Worst FederalAgency by Employees,
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In 2010, the government-wide employee satisfaction score set forth
by Best Places to Work-achieved an all-time high average of 65 out of
100, representing a slight increase from 2009.448 The best small agency
rated an 86.8 and the best large agency an 81.8."' By comparison, the
IBWC garnered a score of 48, a drop from 49 in 2009, just edging out
the Selective Service System at 47 as the worst place to work in the
Federal Government; no large agency ranked below 57.4"o "The 2010
survey for the fifth time in a row showed the primary driver in the
federal space is effective leadership," according to the Institute for the
Study of Public Policy Implementation (ISPPI).451 In 2010, the IBWC
came in dead last in this category. IBWC's Effective Leadership score
was 33, down from 37 in 2009.452
The agency made an inadvertent public admission of its chaotic
management in a September - 15, 2009, contract solicitation for
reorganization assistance that stated "the agency is declining
significantly in overall indicators of human capital performance,"
caused by "numerous reorganizations of the USIBWC headquarters
[that] have taken place ...without the benefit of consistently
methodical approaches .

. . ."45

The agency cancelled the solicitation

one month later, without explanation. The irony was not lost on
Washington Post columnist Al Kamen who commented with sardonic
restraint, "The solicitation was canceled November 16, so maybe
things have gotten better on their own."454
The lack of professional management at the U.S. Section is evident
in a wide range of alleged misconduct, including rampant workplace
hostility and threats of violence, illegal manipulation of payrolls, secret
electronic surveillance of employees, and similar wrongdoing. 5 5
Unfortunately, due to the State Department's hands-off policy, and the
EL PASO INC., Sept. 13, 2010,
(documenting
http://www.elpasoinc.com/readArticle.aspx?issueid=303&xrec=5649
the IBWC's low ranking in the survey).
448. The Big Picture,
BESTPLACESTOWORK.ORG, http://bestplacestowork.org/BPTW/analysis (last visited
Mar. 22, 2011).
449. Welcome to the 2010 Best Places to Work Rankings, BESTPLACESTOWORK.ORG,
http://bestplacestowork.org/BPTW/rankings (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
450. Overall Index Scores,
BESTPLACESTOWORK.ORG, http://bestplacestowork.org/BPTW/irankings/overall/small

(last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
451.
452.

BESTPLACESTOWORK.ORG, supra note 448.
BESTPLACESTOWORK.ORG, supra note 58.

453. Conduct a Program Assessment, FEDERAL BUSINESS OPPORTUNITIEs (Sept. 15, 2009),
(follow
https://www.fbo.gov/?s=opportunity&mode=ist&tab=searchresults&.
"Conduct a Program Assessment" link) (showing the solicitation for bids to conduct a
program assessment, dated September 15, 2009, and cancelled November 16, 2009,
including recommendations to reorganize IBWC).
454. Al Kamen, Do You Have What It Takes to Be a Bailout Cop?, THE WASHINGTON
POST, Dec. 14, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2009/12/13/AR2009121302525_2.html?sid=ST2009121400400.
455. McCarthy Memo to OIG, supra note 48, at 1, 5-7, 9-11.
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Office of the Inspector General's doubts about its own jurisdiction, no
serious investigation of these charges is likely.
B.

MILLIONS WASTED ON DETERIORATED LEVEES

The USIBWC built and maintains over five hundred miles of levees
along the Rio Grande that protect more than three million Texas and
(Levees in Mexico protect several million
New Mexico residents.'
Mexican border residents.) A 2001 geo-technical analysis determined
that sixty percent of the Rio Grande flood control system was deficient.
457

In 2009, the USIBWC received $220 million in funding under
President Obama's Recovery Act stimulus progfam, virtually the entire
amount USIBWC requested for levee repair or replacement.4 8 While
the agency was accustomed to an average annual construction budget
the pressure to quickly spend the
of approximately $6 million,"

456. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE & THE BROAD. BD. OF
GOVERNORS, REPORT AUD/CG-10-12, INDEPENDENT ACCOUNTANTS' REPORT ON AUDIT OF
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY AND WATER COMMISSION: CONTRACT AWARD AND
MANAGEMENT OF FUNDS PROVIDED BY THE AMERICAN RECOVERY AND REINVESTMENT ACT 2

at
available
REPORT],
AUDIT
IBWC
[hereinafter
(2010)
http://oig.state.gov/documents/organization/145260.pdf.
457. Id.
458. Id. (stating that the Department of State received $600 million of Recovery
funds, of which $220 million was designated for the IBWC to use for "the repair
and/or rehabilitation of levee segments"); see also State ARRA Plan 2010, supra note
46, at 5 (stating that the $787 billion Recovery Act was signed into law on February 17,
2009, and provided USIBWC with funds for the Rio Grande Flood Control System
Project). See generally American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009, OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF STATE & THE BROAD. BD. OF GOVERNORS,
http://oig.state.gov/arra/index.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2011) (presenting an
overview of the act).
459. The USIBWC's annual construction budget has remained relatively constant
for many years. In the fiscal years 2000, 2001, and 2002, the construction budget was
approximately $6 million. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE BUDGET IN BRIEF - FISCAL YEAR

2002 107 (2002), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/2155.pdf.
In the fiscal years 2003, 2004, and 2005, the annual construction budgets were $5.4
million, $3.5 million, and $8.5 million, respectively. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE BUDGET
IN BRIEF - FISCAL YEAR 2005 BUDGET REQUEST 101 (2005), availableat

7
USIBWC's
The
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/28 90.pdf.
construction budget was approximately $5.2 million for the fiscal year 2006. See U.S.

DEP'T OF STATE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION- FISCAL YEAR 2008 827 (2008),

In the fiscal
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/2155.pdf.
year 2007, the construction budget remained at $5.2 million. For the fiscal year 2008,
the agency received a substantial one-time supplement of $66 million for courtordered construction of secondary wastewater treatment capability at the South Bay
International Wastewater Treatment Plant (SBIWTP) in California, and a dramatic
increase of approximately $20 million in levee construction funds. U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETJUSTIFICATION- FISCAL YEAR 2009 801 (2009),

The
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100326.pdf.
construction budget in the fiscal year 2009 soared to $263 million, including $220
million under the Recovery Act, another $22 million to bring the SBIWTP into
compliance with the Clean Water Act and its discharge permit, and an additional $17
million for levee work. The construction budget was reduced to $43 million in the
fiscal year 2010, including another $6 million for the SBIWTP and $21 million for
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Recovery Act funds predictably overwhelmed the agency. Flush with
funds, the agency tore down newly built levees allegedly so that it
could rebuild them with Recovery Act appropriations, wasting millions
of dollars as a consequence.6
In the process, the USIBWC cancelled
earlier construction contracts that were not a part of the Recovery Act,
under conditions that pushed several small businesses and contractors
to the brink of bankruptcy. 461
The agency was so anxious to spend the Recovery Act windfall that
its very first construction contract solicitation listed hundreds of pages
of state, rather than federal, contract regulations and building
specifications, which it had lifted verbatim from a private architectural
firm's designs for a non-federal client, along with the designs
themselves.462 The agency even agreed to subsidize the border barrier
being built by the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS") by
combining a levee with a border barrier wall in a single structure and
using Recovery funds to pay millions of dollars of the cost of the
border barrier in addition to the cost of the levee.463 By doing so, the
USIBWC was able to piggyback on DHS's exemption from compliance
with a wide range of environmental laws.464
In addition to the Recovery Act funds, the USIBWC received
another $37 million in 2009 emergency appropriations to reconstruct
fifteen miles of levees at Presidio, Texas, that had been completely
levees. The construction budget request for the fiscal year 2011 is approximately $27
million, including another $21 million for levees and $5 million to begin
rehabilitation of Amistad and Falcon Dam.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET JUSTIFICATION- FIScAL YEAR 2011 691-94

(2011), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/136355.pdf.
460. Crowder, supranote 54.
461. Id.
462. See Recovery - Construct Banker Floodway North Levee, FEDERAL BUSINESS
OPPORTUNITIES (July 24, 2009),
(follow
https://www.fbo.gov/?s=opportunity&mode=list&tab=searchresults&
"Recovery - Construct Banker Floodway North Levee" link to original and amended
solicitations) (in possession of author); see also McCarthy Memo to OIG, supra note 48,
at 2.
463. See McCarthy Memo to OIG, supranote 48, at 3. Such an agreement would be a
violation of the Purpose Act, 31 U.S:C. § 1301 (2011), and the Anti-Deficiency Act, 31
U.S.C. § 1341 (2011). Violations of the Anti-Deficiency Act can carry civil and criminal
penalties. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 1349, 1350 (2011).
464. The REAL ID Act of 2005 authorized the Secretary of Homeland Security to
"waive all legal requirements . . . necessary to ensure expeditious construction" of the
U.S-Mexico border fence. Pub. L. No. 109-13,. Div. B, Title 1, § 102(c), 119 Stat. 306
(2005), reprinted in 8 U.S.C. § 1103 note (Improvement of Barriers at Border).
Lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the exemptions law have been
unsuccessful. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Chertoff, 527 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C. 2007);
County of El Paso v. Chertoff, No. EP-08-CA-196-FM, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83045, at
For more information on border fence
*9, *13 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 29, 2008).
construction and the REAL ID Act, see generally CHAD C. HADDAL ET AL., BORDER
SEcURIY: BARRIERS ALONG THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL BORDER (2009), available at

discussion
of
For
a
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33659.pdf.
constitutional and policy concerns regarding such delegated waiver authority, see
generally Kate R. Bowers, Saying What the Law Isn't: Legislative Delegations of Waiver
Authority in EnvironmentalLaws, 34 HARV. ENvrL. L. REv. 257 (2010).
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destroyed by floods in 2008.465 Although geotechnical reports strongly
recommended construction on a new alignment, due to unsuitable
soils that had contributed to the original failure of the levees, the
USIBWC chose to rebuild the levees along the original alignment
because it was under pressure to act quickly."' These cosmetic levees
give a false appearance of protection and will again be subject to
disintegration in a flood of even lesser flow levels, wasting tens of
millions of dollars, not including the flood damages that may result.6 7
C.

SANITATION PLANTS SPEW Toxic WASTES

Pursuant to the terms of the 1944 Treaty, through which the
United States and Mexico agreed to give preferential attention to the
solution of all border sanitation problems, the IBWC operates a small
number of international Wastewater Treatment Plants. The South Bay
International Wastewater Treatment Plant (SBIWTP), located in San
Diego County, California, and adjacent to Tijuana, Mexico, has for
years continuously violated effluent limitations under the Clean Water
Act, and delays have plagued construction of court-ordered secondary
treatment facilities .4 The USIBWC recently renewed a five-year, $35
million contract with Veolia Water North America, which has operated
the plant since its inception in 1996.6
465. Consolidated Security, Disaster Assistance, and Continuing Appropriations Act
of 2009, H.R. 2638 110th Cong. (2008). See also, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL
COMMIsSIONS: CONGRESSIONAL BUDGETJUSTIFICATION 743 (2009),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/123638.pdf.
466. Id.
467. See George Sills, Letter Report: August 2009 Geotechnical Levee Assessment of
U.S. IBWC Levees at Presidio, TX, October 28-29, 2008 and January 6-7, 2009, (2009)
availableat http://peer.org/docs/tx/1-31 11_PresidioLeveeexcerpts.pdf ("it is very
critical to move the levee landward as far as practical to achieve improvement of the
river flow within this reach"); see also U.S. SECTION OF INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER
COMM'N, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT: FLOOD CONTROL IMPROVEMENTS AND
PARTIAL LEVEE RELOCATION, USIBWC PRESIDIO FLOOD CONTROL PROJECT, PRESIDIO,
at
available
(2010),
2-9
ES-6,
at
TEXAS,
(rejecting
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/FinalEISPresidoFCP_022210.pdf.
realignment alternative and selecting alternative to rehabilitate the levee system along
the current alignment notwithstanding acknowledgement that "preliminary
geotechnical studies (ERDC 2008) indicated several structural problems in this area");
McCarthy Memo to OIG, supra note 48, at 3.
468. See e.g. Chlifornia v. Duran, No. 01-CV-0270-BTM(JFS), at 1 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 6,
2004), available at
http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/rwqcb9/water-issues/programs/iwtp/docs/ibwc-ordl.pdf.
See also ERIC TERRILL ET AL., SCRIPPS INST. OF OCEANOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT: COASTAL
OBSERVATIONS AND MONITORING IN SouTH BAY SAN DIEGO, IBWC/ SURFRIDER CONSENT
DECREE 159-60 (2009),
at
available
http://cordc.ucsd.edu/about/docs/sboo-ibwc/IBWC-MonitoringSBOO.pdf; IBWC
& EPA, RECORD OF DECISION FOR FINAL EIS OF SBIWTP CLEAN WATER ACT COMPLIANCE
(2008) (recounting difficulties and controversies encountered in attempting to decide
how to comply with consent decree).
469. International Boundary & Water Commission Renews Veolia Water North America
Contract: Agreement to Extend Long-Standing Relationship, BUSINESSWIRE.COM (Dec. 15,
2010, 11:00AM),
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A second plant, in Nogales, Arizona, received 128 citations
between January 1995 and January 2000 for violation of water quality
standards.4 70 The USIBWC continues to struggle to comply with court
orders to clean up the plant's effluent.47 ' The IBWC has faced further
heavy criticism as well for its crumbling flood control channel in
Nogales, Sonora, Mexico, whose disrepair contributed to millions of
dollars in damages in 2008.7' These and other experiences have led
critics to describe the IBWC's role at Ambos Nogales (both Nogales) as
a series of failures over a period of more than fifty years.7
D. SKIRTING NEPA
The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal
agencies to ensure that environmental considerations are given careful
attention and appropriate weight in every recommendation or report
on proposals for legislation and for other federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment. 47 4 The regulations of
the Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ) set forth the procedures
for complying with NEPA.4 "* The CEQ Regulations require that each
federal agency develop their own regulations to detail how it will

http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20101215005203/en/InternationalBoundary-Water-Commission-Renews-Veolia-Water.
470. See Sierra Club v. Whitman, 268 F.3d 898, 900 (9th Cir. 2001).
471. See Abbott, supra note 53 (citing elevated levels of toxic metals in effluent from
the NIWTP in reports from May 2008 to June 2010, the Arizona Department of
Environmental Quality (ADEQ) issued an order requiring IBWC to clean up its
effluent and to stop its practice of spreading contaminated sludge on grazing pasture.)
"The order also alleges that IBWC knew it had excessive cadmium levels in its
biosolids on June 1, 2009, but delayed notifying the state until Aug. 4, 2010. According
to its permit under the Clean Water Act, IBWC is supposed to call ADEQ within 24
hours of learning about any exceedance 'which may endanger health or the
environment."' Id. See also Mark Shaffer, Ariz. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, ADEQ Issues
Order to IBWC for Cadmium Water Quality Violations and Failureto Properly Manage Sewage
Sludge (Oct. 25, 1010), availableat
("'The state is
http://www.azdeq.gov/function/news/2010/download/102510.pdf
telling the responsible federal agency, the IBWC, enough is enough. We need them to
step up to the plate and across the border to prevent toxic wastewater and sludge and
invest in 21st Century infrastructure, ADEQ Director Benjamin H. Grumbles said").
472. See Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, supra note 40. See also
Manuel C. Coppola, Crews Wrap up Sewer Line Repairs, NOGALES INT'L (Nov. 5, 2010,
11:50 AM),
http://www.nogalesinternational.com/articles/2010/11/05/news/doc4cd42dbadd05
2028877752.txt (reporting that Arizona's two United States Senators had written to
President Obama to complain that IBWC "has failed to provide the resources needed
for a long-term fix to the problem," which they said is estimated to require $20
million); Manuel C. Coppola, IBWC Working with City, Corps to Address Fooding,
NOGALES
INT'L
(Aug.
13,
2010,
10:26
AM),
http://www.nogalesinternational.com/articles/2010/08/13/news/doc4c655f30285e0
835852169.txt (reporting on flood damages to the IBWC Nogales Wash flood channel
and estimates of more than $60 million in needed repairs).
473. Ingram & White, supranote 4, at 158-74.
474. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006)
475. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (2010).
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comply with NEPA. 7 1 Both NEPA and the CEQ regulations emphasize
engaging the public in the develo ment and implementation of
individual agency NEPA procedures.
The USIBWC adopted its Operational Procedures under NEPA in
1981, with minimal public input from a border population that was
just beginning to appreciate the importance of the agency's NEPA
compliance. 7'
The USIBWC acknowledged, "[c]omments were
received only from the Council on Environmental Quality in response
to the Federal Register notice containing the proposed procedures.""
The CEQ suggested revision of section 100.3 of the USIBWC's NEPA
procedures to provide that the section shall comply with the
procedures and CEQ regulations except where compliance would be
inconsistent with statutory or treaty requirements.4 so Indeed, the
USIBWC complied with this suggestion, thus exempting the vast
majority of its actions from NEPA review:
The operational Procedures apply to all Section programs and
activities to the maximum extent possible without impairing its
international mission. Domestic requirements must not impair the
Section's performance of the United States' international obligations
with [sic] are carried out consistent with the treaties and foreign
policy of the United States. The Section shall comply with these
would
procedures and the CEQ regulations except where compliance
48
be inconsistent with statutory or treaty requirements. '
In addition to the broad exclusion for treaty requirements, the
USIBWQC adopted additional "categorical exclusions, "482 pursuant to
CEQ regulations that permit agencies to exempt from NEPA's
procedural requirements actions that do not have significant
The USIBWC lists thirteen
environmental consequences.4 83
categorical exclusions, including but not limited to:
Actions specifically required under any treaty or international
agreement, or pursuant thereto, to which the United States is a party,
or required by the decision of international organizations (including
courts), authorities or consultations in which the United States is a

476. Id. § 1507.3(a).
477. See id. § 1506.6(a) (requiring agencies to make "diligent efforts to involve the
public in preparing and implementing their NEPA procedures"); id. § 1507.3(a)
(providing that an agency's NEPA procedures shall be adopted only after an
"opportunity for public review," and that once in effect, the procedures must be made
"readily available to the public").
478. USIBWC NEPA Procedures, supra note 57, at 44083-44094.
479. Id. at 44083.
480.- Id. at 44083-84.
481. Id. at 44084.
482. Id. at 44086.
483. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2011) ("Categorical exclusion means a category of actions
which do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human
environment and which have been found to have no such effect in procedures
adopted by a federal agency in implementation of these regulations.")
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member or participant .... Leases of government land for grazing
and agricultural purposes .... Recreational leases to any city, county,
state or federal agency .... Leases or licenses regarding buried
utilities, including gas, water and sewer pipelines, and telephone
cables, irrigation drains, and storm sewers, sanitary sewers
discharging treated effluent, telephone and electric power poles and
lines, irrigation pumps, drain structures and ditches, fences, roads,
highways and bridges, water wells, boat docks and boat launching
facilities.... Temporary or single-time permit of project facilities. 48
The breadth of these exclusions is breathtaking. Indeed, it is hard
to imagine what projects undertaken by the USIBWC would not come
within one or more of the exclusions. This is not to say the USIBWC
has not undertaken Environmental Assessments (EA) and
Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) for some projects, but it
appears to have been done on a voluntary ad hoc basis with no public
input into the decision whether or not to use a categorical exclusion.48 5
It is unclear whether the public would even know about agency actions
when it has invoked a categorical exclusion, because the agency is
required to produce only an internal agency memorandum.'
Moreover, the USIBWC exclusion of all actions taken pursuant to
treaty requirements becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy since the IBWC
decides what actions to take under the 1944 Water Treaty.
Further,
it misrepresents the language of the Treaty itself, which specifies that
actions to be taken by the respective governments are to fully comply
with the domestic laws of each section.8
The CEQ regulations also require agency procedures to identify
"extraordinary circumstances" pursuant to which full NEPA
documentation is required even for actions that are normally classified
as categorical exclusions.48 9 "Extraordinary circumstances are factors
or circumstances in which a normally excluded action may have a
significant environmental effect that then requires a further analysis in

484. ' USIBWC NEPA Procedures, supra note 57, at 44086.
485. Even if a proposed action fits within the definition of a categorical exclusion,
and does not raise extraordinary circumstances, the CEQ Regulations make clear that
an agency can at its discretion decide "to prepare an environmental assessment ... in
order to assist agency planning and decisionmaking." 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3(b) (2011).
486. USIBWC NEPA Procedures, supra note 57, at 44087 ("Categorical Exclusions.
An environmental memorandum will be prepared which includes a description of the
proposed action, and a finding that the action is categorically excluded and no further
environmental action is needed to comply with NEPA, executive orders, regulations
and other acts. This memorandum shall be referenced in decision documents.")
487. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, at 1257.
488. Article 24 of the 1944 Water Treaty provides, in part, "The International
Boundary and Water Commission shall have, in addition to the powers and duties
otherwise specifically provided in this Treaty, the following powers and duties: ... (b)
To construct the works agreed upon or to supervise their construction and to operate
and maintain such works or to supervise their operation and maintenance, in
accordance with the respective domestic laws of each country." Id. at 1255.
489. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.4 (2011) ("Any procedures under this section shall provide for
extraordinary circumstances in which a normally excluded action may have a
significant environmental effect.").
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an [EA] or an [EIS]. "49

The USIBWC Procedures include an "an extraordinary
circumstance" statement, but provide no criteria for when it would
apply.49 1 In its entirety, the statement reads: "In an extraordinary
circumstance, as determined by the Commissioner, in which a
normally excluded action may have a significant environmental effect,
This barebones
an environmental assessment will be prepared."'
language does not identify what factors or circumstances might
constitute extraordinary circumstances and essentially leaves the
determination to the unfettered discretion of the Commissioner.493
Reference to CEQ Guidance on "Establishing, Applying and
Revising Categorical Exclusions under the NEPA," suggests numerous
shortcomings in the USIBWC's use of categorical exclusions and
extraordinary circumstances.4 4 The CEQ Guidance emphasizes that
"categorical exclusions are not exemptions or waivers of NEPA review;
The CEQ Guidance
they are simply one type of NEPA review."*4
states that categorical exclusions "should clearly define the eligible
category of actions, as well as any physical temporal or environmental
factors that would constrain its use." 4 96
Citing examples of extraordinary circumstances identified by an
agency, such as impact on protected species or habitat, the CEQ
Guidance states "agency NEPA implementing procedures should
clearly describe the manner in which an agency applies extraordinary
circumstances and the circumstances under which additional analysis
Further, "if extensive
in an EA or an EIS is warranted.""
extraordinary circumstances are needed to limit a . proposed
categorical exclusion, the agency should also consider whether the
categorical exclusion itself is appropriate.""'The USIBWC statement
of extraordinary circumstances is completely inadequate, both as
The Ninth Circuit has required
promulgated and as applied.
documentation to demonstrate that a Federal agency has considered
the environmental impact of extraordinary circumstances. 9 The CEQ
regulations direct Federal agencies to "continue to review their
490. Memorandum from Nancy H. Sutley on Establishing, Applying and Revising
Categorical Exclusions under the National Environmental Policy Act 2 (Nov. 23, 2010)
[hereinafter CEQ Guidance], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ceq/NEPA%20Categorical
%20Exclusion%20Guidance%2023-11-2010.pdf.
491. USIBWC NEPA Procedures, supra note 57, at 44086.
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. CEQ Guidance, supranote 490, at 2-3.
495. Id. at 2.
496. Id. at 5.
497. Id. at 6.
498. Id.
499. California v. Norton, 311 F. 3d 1162, 1175-78 (9th Cir. 2002); see also, Kevin H.
Moriarty, Note, Circumventing The NationalEnvironmentalPolicy Act: Agency Abuse Of The
Categorical Exclusion, 79 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2312, 2329-30, 2333 (2004) (analyzing
"extraordinary circumstances" language).
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policies and procedures and in consultation with [CEQ] to revise them
as necessary to ensure full compliance with the purposes and
provisions of [NEPA]."500

The CEQ Guidance states: "Where an

agency's categorical exclusions have not been regularly reviewed, they
should be reviewed by the agency as soon as possible,o' The CEQ
recommends a "seven-year cycle" for review of agency categorical
exclusions, to ensure they are appropriate "in light of evolving or
changing conditions that might present new or different
environmental impacts or risks."o 2 The USIBWC categorical
exclusions, inadequate as they are, have not been reviewed in 30 years.
E.

CATERING

To SPECIAL INTERESTS

In recent years the USIBWC has established advisory groups in an
attempt to counter criticisms that it is secretive and resistant to public
input. The USIBWC established five regional "Citizen Forums"
between 1999 and 2005, each comprising a membership appointed by
the U.S. Commissioner, "to facilitate the exchange of information
between the USIBWC and members of the public about Commission
activities. "o50 In addition, the USIBWC's "Clean Rivers Program" has
established separate "Basin Advisory Committees. "50o It appears that
the USIBWC establishment of these advisory committees is in direct
violation of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA),' which has
stringent requirements for establishment of such groups.
Enactment of FACA in 1972 was prompted by the belief of many
citizens and Members of Congress that a proliferation of advisory
committees was duplicative, inefficient, and lacked adequate control
or oversight. Additionally, there was strong public sentiment that such
committees failed to sufficiently represent the public interest by
allowing special interests special access to sway policy-makers.os
Through FACA, Congress sought to sharply limit the increasing
number of advisory committees and to open their activities to public
FACA requires continuing congressional review of each
scrutiny.0
advisory committee to ensure that it fulfills its defined purpose, that its
membership is "fairly balanced in terms of the points of view
represented and the functions to be performed," 50' and that the

500.
501.
502.

40 C.F.R. § 1507.3(a) (2011).
CEQ Guidance, supranote 4900, at 15.
Id.atl6.

503.

San

Diego

Citizens

Forums,

INT'L

BOUNDARY

http://www.ibwc.gov/Citizens_Forums/CF_SBIWTP.html
504.

See

Basin

Advisory

Committees,

INT'L

&

WATER

COMM'N,

(last visited Mar. 8, 2011).

BOUNDARY

&

WATER

COMM'N,

http://www.ibwc.gov/crp/participation.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
505. 5 U.S.C. app. § 5 (2006).
506. See WENDY R. GINSBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40520, FEDERAL ADVISORY
COMMITEES: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2009),

availableat http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40520.pdf.
507. 5 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2006).
508. Id.§5(b)(2).
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committee will "not be inappropriately influenced by the appointing
authority or by any special interest." 5 "
Congress charged the General Services Administration (GSA) with
administering FACA, granting it authority to develop and apply
guidelines and controls to improve the performance of advisory
committees. 1 0 All advisory committees that are subject to FACA must
file a charter every two years with the GSA."1 ' FACA-governed entities
are defined specifically within the act, to include:
any committee, board, commission, council, conference, panel, task
force, or other similar group, or any subcommittee or other subgroup
thereof (hereafter in this paragraph referred to as "committee"),
which is -

(A) established by statute or reorganization plan, or

(B) established or utilized by the President, or

(C) established or utilized by one or more agencies, in the interest of
obtaining advice or recommendations for the President or one or
more agencies or officers of the Federal Government, except that
such term excludes any committee that is composed wholly of fulltime, or permanent part-time, officers or employees of the Federal
Government, and (ii) any committee that is created by the National
or the National Academy of Public
Academy of 5 Sciences
12
Administration.
There is no reason to doubt that the advisory committees created
by the USIBWC are covered by the FACA, yet there. is no record of the
USIBWC having complied with the requirements for establishing such
Additionally, a large part of the
advisory groups under the FACA."
intent and purpose of the FACA, to ensure that special interests are
not given special access to sway public policy, is frustrated by the makeup of the USIBWC's committees. Although the full membership
information is not posted on the USIBWC's website, a review of press
releases in the last couple of years reveals the committees are stacked
51
with representatives of local irrigation districts. " Thus, even if the

509. Id.§5(b)(3).
510. Id. § 7.
511. Id. § 14 (a) (B) (2) (2006).
512. Id., § 3(2).
513. See DatabaseSearch, FEDERAL INTERAGENCY DATABASES ONLINE,
http://fido.gov/facadatabase/databasesearch.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
514. See, e.g., Press Release, USIBWC, USIBWC Appoints Colorado River Citizens
Arizona (Aug.
Forum Board Members; Public Meeting Set For September 1 In Yuma,
9
20, 2009), available at-http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/PressRelease_08200 .pdf.
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USIBWC successfully completed the procedural steps required to
create such committees, they would be unlikely to satisfy FACA's
requirement that membership be "fairly balanced in terms of the
points of view represented.""'
AJustice Department opinion states that "Congress did not intend
the Federal Advisory Committee Act ... to apply to such a body
created jointly by the United States and another nation," such as the
U.S.-Japan Consultative Group on Economic relations.' However, the
USIBWC advisory committees do not advise the IBWC, an
international body, they advise the U.S. Section, a federal agency.
Thus, the USIBWC has used the FACA, much like NEPA, to give the
appearance of public participation while actually skirting the law and
shutting the public out.
F.

NEGLECTED DAMS POSE CATASTROPHIC THREATS

The most alarming fact about the current state of the USIBWC and
its failing infrastructure, however, concerns the unsafe condition of
two major storage dams on the Rio Grande, and the agency's efforts to
hide from the public breathtaking information about the imminent
threat of a major catastrophe.'
The Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA) in 2009 rated three massive storage dams operated by
the IBWC in its highest hazard classification, another dam as a
"significant" hazard, and three dams as presenting a "low" hazard."'
Indeed, the USIBWC itself had previously recognized that that

515. 5 U.S.C. app. § 5(b) (2) (2006).
516. Memorandum from Larry A. Hammond, Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legal Counsel, to the President 3 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 321, 322 (1979).
517. See, e.g., Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, supra note 39
("Two international storage dams operated by USIBWC have been rated unsafe.
Millions of residents on both sides of the border are at high risk of inundation by
floods due to the disrepair.").
See also, Emma Perez-Trevino, Inspections Indicate
Weakness
in
Some
Dams,
BROWNSVILLE
HERALD,
July
14,
2010,
http://www.brownsvilleherald.com/articles/dams-1 14378-indicate-inspections.html;
Emma Perez-Trevino, State Keeping Eye on Dams and Levees, BROWNSVILLE HERALD, July
19,
2010,
http://www.brownsvilleherald.com/articles/texas-1 14531-divisioncommission.html; Emma Perez-Trevino, Former IBWC Counsel Alleges Abuses Affecting
Safety,
BROWNSVILLE
HERALD,
August
7,
2010,
http://www.brownsvilleherald.com/articles/water-1 15220-grande-dams.html
(documenting concerns with the IBWC).
518. FEMA, P-759, DAM SAFETY IN THE UNITED STATES (2009), available at
http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?id=3677 (follow download link); Federal
law imposes duties on both the Army Corps of Engineers and FEMA with respect to
dam safety. The law requires the Corps of Engineers to "carry out a national program
of inspection of dams for the purpose of protecting human life and property." 33
U.S.C. § 467(a) (2006). Excluded from the program, however, are dams under the
jurisdiction of the-IBWC, unless the IBWC requests the Corps to inspect its dams. Id.
FEMA is responsible for coordination of dam safety, including an Interagency
Committee on Dam Safety, which ironically, includes IBWC representation. Id. §
467(e). FEMA has adopted Federal Guidelines for Dam Safety to establish a basic
structure for agencies' dam safety programs. Federal Guidelinesfor Dam Safety, FEMA,
(last modified Aug. 11, 2010),
http://www.fema.gov/plan/prevent/damfailure/fema333.shtm.
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none of the IBWC dams located on the Rio Grande are considered
"Safe". Using criteria developed by the United States Army Corps of
Engineers, the IBWC itself assigned safety ratings to its dams on a scale
that ranges from Class I to Class V, with Class V being "Safe." "'
Ratings assigned to the two massive IBWC storage dams on the Rio
Grande are especially alarming, as they are deemed to be in "urgent"
and "high priority" need of repair. '
Amistad Dam, dedicated in 1969, is the largest of the storage dams
and reservoirs built on the international reach of the Rio Grande.
Amistad Storage Dam was rated Class II, "Urgent (Potentially
Unsafe)."522 The actual report on which the conclusions are based is
referenced on the IBWC website.52 ' But, the USIBWC refused to
release an updated report in response to a FOIA request from Public
Employees for Environmental Responsibility (PEER).524
Although not acknowledged on the IBWC website, the rating
assigned to Amistad means "failure could begin during normal
operations or be initiated as the consequence of an event. The
likelihood of failure from one of these occurrences, prior to
remediation, is too high to assure public safety." The operator of a
Class II dam is supposed to "[i]mplement interim risk reduction
[c] onduct
measures, including operational restrictions,...
heightened monitoring and evaluation ... [and] [g]ive very high
priority for investigations to supportjustification for remediation."52 1
Falcon Dam, built between 1950 and 1954, "is the lowermost major

519.

See

Safety

of

Dams,

INT'L

BOUNDARY

&

WATER

COMM'N,

http://www.ibwc.gov/MissionOperations/SoD.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
There are five Dam Safety Action Classes. They are as follows: I - Urgent and
Compelling (Unsafe); 11 - Urgent (Unsafe or Potentially Unsafe); III - High Priority
(Conditionally Unsafe); IV - Priority (Marginally Safe); V - Normal (Safe), id.
520.

Amistad Dam, INT'L BOUNDARY& WATER COMM'N,

[hereinafter Amistad
http://www.ibwc.gov/MissionOperations/SoDAmistad.html
Dam] (last visited Mar. 22, 2011); Falcon Dam, INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM'N,
http://www.ibwc.gov/Mission-Operations/SoDFalcon.html [hereinafter Falcon Dam]
(last visited Mar. 22, 2011).
521. Amistad
Project
Office,
INT'L
BOUNDARY
&
WATER
COMM'N,
(last
http://www.ibwc.gov/Organization/Operations/FieldOffices/amistad.html
visited Mar. 22, 2011).

See generally INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM'N, STRATEGIC PLAN

FY 2008- FY 2013 (2010), http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/StrategicPlan.pdf [hereinafter
IBWC STRATEGIC PLAN].

522. See Amistad Dam, supra note 520.
523. Amistad Project Office, INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM'N,
(follow
http://www.ibwc.gov/Organization/Operations/Field_Offices/amistad.html
the link "Joint Report of the Technical Advisors of the IBWC regarding the
Geotechnical, Electrical, Mechanical and Structural Safety of Amistad Dam") (last
visited Apr. 18, 2011).
524. See Jared Taylor, Environmental Group Sues IBWC over Withheld Info, MONITOR,
Feb.,. 1, 2011, 7:08 PM, http://www.themonitor.com/news/environmental46750group-ibwc.html.
525. See, e.g., TIMOTHY M. O'LEARY, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS, USING PFMA WITH
IRRM PLANS: POTENTIAL FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS WORKSHOP, at Q-5 (2007),
http://www.usbr.gov/ssle/damsafety/Risk/pfma/TabQ
UsingPFMAwithIRRMPlans.pdf.
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multipurpose international dam and reservoir on the Rio Grande."52 6
The United States Army Corp of Engineers rated the Falcon Storage
For a
Dam as Class III, "High Priority-(Conditionally Unsafe)." 2
Class III dam, such as Falcon, the "probability of failure is moderate to
high." Corrective action calls for the agency to "[i] mplement interim
risk reduction measures, including operational restrictions ...
[c]onduct heightened monitoring and evaluation ...
[and]
for
for investigations to support justification
[p]rioritize
remediation.""'
Yet, in the 2010 hurricane and monsoon season, the IBWC
maintained historically high dam levels and made unprecedented dam
releases, nonchalantly proclaiming that the IBWC was operating the
dams normally. 2' According to the Corps, only for dams in Class V,
the "Safe" dams, should the operator "[c]ontinue routine dam safety
"Heightened
activities, normal operation, and maintenance."so
monitoring and evaluation" and "very high priority for investigations",
as translated by the IBWC, meant that a "risk analysis study on Amistad
IBWC's
Dam" was supposed to be completed sometime in 2010!'
website notes that it planned to "initiate preliminary investigations and
evaluation of Falcon Dam in FY2009."1 2 The agency acknowledges
that it prepared a November 2009 updated report on the condition of
Amistad," but refused to make that public.3
G. SECRECY AND COVER-UP

More shocking, however, was the agency's decision to hide from
the public the inundation maps that would show the extent of the
catastrophe that would ensue should one of the IBWC dams fail. The
IBWC website does not even acknowledge the existence of
"Emergency Action Plans" (EAPs) and inundation maps, although
they are considered essential to reduce potential property damage and
loss of lives in areas that dam failure would affect. A complete EAP
includes a map of the potential inundation area, procedures and

526. Falcon Dam & Power Plant, INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM'N,
(last
http://www.ibwc.gov/Organization/Operations/FieldOffices/Falcon.html
visited Apr. 18, 2011); IBWC STRATEGIC PLAN, supranote 521, at 7.
527. INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER COMM'N, supra note 5266; INT'L BOUNDARY & WATER
COMM'N JoINT REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL ADvISORS OF THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
AND WATER COMMISSION REGARDING THE GEOTECHNICAL, ELECTRICAL, MECHANICAL AND
STRUCTURAL SAFEIY OF FALCON DAM 5, availableat

http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/SODReportFalcon.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
528. O'LEARY, supra note 525, at Q-5.
529. See, e.g., Perez-Trevino, Inspections Indicate Weakness in Some Dams, supra note
517; Perez-Trevino State keeping Eye on Dams and Levees, supra note 517; Perez-Trevino,
FormerIBWC Counsel Alleges Abuses Affecting Safety, supra note 517.
530. O'LEARY, supra note 525, at Q-5.
531. Id.; Perez-Trevino, supra note 59.
532. Falcon Dam, supranote 520.
533. Amistad Dam, supranote 520; Perez-Trevino, supranote 59.
534. Taylor, supra note 524.
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information for warning downstream emergency management
authorities, and other crucial information."
Although the IBWC denied a FOIA request for its EAP and maps,
claiming they do not exist,536 the agency apparently has told another
story to FEMA. FEMA has reported that "the USIBWC has an EAP for
each of its large storage dams (Amistad and Falcon), as well as for
Anzalduas and Retamal International Diversion Dams."53 1
The IBWC has been aware of the sinkholes that threaten the
integrity of Amistad Dam since 1990, and they have gotten worse, now
numbering approximately thirty and varying in 'size and severity. 3
Besides the sinkholes, a "depression" area has also been noticed on
the upstream embankment and water seepage has been noticed
downstream from the dam.539 If the Amistad Dam were to fail, nearly 5
million acre-feet of water would be released. 4 o Falcon Dam also has a
history of foundation seepage and there are serious questions about
the stability of the entire Falcon Dam, which inspectors noted is in
need of further evaluation."' "Both Amistad Dam and Falcon Dam
were built before 1972 when the National Dam Inspection Act was
passed and before . . . guidelines for dam safety were developed." 4 2

On appeal of the FOIA denial, the USIBWC belatedly
acknowledged the existence of various documents related to the ultrahazardous condition of the Amistad and Falcon Dams, but once again
the U.S. Section refused to produce the requested information.
This time, instead of denying the existence of the documents,
including an admitted seventy-seven inundation maps, the USIBWC
claimed the documents are exempt from disclosure under the FOIA
because they are mere drafts subject to the deliberative process
exemption under the FOIA.544 Additionally, IBWC withheld the
documents pursuant to a claim that "disclosure of such information
could facilitate illegal acts against critical infrastructure."54 5
The claim that the documents are drafts subject to the deliberative
process exemption is troubling, both since "maps are simply factual
535. About
EAPs,
DAMSAFETYACrION.ORG,
http://www.damsafetyaction.org/TX/about-eaps/what-eap.php (last visited Mar. 22,
2011).
536. Taylor, supra note 524.
537. FEMA, Dam Safety in the United States, supranote 518, at 32.
538. Perez-Trevino, Deficiencies, supra note 59.
539. Id.
540. Id.
541. Id.
542. Id.
543. See Letter from Steve Fitten, Chief FOIA Officer, USIBWC, to Public Employees
for Environmental Responsibility (Nov. 29, 2010) (on file with author); Complaint at
1, 2, Pub. Emp. for Envtl. Responsibility v. U.S. Int'l Boundary & Water Comm'n, No.
1:11CV00261 (Jan. 31, 2011), 2011 WL 466053,
at
available
http://peer.org/docs/tx/1_31 11_USIBWC-damsafetyFOIAComplaint.pdf.
544. Complaint, supra note 543, at 2.
545. Letter from Steve Fitten, supra note 543; Complaint, supra note 543, at 8.
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representations and not subject to policy deliberation, [and] also
because the documents have been in perpetual draft form decades
after they were first required, precisely to avoid public disclosure."54
Moreover, the claim of deliberative process suggests the EAPs have not
been shared with state and local officials, which is either a
preposterous claim or an admission of a truly counterproductive
obsession with secrecy.54 7
Even more troubling is the USIBWC claim that emergency action
plans and inundation maps may be withheld from the public on the
basis that "disclosure of such information could facilitate illegal acts
against critical infrastructure."8 . By this logic, communities
throughout the nation may be denied the very information mandated
for their safety planning."' In reality, it is plain that the USIBWC is
546. Complaint, supra note 543, at 2. The Amistad EAP "itself suggests this, at p. 27
('Emergency Action Plans should be considered 'Living Documents,' This means that:
(1) They will never be complete, (2) They should be reviewed not less than
annually.')." Id. at 2 n.I. See also EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 91 (1973) (discussing the
Freedom of Information Act and the scope of the deliberative process privilege).
547. The exemption protects "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters
which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with
the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (5) (2011).
548. Complaint, supra note 543, at 20. The USA Patriot Act of 2001 defines "critical
infrastructure" as "systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United
States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a
debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or
safety, or any combination of those matters." 42 U.S.C. § 5195c(e) (2011). The
Homeland Security Act of 2002 includes a provision that operate as a new "Exemption
3 statute" under the FOIA for "critical infrastructure" information that is obtained by
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 6 U.S.C. § 133(a) (1) (A) (2011). The
Exemption 3 statute provides new protection under the FOIA for information
pertaining to the nation's critical infrastructure that is voluntarily submitted to DHS.
The Act contains an extensive definition of the term "critical infrastructure
information." This exemption would not apply to USIBWC, and USIBWC has not
claimed Exemption 3. Courts have been asked to protect different types of
information related to homeland security under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (2011), but the
information must relate solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency. Not only that, but even when the exemption is sought, the agency must
sufficiently articulate the potential harm from disclosure. Agencies' "conclusory ...
boilerplate" assertions are insufficient to support non-disclosure of even intra-agency
practices. See, e.g., El Badrawi v. Dep't Homeland Security, 583 F. Supp. 2d 285, 312
(D. Conn. 2008).
549. There is some precedent for withholding inundation maps under FOIA due to
claimed threat of terrorist attack. In Milner v. Department of Navy, 562 U.S. -, 131
S. Ct. 1259 (2011), the Supreme Court of United States held that FOIA exemption 2, 5
U. S. C. §552(b) (2), could not be used by the Department of the Navy to deny a FOIA
request for data and maps used to help store explosives at a naval base in Washington
State. Thus, when assessing records whose disclosure would risk circumvention of the
law, as by terrorists, the government must assert interference with a law enforcement
function, under exemption 7, §552(b) (7), as in the only reported case to uphold an
agency's refusal to release inundation maps. A Federal District Court in Utah declined
to order the Bureau of Reclamation to release inundation maps for the areas below
Hoover Dam and Glen Canyon Dam, when the Bureau claimed that it was acting in a
statutory law enforcement capacity. Living Rivers, Inc. v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation,
272 F. Supp. 2d 1313, 1320, 1322 (D. Utah 2003); see also Cara Muroff, Terrorists and
Tennis Courts: How Legal Interpretations of the Freedom of Information Act and New Laws
Enacted to Prevent Terrorist Attacks Will Shape the Public's Ability to Access Critical
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cowering behind bogus claims of privilege to hide its own gross
incompetence, thereby putting millions of border residents at even
greater peril by virtue of denying them information deemed essential
to their safety.
The annual USIBWC budget requests in recent years indicate the
agency has considered dam safety anything but a "high priority" in the
twenty years it has known about the poor condition of the dams.
There appears to be a dawning awareness of the need to address
urgent safety issues at the two major international storage dams on the
Rio Grande, but those tentative efforts appear to be mainly still in the
investigatory stages.55 0 The agency's response to the
FOIA appeal also revealed that it did- not even have an EAP of any
kind for Falcon Dam prior to
February 17, 2009." Similarly, the agency suggests the EAP still
has no inundations maps. 5
VIII.EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY AND THE USIBWC
A.

DOCTRINE OF SELF-EXECUTING TREATIES

The Supremacy Clause states that, like the Constitution and
federal statutes, "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
"
In the leading case of Foster v. Nielson, 554 decided in
Land;

InfrastructureInformation, 16 U. FLA.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 149, 166-68(2005). The IBWC has
made no law enforcement claim, which in any event would not explain its initial
deception regarding the existence of the maps. Significantly, the Army Corps of
Engineers, like most of the 100,000 dam operators in the U.S., make their EAPs and
inundation maps widely available, often on the internet. The Corps maintains the
National Inventory of Dams at http://nid.usace.army.mil. The Corps has posted
online all of the inundation maps for Wolf Creek Dam in Kentucky, for example,
which impounds Lake Cumberland, the largest reservoir east of the Mississippi River
and ninth largest in the U.S. See Wolf Creek Inundation Maps, ARMY CORPS. OF ENGINEERS
http://www.1m.usace.army.mil/WolfCreek/mapsonline.htm (Apr. 19, 2011); see also,
Austin Peay State University GIS Center, Wolf Creek Dam, AP GIS CENTER,
http://gisweb.apsu.edu/WolfCreek.html (last visited May 24, 2010). FEMA is similarly
unequivocal about the need for communities to have access to EAPs and inundation
maps for their own emergency preparedness planning. See, e.g., FEMA, CREDIT FOR
DAM SAFETY, at 2 (2006),
available

at

http://www.fema.gov/library/viewRecord.do?fromSearch=fromsearch&id=4612.
State laws often require public access to dam safety information as well. See, e.g., CAL.
GOv'T CODE § 8589.5(b) (West 2010); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 173-175-520 (West 2009).
550. See, e.g., STATE DEP'T BUDGET 2011, supra note, at 692-96.
551. See Redacted FOLA copy of the Falcon EAP, C-10, Revisions and Updates made
to EAP, describing February 17, 2009 version as the "original" EAP (on file with
author).
552. See Redacted FOIA copy of the Falcon EAP, G-1, Desirable Additions to this
Manual includes "inundation maps" (on file with author).
553. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
554. See Foster v. Nielson, 27 U.S. 253 (1829), rev'd on other giounds, United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. 51 (1833).
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1829, the Supreme Court explained that notwithstanding the language
of the Supremacy Clause, not all treaties are immediately the law of the
land upon their ratification:
But when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either
of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty addresses
itself to the political, not the judicial department; and the legislature
must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the
Court.
The Supreme Court recently revisited the distinction in the case of
Medellin v. Texas,"" wherein the Court noted the longstanding
distinction between a self-executing treaty, which upon entry into force
"automatically constitute [s] binding federal law enforceable in United
States courts," and a non-self-executing treaty, which does not.557 In
determining whether a treaty provision is self-executing, the Court has
focused on the intent of the U.S. treatymakers as evidenced by the
treaty's text.558 The Court has also considered the negotiation and
drafting history, as well as the post-ratification understanding of
signatory nations, including the views of the Executive Branch.5
Nothing in the Court's Medellin decision suggests that the
president is not still constitutionally bound to comply with a non-selfexecuting treaty. The lack of implementing legislation (and thus
justiciability) would seem to have no effect on the president's
constitutional duty to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."
Indeed, Medellin makes clear that the president may take non56
judicial actions to enforce a non-self-executing treaty, even if the
president is precluded from "unilaterally making the treaty binding on
domestic courts."561 For example, the Court suggests, the president
might set aside state law to implement a non-self-executing treaty.6 2
Obviously, then, the President may and must require compliance with
a non- self-executing treaty within the executive branch, and to that
end should employ any available constitutional or statutory
authorities.5 63
Under Medellin, the 1944 Water Treaty is shown to be non-self555. Id. at 314.
556. Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008).
557. Id. at 504. Due to the unique facts of the case, and the court's somewhat
inscrutable opinion, scholars disagree as to how far the Court may have tilted away
from a presumption of self-execution of international agreements entered into by the
United States, and the power of the president to implement such agreements without
an act of Congress. See generally, David J. Bederman, Medellin's New Paradigmfor Treaty
Interpretation,102 AMI.J. INT'L L. 529 (2008).
558. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 506 n.3, 518-19.
559. Id. at 507, 513.
560. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
561. Medellin, 552 U.S. at 530.
562. Id. at 523 n.13.
563. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Intent, Presumptions, and Non-Self-Executing Treaties,
102 AM.J. INT'L L. 540, 549-50 (2008).
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executing. Applying the first part of the analysis, examination of the
text, the Protocol to the Treaty specifies that it is "an integral part of
the Treaty," and:
(a) [t]hat no commitment for works to be built by the United States
in whole or in part at its expense, or for expenditures by the United
States, other than those specifically provided for in the treaty, shall be
made by the Secretary of State of the United States, the
Commissioner of the United States Section of the International
Boundary and Water Commission, the United States Section of said
Commission, or any other officer or employee of the United States,
without prior approval of the Congress of the United States ....

(b) Insofar as they affect persons and property in the territorial limits
of the United States, the powers and functions of the Secretary of
State of the United States, the Commissioner of the United States
Section of the International Boundary and Water Commission, the
United States Section of said Commission, and any other officer or
employee of the United States, shall be subject to the statutory and
constitutional controls and processes. Nothing contained in the treaty
or protocol shall be construed as impairing the power of the
Congress of the United States to define the terms of office of
members of the United States Section of the International Boundary
and Water Commission or to provide for their appointment by the
President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate or
otherwise. 5
Indeed, Congress has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme
to implement the 1944 Water Treaty and the other boundary and
water treaties.5 " The Senate Report that accompanies the AmericanMexican Treaty Act of 1950 states that the legislation was needed to
authorize the USIBWC to engage in activities including construction
of storage dams on the Rio Grande, and other activities consistent with
and required by 1944 Water Treaty, which heretofore had been
authorized only on a yearly basis by appropriation acts.5" Moreover,
the Report makes clear that "[t]he treaty of 1944 and enabling
legislation (principally the Act of August 19, 1935, 49 Stat. 660)
authorize the United States Section of the Boundary Commission to
carry on most of the activities necessary in connection with its
The Report is accompanied by letters from the State
operations.

564.

1944 Water Treaty, supranote 3, at Protocol (a), (b).

565. See 22 U.S.C. § 277 (2011).
566. S. Rep. No. 81-2095 (1950), reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3734, 3735, 1950 WL
1829.
567. Id. As described above, the exact same 1935 law cited in the legislative history
as giving the USIBWC most of its powers explicitly authorizes the President to
designate the USIBWC, or any other federal agency, to perform those functions, and it
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Department, which drafted the bill."* The detailed provisions of these
statutes also evidence the post-ratification understanding of the United
States that such legislation was essential to implementation of the
treaties.
Again, it is important to stress that the non-self-executing nature of
the Treaty merely precludes judicial enforcement, except for those
provisions that have been implemented through legislation. The
executive branch is nevertheless bound by all of the Treaty's
provisions, including for example those concerning allocation of
boundary waters between the United States and Mexico.
B. EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY OVER ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
The State Department has fabricated a variety of excuses for
abandoning its responsibilities for oversight of the USIBWC. Chief
among these is the implication that the agency is subject not to control
by the executive branch, but solely by Congress. The fuzzy claim is
promoted by the Department's oft-repeated insistence that the
USIBWC cannot be reined in by the executive branch absent
congressional approval. Even academic scholars have propagated the
myth of congressional control that the State Department instigated. A
recent article claims that "the U.S. IBWC was structured, in effect, as a
congressional agency, an agency that under normal circumstances was
meant to operate with a considerable degree of congressional
oversight."56 9 Yet, when it ratified the 1944 Treaty, the Senate did not
make the position of Commissioner subject to its advice and
consent.7 o The abdication of this right-indeed this constitutional
obligation-hardly suggests a heightened congressional interest in
overseeing the agency.5 71
In contrast to the "congressional agency" theory, the IBWC
"considers itself an independent federal government agency whose

specifies that the Secretary of State, acting through the USIBWC, is so authorized.
568. Id.
569. Mumme & Little, supranote 5.
570. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, at Protocol (b).
571. Under the U. S. Constitution Appointments Clause, the president may appoint
two classes of officers: principal officers and inferior officers. The former are
appointed subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl.
2. In Edmond v. United States, the Court explained that, at a minimum, to be an
inferior officer one must be subordinate: "Whether one is an 'inferior' officer
depends on whether he has a superior." Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662
(1997). If "directed and supervised at some level by others who were appointed by
Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of the Senate," one has a
superior. Id. at 663.
The Congress has no authority to vest the appointment of
"principal" officers in the President alone. The Supreme Court has recognized that
"the Appointments Clause of Article II is more than a matter of 'etiquette or
protocol'; it is among the significant structural safeguards of the constitutional
scheme."
Id. at 659 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976)).
The
requirement for "Advice and Consent of the Senate" serves both to curb Executive
abuses of the appointment power, and "to promote ajudicious choice of [persons] for
filling the offices of the union." Id. (citations omitted).
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leader is answerable only to the President." 7 ' This view presumably is
shared by the State Department,5 7" yet there is no statutory or other
support for the claim. Independent agencies are distinguished from
other executive agencies by their structural and functional
characteristics, or by statutory designation; whereas most executive
agencies have a single head, independent agencies are normally led by
a multi-member commission or board, and there are usually statutory
limitations on presidential influence. 7
The - State Department likens the USIBWC to genuinely
independent agencies that have since been statutorily reassigned to
the State Department,575 but the comparisons are inapt.5 76 In, 1961,
the Arms Control and Disarmament Act established the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) as an independent
In 1999, "ACDA was abolished and two new Department
agency.
bureaus, Arms Control (BAC) and Nonproliferation (BN), were
Subsequently in 2000, due to congressional concerns
created.
regarding effective verification of and compliance with arms
agreements, part of the [BAC] became a separate Bureau of
Verification and Compliance [BVC]."57

The United States Information Agency (USIA) "was created in
1953 as an independent foreign affairs agency within the executive
branch

of

the

U.S.

government .

. .

."'"

In

1977,

the

State

Department's educational exchange programs and USIA were
combined as the United States International Communication Agency
(USICA).s In 1982, President Reagan restored the agency's name to
"Pursuant to the Foreign Affairs Reform and
the USIA.5 11
Restructuring Act of 1998, USIA was abolished on October 1, 1999,
and its functions were merged into the State Department. "582
In contrast to these agencies, the USIBWC has always been under
the sole jurisdiction of the State Department, notwithstanding the

572. OIG 2005 REPORT, supra note 31, at 10.
573. See id. at 5, 6, 12; see also OIG, 2006 REPORT, supranote 36, at 5.
574. See, e.g., RICHARD PIERCE Jr., ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS, § 4.4.1b at
95-96 (4th ed. 2004).
575. OIG, 2006 REPORT, supra note 36, at 5 (comparing the USIBWC to the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ("ACDA") and the United States Information
Agency (USIA)).
576. See generally Foreign Affairs Agencies Consolidation Act of 1998, 22 U.S.C. §
6501 (2011); KENNON H. NAKAMURA & MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R40989, U.S. PUBuC DIPLOMACY: BACKGROUND AND CuRRENT ISSUES 15-16 (2009),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R40989.pdf.
577. Arms Control and Disarmament Act, Pub. L. No. 87-297, 75 Stat. 631 (1961).
578. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT No. ISP-I-05-51: REPORT OF
INSPECTION, THE BuREAu OF VERIFICATION AND COMPLIANCE 4 (2004).
579. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF STATE, OIG REPORT NO. ISP-I-05-54:
SUMMARY REPORT; PUB. DIPLOMACY AT THE DEP'T OF STATE 22 (2005).
580. Id.
581. Id. at 23
582. Id.; see also Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.
105-277, 112 Stat. 2681.
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State Department's reticence to exercise that jurisdiction. As such, the
USIBWC was never an independent agency reporting to Congress
rather than to the executive branch, and Congress has, therefore,
never tried to insulate the USIBWC from State Department control.
In addition, a dramatic contrast may be made with the International
Boundary Commission, United States- Canada, which does not even
have a U.S. or Canadian Section, but exists only as an international
body, not a Federal agency, independent or otherwise.
Those who embrace the State Department's hands-off policy also
claim to find support in Treaty language that purportedly delegates
unfettered authority to the USIBWC. "The foundation of the [US]
Section's authority is the 1944 Water Treaty," 8 5 according to one
scholarly tribute to the U.S. Section's autonomy, which also describes
the 1944 Water Treaty as "the basic organic act of the modern
Commission."" The authors say the U.S. Section was endowed with
exclusive operational authority over the construction of mandated
international works, independent control over its payroll,
procurement, and retention of consultants, and other discretionary
authority that might be justified in the discharge of its functions.
These authorizations were not made 'through the Secretary of State,'
States Commissioner, who
but were conferred directly on the United587
has the statutory status as 'head of agency.'

Failure to read the statutes that implement the treaty language
results in concluding the exact opposite of what Congress intended,
and in fact legislated. The statutory scheme enacted by Congress is
susceptible to no interpretation other than that Congress intended to
empower the Secretary of State to carry out the various statutory
duties, and to do so presumptively, but not conclusively, through the
USIBWC.'" The statute reinforces this intent with commonly used
phrases such as "the construction of any project or works undertaken

583. See The Official White House List of Independent Agencies and Government
CorporationsCreated by Congress, USA.GOV,
http://www.usa.gov/Agencies/Federal/Independent.shtml (last visited Mar. 22, 2011)
(showing that IBWC is not listed as an "Independent establishment").
584. See David C. Weiss, The International Boundary Commission, Treaty Interpretation,
and the President'sRemoval Power, 41 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 39, 48 (2010).
585. Mumme & Moore, supra note 34, at 669.
586. Id. (whereas the treaty might be viewed as the organic act of the IBWC, only in
the broadest sense of the term, it certainly is not the organic act for the U.S. Section,
an essential distinction); See Robert L. Fischman, The National Wildlife Refuge System and
the Hallmarks of Modern OrganicLegislation, 29 ECOLOGY L.Q. 457 (2002).
587. Mumme & Moore, supra note 34, at 673. To be fair to the authors, they
presumably were misled by a 1954 State Department Memo that they cite as authority
for this mistaken claim. Id. at n.47.
588. See generally YULE KIM, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND
RECENT TRENDS (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf. "A

cardinal rule of construction is that a statute should be read as a harmonious whole,

with its various parts being interpreted within their broader statutory context in a
manner that furthers statutory purposes." Id. at CRS-2.
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or administered by the Secretary of State through the International
Boundary and Water Commission;""' and "in connection with
projects, in whole or in part, constructed or administered by the
Secretary of State through the said American Commissioner." 590
More specifically, the statutes frequently reference the fact that all
USIBWC appropriations are made through the State Department.59 1
Of course many of the statutes reflect the non-remarkable fact that the
State Department is charged with negotiating agreements with Mexico,
sometimes "acting through" the USIBWC,"" but often acting directly,
even.where the agreements implement projects previously designated
and agreed to by treaty.9 Moreover, some statutory language goes so
far as to direct the Secretary of State, again without reference to the
USIBWC, to negotiate a new Minute.
Ultimately, however, most of the statutes direct the Secretary of
State, "acting through" the USIBWC, to take a variety of actions, not
merely to negotiate or approve agreements, but to conduct
investigations and construct water systems and other works along the
border.s Some of these statutes impose such implementation duties
directly on the Secretary of State, not acting through the USIBWC."'
Others explicitly give the Secretary the discretion to act "through such
officers as he may designate.""' Obviously, to the extent that the
Secretary delegates such statutory duties to the USIBWC, the Secretary
cannot escape responsibility to see that they are properly performed.
Notably, Congress also recognized the jurisdiction of the State
Department OIG to investigate the USIBWC, specifically calling on the
OIG to monitor and report on the SBIWTP."
The State Department's own Basic Authorities Act makes clear that
the State Department may not simply treat one of its agencies as
"independent."9" The law provides that "the Secretary shall have and
exercise any authority vested by law in any office or official of the
Department of State.""o Additionally, "a reference in any other
provision of law to an official or office of the Department of State ...
589. 22 U.S.C. § 277e (2011).
590. Id. "Statutes should be construed 'so as to avoid rendering superfluous' any
statutory language." KIM, supranote 588, at CRS-12.
591. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. §§ 277d-3, d-5, d-7, d-9 (2011).

592. See, e.g., §§ 277d-13, d-14, d-26, d-30, d-32.
593. See, §§ 277d-6, d-8, d-26, d-41, 277g(a).
594. § 277d-45(a). This resulted in Minute No. 311. See IBWC Minute 311, supra
note 157.
595. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. §§ 277a, 277d-1, d-17, d-34, 277e (2011).
596. Id. §§ 277e, 277f, 27 7 g- 2 .
597. Id. §§ 277, 277e. This explicit authority to act "through such officers as he may
designate" reflects similar statutory authority given to the President, to construct,
operate; and maintain treaty projects through "any Federal agency" the President may
designate. Id. §§ 277b(a), 277c.
598. Id. § 277d44.
599. State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-885, 70 Stat. 890
(codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2651a, 2669 et seq).
600. 22 U.S.C. § 2651a(a) (3) (A) (2011).
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shall be deemed to be a reference to the Secretary of State or the
In 1991, Congress
Department of State, as may be appropriate."6'
designated the US. State Department as the lead agency for
coordination of international water resource policies."o2 Ironically, the
Department's annual reports to Congress under the Senator Paul
Simon: Water for the Poor Act, listing U.S. Federal Agencies Working
on International Water-Related Activities, include no mention of the
IBWC." 3
The, refusal of the State Department to fulfill its own statutory
authority over the IBWC flies in the face of not only the expectations
of Congress, the public, and the White House (as acknowledged by
State OIG),604 but also contradicts settled constitutional doctrines
concerning executive authority over both treaty matters and
administrative agencies. Recent scholarship and a broad spectrum of
political consensus strongly supports the constitutional right and duty
of the executive branch to assert control over federal agencies,
especially where there is a clear statutory delegation, and most of all,
over a non-independent agency such as USIBWC."0
One need not embrace the "unitary executive" theory espoused by
those who contend the president has exclusive control of executive
agencies to agree that the executive branch has not just the right but
an obligation to reign in and direct a renegade agency-particularly
one whose head he alone appoints and removes-and subject it to
Indeed, President Obama's second
administrative discipline.
appointee to the Supreme Court, former Harvard Dean and Solicitor
General Elena Kagan, persuasively articulated the constitutional basis
for presidential control of such administrative agencies in a landmark
law review article published ten years ago, in which she distinguished
the more radical doctrine the Regan and Bush administrations
espoused. 6
Kagan does not embrace the "unitarian" view that "the

601. Id. at§ 2651a(d).
602. Id. at § 2686a(a) (providing that the "Secretary of State shall designate a
Special Coordinator" for water policy Negotiations and water resource policy).
603. The Water for the Poor Act makes access to safe water and sanitation for
developing countries a specific policy objective of U.S. foreign assistance programs. 22
U.S.C. § 2152h (2011); see Water for the Poor Act of 2005, U.S. DEP'T STATE., at T.4.1
(June 1, 2006), http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/rpts/67447.htm; see also, e.g., Senator
Paul Simon, U.S. DEP'T STATE., WATER FOR THE POOR AcT: REPORT TO CONGRESS JUNE
at
(2010)
available
2010
72
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/146141.pdf (describing efforts of EPA
"to reduce water contamination along the US-Mexico border").
604. OIG, 2006 REPORT, supranote 35, at 4.
605. See, e.g., Farina, supra note 29, at 358-59 (noting how the unitary executive "has
attained mainstream constitutional status and won adherents across the political
spectrum"); Kagan, supra note 29, at 2251; Strauss, supranote 29, at 713-15.
606. See generally Kagan, supranote 29. For an objective analysis of Kagan's views, see
generally TODD B. TATELMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41272, SUPREME COURT NOMINEE
ELENA KAGAN: PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (2010),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R41272.pdf.
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Constitution provides the President with plenary authority over
administration, so that Congress can no more interfere with the
President's directive authority than with his removal power.""
Rather, Kagan argues that "statutory delegation to an executive agency
official - although not to an independent agency head - usually should
be read as allowing the President to assert directive authority."6 08 By
"independent" agencies, Kagan means those agencies created by
Congress, "whose heads the President may not remove at will.""'
The traditional understanding has been that when an agency
possesses delegated authority under a statute, agency heads-not the
president-must be the ultimate deciders of policy made under
authority of that statute."o Yet under this theory, a president, as the
head of the executive branch, may lawfully try to influence agencies'
actions, and can even remove the head of an agency who does not
follow the president's wishes. 1 Proponents of the fully unitary
executive doctrine, on the other hand, take the extreme view that the
Constitution gives presidents the power to control their subordinates including the so-called independent agencies, whose heads the
president may not remove at will.612
Kagan describes the need for executive leadership to revitalize
especially moribund agencies, stating that "bureaucracy also has
inherent vices (even pathologies), foremost among which are inertia

607. Kagan, supra note 29, at 2251; see Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 29, at 599.
608. Kagan, supra note 29, at 2251.
609. Id. at 2247.
610. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 29, at 698, 703.
611. See Id. at 715-16, 735-36, 751 (finding a presidential role uncontroversial where
"presidential authority readily fit the 'oversight' mold and/or may have been explicitly
conferred by Congress."). Even where Congress has designated an agency "an
independent agency of the executive branch", the Department of Justice Office of
Legal Counsel has concluded "[a] 11 that should be inferred from the status of an
'independent agency' is that the entity is not located within another department or
agency." Memorandum from Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen. Richard L. Shiffrin on
Removal of Holdover Officials Serving on the Fed. Hous. Bd. and the R.R. Ret. Bd. to
1997)
available at
1,
5
(Aug.
President
to
the
Counsel
the
http://wwwjustice.gov/olc/removalthtm.
612. STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. Yoo, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 4 (2008) [hereinafter Calabresi &
Yoo]. This position has been the subject of much criticism that it seeks to encroach on
the constitutional powers of the congress. See e.g., Mark Tushnet, A PoliticalPerspective
on the Theory of the UnitaryExecutive, 12 U. PA.J. CONST. L. 313, 313, 318-19, 323 (2010).
Whereas the debate is beyond the scope of this article, it should be noted that the
Unitary Executive theory draws its name from a passage in The Federalist No. 70, in
which Alexander Hamilton defended the need for a vigorous, energetic, and therefore
unified executive; that the theory has long been debated among scholars whose
references are exclusively to the Constitution's textual grant of executive powers to the
president; but that this traditional theory has little in common with the truly radical
proposition promoted during the Administration of George W. Bush that the
president has vast "inherent" powers that do not appear in the Constitution or federal
law and that are not subject to any power of Congress to limit their exercise. Robert
D. Sloane, The Scope of the Executive Power in the Twenty-First Century: An Introduction, 88
B.U. L. REV. 341, 343-45 (2008).
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and torpor."'
She notes that even traditional proponents of agency
independence have long acknowledged that "governmental agencies
inevitably develop 'arteriosclerosis,"' a "rigidity cycle" or "ossification
syndrome" where "Bureaus 'become [] ... gigantic machine [s] that
slowly and inflexibly grind[] along in the direction in which...
initially aimed,' incapable of acting speedily or making necessary
innovations;" all seemingly apt descriptions of the USIBWC."' The
President has the constitutional responsibility to ensure that the "Laws
be faithfully executed."'
The State Department and the USIBWC
must not be permitted to continue their flagrant defiance of the laws.
C. EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY OVER TREATY AFFAIRS
It is well established that the President, by virtue of various
constitutional powers, controls the "vast share of responsibility for the
conduct of our foreign relations." 66 It has even been argued that the
president has "unilateral freedom to interpret and reinterpret
At a
notwithstanding their domestic law effect."
treaties,""'
minimum, scholars agree that the president has authority to interpret
treaties that are not "self-executing," and thus do not have the force of
federal law absent statutory implementation.1
Those who celebrate the purported autonomy of the USIBWC,
eschewing any consideration of the governing statutes, rely on the
1944 Water Treaty to support their thesis. Ironically, the Treaty itself
does no such thing, but rather explicitly recognizes the right of each
country to construct treaty works through any public or private agency
in accordance with domestic laws."o Indeed, the State Department
and the U.S. Section went to elaborate lengths at the Senate heaings
on the Treaty to assure apprehensive Senators that the USIBWC could
never become the renegade agency it is today. The "American
Commissioner" testified, in regard to such concerns, that the role of
the

U.S.

Section

was

merely

as

a

coordinator

of

communications

with

Mexico, not a border jurisdictional goliath:
The discharge of various functions imposed by provisions of the

613. Kagan, supra note 29, at 2263.
614. Id. at 2264 (citations omitted).
615. U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 3.
616. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (giving the president
"Commander in Chief" authority); U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (granting the
President power to make treaties and appoint ambassadors); U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl.
3 (providing for the presidential authority to receive ambassadors).
617. Yoo, supranote 28, at 868.
618. See id. at 853, 862-63, 867.
619. See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith in Treaty Jurisprudence
and a Call for Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1888, 1900-01, 1942-43 (2005)
(distinguishing presidential power concerning treaties that are not "self-executing"
from the authority that the federal courts have to interpret "self-executing" treaties).
620. 1944 Water Treaty, supranote 3, art. 20.
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treaty can in fact be handled by other Federal agencies, but all
dealings between the two countries concerning boundary and
international water matters are funneled through the Commission,
subject always to the control, on matters of policy, of the respective
foreign relations departments.

The purpose of article 2, and other articles of the treaty hereafter to
be noted bearing on the functions and jurisdiction of the
International Boundary and Water Commission, is to provide a
central agency through which all such matters can be cleared and
which would also serve to coordinate the activities of other agencies
aged in the discharge of functions relating to
which might be en
boundary matters.62
The Commissioner's testimony was echoed repeatedly by
Government witnesses eager to assure the lawmakers of the limited
jurisdiction of the USIBWC.6 22
The effect of this provision [Article 20] is to vest in the respective
sections of the Commission the responsibility for the construction of
The actual
the works required by the terms of the treaty.
construction may be carried on by any competent public or private
agency. The sole purpose of the provision is to vest the responsibility
for carrying out the provisions of the treaty in one central agency, to
which either country may look for compliance with the treaty terms.
Here, again, internal arrangements are not sought to be
controlled.623

The jurisdiction of the United States section, as distinguished from
that of the Commission, over the administration of treaty functions, is
very limited. The American section is the representative of the
United States in performing the treaty obligations of the United
States to Mexico and also in seeing that Mexico's obligations to the
United States are carried out. The underlying idea is that all treaty
functions should be centralized in an international agency, and that
the functions to be performed by interior agencies, to the extent that
they bear upon the performance of international functions, should
be correlated and carried out in cooperation with the respective
national section.624

621. Hearings on the 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 98, pt. 1, at 162-63 (statement of
L.M. Lawson, American Comm'r, IBWC).
622. See id., pt. 5, at 1801, 1809-11 (Digest of Testimony of Witnesses for the Dep't of
State and United States Section, IBWC).
623. Id. at 1811.
624. Id. at 1814.
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[The United States section] acts .... as a clearing house through
which matters involving treaty rights, obligations and functions are
cleared, without in any way encroaching upon the jurisdiction of an
or
local.6
Federal,
State,
interior
agency
Thus, the president is empowered not only by the Constitution and
by statute, but also by the 1944 Water Treaty itself to assert executive
authority, and specifically to reassign technical duties away from the
USIBWC and State Department. Freed from technical engineering
responsibilities, the USIBWC should also be unchained from the
debilitating treaty requirement that engineers dominate its leadership.
The 1944 Water Treaty designates five officials for each section: an
"Engineer-Commissioner," two principal engineers, a legal adviser,
and a secretary. 2 An earlier treaty had required the appointment of a
"practical astronomer," an anachronistic requirement that, unlike that
of the "principal engineers" and "Engineer-Commissioner," has been
Indeed, Mexico unilaterally departed from this
dropped.
requirement in 2009 when it appointed a new commissioner who is
not an engineer. 62' The United States had earlier departed from at
least the spirit of the requirement in 2004, when President George W.
Bush appointed Arturo Duran, a chemical engineer rather than a civil
engineer, but with similarly nonexistent management abilities. 2' The
IBWC should, by Minute, eliminate this designation of leadership, so
that each section may be free to employ a variety of appropriate
professionals. Perhaps USIBWC employees will finally be freed from
incompetent and abusive management, and the agency may begin to
focus on active diplomacy and adaptive treaty interpretation, to pursue
new policy initiatives, with maximum public participation, in areas
such as water conservation, water quality, groundwater protection, and
environmental restoration.
D.

SEPARATING DIPLOMATIC DUTIES FROM TECHNICAL RESPONSIBILITY
FOR TREATY WORKS

It has been established that the President has the constitutional,
statutory, and treaty-endowed power to assign technical responsibility
for treaty works to an agency other than USIBWC or the State
Department. The USIBWC has proven that it cannot capably perform
625. Id. at 1816.
626. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, art. 2. In recent years, the normal in-house
permanent personnel of the USIBWC number nearly 300. STATE DEP'T BUDGET 2011,
supranote, at 683.
627. Convention of 1882, supra note 82, art. II.
628. See Press Release, Int'l Boundary and Water Comm'n, U.S. Section, The
Boundary Marker, Mex. Names a New Comm'r (2009), availableat
http://www.ibwc.gov/Files/BM-Spring-2009.pdf.
629. See OIG, 2005 REPORT, supra note 31, at 7.
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both diplomatic and technical duties, and the State Department is
admittedly unwilling and unable to oversee the latter. It is yet to be
seen whether the USIBWC, under the close supervision of the State
Department, as proposed herein, can effectively perform the former.
Meanwhile, technical duties should immediately be transferred
elsewhere.
Undoubtedly, there is a continuing important role for the Border
2012 Program, Border Environment Cooperation Commission
Good
(BECC), North American Development Bank (NADB),
Neighbor Environmental Board (GNEB), and similar binational
institutions."'o Since its inception in 1995, BECC has certified a total of
175 environmental infrastructure projects-eighty-two in the United
States and ninety-three in Mexico-related to water, sewage, and
municipal waste.63 ' The projects are estimated to cost a total of $3.92
billion to construct and will benefit an estimated 13.8 million border
BECC works in cooperation with the North American
residents.3
which administers the Border
Development Bank (NADB),
Environment Infrastructure Fund (BEIF), consisting of grant
resources provided by EPA for water and wastewater infrastructure
projects.63 3 Since its inception in April 1997, a total of $560 million in
BEIF grants were approved and contracted to support ninety-two water
NADB
and wastewater projects in the United States and Mexico.'
also provides direct financing in the form of loans for the construction
of BECC-certified environmental projects. 3 5 To date, NADB has
loaned an estimated $569.8 million for fifty-six environmental
infrastructure projects, and another $438.6 million for forty-four loans
in Mexico through the multipurpose financial institution COFIDAN.
616 Such groups might play a larger diplomatic role in addition to their
existing duties, however, they are not the type of organizations that
could be expected to assume the USIBWC's technical duties.
The Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers are
two agencies that are possible successors to the USIBWC, at least with
regard to responsibility for treaty-based construction, operation,
maintenance, and environmental restoration projects. Unfortunately,
neither would be a panacea for what ails the USIBWC. The Bureau of
Reclamation's organic act, the Reclamation Act of 1902, gave it broad
authority to build and operate large-scale projects to irrigate the arid

630. For an interesting discussion of the unique new participatory opportunities
opened for Mexican farmers by BECC and similar groups, see generally Margaret
Wilder, Border Farmers, Water Contamination, and the NAAEC Environmental Side Accord to
NAFTA, 40 NAT. RESOURcESJ. 873 (2000).
631. BORDER ENvTL. COOPERATION COMM'N, N. AM. DEv. B.ANK, QUARTERLY STATUS
REPORT 17 (2010), available at http://www.nadbank.org/pdfs/status-eng.pdf.
632. Id.
633. Id. at 1, 4.
634. Id. at 20.
.635. Id. at 1.
636. Id. at 20.
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Additional legislation includes statutes of general
West.637
applicability 38 and project-specific laws. 639 The Department of the
Interior, within which the Bureau of Reclamation is located, has a
horrible record of supervising its sub-agencies, as demonstrated by
mismanagement debacles of the Bureau of Indian Affairsro and the
Moreover, the Bureau of
Minerals Management Service."'
Reclamation itself has a very poor reputation with environmentalists,
historic
and
expertise
its
engineering
notwithstanding
accomplishments."
The Army Corps of Engineers has a similarly mixed reputation,
lauded for its engineering expertise and condemned for its reckless
The Corps lacks an organic statute to
environmental destruction."
limit its discretion," but was given broad authority to prevent
obstructions to navigation under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899;
" wide discretion for flood control projects under a series of Flood
Control Acts adopted between 1928 and 1965;" and project-specific

637. See generally The Reclamation Act of June 17, 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. § 390b (2011)).
638. See, e.g., The Reclamation Reform Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat. 1263
(codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 390aa to 390zz-1 (2011)).
639. See, e.g., Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 617 (a)-(v) (2011) (ratified
the Colorado River Compact and authorized construction of Hoover Dam).
640. See Robert J. McCarthy, The Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Federal Trust
Obligation to American Indians, 19 BYUJ. PUB. L. 1, 5-6 (2004) (recounting long history
of gross mismanagement of Indian affairs); see also News Release, U.S. Dep't of
Interior, Secretary Salazar, Attorney General Holder Announce Settlement of Cobell
Lawsuit on Indian Trust Management (Dec. 8, 2009), available at
http://www.doi.gov/ost/cobell/FINAL 12-08-09_Cobell-releaseasrevised_127PMFINAL.pdf (discussing United State's mismanagement of Indian trust accounts).
641. Following years of congressional investigations and scathing reviews by the DOI
Inspector General, the last straw for the Minerals Management Service was its
culpability in the British Petroleum Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. See, e.g.,
Minerals Management Service Oversight Hearing: House Committee on Natural Resources,
Subcommittee on Natural Resources, 111th Cong. (2010) (statement of Mary L. Kendall,
available at
Interior)
Department of the
General,
Acting Inspector
http://www.doioig.gov/reports/congressional-testimony; Secretarial Order No. 3302
(June 18, 2010), availableat
http://www.doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/loader.cfm?csModule=security/getfile&Pagel
D=35872 9 (renaming the Minerals Management Service as the Bureau of Ocean
Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEMRE)).
642. See generally, MARc REISNER, CADillAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS
DISAPPEARING WATER 222-99 (1986) (detailing the relationship between Floyd Dominy
and David Brower during the era large dam construction).
643. See Tarlock, supra note 65, at 1285-86; Klein, supra note 65, at 679-82 (discussing
both the Corps technical ability to build dams and their propensity for inefficient
expenditures of public monies).
644. Zellmer, supra note 43, at 602.
645. See 33 U.S.C. § 403 (2011).
646. See e.g., Flood Control Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-391, ch. 569, § 1, 45 Stat. 534
(codified at 33 U.S.C. § 702a (2011)); Flood Control Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-738,
ch. 688, § 1, 49 Stat. 1570 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 701a (2011)); Flood Control Act of
1944, Pub. L. No. 78-534, ch. 665, § 1, 58 Stat. 887 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 701-1
(2011)); Flood Control Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-298, 79 Stat. 1073 (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1962d-5 (2011) & 33 U.S.C. § 2220 (2011)).
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appropriations for specified navigational enhancements, dams, levees,
and other engineering structures in various Water Resources
Development Acts. .
Notwithstanding its own record of environmental destruction and
wasteful spending, the Corps may offer a better prospect for reform
than the Bureau of Reclamation. According to one leading scholar:
" [T]he Corps is often portrayed by environmentalists as a lawless
agency, but in fact, it is a model 'rule of law' agency compared to sister
management agencies, such as the Bureau of Reclamation."64
Moreover, the Corps has admitted its errors," and seems ready to
"reinvent itself as a restoration agency.",6o
Nevertheless, recent developments would suggest that the Bureau
of Reclamation is the front-runner to succeed the USIBWC. The
agency's close relationship with the seven Basin states, its dominant
role in management of the Colorado River, its designation as lead
agency in legislation such as the Transboundary Aquifer Assessment
Act, and its guiding hand in promised negotiations of a new
comprehensive water agreement with Mexico all signal, not so much
that it might serve as an appendage to the USIBWC, but that the
USIBWC might become the diplomatic arm of the Bureau. Given the
Bureau's notorious lack of diplomacy, it would be wise to separate
responsibility for technical matters from diplomatic ones, as proposed
herein, before it is too late.
E.

ADAPTIVE TREATY INTERPRETATION

The most urgent policy imperative is that the U.S. Section and
State Department aggressively pursue new initiatives, with maximum
public participation, in areas such as water conservation, water quality,
The
groundwater protection, and environmental restoration.
and
review
participation,
USIBWC should immediately, with full public
categorical
justify
and
revise its defective NEPA procedures, to narrow
exclusions, and to specify the criteria for extraordinary circumstances
to override those exclusions. Similarly, the agency should either
eliminate its advisory committees or else comply with procedural and
substantive requirements, including those for legislative authorization

647. See, e.g., Water Resources Development Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-662, 100
Stat. 4082 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2201 et seq. (2011)); Water Resources Development
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-640, 104 Stat. 4604 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2201 (2011));
Water Resources Development Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-541, 114 Stat. 2572
(codified at 33 U.S.C. § 2201 (2011).
648. Tarlock, supra note 65, at 1291.
649. See U.S. ARmY CORPS OF ENG'Rs, USACE 2012: ALIGNING THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF
available at
ENGINEERS FOR SUCCESS IN THE 2 1sT CENTURY i, ii (2003),
http://aapa.files.cms-plus.com/PDFs/USACE 2012Final-ExSum.pdf.
650. Tarlock, supranote 65, at 1325. Additionally, unlike the Bureau, the Corps also
has general authority to modify water project facilities and operations for
environmental benefits. Reed D. Benson, New Adventures of the Old Bureau:Modern-Day
Reclamation Statutes and Congress's Unfinished Environmental Business, 48 HARV. J. ON
LEGIs. 137, 176 (2011).
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and for "balance."
As for transboundary environmental impacts, such as those caused
by operation of the Yuma Desalting Plant, they are generally
unregulated by U.S. law. 6' Nevertheless, the United States is a party
to many international agreements that recognize the responsibility of
each nation to consider the transboundary environmental effects of
These include, e.g., the United Nations
governmental actions."'
Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary
Context;... the North American Agreement on Environmental
Cooperation;... the United Nations Convention on the Protection and
Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes," and
the Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of
Transboundary environmental impacts
International Watercourses.'
on the US- Mexico border have generally been viewed as subject to
Article 25 of the 1944 Water Treaty
regulation by the IBWC."'
contemplates or at least permits application of these new international
It may well be too late to
understandings to evolving conditions.'
ward off the worst ecological effects of a century of neglectful
development of the boundary rivers, especially in light of potentially
apocalyptic climate change," but a continuing failure to try to reverse

651. See, e.g., Jonathan Remy Nash, The Curious Legal Landscape of the Extraterritoriality
of U.S. Environmental Laws, 50 VA.J. INT'L L. 997, 1012 (2010) ("[T]o the extent that
U.S. courts have recognized extraterritorial applications of NEPA, such applications
have occurred exclusively in settings governed as a global commons where no other
single sovereign asserts exclusive jurisdiction.") (citations omitted).
652. See generally Thomas E. Digan, Comment, NEPA and the Presumption Against
ExtraterritorialApplication: The Foreign Policy Exclusion, 11 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y
165 (1994); Erika L. Preiss, Student Article, The International Obligation to Conduct an
EnvironmentalImpact Assessment: The ICJ Case Concerningthe Gabcikovo-NagymarosProject, 7
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 307 (1999); Angela Z. Cassar & Carl E. Bruch, Transboundary
Environmental Impact Assessment in International Watercourse Management, 12 N.Y.U.
ENvrL. L.J. 169, 171 (2003).
653. United Nations Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context, Feb. 25, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 800.
654. North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, Can.-Mex.-U.S.,
Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480.
655. United Nations Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary
Watercourses and International Lakes, Mar. 17, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1312.
656. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, May 21, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 700.
657. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT: YUMA DESALTING PLANT PILOT RUN 7-8 (2009), available at

http://www.usbr.gov/lc/yuma/environmentaldocs/ydp/finalea.pdf.
658. 1944 Water Treaty, supranote 3, art. 24-25.
JANE A. LEGGETF, RL
659. "Warming of the climate system is unequivocal ......
34266, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CLIMATE CHANCE: SCIENCE HIGHLIGHTS 19 (2009) (citing
INTERGOVERNMENTAL

PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: SYNTHESIS

REPORT 2 (2007)), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34266.pdf. The
IBWC has at least acknowledged the problem of climate change, although has not
begun to address it outside the context of drought. See Paul Stanton Kibel, Climate
AdaptationPolicy at the ContinentalLevel: NaturalResources in North America and Europe, 27
PACE ENVEL. L. REV. 473, 479 (2010).
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this trend is not an option.660
IX. CONCLUSION
There has never been a greater opportunity for radical reform of
the USIBWC due to a confluence of unhappy events that include a
crescendo of criticism; disappearing water supplies and related
ecological crises; an unprecedented level of expenditures by the
USIBWC; continuing rapid turnover in its ineffective leadership, the
lowest employee morale of any federal agency; and a still rising tide of
scandal, including recent revelations about failing dams and other vital
infrastructure that now pose catastrophic threats to millions of border
residents, the region's ecosystem and its economy.
The executive branch urgently needs to exercise its constitutional,
statutory, and treaty authorities in order to salvage a dedicated forum

for transboundary diplomacy. The State Department's shameful
incompetence and neglect necessitate narrowing its mandate to
diplomatic duties only, along with those of the USIBWC. As other
institutions take over responsibility for carrying out treaty projects, the
need is greater than ever for the State Department and the USIBWC to
rise above decades of disrepute and dishonor, to finally focus on
adaptive treaty interpretation and sustainable management of
boundary waters.

660. Imprisoned by Mussolini in Fascist Italy in 1926, the Italian philosopher
Antonio Gramsci famously wrote, "pessimism of the intellect and optimism of the
will."
ANTONIO GRAMsci, The Modern Prince, in SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON
NOTEBOOKS 175 (Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds., 1971); see also Michael
Ekers & Alex Loftus, The Power of Water: Developing Dialogues Between Foucault and
Gramsci, 26 ENV'T & PLANNING D: Soc'Y & SPACE 698 (2007), availableat
http://www.gg.rhul.ac.uk/loftus/Ekers%20and%20Loftus%202008.pdf.
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INTRODUCTION

In the development of Utah water law, two dates stand out as
pivotal points in the evolution of the method for recognizing
ownership of a water right: March 12, 1903, and March 22, 1935. On
the first date, the state legislature adopted Utah's comprehensive
appropriation statute.! On the second, the legislature amended the
appropriation statute to reflect that the statute applied to all waters of
the state, including underground waters.
Recognizing that residents had diverted a substantial amount of
water and placed it to beneficial use prior to the enactment of these
statutes, the legislature provided mechanisms for water users to record
their previously-established rights with the State Engineer.- Specifically,
Jamie Carpenter originally wrote this article for Professor Robert Adler's Water Law
class during in her third year of attending S.J. Quinney College of law. Prior to
attending law school, she worked as a water rights and water quality specialist for the
City of St. George Utah (2005 to 2008) and before this, she worked as a chief operator
at the Quail Creek Drinking Water Plant (1997 to 2005). She is the owner of Southern
Utah Water Rights Consulting and is certified with the Utah Division of Drinking
Water as a level IV treatment operator. She currently assists Utah water systems with
water quality and sampling compliance. She received a certificate specializing in
environmental law, is scheduled to take the Utah bar (2011) and plans to expand her
business to capture all aspects of environmental law and water quality compliance.
She is an active member of the Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation and the
Utah Chapter of the American Water Works Association.
1. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-1 (2010).
2. See id. § 73-1-1.
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water users could file claims setting forth the elements of diversion
and beneficial use in place prior to the statutory enactments. These
"pre-statutory claims" fall into two categories: diligence claims and
underground water claims.
A diligence claim under Utah water law is a claim to a surface water
right that a user established by "diverting [water] from its natural
channel and putting it to beneficial use" prior to March 12, 1903. An
underground water claim (sometimes referred to as an "UGWC") is a
claim to underground water established by diversion and beneficial'
use of ground water prior to enactment of the 1935 statute.
Since the enactment of the 1903 appropriation statute, water users
have filed approximately 80,000 pre-statutory claims with the Utah
Division of Water Rights; these claims comprise about 800,000 acrefeet (A.F.) of water.'
Of these claims, around 28,794 claims,
comprising 290,000 A.F. of water, have not been subjected to public or
judicial review and remain unevaluated.'
As water becomes an
increasingly scarce commodity and water users compete for this
limited public resource, the claimed date of the water's first use
becomes increasingly important. During drought or water shortages,
those with senior rights are entitled to their full allotment of water
before junior claims are satisfied.' Pre-statutory rights generally have
priority over rights established under the statutory application
process..
Because the requirements for filing pre-statutory claims were
lenient compared to the requirements of the statutory application
process, many claimants have filed claims with minimal or no evidence
to support their claimed pre-statutory priority dates.' Furthermore, as
the state closed areas to new appropriations, the only way to obtain
recognition of a new water right was by filing a pre-statutory claim."o
As a result, the State Engineer and the claimants face the challenge of
evaluating, validating, and quantifying these pre-statutory rights
whenever the claimants request distribution orders requiring delivery
3. Eskelsen v. Town of Perry, 819 P.2d 770, 771 n.1 (Utah 1991).
4. See Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipeline Corp., 5 P.3d 1206, 1216 (Utah 2000)
(explaining that diligence rights to percolating and ground water are expressly limited
to the amount of water actually beneficially used prior to 1935, the effective date of the
statute, which first subjected percolating and groundwater to the application and
appropriation process).
DATABASE,
OF
WATER
RIGHTS
generally
UTAH
DivIsION
5. See
http://waterrights.utah.gov (last visited April 21, 2011).
This information was
obtained by searching the Utah Division of Water Rights database with the assistance
of the Utah Division of Natural Resources database specialist. All records are available
to the public through the Division of Water Rights web site and can be accessed,
downloaded and sorted based on the criteria selected herein.
6. Id.
7. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-1 (2010).
8. See Wendy B. Crowther, Utah Water Law 101, Presentation Before the Utah
State Bar 2008 Spring Convention (Mar. 14, 2008), at 3-4, availableat
http://wwy.utahbar.org/cle/springconvention/materials/water-law101.pdf.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 4,8.
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of their water or file change applications. The process can be
contentious. Sometimes the pre-statutory claimants exercise their
rights adversely against statutory water right holders, or seek to convert
early-priority surface water rights to ground water sources. A great
deal of uncertainty also exists for those who have inherited or
purchased unadjudicated pre-statutory rights. When the claim is
judicially reviewed in the future, courts may find the claim invalid.
This paper addresses the history of Utah water law relating to the
recognition of pre-statutory claims and examines the number of claims
that remain unadjudicated. Additionally, this paper addresses the
limitations on the administrative and judicial powers to evaluate prestatutory claims, as well as the types of evidence that can support a
claim to pre-statutory water use.
I. UTAH WATER LAW - A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Although a
All waters in Utah are property of the public."
"perfected right" to the use of water is a property right, its ownership
gives only the right to use a given amount of the transitory waters of a
stream or source for a specific time, at a specific place, and for a
specific purpose." The actual beneficial use of the water is the basis
and measure of the right.'3 For pre-statutory claims, the priority is the
date of the water's first use; for rights established under the
appropriation statute, the priority is the filing date of the application
to appropriate. 4
The appropriation statute serves two important functions in the
administration of water rights. First, it seeks to ensure there is an
adequate supply of water in the water source before granting new
rights. Second, it provides a system of priority for resolving the
competing rights of one owner against the rights of another owner,
thus creating a level of predictability.
The Utah legislature passed its first act addressing the method and
mode of appropriating water in 1897. This act required that any
person desiring to appropriate surface water must post written notices
in two conspicuous places: at the post office nearest to the point of
intended diversion and at the actual point of diversion. 5 The statute
also required that the notices be recorded, and described their
content.16 By contrast, prior to 1897, Utah required only that water
users record notices for accomplished appropriations in the county

11. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1(1) (2010) ("All waters in this state, whether above or
under the ground, are hereby declared to be the property of the public, subject to all
existing rights to the use thereof.").
12. In re Uintah Basin, 133 P.3d 410, 423 (Utah 2006); see also id. § 73-3-2.
13. § 73-1-3.
14. See WELLS A. HUTcHINS & DALLIN W. JENSEN, THE UTAH LAW OF WATER RIGHTS
14-15 (1965).
15. Act of Mar. 11, 1897, ch. 52, § 8,1897 Utah Laws 219, 221.
16. Id.
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recorder's office.17
Utah did not enact further legislation with respect to the
appropriation of water until 1903. Under the 1903 legislation, the
" [r]ights to the use of any of the unappropriated water in the State
may be acquired by appropriation, in the manner ... provided, and
not otherwise."' Furthermore, the appropriation had to "be for some
useful or beneficial purpose, and, as between appropriators, the one
first in time shall be first in right."" Before the applicant could
develop and beneficially use the water, the new procedures required a
prospective water user to file an application that the State Engineer
would review for statutory compliance.20 If approved by the State
Engineer, the priority of the right was the filing date of the
Other than through a court-ordered general
application.'
adjudication, the 1903 statute did not include procedures for
recognizing or recording claims for those who had already established
a beneficial use of water prior to 1903.22 Furthermore, the 1903 statute
did not apply to ground water or percolating waters that were not
flowing in a defined stream channel.
By the early 1930s, underground water use was rapidly increasing
due to advancements in drilling technology.24 At the same time,
private ownership of rights to underground and percolating waters
diluted the predictability of the prior appropriation doctrine. In a
1921 case, however, Utah courts adopted the "correlative rights" or
"reasonable use" doctrine to groundwater use, and applied the
beneficial use requirement to resolve a dispute over percolating waters
between adjacent property owners in an artesian basin.2 ' From 1935 to
1939, the legislature eliminated conflicting means of obtaining or
controlling water outside the appropriation process and declared that
correlative rights, reasonable use, and adverse possession were no

17. Act of Feb. 20, 1880, ch. 20, §§ 1-4, 1880 Utah Laws 36, 36-37 (directing the
appointment of county wide water commissioners who were to issue water certificates
based on established water use and providing that such certificate shall be "prima facie
evidence" of such claims).
18. Act of Mar. 12, 1903, ch. 100, § 34, 1903 Utah Laws 88, 97.
19. Id.
20. Id. § 39, 1903 Utah Laws at 99.
21. Id. § 46, 1903 Utah Laws at 101.
22. See id. §§ 10-14, 1903 Utah Laws at 91-93.
23. See id. § 47, 1903 Utah Laws at 101. ("The water of all streams and other
sources in this State, whether flowing above or underground, in known or defined
channels, is hereby declared to be the property of the public, subject to all existing
rights to the use thereof."). See also Riordan v. Westwood, 203 P.2d 922, 925 (Utah
1949) ("Until 1935, decisions of this court treated the waters of artesian basins as
percolating waters, and as such the ownership went with the owner of the ground
where such waters were located and were not considered to be subject to
appropriation.").
24. See S.G ROBSON & E.R. BANTA, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GROUND WATER ATLAS
at
(1995)
available
STATES
UNITED
OF
THE
http://pubs.usgs.gov/ha/ha730/ch-c/index.html.
25. See Home v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 202 P. 815 (Utah 1921).
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longer valid means for obtaining water rights. 6
In an attempt to incorporate existing underground water use into
the State Engineer's records, Utah adopted a statute that required
filing of underground water claims within a one-year period; the
statute deemed failure to do so evidence of intent to abandon
underground water rights.2 ' An examination of the Utah Division of
Water Rights' records reveals that water users filed over 17,470 preMost of these claims were
statutory claims between 1930 and 1940.
underground water claims asserting established diversion and
beneficial use prior to 1935, but also included claims to surface water
for diversions and uses prior to 1903." As one source accurately states:
The time for filing such claims was subsequently extended by various
acts of the legislature ...

[and] in 1949 the legislature enacted

[section] 100-5-13, Utah Laws 1949, Ch. 67, [section] 3, the
predecessor statute of the present act which allowed the filing of
claims until March 22, 1955. In 1955 the legislature ... deleted any
further reference to time within which claims must be filed and left
the statute in its present form.s0.
Utah Code section 73-5-13 still governs the method of filing prestatutory claims to surface or underground water not otherwise
represented (i.e., by certificates of appropriation or court decrees).3 1
The current pre-statutory claim statute (section 73-5-13, effective
May 4, 1997) changed both the filing procedure and the significance
It added an advertising requirement, and
of the filing action.3
required opposing water users to file objections in district court.33 In
26. See Act of Mar. 22, 1935, ch. 105, § 100-3-1, 1935 Utah Laws 195, 196; see also
Act of Mar. 20, 1939, ch. 111, § 100-3-1, 1939 Utah Laws 146, 148. Prior to 1935,
ground water was considered to be under private ownership and it was regulated for
the first time in 1921, when the court applied the correlative rights and reasonable use
doctrine to resolve a dispute between property owners. In 1935, ground water was
declared to be owned by the public and correlative rights and reasonable use were
replaced by the appropriation doctrine, as applied to underground water. See Act of
Mar. 22, 1935, ch. 105, § 100-1-1, 1935 Utah Laws 195, 195 ("All waters in this state,
whether above or under the ground are hereby declared to be the property of the
public, subject to all existing rights to the use thereof.").
27. See Act of Mar. 22, 1935, ch. 105, § 100-5-12, 1935 Utah Laws 195, 200.
28. Between 1903 and 2010, 71,445 pre-statutory claims were filed with the Utah
Division of Water Rights. Of these claims, 30,030 have no filing date associated with
the claim. The estimate number of claims filed between 1930 and 1940-17,470does not include any of the undated claims filed during this period. Therefore, the
actual number of pre-statutory claims filed in the 1930s could be much higher. See
generally UTAH DIVIsION OF WATER RIGHTS DATABASE, supra note 5.
29. Id.
30. HUTCHINS &JENSEN, supra note 14, at 113 n. 78.
31. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-5-13(1) (a) (2010) ("All claimants to the right to the
use of water, including both surface and underground, whose rights are not
represented by certificates of appropriation issued by the state engineer, by
applications filed with the state engineer, by court decrees, or by notice of claim filed
pursuant to law, shall submit the claim to the state engineer.").
32. See id. § 73-5-13.
33. See id. § 73-5-13(6).
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addition, it mandated a State Engineer field investigation and report.14
The report prepared by the State Engineer can be considered as
evidence for evaluating the validity of the claim or for determining the
quantity of water diverted and the extent of beneficial use in both
judicial and administrative proceedings."
The revised statute gave the State Engineer authority to establish
standards for the determination of "acceptably complete claims" and
removed the provision declaring a filed claim to constitute "prima
facie evidence" of the validity of the claimed water right." Instead, it
required that the claimant prove the claim's legitimacy in any action to
determine the validity of the claim." If the claimant, or any other
interested party, does not agree with the report's evaluation and
conclusions regarding the claim, the claimant can petition for
adjudication in district court."
Prior to the adoption of the 1997 standards, many pre-statutory
claims were listed in a Proposed Determination of Water Rights (PD)
produced by the State Engineer during a court-ordered adjudication
and were subjected to both public and judicial review." However,
during the thirty to forty-year period from the time when most general
adjudications were conducted (the 1950s and 1960s) until the
adoption of the 1997 statute, a number of pre-statutory claims were
These claims were not filtered through the general
filed.40
adjudication proceedings and were not subject to the filing and review
requirements of the 1997 statute. Hence, these claims remain both
unevaluated and unadjudicated.
An examination of the Utah Division of Water Rights' records
reveals that 77,071 pre-statutory claims were filed prior to the 1997
statute, of which 28,794 claims have not been published in a proposed
determination or subjected to a general adjudication.41
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II. METHODS FOR OBTAINING A WATER RIGHT UNDER UTAH LAW

There were two ways through which a private party may have
obtained a water right prior to the 1997 amendments to Title 73,
Chapter 5: (1) by filing an appropriation application under Title 73,
Chapter 3, or (2) by filing a claim for a pre-statutory use under Title
73, Chapter 5.*

A. THE STATUTORY APPROPRIATION PROCESS
If a water user filed an appropriation application under Title 73,
Chapter 3, the criteria set forth in section 73-3-1, previously and still
currently requires the State Engineer to approve an application if:
(a) there is unappropriated water in the proposed source; (b)
the proposed use will not impair existing rights or interfere
with the more beneficial use of the water; (c) the proposed
plan is physically and economically feasible. . . and would not
prove detrimental to the public welfare; (d) the applicant has
the financial ability to complete the proposed works; and (e)
the application was filed in good faith and not for purposes of
speculation or monopoly.4 3
The burden of persuasion is on the applicant throughout the
application process to show that the proposed uses will not impair
prior vested rights."
After an application is approved, the applicant has a specified
period of time (set forth in the approval decision) in which to
complete the proposed work and put the water to beneficial use.
After the diversion and delivery system and the beneficial use are in
place, the applicant typically retaines the services of a professional
engineer or land surveyor who files "proof of appropriation"
documentation providing a description of the diversion works and
methods used in applying water to beneficial use, along with water
diversion measurements, and professionally-created maps." If the
State Engineer finds the proof documentation sufficient, the State
Engineer then issues a certificate of appropriation that sets forth and
affirmes the details contained in the proof.4 7 An issued certificate is
42. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73-3-1, 73-5-13 (1996).
43. Id. § 73-3-8 (emphasis added).
44. See Searle v. Milburn Irrigation Co., 133 P.3d 382, 396 (Utah 2006).
45. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-3-10 (1996) ("The state engineer shall state in his
endorsement of approval the time within which the construction work shall be
completed and the time within which the water shall be applied to beneficial use.").
46. Id. § 73-3-16.
47. Id. § 73-3-17 ("Upon it being made to appear to the satisfaction of the state
engineer that an appropriation or a permanent change of point of diversion, place or
nature of use has been perfected in accordance with the application therefor, and that
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prima facie evidence of the owner's right to the use of water in the
quantity, for the purpose, at the place, and during the time specified
therein, subject to prior rights.4 1
B. PRE-STATUTORY CLAIMS
To obtain recognition of a water right acquired through diversion
and beneficial use made prior to the adoption of the appropriation
statutes (1903 for surface water and 1935 for ground water), section
73-5-13 (prior to the 1997 amendments) required the claimant to file a
statement under oath declaring the quantity of water diverted and
used, the nature of the use, and the date when beneficial use was first
established.4 '
The statute provided a standard form for such
declarations.5 o This form contained a section for a sworn affidavit
from a disinterested third party with personal knowledge who affirmed
that the facts set forth in the claim were true and accurate accounts.5 1
Regardless of whether a water user established a water right under
the stricter procedures of the appropriation application or under the
more lenient pre-statutory claim statute, the effect was the same both processes produced prima facie evidence of a valid water right.
II.JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESSES - THE LIMITATIONS ON
EVALUATING PRE-STATUTORY CLAIMS
A. ADMINISTRATIVE EVALUATION OF PRE-STATUTORY CLAIMS

Although the State Engineer has broad statutory discretion to
"secure the equitable apportionment and distribution of the water
according to the respective rights of appropriators,"5 2 the State
Engineer lacks authority to adjudicate the validity of these rights."
The State Engineer may, however, rely on available evidence to deny
an administrative action if this evidence shows the pre-statutory claim

the water appropriated or affected by the change has been put to a beneficial use, as
required by §§ 73-3-16, he shall issue a certificate.").
48. Id. § 73-3-17.
49. See id. § 73-5-13.
50. See id.
51. Utah Admin. Code R655-614 (G) allows the state engineer to refer to maps,
aerial photographs and any other information necessary when making an
administrative decision. Where information obtained shows a claim may be invalid or
overstated, such an application could be denied both because there is no
unappropriated water to be taken and because the new demand on the resource
would unavoidably impair prior vested rights pursuant to the requirements under § 733-8 and § 73-3-1. In a fully-appropriated source, allowing a new water right to come
into play pursuant to any administrative action would produce the effect of a new
appropriation of water in that resource.
52. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-2-1 (3) (b) (2010).
53. Searle, supra note 44 at 391 ("[The] district court, when reviewing the State
Engineer's decision to approve or reject an application for a change in use of a water
right, is not sitting in its capacity as an adjudicator of rights, but is merely charged with
ensuring that the State Engineer correctly performed an administrative task.").
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might be invalid or overstated." Therefore, when subjecting a claim to
the administrative process, the owner of a pre-statutory water right
should be prepared to provide evidence to substantiate the priority
and extent of the claimed use.
The most common administrative action involving a pre-statutory
claim occurs when the owner files a change application seeking either
to modify the nature of the beneficial use (i.e., irrigation, municipal,
power, stock watering), the point of diversion, and / or the place of
use.5 Sections 73-3-3 and 73-3-8 govern the procedures and criteria
under which the State Engineer must approve a change application."
The State Engineer is required to undertake the same investigation for
permanent change applications as for applications for water
For example, the State Engineer must find that the
appropriations.
proposed use will not impair existing rights or interfere with the more
beneficial use of the water, and that the change is -feasible and would
not prove detrimental to the public welfare.
Because a claim filed prior to 1997 is prima facie evidence of a
valid right, the State Engineer must, when evaluating a change
application based on such a pre-statutory claim, take administrative
notice of the facts set forth in the claim. These facts include the
amount of water used, the nature of use, and the priority of the claim.
The Division of Water Rights has adopted administrative rules that
allow the State Engineer to refer to maps or aerial photographs, to
compel the production of any necessary evidence, and to consult
All
experts before approving or denying a change application."
adjudicative proceedings of the Division (including change
applications) are informal proceedings."o At its discretion, the Division
may determine matters within its authority by holding hearings on
adjudicative proceedings." Although the rules prohibit the type of
discovery typical of litigation, the rules establish permissible types of
evidence and confer the power to compel production of necessary
At a hearing, "[t]he Presiding Officer may take official
evidence.
notice of the following matters which shall be considered as facts
presented at the hearing: [r]ules, regulations, official and unofficial
reports, surveys, maps, investigations, all Division files, decisions and
orders of the State Engineer and any other regulatory agency, state or
federal." 63
The State Engineer may have access to historic hydrographic

54. See UTAH CODEANN. § 73-3-5(2), (4) (2010).
55. See generally UTAH DIVIsION OF WATER RIGHTS DATABASE, supra note 5.
56. See id. § 73-3-3.
57. Id. § 73-3-3(5) (a).
58. Id. § 73-3-8(1) (a).
59. UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 655-6-14 (G) (2011).
60. Id. at r. 655-6-2.
61. Id. at r. 655-6-7(D).
62. Id. at r. 655-614(A).
63. Id. at r. 655-6-14(G).

310

WA TER LAWREWEW

Volume 14

survey maps showing the purported place of beneficial use. If the
record shows the claimed use is invalid or overstated, the State
Engineer may reject the application on the grounds that approving a
change to an invalid or overstated right would have the effects of a new
appropriation of water or constitute an enlargement of the underlying
right." Although these findings could support a conclusion that a
certain water right claim is invalid, as long as the State Engineer is not
asserting a determination of forfeiture or abandonment of the
underlying right, he is neither adjudicating the right nor exceeding his
administrative powers."
A party may obtain judicial review in district court of any order
from the State Engineer."6 Although a party may ask the State
Engineer to reconsider his action, that party does not have to exhaust
administrative remedies before appealing.
Where a party appeals, the trial court is required to determine the
same questions that were before the State Engineer in the
administrative process in a de novo review.
When appealing the
rejection of a change application, the extent or priority of rights that
the applicant asserts have been acquired under a pre-statutory claim
cannot be adjudicated because "no cause of action for the
adjudication ... accrue [s] " from the administrative action on a
change application."6 ' Therefore, the court's reviewing of the denial
of a change application is "based only on a finding of reason to believe
that such facts do or may exist if the application is approved rather
than a finding of such facts." 70
Even where the. State Engineer's records show that the claimed use
or priority may be invalid, the records of the State Engineer extend no
further than the sanctity of his decisions.7 1 The courts are not bound
by evidence or data adduced at hearings before the State Engineer.
Regardless of what evidence the court considers on appeal, the extent
and validity of a pre-statutory claim cannot be judicially determined
until the validity of that right is itself the subject of a judicial or
adjudicative action. Therefore, an invalid or overstated pre-statutory
claim could continue to underlie the right to water use under the
original claim for decades after the State Engineer denied a change
application. Furthermore, the right may change ownership several

64.
65.

SeeUTAH CODEANN. §§ 73-3-8(1) (2010).
See id. § 73-2-1 (setting out the powers and duties of the State Engineer).

66.

UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 655-6-18(A) (2011).

67. Id.
68. E. Bench Irrigation Co. v. State, 300 P.2d 603, 606 (Utah 1956).
69. Id. at 607.
70. Id.
71. See Am. Fork Irrigation Co. v. Linke, 239 P.2d 188, 190-91 (Utah 1951) (stating
that courts are the "sole ultimate arbiter[s] of law and fact in water cases, bound
neither by the nature, extent or content of [the State Engineer's] decision, nor as to
the character, quantum or quality of proof, evidence or data adduced at hearings
before him or accumulated independently by his office.").
72. Id. at 190-91.
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times, possibly creating unfounded expectations of a valid water right.
B.JUDICIAL ADJUDICATION - EVALUATING PRE-STATUTORY CLAIMS

There are only two ways to accomplish a forfeiture of a water right:
either pursuant to a court-ordered adjudication, or in a civil action
where a plaintiff shows, through evidence, that a user has either
abandoned or forfeited the right." A general adjudication is a
statutorily-created process intended to evaluate the extent and priority
of all water rights in an entire drainage or sub-drainage basin; it is
governed by sections 73-4-1 through 73-1-24."
An adjudication may commence when five or more users of a water
source file a petition requesting an investigation into their relative
rights. 75 If, after investigation, the facts justify a determination, the
State Engineer has a duty to file an action in district court." All
adjudications commenced since 1903 have begun either by petition or
sua sponte (i.e., a court hearing a private cause of action regarding
water rights converted the proceeding into a statutory adjudication) '
After an action is filed in district court, the State Engineer is
required to provide notice to all water rights owners in the affected
drainage basin.7 ' The State Engineer then performs extensive surveys
to determine the location and extent of all diversions and beneficial
Subsequently, the State
uses of water within the designated area.
Engineer publishes a record of all uses in the form of a PD and
delivers a copy to each party in the action." The water users must file
a Water User's Claim ninety days after notice of the adjudication.8 '
Opposing users must file objections to the PD no more than ninety
days after delivery of the PD to the claimants." If a party fails to assert
any claim to water covered under the adjudication, that party may be
barred from asserting the claim in the future.8
Most adjudications have turned out to be a lengthy process, with
some proceedings lasting over forty years." An examination into past
73. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-4 (2010).
74. Id. §§ 73-4-1 through 73-1 -24.
75. Id. §73-4-1(1).
76. Id. § 73-4- (2) (b)-(c).
77. See id. § 73-4-18; see also Watson v. Dist. Ct. ex rel. Cache Cnty., 163 P.2d 322,
323 (Utah 1945) (district court converted a private suit into a general adjudication).
78. Id. § 73-4-3(2) (a).
79. Id. § 73-4-3(3).
80. Id. § 73-4-11(2).
81. Id. § 73-4-5.
82. Id.§73-4-11(2)(b).
83. Id. § 734-9. See also In re Gen. Determination Of Rights To Use All Water, Both
Surface and Underground Within Drainage Area of Utah Lake and Jordan River in
Utah, Salt Lake, Davis, Summit, Wasatch, San Pete and Juab Counties in Utah, 982
P.2d 65, 70-71 (Utah 1999).
84. See GeneralAdjudications in Utah, UTAH DIVIsIoN OF WATER RIGHTS,
http://waterrights.utah.gov/adjstatus/default.asp (last visited Mar. 13, 2011) (for
example, Area 52 Little Bear River).
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adjudication proceedings reveals that in one case, a PD was published
over twenty-four years ago, protests are on record with the court and,
while a final hearing has yet to be scheduled, many of the described
water rights have transferred ownership several times. 85 Additionally,
the status of objections filed by persons who have deceased since
These conditions
publication of the PD remains unresolved."
exemplify the lack of order and certainty and the limitations for
evaluating both statutory and pre-statutory water rights through a
general adjudication.
A water right owner desiring some degree of certainty as to extent
and priority of a pre-statutory claim may request a declaratory action in
judicial court. However, the Utah Supreme Court has addressed the
problems imposed by private remedies and declared that no decree
can be entered for a private water right until a general determination
Thus, even a private action for a
of water rights is completed."
declaratory judgment or to quiet title leaves a degree of uncertainty as
to the ultimate rights under a pre-statutory claim.
V. EVIDENCE - How TO SUBSTANTIATE A PRE-STATUTORY CLAIM.

Historically, courts have placed strict requirements on evidence
submitted to substantiate claims for pre-statutory water rights and held
that "vague and indefinite evidence might be insufficient to establish
In a departure from traditional
pre-1903 beneficial water use."
evidentiary standards, in 1991, the Utah Supreme Court awarded a
pre-statutory diligence claim and allowed as evidence hearsay
testimony from a witness who had merely heard of such uses. The
court reasoned that "it would be overly burdensome and unrealistic
for us to require a water user to produce unquestionable,
overwhelmingly clear evidence of water use" prior to 1903.9
85. See Virgin River Adjudication - Book 2 Details, UTAH DIVISION OF WATER RIGHTS,
http://waterrights.utah.gov/adjstatus/default.asp (follow "Area 81 - East Fork Virgin
River Division Book 2" hyperlink) (last visited Mar. 13, 2011).
86. Id.
87. See Watson, supra note 77, at 323 ("If a court were allowed to enter final
judgments of individual rights in a suit for general adjudication before the state
engineer has made his survey, report, determinations and recommendations as
provided for in the statute, the very purpose of the statute, which we have shown is to
avoid piecemeal litigation, would be circumvented. [N]o final judgment should be
entered until all the rights of all the claimants can be adjudicated."). In a case of
quiet title to land, the courts have recommended using the adjudication statute and
procedures that require completion of a hydrologic survey to determine the rights to
which parties are entitled. See Hardy v. Beaver Cnty. Irrigation Co., 234 P. 524, 530-31
(Utah 1924) (holding that the trial court did not determine the rights to a definite
degree, the court recommended filing a petition to adjudicate the basin in question
suggesting that "[a] disinterested hydrographic survey of respondents' lands and
irrigation systems by such state official will inevitably eliminate many of the
uncertainties which are inherent in the record now before us.").
88. Eskelsen, supra note 3, at 774 (citing Mt. Olivet Cemetery Ass'n v. Salt Lake
City, 235 P. 876, 878-79 (Utah 1925)). See also Richfield Cottonwood Irrigation Co. v.
City of Richfield, 34 P.2d 945, 949 (Utah 1934).
89. Eskelsen, supra note 3, at 774.
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Because "[i]t is elementary that an appropriation of water is
,limited by time as well as by amount... an appropriator's right is
limited by not only the quantity of water which he has beneficially used
and the seasonal period [in which it was used]."90 Historical deeds,
maps, witnesses, journals and any evidence that tends to support the
claimed uses can be adduced to establish these essential facts.9'
Courts have rejected some types of evidence as creating a vested
pre-statutory claim including, water certificates created pursuant to the
1880 Laws of Utah," and federal land patents granted under the
Homestead and Mining Acts." An owner of a pre-statutory claim or
potential purchaser of such a claim should investigate the original
claim statement and be prepared to present evidence anytime the
water right is the subject ofjudicial or administrative action.
CONCLUSION
The prior appropriation doctrine strives to create predictability
and accuracy in securing the equitable apportionment of Utah's
waters. Over 27,000 pre-statutory claims remain unevaluated and
unadjudicated, creating a high level of uncertainty not only to the
persons who own or acquire these claims, but also to those who have
established their rights under the appropriation process and may have
competing priority." An owner of an unadjudicated pre-statutory
water right should be prepared with evidence to substantiate the
claimed priority date and extent of claimed beneficial uses. Because
private remedial actions outside statutory adjudications serve only to
produce interlocutory decrees, there is a strong public policy interest
in authorizing the State Engineer to exercise reasonable regulatory
power to ascertain and regulate pre-statutory claims through
administrative actions.

90. Hardy, supra note 87, at 529.
91.

See UTAH CODE ANN.

§

73-3-16 (2010).

92. See Holman v. Christensen, 274 P. 457, 461 (Utah 1929).
93. See 43 U.S.C. § 661 (2011) ("Whenever by priority of possession, rights to the
use of water for mining, agricultural, manufacturing or other purposes, have vested
and accrued, and the same are recognized and acknowledged by the local customs,
laws and decisions of courts, the possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be
maintained and protected in the same.... All patents granted, or preemption or
homesteads allowed, shall be subject to any vested and accrued water rights, or rights
to ditches and reservoirs used in connection with such water rights, as may have been
acquired under or recognized by this section.").
94.

See generally UTAH DivisioN OF WATER RIGHTS'DATABASE, supra note 5.
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ABSTRACT

In 2008, the Utah Supreme Court held that the public right to recreational
use of water includes the right to incidentally contact privately owned beds of
waterways. The court's decision ignited controversy, and the Utah legislature
responded emphatically with a new public ownership statute nulifying the
court's holding. The statute's supportersconcluded, not entirely without reason,
that public ownership of 'Utah'swaters arises solely from the Utah Code. If this
reasoning is sound, it follows that the legislature was free to correct the judicial
interpretationwith which it disagreed. But, it is not altogetherclear that public
ownership of Utah's waters is purely statutory. Judicial precedent and
constitutionalhistory suggest that an alternative, independent legal basisfor the
public ownership of Utah's waters exists. The purpose of this article is thus to
shed light on the origins of public ownership in Utah water law, and to assess
the potential implicationsfor the constitutionality of the new public ownership
statute.
INTRODUCTION

The constitutions of most western states provide for public
ownership of water. However, the Utah Constitution is exceptional in
* Assistant Attorney General, Wyoming Office of the Attorney General, Water and
Natural Resources Division. I am grateful to Robert Adler for inspiring this research
and to Peter Michael for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Opinions
and errors are mine alone.
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this regard because it does not clearly assert public ownership of water.
Instead, article XVII of the Utah Constitution provides only.that "[a]ll
existing rights to the use of any of the waters in this State for any useful
or beneficial purpose, are hereby recognized and confirmed."'
Nevertheless, Utah courts have long recognized public ownership as
an element of Utah water law. 2
In most areas of water use, Utah and other western states apply the
public ownership concept similarly - by common law and statutes
that flesh out how the public water resource may be put to private use
for the benefit of society.' For example, western water law generally
allows individuals to divert publicly owned waters for private
agricultural use.' While private agricultural use of publicly owned
water has deep historical roots, public recreational use of water is a
subject of more recent concern.
The issue of public use of water for recreational purposes came to
the fore only recently, for obvious reasons - namely, western settlers
focused on water use for survival and basic industry, not whitewater
rafting and fly-fishing. By the end of the twentieth century, however,
most western states had addressed the extent to which public
ownership of water includes public rights of access to watercourses for
recreational purposes such as fishing, boating, and hunting. The
Colorado Supreme Court, for example, concluded that even though
the Colorado Constitution provides that the water of every stream is
public property dedicated to the use of the people,' the right of public
ownership does not include the right to float and fish on nonnavigable waterways.' In contrast, the supreme courts of other western
states, including Wyoming, Montana, and New Mexico, have
concluded that the constitutional provision for public ownership of
water does include the right to float and fish on non-navigable waters.'
These deeply divergent views on whether public ownership of water
includes rights to recreational access help to illustrate the complex
and controversial nature of the issues. Some states, such as Wyoming,
have essentially settled the debate.' But the battle rages on in other
states.9
1. UTAH CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
2. Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir, & Power Co., 72 P.2d 648, 652-53 (Utah
1937).
3. See e.g., I WELLS A. HUTCHINS, COMPLETED BY HAROLD H. ELLIS & PETER DEBRAAL,
WATER RIGHTS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 5 (2004).

4. See e.g., id. at 17.
5.
6.

COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.
People v. Emmert, 597 P.2d 1025, 1026 (Colo. 1979).

7. Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 147 (Wyo. 1961); Montana Coal. for Stream
Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 171 (Mont. 1984); New Mexico v. Red River
Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421, 430-34 (N.M. 1945) (rejecting the reasoning of the Colorado
Supreme Court).
8. Day, 362 P.2d at 147.

9. In Montana, for example, the 1984 Montana Supreme Court decision in Curran
did not ultimately settle the issue; instead the fight continues. See Michael Babcock,
Anglers Anxious Bill Would Cut Stream Access, GREAT FALLS TRIB., Feb. 10, 2011; Pat
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Utah first faced the question of whether public ownership of water
gives rise to rights to recreational access in 1982.o Borrowing from the
law of Wyoming, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that a right to
recreational access exists incident to public ownership of water." At
the time, however, the Utah Supreme Court reserved the question of
whether the public recreational access right includes the right to touch
privately owned streambeds.12 That question materialized nearly three
decades later; in a highly controversial opinion, the Utah Supreme
Court held that the tight of recreational access inherent in public
ownership of water includes the right to incidentally touch privately
owned beds of waterways."
Private owners of riparian property and the Utah legislature
reacted emphatically to this holding, declaring the court's opinion
null and void through a new public ownership statute - the Utah
Public Waters Access Act (HB- 141)." The supporters of the bill
asserted, not entirely without reason, that public ownership of Utah's
waters arises solely from a statutory provision in the Utah code.'" If
this reasoning was sound, it follows that the legislature was free to
correct the judicial interpretation with which it disagreed.
However, it is not altogether clear that public ownership of Utah
water rests solely on a statutory foundation. Judicial precedent and
constitutional history suggest that an alternative, independent legal
basis for public ownership of Utah's waters exists. While Utah courts
have repeatedly alluded to public ownership independent of statutory
authority, explanations of the legal basis therefor are limited. The
Utah Supreme Court has referred to a "doctrine of public ownership,"
explaining the concept in terms of prior appropriation and natural
law.1 But, Utah courts have not identified the doctrine's precise legal
origin. As a result, the state of the law is uncertain. This uncertainty
has ripened in the form of a constitutional challenge to HB 141 that
will likely require the Utah courts to determine whether the doctrine
Munday, Montana Puts Limits on National Trout Unlimited, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS, Apr. 16,
3
2007, http://www.hcn.org/issues/3 4 4 /16 9 5 . And, even though the Colorado
the issue of public recreational access
on
Supreme Court has spoken authoritatively
rights deriving from public ownership of water, debate over the subject has not ended.
See Jimy Valenti, Rafting Bill Sent Upstreamfor More Study, COLO. STATESMAN, Mar. 19,
2010,
http://www.coloradostatesman.com/content/991683-rafting-bill-sent-upstream-morestudy; Lori Potter et al., Legal Underpinnings of the Right to Float Through Private Property
in Colorado:A Reply tojohn Hill, 5 U. DENVER WATER L. REv. 457 (2002).
10. J.J.N.P. Co. v. Utah Div. of Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1982).
11. Id. at 1137.
12. Id. at 1139.
13. Conatser v. Johnson, 194 P.3d 897, 903 (Utah 2008).
14. HB 141 (Utah 2010). The ownership provision is codified as paragraphs (2)
through (4) of the public ownership statute. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1 (West
2010).
15. FloorDebate on House Bill 141: Recreational Use of Public Water on Private Property,
Utah H.R., Feb. 22, 2010 (statement of Rep. McIff) [hereinafter McIff], available at
http://e.utah.gov/-2010/htmdoc/hbillhtm/HBO141.htm
16. Conatser 194 P.3d at 899.
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of public ownership has roots in the Utah Constitution.' 7
This article thus aims to shed light on the origins of public
ownership in Utah water law, and to assess the potential implications
for the constitutionality of HB 141. The discussion begins with an
overview of the evolution of the public recreational easement in Utah
water law, examining first the Conatser decision and its predecessors,
and then proceeding to the passage and substance of HB 141. This
article then analyzes potential sources of public ownership law,
including statutory declarations, judicial interpretations, prior
appropriation doctrine, and Utah Constitution article XVII.
Several propositions become evident from analysis of these legal
sources. First, article XVII of the Utah Constitution does not expressly
provide for public ownership. Rather, it only preserves the status quo
ante for water rights existing at the time of statehood. Second, article
XVII protects water rights established according to Utah prior
appropriation law. And third, public ownership has inhered in Utah's
water appropriation law since territorial times. From these premises,
this article argues that article XVII provides for public ownership, even
if only as a component of the existing water rights system that the Utah
Constitution preserves.
Whether the water amendment to the Utah Constitution provides
for public ownership of water is a debatable point. The text of article
XVII is not rich in meaning, and countervailing historical arguments
concerning its interpretation exist. The weight of the evidence
suggests that public ownership has always been a component of Utah
water law. Yet the drafters of the Utah Constitution rejected a water
amendment that expressly provided for public ownership.
Concluding that public ownership of water arises from the Utah
constitution implicates serious questions concerning the validity of HB
141. Interpreting the meaning of constitutional provisions, such as
whether public ownership of water entails a right to recreational
access, as well as the nature and extent of that right, undoubtedly falls
within the province of the judiciary. Nonetheless, HB 141 purports to
usurp this judicial authority, replacing the Utah Supreme Court's
interpretation with that of the legislature. Accordingly, this article
closes with an analysis of the separation of powers implications that
follow from concluding that public ownership of Utah water has roots
in the Utah Constitution.
I. THE PUBLIC EASEMENT IN WATER

The Utah Supreme Court has recognized a public recreational
17. See Complaint at 18, Utah Stream Access Coal. v. Victory Ranch, L.C. (4th Jud.
Dist. Ct. of Utah 2010) [hereinafter Coalition Complaint], availableat
http://utahstreamaccess.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/11/RY8657.pdf.
(alleging
that HB 141 violates public rights and the constitutional separation of powers). Also
see Roxanna Orellana & Peter S. Lozancich, Group Sues over Stream Access, SALT LAKE
TRIB., Nov. 19, 2010, http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/home/50666012-76/access-publicutah-act.html.csp.
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right incident to public ownership of water. Many other states
recognize similar rights," but the recreational easement, as it is
understood in Utah, has become a controversial subject in the state's
water law. The Utah Supreme Court first recognized the easement in
a 1982 case involving a corporation's attempt to convert a public water
body into a private fishery. However, the 1982 decision left open the
question of whether the easement burdened the beds underlying
public waters. That question ripened almost thirty years later, and
Utah's high court concluded that the public easement granted the
public license to incidentally contact privately owned streambeds while
utilizing public waters.' 9 Controversy followed the decision, and the
Utah legislature responded- with a statute to overrule the court's
interpretation of the law. Opponents have now challenged the statute,
raising questions concerning the constitutional separation of powers.
A. PUBLIC OWNERSHIP
The Utah Supreme Court first recognized the public recreational
easement in water in the 1982 case of J.J.N.P. Co. v. Utah Division of
Wildlife Resources.20 In that case a corporation, which owned all of the
land surrounding a natural lake, challenged the state's denial of its
application to operate a private fishery on the lake." The state
asserted that the lake was navigable and, therefore, a public trust
property that the company could not convert into a private fishery."
The court held, however, that "[allthough 'navigability' is a standard
used to determine title to waterbeds, it does not establish the extent of
the State's interest in the waters."
Refusing to dispose of the case on public trust grounds, the court
instead assessed the claims in light of public ownership of water. In
Utah, like most states west of the Mississippi River, public ownership of
water is the rule.2 ' The JJ.N.P. court began its analysis of public
ownership with a reference to the Utah Code provision on public
ownership, which provides that "all waters ... are the property of the
public." The court then went on to explain that "public ownership is
18. See, e.g., Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 151 (Wyo. 1961); S. Idaho Fish &
Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 528 P.2d 1295, 1298 (Idaho 1974); New Mexico
v. Red River Valley Co., 182 P.2d 421, 434 (N.M. 1945); Roberts v. Taylor, 181 N.W.
622, 626 (N.D. 1921); Luscher v. Reynolds, 56 P.2d 1158, 1162 (Or. 1936); Hillebrand
v. Knapp, 274 N.W. 821, 822 (S.D. 1937); Snively v. Jaber, 296 P.2d 1015, 1019 (Wash.
1956).
19. Conatser,194 P.3d at 903.
20. J.J.N.P. Co. v. Utah Div. of Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 1982).
21. Id.at1135.
22. Id. at 1136.
23. Id. (citing Monroe v. State, 175 P.2d 759 (Utah 1946); Comment, Basis for the
Legal Establishment of a Public Right of Recreation in Utah's "Non-Navigable" Waters, 5 J.
CONTEMP. L. 95 (1978)).
24. Id. (citing UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1).
25. See, e.g., COLO. CONsT. art. XVI, § 5; IDAHO CONST. art. XV, § 1; WYo. CONsT. art.
VIII, § 1; NEV. REV. STAT. § 533.025 (2010).
26. J.JN.P., 655 P.2d at 1136.
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founded on the principle that water, a scarce and essential resource in
this area of the country, is indispensable to the welfare of all the
people; and the State must therefore assume the responsibility of
allocating the use of water for the benefit and welfare of the people of
The legal corollary to this principle of
the State as a whole.""
necessity is what the JJ.N.P. court described as the "doctrine of public
ownership."" However, the JJ.N.P. court did not clearly define the
source of the public ownership doctrine. The court described the
doctrine in terms of natural law, citing to Blackstone, and as a
necessary incident to prior appropriation. 9
One can understand the court's failure to more precisely explain
this doctrine of public ownership, because regardless of the source,
public ownership of water is settled Utah law.so Utah courts have long
understood that the state serves as trustee of the water and regulates its
use in protection of the public interest. Public ownership provides
the basis for the state to regulate water for the good of the people."
Only waters taken into physical possession by placement in storage
receptacles may be privately owned." All other waters are the property
of the public; all are equal owners, with coequal rights, and no one can
have exclusive control thereof.'
B. PUBLIC RIGHTS
As an incident to public ownership, the Utah Supreme Court
explained in JJ.N.P., the public holds an easement over the water
"regardless of who owns the water beds beneath."" Accordingly, the
public does not trespass when utilizing publicly owned waters, even
where such water is flowing over privately owned lands." Interpreting
the scope of the easement, the court concluded that "the public, if it
can obtain lawful access to a body of water, has the right to float leisure
craft, hunt, fish, and participate in any lawful activity when utilizing
that water."" But, the J.JN.P. court left open the question of whether
the public easement burdens privately owned beds of waterways,
rendering the actual scope of the easement highly uncertain. 8
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1136 n.3.
30. See, e.g., Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water & Elec. Power Co., 67 P. 672, 677
(Utah 1902).
31. Tanner v. Bacon, 136 P.2d 957, 966-67 (Utah 1943).
32. J.J.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136 (citing Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971)).
33. Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir, & Power Co., 72 P.2d 648, 652 (Utah
1937) (describing an ownership rule of capture).
34. Id.
35. JJ.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136.
.36. Id. at 1136-37.
37. Id. at 1137 (citing Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 147 (Wyo. 1961); S. Idaho
Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 528 P.2d 1295, 1298 (Idaho 1974)). The
court also notes a long list of other states that have found a public right to recreational
use of public waters. See fJ.N.P., 655 P.2d at 1137 n.4.
38. Id. at 1138 n.6.
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That uncertainty came to the fore nearly thirty years later in
Conatser v. Johnson.3" The Conatsers were recreational users of the
Weber River, who appear to have had a long running dispute
concerning the scope of the public easement with the Johnsons,
owners of property riparian to the Weber.40 The Johnsons eventually
notified the sheriff, who arrested the Conatsers for trespass based on
their contact with the Johnsons' privately owned riverbeds." The trial
court convicted the Conatsers, but on appeal the state dropped its case
due to "uncertainty regarding the Conatsers' status as trespassers. "42
Desiring a resolution to the long running conflict, the Conatsers filed
an action seeking a declaration of their rights to the river. 3 They
argued that the public easement to utilize the waters allows for nonobtrusive touching of the privately owned steam beds." The District
Court rejected this argument, concluding that the easement only
allows members of the public to be upon the water and to touch the
beds and banks incidental to flotation.4 5
The Utah Supreme Court, however, saw the matter differently.
Rejecting the District Court's reliance on the Wyoming case of Day v.
Armstrong, the high Utah court pointed out that J.JN.P. had subtly
departed from the holding in Day.4 6 The Day court concluded that
recreational rights to access publicly owned waters were derivative of
the right to float, and thus the easement allowed only activities "upon"
the water.4 ' But, the Utah Supreme Court noted J.JN.P. did not adopt
the same limiting language." Rather, JJN.P. found an easement to
"utilize" -the water, not merely to be upon it.4" Thus, the question
reserved by the /J.N.P. court - whether the easement reached the
beds of waterways - was not so easily disposed of as the trial court
concluded.
Looking to the law of easements, the Utah Supreme Court in
Conatser explained that an easement holder is privileged "to. do such
acts as are necessary to make effective his or her enjoyment of the

39. Conatser v.Johnson, 194 P.3d 897, 897 (Utah 2008).
40. Id. at 898-99.
41. Id. According to the record, the Conatsers contacted the river bottom in four
ways: their raft occasionally made contact in shallow areas; their raft paddles
occasionally touched bottom; fishing tackle occasionally touched bottom; and Mr.
Conatser walked on the bed to fish and remove fencing the Johnsons installed across
the river. Id.
42. Id. at 899.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. Accordingly, the trial court found that Mr. Conatser's act of walking on the
river bottom while fishing constituted a trespass. Id.
46. Id. at 901.
47. Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 144 (Wyo. 1961).
48. See Conatser, 194 P.3d at 901. In fact, it is unclear why the Day court found it
necessary to limit the public easement to activities incident to navigation, especially
since the court expressly refused to resolve the case based on navigability. See Day, 362
P.2d at 143-44.
49. J.J.N.P. Co. v. Utah Div. of Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133, 1137 (Utah 1982).
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easement."o But the rights of the dominant and servient estates are
"limited, each by the other, that there may be a due and reasonable
enjoyment of both."" Applying these general easement principles to
the public easement in water, the Utah Supreme Court concluded that
members of the public may engage in all lawful activities that utilize
the water, including coming into contact with privately owned
submerged lands, so long as the activities are conducted reasonably,
and in a way that does not cause unnecessary injury to the servient
estate.
The effect of the Conatserdecision was to make certain the public
right to incidentally touch beds of waters that do not meet the
traditional test for navigability-in-fact. Under Utah law, beds to waters
that were navigable in fact at the time of statehood are owned by the
state in trust for the public." A watercourse is considered navigable if,
in its natural state at the time of statehood, it was available as a public
highway for practical, valuable, commercial purposes.5 ' Beds to
navigable waterways, then, are owned by the public and openly
available to public recreational use irrespective of the public
recreational easement. Watercourses that were not navigable-in-fact at
the time of statehood, on the other hand, are not subject to the public
trust, and the beds thereof may be privately owned." Those privately
owned -beds of small streams and rivers are the estates that the
recreational easement burdens.
C. HOUSE BILL 141
Not surprisingly, the Conatser decision generated mixed reactions.
While the case dealt a monumental victory to public recreational
interests, it raised fears of trespassing and declining property values for
riparian property owners. 6 Now, every stream or river reach that does
not meet the navigable-in-fact test for public ownership, many of which
flow through highly valuable residential property, would be opened up
to public use. Given the vagueness of the -Conatser standards "reasonable use" and "unnecessary injury" - as well as the high
transaction costs that would accompany prosecuting, for example,
small scale littering, property owners argued that the Conatser decision
disposed of what were seemingly settled investment-backed property
expectations.
50. Conatser, 194 P.3d at 902.
51. Id. (citing Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 174 P.2d 148, 158 (Utah
1946) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
52. See id.
53. See Monroe v. State, 175 P.2d 759, 760 (Utah 1946).
54. See id. at 761.
55. See id. at 760.
56. See Randy Parker, Op-Ed., Balance PropertyRights, Recreation, DESERET NEWS, Mar.
10, 2010, http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700015272/Balance-property-rightsrecreation.html.
57. AmyJoi O'Donoghue, Gov. HerbertSigns Bill RestrictingAccess to Streams on Private
Property, DESERET NEWS, Apr. 1, 2010 (noting the perception that Conatser "gutted"
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The Utah legislature took up the riparian owners' cause, and in
the first week of February 2010, Utah Representative Kay McIff
introduced House Bill 141 (HB 141), also known as the Utah Public
Waters Access Act. The Bill railed against the Conatser decision,
declaring it to be a violation of Utah's constitutional protection against
uncompensated takings of private property."
Nevertheless,
Representative McIff explained on the house floor that HB 141 was
"not intended as an attack on the Supreme Court."" McIff went on to
assert that the "good news is the [Conatser] court did not rely upon any
constitutional provisions; there's [sic] no constitutional analysis; it
relied on a statute; the legislature can deal with statutes; it can clarify
and amend."'
Therefore, McIff concluded, the legislature could
undo the Conatser decision without violating the constitutional
separation of powers.
The bill passed both houses of the legislature, and in late March
2010 Utah Governor Gary Herbert signed HB 141 into law. The bill
amended the Utah statute on public ownership of water, providing
that the declaration of public ownership "does not create or recognize
an easement for public recreational use on private property. "61 HB
141 asserted further that "The Legislature shall govern the use of
public water for beneficial purposes, "6' again noting a concern for
constitutional protections for private property. In rejecting the
Conatser decision, HB 141 did not do away with the public easement
altogether. Instead, it essentially substituted the reasoning of the
Conatser trial court decision and Day v. Armstrong for that of the Utah
Supreme Court, declaring that the public easement allows only
touching of streambeds incidental to flotation."
Like the Conatser decision, HB 141's passage into law received
mixed reviews. Riparian property owners praised the bill as a
restoration of their private property rights,'
whereas water
recreationists saw it as a devastating blow to public rights."5
II. THE LEGAL ORIGINS OF PUBLIC OWNERSHIP

Riparian property owners may have found relief in the legislature,
but Utah's stream wars continue. In November 2010, recreational
property rights), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/700020962/Gov-Herbert-signsbill-restricting-access-to-streams-on-private-property.html.
58. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-29-103 (2010).
59. McIff, supra note 15.
60. Id.
61. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1 (2011).
62. Id.
63. See id. § 73-29-202.
64. See, e.g., Opinion, Ask Permission,SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 9, 2010,
http://www.sltrib.com/sltrib/opinion/49373875-82/utah-bill-anglers-ask.htm.csp
(describing HB 141 as leveling the playing field for riparian owners).
65. See Opinion, Guv's Bad Decision, SALT LAKE TRIB., Apr. 2, 2010,
http://www.sitrib.com/strib/opinion/49335333-82/outdoor-utah-decisionquality.html.csp.
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water users filed suit asking the judiciary to invalidate HB 141, arguing
that the law violates public rights in water and the constitutional
separation of powers.66 The challenge to the validity of the Utah
Public Waters Access Act raises complex questions about the legal
origins of public ownership of water in Utah. As supporters of HB 141
will be quick to point out, the Utah Code provides for public
ownership. Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly
emphasized that the Code is not the only legal authority for public
ownership, often referring also to the "doctrine of public ownership."
Unfortunately, Utah courts have been vague about the precise legal
origin of this independent, alternative basis for public ownership.
Teasing out the meaning of the doctrine of public ownership
requires a careful review of the history of public ownership in Utah
water law. The analysis begins at the most certain point - the Utah
Code - which expressly declares public ownership of water. Next,
this paper examines the judicial expressions of an independent
alternative basis. Notably, the Utah Supreme Court understood public
ownership to be the rule even before the enactment of the public
ownership statute, describing public ownership in terms of prior
appropriation doctrine and natural law. The Utah Constitution also
expresses these concepts, raising questions about whether the
independent basis for public ownership of Utah water is, in fact,
constitutional. The authorities suggest that the case for public
ownership of water finds traction in Utah Constitution article XVII's
protection of the water rights status quo at the time of statehood. The
evidence is not conclusive, however, and countervailing arguments
exist.
A. STATUTORY AuTHoRITY
The Utah Code provides for the public ownership of water, stating
that "all waters ...

are hereby declared to be the property of the

public."" This provision traces its roots to the 1903 irrigation bill,'
and its language remains essentially unchanged today." The 1903 bill,
which many contemporary observers believed to be the most
important legislation of the session,o aimed to resolve the
enforcement problems and according uncertainties that were

66. See Coalition Complaint, supra note 17, at 15.
67. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-1-1(1) (West 2011).
68. See 1903 Utah Laws ch. 100, § 47. Interestingly, Westlaw traces the current
codification of the public ownership statute to a 1919 law, which in fact inherited the
provision from the 1903 irrigation bill,
69. See id. The 1903 bill provided as follows: "The waters of all streams and other
sources in this State, whether flowing above or underground, in known or defined
channels, is [sic] hereby declared to be the property of the public, subject to all
existing rights to the use thereof."
70. See, e.g., Legislature in Expiring Throes, DESERET NEWS, Mar. 14, 1903, at 1
(describing the irrigation bill as "[t]he most important piece of legislation that has
been enacted"); Gov. Urges Passageof IrrigationBil4 DESERET NEws, Mar. 9, 1903, at 1.
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In addition to
wreaking havoc on Utah water supply management.'
of water 72
control
centralized
for
bill
provided
the
public ownership,
and forfeiture of water rights for non-use. The bill faced insignificant
opposition and generated little relevant debate.7 4
That the bill faced little opposition is remarkable because less than
a decade earlier, similar public ownership language proposed for the
One possible
Utah Constitution gave rise to staunch opposition.
explanation for this apparent discrepancy is that in 1903 the state of
water supply management was more objectionable than it was a decade
earlier, and that a majority of the public believed comprehensive
It may also be that the 1903 public
legislation was the solution.
ownership provision was included as an unexamined piece of
legislation borrowed from another jurisdiction." Another explanation
for the disparity may lie in a subtle semantic distinction between the
proposed constitutional amendment and the 1903 irrigation bill. The
proposed constitutional text provided that.all waters would be the
property of the "State,"7 whereas the irrigation bill declared the
Had the public ownership
waters to belong to the "public."7 '
provision in the 1903 irrigation bill stimulated more debate, some
insight might have been gleaned as to the legislature's understanding
71. Prior to 1903, county courts served as the forum for water rights disputes.
However, county lines restrained jurisdiction, which normally contained only segments
of water sources. See Rights of Water Owners: Important Case Heard in the Court at Fillmore,
SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 15, 1897, at 7. As a result, inconsistent decrees became the
norm, and the jurisdictionally constrained focus of county court judges led to decrees
far in excess of supplies. See, e.g., UTAH IRRIGATION COMM'N, IRRIGATION IN UTAH 96
(1894) ("How then, shall we rank him, who, by judicial fiat alone, can cause 800
inches of water to run where Nature only put 100 inches?"). Uncertainty over water
supplies persisted and litigation was widespread. See, e.g., Water Famine Near: Mrs. Dudler
Takes Half of Parley's Creek Flow, SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 25, 1898, at 8; Big IrrigationSuit,
SALT LAKE TRIB., Aug. 23, 1897, at 1; Southern Utah Water Famine, SALT LAKE TRIB., May
4, 1896, at 8.
72. 1903 Utah Laws ch. 100, § 1 (granting broad administrative authority to state
water engineer). See also id.§ 35 (establishing a permit system).
73. See id. § 50.
74. See Big IrrigationBill Is Passed, SALT LAKE HERALD, Mar. 11, 1903, at 1 (noting
widespread support and minimal opposition in the legislature). Opposition to the bill
focused primarily on the cost of administration and central versus local control. See
Opposed to Bill: American Fork Men Don't Like Irrigation Measure, SALT LAKE HERALD, Mar.
6, 1903, at 7. The support the bill received from newspaper editors is also noteworthy.
'See, e.g., The IrrigationQuestion, DESERET NEWS, Mar. 2, 1903, at 5; Pass the Joint Irrigation
Bill, SALT LAKE HERALD, Mar. 1, 1903, at 12.
75. See infra notes 111-114 and accompanying text.
76. See Solons Asked to Legislate, SALT LAKE HERALD, Feb. 18, 1903, at 2 (asserting that
comprehensive legislation was best way to remedy the system). The proponent cites
Wyoming as a model. Ironically, Wyoming served as the model for the language
rejected from the constitution. See The IrrigationArticle, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 11, 1895,
at 3.
77. See Solons, supra note 76. Public ownership did come up in debate over another
water bill. See Ogden Water Was in Senate, SALT LAKE HERALD, Mar. 5, 1903, at 5.
However, the issue there was not so much public ownership as municipal power to
condemn water rights. See id.
78. See The IrrigationArticle, supra note 76.
79. 1903 Utah Laws ch. 100, § 47.
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of the origins of public ownership in Utah water law. Instead, it is
uncertain whether the legislature believed that the public ownership
provision in the 1903 irrigation bill implemented new law, codified
common law, or enacted law pursuant to the constitution.
The passage of the 1903 irrigation bill, though significant, was not
the only important water policy event in Utah that year. Six months
after the irrigation bill passed, the Eleventh National Irrigation
Congress convened in Ogden, Utah."o Though not bearing directly on
Utah legislation, the proceedings in Ogden shed some light on
professional understandings of public ownership of water at the time.
Moreover, the meetings may also say something about the Utah
legislators' understanding of public ownership. More than one-fifth of
the Utah legislators who voted for the irrigation bill were among the
official delegates to the Irrigation Congress." Utah Senator David
McKay, a leader in Utah water law," helped to organize the
convention." The meaning to be derived from the proceedings may
be limited, however, because the recently passed Utah public
ownership law was not mentioned once on the record."
That is not to say that public ownership was not a prominent
theme in the proceedings. In fact, the delegates discussed public
ownership of water both as a general theoretical proposition and as an
aspect of Utah water management. George H. Maxwell, the Executive
Chairman of the Congress, for example, introduced a resolution,
which a majority of the delegates later adopted," declaring that public
ownership of water is the ideal." Another speaker explained the

80. The'annual irrigation congress meetings received widespread press and were
among the most significant events of the day. The first meeting, held in Salt Lake City
in 1891, was later described as the first time that Mormons and Gentiles "joined hands
with equal enthusiasm and in utter forgetfulness of the differences of the past."
William E. Smythe, The Influence of Irrigation on the American Ideal, in OFFICIAL
PROCEEDINGS OF THE ELEVENTH NATIONAL IRRIGATION CONGRESS: HELD AT OGDEN, UTAH,
SEPTEMBER 15-18, 1903, 182, 188-89 (Gilbert McClurg ed., 1904) (hereinafter 11TH
IRRIGATION]. More than 1,200 delegates from thirty states and two foreign nations
attended the 1903 Congress, including noteworthy leaders like Chief Forester Pinchot
and Chief Engineer Newell. 11TH IRRIGATION, at 107,124.
81. See id. at 117-22. See also Utah State Legislature, Utah State Legislators: Session
1903, http://le.utah.gov/asp/roster/roster.aspyear=1903 (last visited Dec. 17, 2010).
Senators serving as delegates included John M. Barnes, Henry Gardner, and Joseph R.
Murdock. Delegate representatives included George H. Adams, John C. Child,
Stephen L. Chipman, Asa R. Hawley, Archibald McFarland, Robert McKinnon, and
David R. Roberts.
82. McKay was considered to be an expert in Utah irrigation. See, e.g., Talked of
IrrigationLaw: joint Session of Legislative Committees, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 20, 1896, at 8
(noting that Sen. McKay presided over discussion of irrigation issues); see also Ogden
Water Was in Senate, supra note 777 (reporting on Sen. McKay debating water policy).
83. See 11TH IRRIGATION, supra note 80, at 5, 13.
84. See generally id. However, Nevada's public ownership law was discussed in detail.
See A.E. Chandler, The IrrigationLaws of Nevada, in 11TH IRRIGATION, supra note 80, at
411,412.
85. 11TH IRRIGATION, sup-a note 80, at 220. No Utah delegate opposed the
resolution. Id. at 226-27.
86. Id. at 79.
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importance of the "rights of the public in the control and disposal of
public water supplies."" Although indicative of general support for
the policy of public ownership, these facts say little about the legal
origins of public ownership of Utah water.
William E. Smythe, a leading thinker on irrigation and former
president of the irrigation congress," spoke specifically of public
ownership of water in Utah, shedding some light on its origins.'
Prophetically, he explained to the convention the story of Utah's
founders:
Standing there by the banks of City creek, in the midst of a boundless
extent of rich but arid soil, they asked themselves this question: "In a
place

like

this, where land

is worthless without

application of moisture, who should own the water -

the artificial

who should

own the melting snow and the bubbling brook?

The life of every man, woman and child in the party depended upon
the answer.... If water in an arid land is property subject to private

ownership, then the men having the strength or capital to take
possession of that stream have the right to dictate the terms upon
which their fellowmen should live.90

Smythe continued, "What then was City creek?"" He answered
that "to the everlasting credit of the Mormon pioneers,"92 they
recognized the public importance of water for survival in an arid land,
and that each has a right in such a vital resource.
What bearing the convention proceedings have on the Utah
Legislature's understanding of the public ownership provision in the
1903 irrigation bill is subject to argument. The widespread emphasis
on the importance of public ownership may help to further explain
why that portion of the irrigation bill passed without debate. William
E. Smythe's account, however, suggests that some sense of public
ownership of Utah water traces its origins back further than the 1903
bill. Even so, courts have repeatedly referred to the public ownership
statute as legal authority for public ownership of Utah water." The

87. Morris Bien, Relation of Federal and State Laws to Irrigation, in 11TH IRRIGATION,
supra note 80, at 397, 399.
88. San Diego History Ctr., William Ellsworth Smythe (1861-1922),
http://www.sandiegohistory.org/bio/smythe/smythe.htm (last visited Dec. 17, 2010).
Smythe once astutely noted that "there never was, there is not now, and there never
will be plenty of water." Smythe, supra note 80, at 187.
89. Smythe, supra note 80, at 182.
90. Id. at 186.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. See id.
94. See, e.g., Wrathall v. Johnson, 40 P.2d 755, 767 (Utah 1935);J.J.N.P. Co. v. Utah
Div. of Wildlife Res., 655 P.2d 1133, 1136 (Utah 1982); Conatser v. Johnson, 194 P.3d
897, 899 n.2 (Utah 2008).
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sponsor of HB 141 even noted this fact when voicing his support for
the bill."
B. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS

The Utah Supreme Court's water law jurisprudence is consistent
with William Smythe's account, which suggests that there may be more
to the story of public ownership than simple statutory declarations. In
February 1902, more than a year before the legislature declared public
ownership of water, Utah's highest court expressly understood the
public to own naturally flowing waters."
The theme of public
ownership of water independent of statutory authority appears also not
long after the legislative codification. In 1925, for example, the Utah
Supreme Court explained that "[u]nder the statute, and before its
enactment, it is and was settled doctrine in arid and semiarid sections of
our country that the corpus of the water of a natural stream was not
subject to private ownership but was the property of the public."9 7 In
Riordan v. Westwood, Justice Wolfe reiterated this principle by stating
that all unappropriated waters of the state "are, and have always been,
public waters."
Interpreting the statutory declaration of public
ownership when it was expanded to groundwater in the 1950s, the
Utah Supreme Court again affirmed its belief in an independent,
alternative basis for public ownership, asserting that public ownership
of ground water "has probably always been the law of this state." 9
The source of this independent basis for public ownership is a
point on which Utah courts have not been clear. In Oldroyd, for
example, the court simply asserted "[w]e all know" that public
ownership is "settled doctrine."'o The Salt Lake Water & Elec. Power
Co. court provided more support for its argument, basing its assertion
of an independent basis for public ownership on prior appropriation
principles.'o' Justice Wolfe's separate opinion in Riordan elaborates
upon this idea of public ownership as a necessary condition for prior
appropriation.o 2 He explained that "the legislature at various times
concerned itself with different categories of public waters by extending
to them certain statutory requirements in order to appropriate said
waters."' Justice Wolfe went on:

95. See McIff, supra note 15.
96. See Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water & Elec. Power Co., 67 P. 672, 677
(Utah 1902) (explaining that unappropriated water belongs coequally to the public
and remains so until capture in artificial ditches or reservoirs). This same case
supported the Utah Supreme Court's analysis in J..N.P., 655 P.2d at 1136.
97. Oldroyd v. McCrea, 235 P. 580, 584 (Utah 1925) (emphasis added).
98. Riordan v. Westwood, 203 P.2d 922, 932 (Utah 1949) (Wolfe, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
99. Fairfield Irrigation Co. v. Carson, 247 P.2d 1004, 1007 (Utah 1952).
100. Oldroyd, 235 P. at 584.
101. See Salt Lake Water & Elec. Power Co, 67 P. at 677.
102. See Riordan,203 P.2d at 932.
103. Id.
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The legislature did not, by a declaration, make public what were
previously non-public waters. It simply extended to all public waters
the necessity of application to the state engineer in order to
They were always public until appropriated by
appropriate....
diligence or by application when the latter was made the necessary
method of appropriation.o 4

Justice Wolfe's point, then, is that public ownership is a necessary
antecedent to appropriative rights. Were unappropriated water not
owned by the public, an appropriation would constitute a trespass
against the non-public owner. But, because water in its natural state
belongs to all, it is available to each to be put to beneficial use.
This explanation, however, raises further questions about the legal
origin of public ownership. If prior appropriation law. necessarily
entails public ownership, and that law predates the 1903 irrigation bill,
then what is the source of that law? Is it merely common law, subject
to

legislative

modification?

Moreover, is

public ownership

so

inextricably linked to prior appropriation doctrine that public
ownership cannot be removed without changing prior appropriation
itself? Because the Utah Constitution does not expressly guarantee
that prior appropriation will be the system of water appropriation, the
Utah legislature could presumably do away with prior appropriation,
subject to existing vested rights. However, even if the Utah legislature
could not do away with prior appropriation altogether, could it
nevertheless define the contours of public ownership as long as the
definition is consistent with prior appropriation? Arguably, this is
exactly what the legislature did in passing HB 141.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS

The Utah Constitution provides that "[a]ll existing rights to the
use of any of the waters in this State for any useful or beneficial
purpose, are hereby recognized and confirmed."o'

The irrigation

article, as it was known,'o is unique among water amendments to
western states' constitutions because it does not -expressly provide for

public ownership of water.' 7 Understanding the meaning of this
provision, which on its face protects the water rights status quo at the
time of statehood, requires a careful analysis of Utah's constitutional
history.os
104. Id.
105. UTAH CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
106. See The IrrigationArticle, supra note 76.
107. CompareUTAH CONsT. art. XVII, § 1, with COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5, and IDAHO
CONST. art. XV, § 1, and Wyo. CONsT. art. VIII § 3. The Utah Constitution is unique
among western states' constitutions also because it does not clearly guarantee that

prior appropriation will govern water supply management.
108. See Am. Bush v. S. Salt Lake, 140 P.3d 1235, 1240 (Utah 2006) (citing Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 523 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)) (explaining that
the constitution "is to be read not as barren words found in a dictionary but as symbols
of historic experience illumined by the presuppositions of those who employed
them"):
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It took nearly half of a century of effort and at least seven
constitutional drafts for Utah to achieve statehood. The final, 1895
constitution followed "an eclectic model," drawing on "numerous"
sources, including previous draft Utah constitutions and the
constitutions of many other states, including Washington, Idaho,
Montana, Colorado, and Wyoming.os Because the 1895 convention
delegates were able to rely so extensively on the work of both previous
Utah conventions and the drafters of others states' constitutions, the
convention involved little serious debate."'
Yet, the text proposed for Utah Constitution article XVII
generated noteworthy discussion. The first proposal for a water
amendment to the 1895 Utah Constitution borrowed, essentially
verbatim, from the Wyoming Constitution and included a declaration
that all waters in the state are the property of the state."' Utah citizens
feared that in declaring state ownership of water, the amendment
would eliminate vested private rights to appropriate and use water.'
The subcommittee that proposed the text tried to clarify the
misunderstanding, explaining that the text did not intend to eradicate
existing usage rights and that the amendment included an express
protection of those rights."' The commission went forward with the
original text, which declared state ownership and protected existing
rights, submitting it to the constitutional convention."' But public
fear and confusion persisted, and the convention eventually rejected
the proposed text. Instead, the drafters provided only the following
vague, constitutional mandate on water: "All existing rights to the use
of any of the waters in this State for any useful or beneficial purpose,
are hereby recognized and confirmed."'
This piece of history could mean that the Utah Constitution does
not provide for public ownership of water. That conclusion, however,
reasons too far from the facts. At most, article XVII is ambiguous with
respect to public ownership, for it neither affirms- nor denies it. The
rejection of the Wyoming public ownership text does not fully
elucidate the meaning of article XVII, for it proves only that the
adopted text intended to clarify that vested appropriation rights would
109. Thomas G. Alexander, Utah's Constitution:A Reflection on the TerritorialExperience,
64 UTAH HIST. Q. 264 (1996).
110. John J. Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government - The History of Utah's
Constitution, UTAH L. REv. 311, 323 (1966).
Of notable contention among the
delegates, however, was the issue of seating arrangements. Stanley S. Ivins, A
Constitutionfor Utah, 25 UTAH HIST. Q. 95, 101 (1957). A serious issue that received
considerable, heated debate was women's suffrage. Work of the Committees: Elections and
Suffrage Clauses - IrigationQuestions, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 14, 1895, at 5.
111. See The IrrigationArticle, supra note 76.
112. See id.; see also Confiscation of Water: Cache County Farmers Utterly Opposed to It, SALT
LAKE TRIB., Mar. 12, 1896, at 5. Even the full committee was uncertain of the meaning
of a declaration of public ownership. See Work of the Committees, supranote 110.
113. The Irrigation Article, sitpra note 76, at 11; Farmers Need Not Be Alarmed, DESERET
NEWS, Mar. 30, 1895, at 8.
114. See Irrigationin the Constitution, DESERET NEws, Apr. 6, 1895, at 11.
115. UTAH CONEr. art. XVII, § 1.
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not be confiscated. The most persuasive reading of article XVII, which
gives a plain meaning to its text," 6 is that the article merely reaffirms
the status quo with respect to ownership of water. Interpreting the
water provision requires, thus, analyzing not only the text rejected
from the irrigation article, but also the status quo, which the language
of the constitution reaffirms. From this analysis, it becomes clear that
the water management status quo at the time of statehood included a
general understanding of public ownership of water accompanied by
usufructuary rights to the use thereof.
The 1895 constitution was very much a product of the historical
experience of early Utahns,"7 and in that history we find some of the
meaning the drafters intended to attribute to the irrigation article.
Irrigation began in Utah at the pioneer camps on City Creek."" The
pioneers recognized that "[i] n an arid land water is natural wealth
essential to the existence of every human being.""' Accordingly, small
appropriations of water were the rule of irrigation,' with each person
"entitled to so much of it as he may apply to a beneficial use, but not a
single drop [more].""' The Utah District Law of 1865 is the first law
regulating Utah water, representing the transition from a common law
rule of capture to a regulated system of administration. 2 Utah water
law remained publicly oriented, emphasizing community control,
rights, and interests throughout territorial times.12 1
As one authority remarked, "the way water law developed in the
Territory of Utah was unique in the West."' 2 Utah water law strongly
emphasized community interests and public ownership.2 2 Evidencing
this originality, Brigham Young famously pronounced in 1848 - a
year before the drafting of Utah's first constitution - that "[t]here
shall be no private ownership of the streams that come out of the
canyons, nor the timber that grows in the hills. These belong to the
116. See, e.g., Am. Bush v. S. Salt Lake, 140 P.3d 1235, 1240 (Utah 2006) (explaining
that constitutional interpretation begins with the "plain meaning" of the text).
117. See Alexander, supra note 109, at 281.
118. See ORSON F. WHITNEY, POPULAR HISTORY OF UTAH 547 (1916); see also Smythe,
supra note 80.
119. Smythe, supra note 80, at 186.
120. WHITNEY, supra note 118, at 547-48.
121. Smythe, supra note 80, at 186.
122. See CHARLES H. BROUGH, THE EcoNOMIc HISTORY OF IRRIGATION IN UTAH 148,
Brough observed that under the regulated system "water is the
150-51 (1898).
common property of all the people." Id. at 148. He traced this concept to Justinian
law, and concluded that public ownership is the foundational principle of water rights
regulation. Id. at 160.
123.

See JOSEPH L. SAX ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURcES 328 (4th ed.

2006); see also Robert Swenson, A Primer of Utah Water Law: Part , 5J. ENERGY L. & POL'Y
165, 167 (1984); Howard R. Lamar, Statehood for Utah: A Different Path, 39 UTAH HIST.
Q. 307, 310 (1971) (emphasizing the communitarian nature of early Utah social
norms).
124. Swenson, supra note 123, at 166.
125.

See LEONARDJ. ARRINGTON, GREAT BASIN KINGDOM: AN ECONOMIc HISTORY OF THE

LATTER-DAY SAINTS, 1830-1900, at 52-53 (2004) (explaining how Mormon stewardship
principles directed natural resource management).
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people: all the people."'12
Young's proclamation indicates an
emphasis on community values and an orientation toward natural law
permeating early Utah society.127
Although Utah's communal treatment of water was exceptional,
Utah's founders' strong orientation to natural law was typical of legal
thinkers of the time. As one scholar noted, Utah was founded on the
idea that sovereignty derives "from natural rights consistent with
human intelligence and liberty."'12 Natural law arguments appear also
throughout the Utah Supreme Court's decisions on public ownership
of water. In Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., for
example, Justice Larson offered the following natural law explanation:
These waters are the gift of Providence: they belong to all as nature
placed them or made them available. They are the waters flowing in
natural channels or ponded in natural lakes and reservoirs. The title
thereto is not subject to private acquisition and barter, even by the
federal government or the state itself .. . no title to the corpus of the
water itself has been or can be granted, while it is naturally flowing,
any more than it can to the air or the winds or the sunshine. 29
In justesen v. Olsen the court followed similarly naturalistic
reasoning, stating "There can be no more ownership of water moving
through the soil than there can be of ownership of water moving
across the surface. It is evasive and constantly changing. In either case
any use must of necessity be in its nature usufructory [sic] only." 30
This orientation toward the public ownership of water has deep legal
roots, tracing its origin to early English common law and Blackstone,
who explained that "water is a movable, wandering thing, and must of
necessity continue common by law of nature; so that I can only have a
126. THOMAS V. CECH, PRINCIPLES OF WATER RESOURCES 262 (2009); ARRINGTON, supra
note 125, at 52; ROBERT DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS INWESTERN WATERS 13 (1983).
Although many authors cite to this quotation, their investigations did not reveal its
location in the historical record. As one author also noted, while Brigham Young
always acknowledged the importance of public ownership of water, he and the early.
Deseret legislature regularly granted exclusive rights to private use. See Swenson, supra
note 123, at 166.
127. Brigham Young, however, was not the only leader to recognize the necessity of
public ownership of water in western states. President Theodore Roosevelt even said
that "[i] n the arid States the only right to which water should be recognized is that of
use." SAMUEL C. WEIL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES § 63, at 125-26 (2d ed.
1908) (internal citation omitted). Also indicative of these attitudes is Monroe v. Ivie, 2
Utah 535 (Utah Terr. 1880), where the territorial court declared that "the lands are
open to all, and the appropriation of the water is open to all."
128. Alexander, supra note 109, at 270. Alexander notes that the 1862 constitutional
convention grounded its entire argument for statehood on the naturalistic ideal of
self-rule as an "unquestioned right." Id.
129. Adams v. Portage Irrigation, Reservoir & Power Co., 72 P.2d 648, 652-53 (Utah
1937).
130. Justesen v. Olsen, 40 P.2d 802, 805 (Utah 1935); see also Riordan v. Westwood,
203 P.2d 922, 929 (Utah 1949). Both of these cases were overruled on other grounds.
See Fairfield Irrigation Co. v. Carson, 247 P.2d 1004, 1007 (Utah 1952) (explaining
that a statutory provision for prior appropriation superseded the holdings of justesen
and Riordanwith respect to correlative groundwater rights).
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Although
temporary, transient, usufuctuary, property therein.""'
Blackstone's reasoning can be applied to all water allocation systems,
including the riparian systems of the eastern United States, it appears
frequently as a component of water law in western prior appropriation
states,132 where scarcity necessitates limits to the private control of
water.
The framers of the Utah constitution reaffirmed this orientation
towards natural law and cultural understanding of public ownership in
article XVII. The plain language of article XVII reaffirms the water
rights and ownership status quo at the time of statehood, recognizing
and confirming "[a] 11 existing rights to the use of any of the waters in
this State for any useful or beneficial purpose."13 3 It is difficult to
conceptualize how Utah's founders could have understood this
reaffirmation of the prior appropriation system without the widely
understood principle of public ownership that had always inhered in
Utah water law. The Utah Supreme Court has rightly recognized this
fact before, explaining that the "right of the public, as well as the
rights of the appropriator, were confirmed by the State Constitution in
article 17.""' This reading of article XVII finds support both in
precedent and in the breadth of historical authority. And, this
confirmation of public rights in article XVII may be the independent
and alternative basis for public ownership of Utah's waters.
Opponents can argue, however, that Utah Constitution article
XVII says nothing about public ownership of water. The framers'
rejection of the proposed public ownership text provides noteworthy
support for this position. Even so, substantial evidence suggests that
the irrigation amendment may in fact entail some notion of public
ownership, if only as a condition of the prior appropriation system of
water management. In either case, the question is constitutional and
therefore appropriate for judicial inquiry.
* -

IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF.HB 141

The possibility of a constitutional foundation for public ownership
of water raises questions concerning the validity of HB 141. The Utah
Constitution establishes tripartite government, dividing powers among
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, and provides that "no
person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one
of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to
either of the others.""' Accordingly, the judicial power is vested in the

131. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 18. The Utah
Supreme Court recited Blackstone's language essentially verbatim in Adams. 72 P.2d
at 653. See also In re Bear River Drainage Area, 271 P.2d 846, 852 (Utah 1954) (Ellett,
J., dissenting).
132. See, e.g., Rock Creek Ditch & Flume Co. v. Miller, 17 P.2d 1074, 1076 (Mont.
1933); Van Sickle v. Haines, 7 Nev. 249, 1872 WL 3542, at *5.
133. UTAH CONST. art. XVII, § 1.
134. Adams, 72 P.2d at 653.
135. UTAH CONST. art. V, § 1.
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3
and the legislative power is vested in the Senate, the
Supreme Court,'1
House of Representatives, and the people of Utah.'13 By mandating
separation of powers and vesting the judicial power solely in the
courts, the Utah Constitution "preserves the sanctity of the judiciary
and helps to ensure that the rule of law, and not political partisanship
or transient majoritarian preferences, shall govern in our courts."'
The judicial power includes the authority to hear and determine
controversies arising between adverse parties, 39 as well as exclusive
jurisdiction to interpret the constitution.140 As ultimate arbiter of the
constitution, the Utah Supreme Court holds the power to invalidate
legislation defying the constitution, including legislative acts that
violate the separation of powers."'
HB 141 purports to interpret article XVII, asserting that public
ownership of water is purely statutory, even though both constitutional
history and Utah Supreme Court precedent suggest a different
The Act states in relevant part that "general
understanding.
constitutional and statutory provisions declaring public ownership of
water and recognizing existing rights of use are insufficient to
overcome the specific constitutional protections for private property
and do not justify inviting widespread unauthorized invasion of private
Interpreting the meaning of
property for recreation purposes."' 4
article XVII and its relationship with the Utah Constitution's
protections for private property is the province not of the Utah House
of Representatives, Senate, or Governor, but of the Utah Supreme
Court. In attempting to call into question the legal bases of f.J.N.P.,"'
which relied in part for its decision on the doctrine of public
ownership, HB 141 may intrude upon the judiciary's exclusive
authority to interpret the constitution, violating the separation of
powers commanded by Utah Constitution article V.
But, the separation of powers analysis may also be more nuanced,
if article XVII provides only a very basic protection for public
ownership of water. In such a case, it remains open to discussion
whether the constitutional separation of powers requires that the
responsibility for defining the contours of public ownership rest solely
with the Utah courts, or if instead the Utah legislature may also act in
this arena, so long as the judiciary ensures retention of the ultimate
nature of public ownership.

136. See id. art. VIII, § 1.
137. See id. art. VI, § 1(1).
138. In re Young, 976 P.2d 581, 602 (Utah 1999).
139. See Timpanogos Planning & Water Mgmt. Agency v. Cent. Utah Water, 690 P.2d
562, 569 (Utah 1984).
140. See, e.g., Rampton v. Barlow, 464 P.2d 378, 390 (Utah 1970).
141. See id. (invaliding legislation on separation of powers grounds).
142. UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-29-103(2) (2010).
143. See id. § 73-29-103(3).
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CONCLUSION

Drawing the line separating private property from public rights is
always controversial, as Utah's stream wars make evident. The
controversial and potentially unsettling nature of dividing public from
private is likely the reason that courts have shied away from navigability
in fact claims,'" which could convert property that riparian owners
have long believed to be private into public ownership. Instead, courts
have preferred public recreational easements as an alternate way to
resolve these public access cases. The story of Conatser and HB 141
makes clear that even recreational rights can have unsettling,
controversial effects, and that courts might create more enduring
certainty by addressing, rather than dodging, navigability claims.
Which branch of Utah government ultimately has the power to
decide the nature and extent to which recreational rights inhere in
Utah water law is uncertain. If public ownership is purely statutory,
then HB 141 should withstand a separation of powers challenge based
on article XVII. However, if public ownership is rooted in the Utah
Constitution, as Utah precedent and constitutional history suggest,
then the Utah Public Waters Access Act raises serious and challenging
constitutional separation of powers concerns.

144. In J.J.N.P., for example, the state asserted a navigability claim, which the court
set aside with little explanation even though a finding of navigability would have
disposed of the case. See 655 P.2d at 1136. See also Day v. Armstrong, 362 P.2d 137, 14344 (Wyo. 1961) (refusing to address navigability claims).
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Conclusion .
All the water there will ever be is, right now.'
Is there a shortage of water in the desert? No, there's no shortage of water in
the desert. There's just the right amount.2
INTRODUCTION

As the population of the United States has grown through the
generations, water use has undoubtedly kept pace.3 The demands on
water resources in a given place are constantly increasing, not just for
agriculture and municipal use, but also from a renewed societal desire
t Second year law student, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; Research
Associate, Rocky Mountain Land Use Institute.
tt Executive Director, Rocky Mountain Land Use Institute; Lecturer, University of
Denver Sturm College of Law; A.B. Brown University; M.A., J.D. University of Virginia.
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(Jun. 25, 2010), http://ct.water.usgs.gov/education/morewater.htm
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(citing NATIONAL

GEOGRAPHIC, Oct. 1993).
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126 (1981)).
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to protect natural places and instream flows for fishing and other
recreational and non-economic purposes.4 As these demands mount,
policymakers must address the fact that the status quo is changing:
population continues to grow and migrate, while evidence continues
to suggest that climate change will affect traditional precipitation
patterns.' At the same time, water users want what they have always
wanted: a steady supply of water that satisfies the needs of a growing
population.'
Because of these changing demands, water conservation will
become increasingly important in the decades to come as a matter of
both public policy and private practice. Municipalities and water
utilities can get a head-start by reaching for some of the lowest-hanging
By
fruit: domestic exterior and landscape irrigation practices.
implementing proactive legislation and removing barriers that prevent
individuals from achieving the greatest levels of efficiency in their
household and business use, cities can stretch current water supplies
further, reducing the need to tap new sources.
A. POPULATION GROWTH

According to data from the Pew Research Center, the U.S.
population will grow to 438 million people by 2050, up from 296 in
Additionally, a significant
2005, a forty-eight percent increase.7
proportion of that population growth has occurred in the arid West, a
trend which is likely to continue.' In Colorado alone, estimates show
population increasing from 5.1 million people in 2008 to anywhere
from 8.6 to 10 million people in 2050, approaching double the current
population.' Statistics also reveal that the United States stands among
the most urbanized nations in the world, with eighty-two percent of
individuals living in city centers or suburbs, and studies estimate that
the rate of urbanization will increase.'o In part because of this strong
urban presence, eighty-six percent of Americans receive their water
from public utilities." However, public utility usage still only accounts
for thirteen percent of water withdrawals every year; agricultural
CAL. DEP'T OF WATERRES. ET AL., 20x2020 WATER CONSERVATION PLAN ix (2010).
Hinrichsen, supra note 3, at 1; U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM,
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 41 (Thomas R. Karl et al. eds.,
2009).
6. A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOK IN LAW AND
PUBLIC POLICY 775 (6th ed. 2009).
7. Pew Soc. Trends Staff, U.S. Population Projections 2005-2050, SOC. AND
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (Pew Research Center, Wash., D.C.), Feb. 11, 2008.
8. PAUL CAMPBELL, CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION PROJECTIONS: STATES, 1995 - 2025,
4.

5.

at 1-2 (1997).
9. COLo. WATER CONSERVATION BD., COLORADO'S WATER SUPPLY FUTURE ES-12
(2011).
10. CENT.
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY,
THE
WORLD
FACTBOOK,

https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2

2

12.html

(last

visited Mar. 30, 2011).
11. JOAN F. KENNY ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN THE
UNITED STATES IN2005, at 1 (2009).
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irrigation and industrial uses currently account for larger
percentages. The Colorado Water Conservation Board (CWCB) has
estimated that the state will need between 538,000 and 812,000
additional acre-feet of water per year to meet the increased demand
from a larger population. 3
B. CLIMATE CHANGE

In addition to population growth, climate change may exacerbate
trends that already exist throughout the country. With an increase in
global temperatures, experts believe precipitation events will become
less frequent in the arid Southwest." Meanwhile, shifting weather
patterns will likely cause precipitation to increase in the Northeast and
Midwest ." While the obvious consequence of this possible trend is
that the Southwest will have to manage its water supply with increasing
resourcefulness, a less obvious effect also exists. In both the Northeast
and the Southwest, when precipitation does come, studies predict that
it will fall in greater quantities and increase the risk of flooding and
inundation of municipal wastewater and sewer systems. 6
Western states, especially in the arid Rocky Mountains and the
Southwest, have historically relied on snowmelt for water supply
through the dry summer months. Climate change will likely cause
earlier snowmelt in the spring, making late-summer flows continuously
lower as the average global temperature continues to rise." According
to experts, average snowmelt and the resulting runoff in the West is
already occurring 20 days earlier than historical averages.
C. IMPACTS ON IRRIGATION

While this article focuses on the subject of conservation within
municipalities, it is important that the impact of climate change and
population growth on agriculture proves relevant because both public
utilities and agricultural operations often seek the same water
resources to meet their needs. Worldwide, twenty-four percent of crop
production comes from irrigated farmland." While irrigation provides
the opportunity to bring additional acreage into production that
normally would not be available, experts believe that only limited

12.

Id.

COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., supranote 9, at ES-14.
14. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supranote 5, at 44.
15. Id.
16. U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE SCIENCE PROGRAM, WEATHER AND CLIMATE ExTREMES IN A
CHANGING CLIMATE 104 (Thomas R. Karl et al. eds., 2008).
17. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, supra note 5, at 45-46.
18. Id.at45.
19. Dieter Gerten & Stefanie Rost, Climate Change Impacts on Agricultural Water Stress
and Impact MitigationPotential,Background Note to the World Development Report 2010, at 1,
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR201O/Resources/52876781255547194560/WDR2010_BGNoteGerten.pdf.
13.
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quantities of new land are available for irrigation.o In the U.S., the
predominant region for irrigation is the West.2' However, as the
population increases, municipalities will place significant demands on
agricultural land as well as the water resources that the agriculture
sector has traditionally claimed." Additionally, climate change will
significantly impact agriculture in the West because, as noted above,
most of the irrigated farmland in the region will likely receive less
water in the future.
I. A PARADOX FOR PUBLIC UTILITIES
While we look to public utilities to promote resource conservation,
municipal water providers must address several hurdles in their effort
to stretch water supplies ever further. First, there is a pervasive
assumption that water resources will never be a barrier to growth.
Public utility laws generally require utilities to provide water service to
anyone who is willing to pay for it.2 ' Therefore, a community in a
growth phase has one of two options - the community can stretch its
current water supply to additional uses, or the community can seek
additional water resources. In reality, cities often have to do both, as
conservation measures alone prove insufficient to provide for the
needs of a growing population.2 ' However, conservation can play a
significant role in lessening the new demands for water.
and
municipalities,
conservationists,
while
Second,
environmentalists often advocate for ratepayers to decrease their water
usage, this "demand-management" approach can also strain the water
supplier because less water usage means less revenue for the utility.2 7
Regardless of the level of conservation, utilities will incur significant
expenses from the inevitable maintenance, repair, and upgrade of
critical water infrastructure.2 ' Recent findings estimate that water
utilities will have to issue well over one billion dollars in bonds to fund

20. Id.
21. Data Sets: Western Irrigated Agriculture, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRic. (July 20, 2004),
http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/WesternIrrigation/.
22. See id.
23. Gerten & Rost, supra note 19, at 3; U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM,
supranote 5, at 44-45.
24. A. Dan Tarlock, We Are All Water Lawyers Now: Water Law's PotentialBut Limited
Impact on Urban Growth Management, in WET GROwTH: SHOULD WATER LAw CONTROL

LAND USE? 57-58 (Craig Anthony Arnold ed., 2005); see generally ROBERT GOTTLIEB &
MARGARET FrzSIMMONS, THIRST FOR GROWTH: WATER AGENCIES As HIDDEN GOVERNMENT

IN CALIFORNIA 211-212 (1991) (providing that agencies have go to great lengths to
ensure that continued growth in California is not stymied by a lack of water resources).

25.

TARLOCKETAL., supranote 6, at 774.

26.

DENVER WATER, SOLUTIONS 2010: SAVING WATER FOR THE FUTURE 34 (2010).

27.

Robert Glennon, Volume-based Water Rates Send Mixed Conservation Messages,

GLOBAL
WATER
FORUM
(Dec.
1,
2010),
http://www.globalwaterforum.org/2010/12/01/volume-based-water-rates-send-mixedconservation-messages/.
28. SHARLENE LEURIG, CERES, THE RIPPLE EFFEct: WATER RISK IN THE MUNICIPAL
BOND MARKET 25 (2010).
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infrastructure repair in the coming decade, and if the utilities collect
fewer revenues because ratepayers are using less water, they will have
greater difficulty issuing those bonds and eventually paying them
back.2 ' To counter these lower revenues from reduced usage, utilities
may need to raise rates in order to maintain stable operations.so
Ratepayers may oppose an increase in rates, especially if they are using
less water."' To counter this problem, many cities have implemented
rate plans that help support conservation while still maintaining a
viable bottom line." These "conservation rate structures" increase
rates according to the rate of usage, and charge those that use a
greater quantity more for the right to do so, thus maintaining the
incentive for individuals to conserve water.33 The following sections
provide a more detailed discussion of the different rate structures and
their benefits.
II. WHAT To Do WHEN THERE's Too LrlTLE

The real-world implications of population growth and climate
change on water supplies are significant, and water conservation
measures can help mitigate costs and potential problems. In the
Southeast, the City of Atlanta is awaiting a federal court decision that
could curb its water supply by up to forty percent of its current
allotment." In California, one-fifth of the energy generated in the
state is dedicated to water delivery and treatment systems, which will
cause water delivery to become more expensive as energy costs rise.35
Lake Mead, arguably the most important source of water in the
Southwest, has experienced falling water levels for years, and there is
More
an increasing threat of a government-declared shortage.
robust conservation practices, as well as new regulations, will provide
for more certainty in the face of population and climate-related
pressures. There are numerous examples where communities have
attempted different conservation policies and methodologies, and
while they will not curb all of the water problems faced by America's
cities, they are a good place to start looking for solutions.

29. Id. at 12.
30. Glennon, supra note 27.
31. Id.
32. Water Rates: Conserving and ProtectingRevenues, Sw. FLORIDA WATER MGMT. DIST.,
http://www.swfwmd.state.fl.us/conservation/waterrates/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2011).
33. Conservation Oriented Rate Structures, ALLIANCE FOR WATER EFFICIENCY,
http://www.allianceforwaterefficiency.org/lColumn.aspx?id=712 (last visited Mar. 14,
2011).
34. LEURIG, supranote 28, at 4.
35. CAL. DEP'T OF WATER RES., supranote 4, at 1.
36. Felieity Barringer, Lake Mead Hits Record Low Level, N.Y. TIMES GREEN BLOG (Oct.
18, 2010, 2:05 PM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/lake-mead-hitsrecord-low-level/?scp=2&sq=1ake%20mead&st=cse; see NASA EARTH OBSERVATORY, Water
2010),
23,
(Sept.
Mead
in
Lake
Changes
Level
(showing a startling
http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=45945
image of Lake Mead's current level compared to its 1985 level).
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A. CONSERVATION TECHNIQUES

Municipalities need to address all facets of a conservation program
before implementing changes that will have potentially far-reaching
impacts. For example, successful water conservation measures that
reduce effluent will reduce the amount of water available for recycled
water programs and downstream discharges." While, in some cases,
there may not be a legal obligation to continue downstream discharges
at any particular rate, conservation will have an overall effect on the
water system that municipalities should address ex ante."
When water is re-used for landscape irrigation, rather than
released as sewage, there may be affects on downstream discharge, and
at the same time reductions in groundwater recharge." Communities
that use groundwater as a strategic reserve during periods of drought
must address this issue. Finally, conservation measures put into place
now may limit the ability of a community to further reduce
consumption in the event of a future drought.40 Over the course of
sustained drought, communities can likely bring new water online to
deal with the shortage, but this takes time and a community that is
already conservation-conscious will not have the flexibility to
significantly reduce consumption any further.'
B. WATER CONSERVATION - INSIDE THE CITY, OUTSIDE THE HOME
There are numerous options a community should consider when
incentivizing or regulating to increase water conservation within the
borders of a town - far too many, in fact, to describe in detail here.
However, the first area warranting attention in any community is also
the most obvious - exterior uses. In many cities and towns, exterior
uses of water comprise over fifty percent of total residential usage."2 In
Denver, Colorado, landscape irrigation consumes fifty-five percent of
all treated water leaving Denver Water's facilities." Not only is this a
significant portion of the water all Denver Water ratepayers use, but it
also accounts for a significant portion of the cost of supplying the
water. Agricultural irrigation and industrial water uses account for
more overall water usage in the United States, but in many cases users
bring that water straight from a water source and apply it to the field
37. Craig Bell, Promoting Conservation by Law: Water Conservation and Western State
Initiatives,10 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 313, 318-319 (2007).
38. See id.
39. Sanjay Shukla & Fouad H. Jaber, GroundwaterRechargefrom AgriculturalAreas in
the Flatwoods Region of South Forida, UNIv. FLA. IFAS EXTENSION (2006), available at
http://edis.ifas.ufl.edu/ae399.
40. Peter D. Nichols & Douglas S. Kenney, Watering Growth in Colorado:Swept Along
by the Currentor Choosing a BetterLine?, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 411, 441 (2003).
41. Id.
42. AQUAcRAFT, INC. & AM. WATER WORKS Ass'N RESEARCH FOUND., RESIDENTIAL
WATER USE SUMMARY (1999), available at

http://www.aquacraft.com/Publications/resident.htm.
43. DENVER WATER, supra note 26, at 17.
44.

Id.
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Conversely, residential subdivisions, golf
or the industrial use.
courses, and city parks take tap water, tested and ready for
consumption, and apply it to water lawns and gardens and fill
swimming pools."
Because of advanced technology and a new socially- and
environmentally-conscious mindset, it is possible to make substantial
gains in this area without asking residents for significant sacrifice. At
the same time, as the nation continues its turn toward a services- rather
than industry-based economy, the addition of new people rather than
new industrial firms will likely push water consumption higher in many
communities.4 A city council or planning commission can take simple
steps to increase the overall water efficiency of new households, which
will significantly stretch current water resources and prevent the
immediate need to tap new resources." The most effective way a city
can advance conservation goals is to implement an individualized
incentive program that encourages conservation, and also changes or
eliminates regulations that thwart best conservation practices." In
some cases, it may be possible to change regulations without a
significant change in the law. In other instances, such as rainwater
harvesting in prior-appropriation states, regulatory reform proves
more difficult.o
1. Landscape Incentives and Ordinances
While individuals may take it upon themselves to conserve water on
their property, well-designed ordinances provide an opportunity to
affect a community's entire water footprint and save water in quantities
substantial enough to mitigate the need to add new water to a system.
Communities experience widely differing variables, from the type and
quality of water sources to average humidity in the summer, making
52
conservation needs in every community slightly different.
45. Gerten & Rost, supra note 19, at 1; DENVER WATER, supra note 26, at 17
(showing that treated water makes up a very small portion of irrigation supplies
compared to residential treated water consumption).
46. Water Use Facts,S. NEV. WATERAUTHORlY,
http://www.snwa.com/html/cons-waterfacts.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2011).
47. See CAMP DRESSER & McKEE INC. & HARVEY EcoNOMIcs, COLO. WATER
CONSERVATION BD.: STATE OF COLO. 2050 MUN. & INDUS. WATER USE PROJECTIONS 4-1
(Apr. 7, 2008),
STATE,
DEP'T. OF
A Service Economy, U.S.
(2010);
http://www.america.gov/st/business-

(explaining that the
english/2008/April/20080415222038eaifas0.9101831.html
service industry makes up 67.8 percent of U.S. gross domestic product, and service
industries are at the top of the list of the fastest growing industries).
48. CAL. DEPT. OF WATER RES. ET AL., supra note 4, at 1.
49.

Bell, supra note 37, at 318; Nichols & Kenney, supra note 40, at 440-41.

50. Daniel Findlay, Note, Rainwater Collection, Water Law, and Climate Change: A Flood
of Problems Waiting to Happen?, 10 N.C.J.L. & TECH. ONLINE 74, 86, 90 (2009), available
at http://cite.ncjolt.org/10NCJOLTOnlineEd74.
51. DREw BECKWITH & JORGE FIGUEROA, WESTERN RESOURCE ADVOCATES, ARIZONA
WATER METER, at ii-iii (2010).
52. See id. at 2-3 (discussing the unique scenario in Arizona when looking at water
management, in particular the special case of groundwater in Arizona); JENNIFER
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Landscape conservation ordinances normally serve two purposes,
both aimed at shifting previous behaviors and rules while incentivizing
ratepayers to act in a water-conscious manner.13 These ordinances may
require either affirmative action on the part of the homeowner, which
can include the utilization of a device like a smart water sprinkler;
alternatively, they. may prevent the homeowner from acting in some
capacity.14
Some of the most commonly used tools in landscape conservation
ordinances include: low water use landscaping requirements,
landscape watering restrictions, and water waste restrictions.
Landscaping requirements often apply to new-build or renovation
situations and usually allow for some level of grass or other turf that
requires watering. 6 The recommended amount of turf and plant
groupings widely varies depending on the community's geographic
location.
The City of Scottsdale, Arizona, provides detailed
regulations stipulating how much water-requiring turf each type of use
permits.
The City of El Paso, Texas does not have an ordinance that restricts
different types of planting, but it does provide a list of "Desert Plants"
to help ratepayers who want to practice effective Xeriscaping.5"
WONG ET AL., THE POLIS PROJECT ON ECOLOGICAL GOVERNANCE, WATER CONSERVATION
PLANNING GUIDE FOR BRITISH COLUMBIA'S COMMUNITIES at 1, 4, 6 (2009) (providing a

detailed roadmap and checklist for communities to utilize when making a
conservation plan. The planning guide readily acknowledges that not every solution
will be beneficial for every community, but attempts to help isolate the issues that need
to be addressed).
53. See TARYN HUTCHINS-CABIBI ET AL., WESTERN RESOURCE ADVOCATES, FRONT RANGE
WATER METER 39 (2007) (Boulder County, Colorado provides a number of rebates to
ratepayers for utilizing water saving devices in their landscaping, such as a rebate of up
to $300 for putting in a drip irrigation system and a fifty percent rebate for purchasing
a smart irrigation controller).
54. BECKWITH & FIGUEROA, supra note 51, at 48-49, 62 (water waste restrictions are
among the most popular in Arizona, forbidding such practices as hosing down
driveways and sidewalks, as well as mandating that sprinklers only water landscape and
not spread over hard surfaces); see also CAL. DEPT. OF WATER RES. ET AL., supranote 4, at
36-37 (discussing the benefits and downsides of imposing landscape restrictions such
as watering restrictions).
55.

BECKWITH & FIGUEROA, supra note 51, at 17.

56. CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 23, §§ 491(b)(2), 491.1(a)(1)-(5) (2009) (written in
response to the Water Conservation in Landscaping Act of 2006. The ordinance
provides statistics and metrics indicating how much water new-build projects are
allowed to use for landscaping and how much the proposed landscaping will utilize
based on proposed plant elements. All California communities were required to
adopt a water efficient landscape ordinance at least as efficient as the model ordinance
byJanuary 1, 2010).
57. Id. §§ 492.6(A)(2)-(3), (C)(1)-(2) (The California Model Ordinance helps
specify recommended layout of plants and turf arrangements to maximize water
utilization).
58. SCOTSDALE, ARIz., CODE §§ 49-245(a)(1)-(3) (2010) (For example, schools
are only permitted to plant water-intensive plants on fifteen percent of the total
surface area of the lot, and new commercial structures are only permitted to use ten
percent of their lot); BECKWITH & FIGUEROA, supranote 51, at 18.
59.

Desert PlantList, EL PASO WATER UTIL.,

http://www.epwu.org/conservation/plants.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2011).
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Xeriscaping is a sustainable landscaping method that traditionallyfollows seven core principles: planning and design; soil improvement;
appropriate plant selection; practical turf areas; efficient irrigation; use
of mulches; and appropriate maintenance.' Although Xeriscaping is
not widespread, some communities incorporate these principles into
their landscape conservation ordinances to help clearly define
regulatory goals. In the city of Tampa, Florida, landscape adhering to
Xeriscape principles may be exempted from strict code compliance.
Other communities have enacted Xeriscape ordinances of one type or
another to help specify the goals of landscape conservation.6
Historically, cities have used outdoor watering restrictions during
drought conditions. However, cities are -now implementing these
Restrictions normally allow
restrictions on a permanent basis."
outdoor watering every other day, by identifying specific watering days
Beyond conserving water, restrictions can
for specific properties.'
reduce the carrying demand on utility pipes during high-consumption
summer months, which may reduce or delay the need to replace
infrastructure6

As one example poignantly points out, municipalities should
thoroughly study the effects of a proposed watering restriction on
In 2009, the City of Los
infrastructure before implementation.
Angeles, California, passed a watering-restriction ordinance permitting
homeowners to water their landscaping twice a week, on Mondays and
Thursdays. 6 What the city failed to account for was the massive
volume of water that would have to pass through the pipes on those
days because of the restrictions on the other days. 7 Within a few weeks
of implementing the plan, numerous water mains throughout the city
burst and had to be replaced." Since then, Los Angeles has instituted
a new ordinance that still restricts watering to certain days of the week,
60. What is Xeriscape?,COLO. WATERWISE,
http://coloradowaterwise.org/Default.aspx?pageld=645743 (last visited Feb. 19, 2011)
(providing definition of Xeriscape and other resources).
61. TAMPA, FLA., CODE § 13-27(h) (1) (2010).
62. Laws & Ordinances: "Xeriscape"Ordinances,UNIV. OF FLA., IFAS,
(last visited Feb. 21,
http://prohort.ifas.ufl.edu/laws-ordinances/Xeriscape.shtml
2011).
63. WOODSTOcK, GA., CODE § 98-50 (2011); see also New Outdoor Watering of
Landscape OrdinanceAdopted, WOODSTOcKGA.GOV (Dec. 14, 2010),
http://www.woodstockga.gov/CivicAlerts.aspx?AID=156 (providing the content of the
ordinance and the legislative reasoning behind making watering restrictions
permanent).
64. Landscape Irrigation Restrictions, S. FLA. WATER MGMT. DIST. (Mar. 2011),
http://my.sfwmd.gov/portal/page/portal/xrepository/sfwmd-repository-pdf/jtf wrpolkjhighlanids.pdf.
65. CHRIS BROWN CONSULTING & LOWER COLORADO RIVER AUTHORITY, THE BUSINESS
CASE FOR WATER CONSERVATION INTEXAS 6 (2007).
66. David Zahniser & Jessica Garrison, Lawn-Watering Rules Contributed to L.A. Main
Breaks, Experts Find, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2010,
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/13/local/la-me-water-mainsf4-2010aprl4.
67. Id.
68. Id.
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but allocates the days out over the whole week to ensure consistent
usage.

6

Another measure to consider is a limitation on when watering is
permitted.
Using water for irrigation in the morning limits
evaporation." While mid-day watering may help plants avoid heatstress, the burden on municipal sources likely does not justify the
benefit? In most cases, a community adopting this type of ordinance
will restrict watering to the hours after 8PM and before 8AM."
2. Gray Water as a Landscape Solution
There are numerous potential benefits to using gray water for
landscape applications, but there are a number of hurdles that must
be overcome in many communities. Gray water is the wastewater
derived from showers, washing machines and most sinks. " Water
from toilets and kitchen water containing food scraps is considered
black water.7 4 Because gray water has already passed through a home
or business and fulfilled some use (thus making it "gray"), it is no
longer suitable for any indoor purpose, such as washing or drinking,
and is typically used only for irrigation."
In some communities, effluent, or wastewater, is drawn back into a
central water-recycling system where it is cleaned to a certain level and
then dispersed back to the community for specific applications, or the
recycled water can be kept locally and utilized immediately. Denver
Water recently built a large facility that is capable of recycling a
significant amount of water every day." While the water is not cleaned
and purified to the point where it could be used for drinking, it is
suitable for irrigation of landscapes or crops and certain industrial
applications." This water is often called "purple water" because the
communities that have wastewater recycling plants redistribute the
water in purple pipes to distinguish it from the potable water."
Presently, the city of Denver is using the recycled water to irrigate golf
courses and as a part of heating and cooling systems at several large

69. Press Release, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, New Watering
Schedule Now in Effect for LADWP Customers (Aug. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.ladwpnews.com/go/doc/1475/881355/New-Watering-Schedule-Now-inEffect-for-LADWP-Customers.
70. Don Taylor, Watering Lawns and Other Turf UNIV. OF MINN. (2011),
http://www.extension.umn.edu/distribution/horticulture/DG2364.html.
71. Id.
72. Mandatory Outside Watering Restrictions, CITY OF LOCKHART, http://www.lockharttx.org/web98/downloads/waterrestrictio.asp (last visited April 7, 2011).
73. SUSTAINABLE SOURCES, Greywater Irrigation,
http://greywater.sustainablesources.com/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2011).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. SOLUTIONS, supra note 26, at 22-23.
77. Id.
78. Josh Goodman, Shades of Greywater, GOVERNING (Apr. 30, 2009),
http://www.governing.com/topics/energy-env/Shades-of-Greywater.html.

EXACTLY THE RIGHT AMOUNT

Issue 2

347

properties in the community." Some city officials in communities that
have water-recycling plants advocate for purple water over gray water
because they claim they have more control over the purple water to
ensure it is used efficiently, whereas efficient gray water practices
depend on the actions of individual citizens.so The argument typically
runs along the line that grey water users are not held accountable for
the application of their water and could be using it wastefully, whereas
the purple water user must pay for the water and will use it more
Critics of that position point to the fact that utilities
responsibly."
have developed a market in purple water and want to protect it against
potential supply problems caused by an expansion of gray water
usage."

However, there are numerous concerns that need to be addressed
when implementing gray water legislation owing to the many health
and safety issues that can arise if the water is used inappropriately.83
For example, unlike municipally recycled water, gray water systems
immediately send their effluent from select sources into an on-site
holding tank and purification system.84 Homeowners then use the
water for exterior irrigation purposes.This example outlines the most
important safety issue that legislation must address; avoiding direct
human contact with the gray water to prevent any possibility of
contamination.
The State of Arizona has enacted an effective package of legislation
concerning gray water usage that proponents typically point to as
exemplary." Arizona law creates a three-tier system with increasing
regulation depending on the amount of gray water being salvaged for
irrigation." Homeowners using less than 400 gallons of water a day
fall into tier one.88 Under tier one, gray water users are issued a
general permit, although there is no application or formal process,
and they must abide by a set of usage requirements." These include:
irrigation systems cannot use spray mechanisms in order to prevent
contaminants from becoming airborne; gray water may only be used
on the property it was generated on; pipes carrying gray water must be

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

SoLUTIONS, supra note 26, at 25-26.

86.

Legal Issues, GREYWATERRECYCLING.NET,

Goodman, supra note 78.
Id.
Id.
A.M. Dixon et al., Guidelinesfor Greywater Re-use: Health Issues, J. CHARTERED INST.
or WATER AND ENvTL. MGMT., 322 (Oct. 13, 1999),
http://www.greywateralliance.org/guidelines-for-gw-reuse.pdf.
84. SUSTAINABLE SOURCES, supra note 73.
85. Az. DEPT. OF ENVIL. QUALITY, USING GRAY WATER AT HOME, available at
http://www.azdeq.gov/environ/water/permits/download/graybro.pdf.
http://www.greywaterrecycling.net/recycling-systems/legal-issues/
21, 2011).
87. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ R18-9-701, 701-20 (2005).
88. Id. at § R19-9-711.
89. Id. at § R19-9-708.
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labeled to prevent confusion with drinking water pipes; and so on.90
Tiers two and three of Arizona's gray water laws apply to larger
operations or situations where the water may not stay exclusively on
the property." In these cases, the state will take a more active role in
monitoring the re-using process.
While the state has created the framework for the gray water laws,
cities and towns in Arizona can enact further legislation to meet water
In one interesting example, the Town of
conservation goals.
Clarkdale, Arizona stipulates in its zoning code that residential golf
course developments must provide effluent sufficient for all the
necessary water for golf course irrigation." That is, the homes in the
proposed community must be able to create a sufficient amount of
usable effluent so that the golf course will not have to draw on
municipal water for irrigation. The town may deny permits for the
development that do not meet this measure.94
Advocates of gray water-friendly ordinances and laws often find
resistance to the proposed changes. The most prominent concerns
raised usually have to do with the safety of using gray water, and
potential public nuisance issues like odors from storage tanks." While
these concerns are genuine, numerous studies have commenced to
establish best practices, and ensure that human and biological health
is not at risk." Some common recommendations include restricting
exposure to gray water, and occasionally testing to ensure that bacteria
levels do not rise. 97
3. Rainwater Harvesting
Like gray water practices, rainwater harvesting decreases the
demand on a municipal water supply and provides an alternative
supply of water for residential irrigation. Storing rainwater for future
use is not a new practice; the tools needed to implement an effective
Most residential harvesting
system are simple and inexpensive.98
systems rely on the roof of a structure to collect the rain and then a
storage system such as a barrel or cistern to collect the water and keep
it until needed for irrigation purposes.' In addition to relatively low
cost and complexity, rainwater harvesting is a green practice that
reduces energy demands and decreases run-off after large storms.
90. Az. DEPT. OF ENvrtL. QuALrY, supra note 85.
91. Id. at §§ R18-9-712 to -719.
92. Id. at § R18-9-711(c).
93. CLARKDALE, ARIZ., SUBDIVISION REGULATIONS § 12-8-1 (2010).
94. See id.
95. Susan Carpenter, Gray Water Debate in Sacramento Steams Up, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 17,
2009, http://1atimesblogs.latimes.com/greenspace/2009/03/greywater-regul.html.
96. Dixon, supra note 83; WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, SAFE USE OF WASTEWATER,
EXCRETAAND GREYWATER 19 (2006).
97. Dixon, supranote 83.
98. Troy L. Payne & Janet Neuman, Remembering Rain, 37 ENvr.. L. 105, 121
(2007).
99. Id. at 109.
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Harvesting systems are often integral elements of stormwater
mitigation plans in dense urban areas where a large storm has the
potential to inundate a city's sewer system. The storage systems, along
with other measures such as green roofs and permeable pavement,
allow for an urban area to absorb more of the water released during a
significant storm.' 0 This keeps storm drains from overflowing and
comingling with the city's sewage. New York City recently introduced a
$1.5 billion initiative to curb its rainwater problem.'0 '
While rainwater catchment systems are simple to build and
operate, widespread implementation will require state and local
government involvement to ensure ordinances, building codes, and
homeowner's association covenants align to maximize the potential for
this renewable water source. In 2003, the Texas state legislature
enacted legislation that prevents homeowners associations from
implementing covenants that restrict water conservation practices,
including rainwater harvesting.o 2 Other states have taken similar
The State of Ohio has developed the most
measures.10 3
comprehensive system of regulations for rainwater cisterns including
code sections dedicated to approved siting, size and features of the
rainwater cisterns.'04 Ohio regulations also allow cistern water to serve
as drinking water when properly stored and filtered.'0 o
Homeowners in some Western states have a significantly higher
hurdle owing to the prior appropriation doctrine that prevents
individuals from collecting the rain that falls on their roofs for later
use. Under the legal theory of prior appropriation, the state holds
water in trust for its residents until users appropriate it for a beneficial
use. The problem arises under the doctrine's assumption that the
water falling on a homeowner's roof will eventually make its way to a
watercourse where another water user has, sometimes a hundred years
beforehand, already claimed rights to the water. The states of
Colorado and Utah have taken a very literalist view in the past,
preventing homeowners and businesses from collecting their rainwater
However, other states have not interpreted the
for later use.'
doctrine of prior appropriation as being so restrictive.'0 7 Arizona, a
prior appropriation state, not only permits rainwater harvesting, but
actively encourages it and some cities have started to mandate the

100. CnTY OF CHICAGO, CHICAGO's WATER AGENDA 22 (2003) (discussing elements of
the new Chicago Center for Green Technology).

101.

Mireya Navarro, $1.5 Billion Plan Would Cut Sewage Flow Into City Waters, N.Y.
2010,

TIMES,
Sept.
28,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/29/science/earth/29sewage.html.
102. H.B. 645, Leg., 78th Reg. Sess. (Tx. 2003).
103. TEXAS WATER DEVELOPMENT BOARD, THE TEXAS MANUAL
HARVESTING 41 (2005).

ON RAINWATER

104. Id. at 42.
105. Id.
106. Findlay, supra note 50, at 85.
107. Laws Inconsistent in Their Support of Rainwater Harvesting,ARIZ. WATER RESOURCE,
Sept.-Oct. 2008, at 7.
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practice. " A City of Tucson ordinance requires all new commercial
developments to provide a minimum of fifty percent of their landscape
water budget from harvested rainwater.os
In 2009, the Colorado legislature passed two bills that allow for
limited rainwater catchments under specific circumstances. The first
bill allows homeowners not served by a domestic water system to install
water catchment systems. 1 o The second bill authorizes up to ten
residential development pilot projects. Under this bill, the projects
will create development-wide collection and storage systems for the
The pilot projects could also include
whole community's use."'
mixed-use development.'12 The primary goal of the pilot program is to
evaluate the effect -of these projects against traditional runoff to
determine whether there is a significant change."
Aside from states that have interpreted prior appropriation law to
limit the use of rainwater harvesting, relatively few barriers remain that
California is currently
a unified approach could not overcome.
debating a law that would allow for rainwater harvesting at the
individual level."' State water law does not explicitly prohibit the
collection of rainwater. However, significant local regulations and
ordinances often limit an individual's ability to obtain the appropriate
permitting for catchment systems."' If passed, the law would trump
local rules that currently inhibit Californians from collecting rainfall
for gardening and other purposes." 6
4. Water Metering
A water utility's choice of rate structures may not be the first place
a community considers regarding conservation, but it is probably the
most logical. An economical way to implement water policy that
promotes conservation is to increase rates when water is in high
demand, and, correspondingly, reduce rates as the demand drops. A
number of cities around the country already pursue this approach,
Typically, in conservation-based
predominantly in drier areas."'
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 7-8.
TuCSON, ARIZ., CODE

§

6-183 (2010).

S.B. 09-080, 67th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2009).
H.B. 09-1129, 67th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2009).

COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BOARD, AUTHORIZATION OF PILOT PROJECTS FOR THE
BENEFICIAL USE OF CAPTURED PRECIPITATION IN NEw REAL ESTATE DEVELOPMENTS
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2010)
28,
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http://cwcb.state.co.us/legal/Documents/Guidelines/FINALRainwaterPilotCG.pdf.
113. Id.
114. Rainwater Capture Act of 2011, A.B. 275, 2011 Leg. Sess. (as introduced by Cal.
Assemb., Feb. 7, 2011),
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/11-12/bill/asm/ab_02510300/ab-275_bill_20110207_introduced.htm.
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structures, water rates are assigned to different tiered levels of usage.
As a user ascends into the new tier, all water used from that point is
A study of different communities
charged at a higher rate."'
throughout Arizona showed that the majority of them participated in
the increasing block rates." 9 However, the communities share little
Among the several
uniformity in choosing the actual rates.120
communities covered by the study, only Phoenix charged a flat rate
throughout the entire year, regardless of consumption level.' 2 1
The flat-rate scheme is by far the most obsolete methodology,
wherein the ratepayer pays a uniform rate notwithstanding actual
water consumption. Yet, some large cities, including Chicago and New
York, still charge a flat-rate.1'2 Chicago is widely considered a leading
"green city" in the United States and yet it has not developed a water
system that encourages conservation. This primarily stems from an
antiquated water metering system where many residences and
industrial buildings do not have an individual water meter that permits
the utility to gauge the rate-payer's specific usage on a regular basis.123
Until the 1980's, New York City relied solely on flat rates, and then
implemented a metering system on some properties that required
quarterly estimates but did not provide accurate readings, while other
properties still paid flat rates."' Only recently did New York City
Mayor Michael Bloomberg initiate the implementation of a new system
that utilizes wireless transmitters that will accurately relay the amount
of water an individual building uses each month. 2 1
Denver Water already uses this technology, which permits the
utility to collect accurate information with fewer employees and less
overhead."' Technology gives a utility the ability to accurately account
for the water a ratepayer uses, enabling the utility to implement a
system that encourages conservation while still maintaining a viable
bottom-line. Finding the right balance may prove difficult, but some
http://www.usmayors.org/urbanwater/foxwoods04/Clunie.ppt.
118. Water
Rate
Structures,
WESTERN
RESOURCE
ADVOCATES,
(last visited Feb. 21,
http://www.westernresourceadvocates.org/water/rates.php
2011).
119. Beckwith, supra note 51, at 6-11.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. NEW YORK CITY DEP'T OF ENVTL. PROT., EVALUATION OF EXPENDITURES, REVENUE
SOURCES, AND ALTERNATIVE WATER, WASTEWATER AND STORMWATER RATE STRUCTURES IN
available at
(2009),
25
19
CITY: FINAL REPORT,
YORK
NEW

http://www.nyc.gov/html/dep/pdf/vaterboard/waterboard-rate-study_12182009.p
df; CHICAGO'S WATER AGENDA supranote 100, at 7.
123. CHICAGO'S WATER AGENDA, supranote 100, at 7.
124. Anthony DePalma & Jo Craven McGinty, City Fails to Collect Millions for Water,
2006,
12,
Dec.
TIMEs,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/12/nyregion/12water.html.
125. David W. Chen, City Turns to Wireless for Water Bills, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2009,
http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/24/city-turns-to-wireless-for-water-bills/.
126. Automatic Meter Reading, DENVER WATER,
http://www.denverwater.org/WaterServiceSupport/TroubleshootingRepairs/WaterM
eters/AutomaticMeterReading/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2010).
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utilities have surged forward.
The Irvine Ranch Water District (IRWD) in California has
developed a unique system for their ratepayers, producing significant
conservation results among the residents of the community." Irvine
Ranch allocates water by "hundred cubic feet" at a base rate
multiplied by the number of individuals in a household.'" In this way,
the system accounts for large families, bringing a measure of equity
into the conservation program. While individual allocation represents
a first step, the crux of the IRWD's system involves the separation of
costs into separate bundles; fixed costs and variable costs.' 9 Utilities
allocate out the fixed costs evenly among ratepayers and then assign
variable costs (those that arise from an increase in water use) to
individual ratepayers.'
Over time this system has proven itself for this
community, as average landscape water use has dropped sixty-one
percent in the period from 1992 to 2005.1
This system appears to be the right fit for this community, but
poses difficulties for cities like Chicago and New York. A system like
the IWRD's is data-intensive; the billing systems of larger cities may
require an upgrade to meet the task. Although possible, such an
upgrade would necessitate a large front-end expenditure.
As
mentioned, New York City has committed to installing smart water
meters that will provide accurate usage data. If a large city paired that
upgrade with a billing system that utilizes the methodology similar to
the IRWD's, there is little reason why even a large metropolitan area
could not implement a system that accurately accounts for an
individual's usage and encourages conservation.
CONCLUSION
While many municipalities have done an admirable job reducing
per capita water consumption in recent decades, city governments and
utilities still have significant opportunities to reduce water demand.
This article has focused on exterior uses, primarily in the residential
context, but many more opportunities for communities to conserve
and stretch the water resources exist. As climate change and
population growth continue to change traditional land use and
community development norms throughout the country, it will
become increasingly important to take a fresh look at the ways we
build and manage our cities to ensure, not only that they afford their
127. Conservation Rate Structure, IRVINE RANCH WATER DIST.,
http://www.irwd.com/alwayswatersmart/conservation-rate-structure.html
(last visited
Mar. 30, 2011).
128. Water Allocation Calculator,IRVINE RANCH WATER DIsT.,
http://www.irwd.com/alwayswatersmart/residential/tools/water-allocationcalculator.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2011).
129.

UnderstandingYour Bill, IRVINE RANCH WATER DisT.,

http://www.irwd.com/customer-care/understanding-your-bill.html
30, 2011).
130. Id.
131. Conservation Rate Structure, supra note 127.

(last visited Mar.

issue 2

EXACTLY THE RIGHT AMOUNT

353

residents a high quality of life, but that they will be able to do so over
time, sustainably, for future generations.
As we look at water conservation as a sustainability practice, saving
water and preserving natural habitats are the obvious effects. But,
what is not as readily apparent is that water conservation also has a
significant impact on energy consumption and greenhouse gas
emissions. As mentioned, in California, as much as one-fifth of the
energy produced in the state goes to water services and delivery.
Western states often use inordinate amounts of energy to move water
from far-flung sources

-

over mountain ranges -

eventually to the

user. With robust land use policies and ordinances that encourage
water conservation, California would not only save water, but also
energy, decreasing the state's overall greenhouse gas emissions and
the need to invest in new energy infrastructure. Other solutions such
as desalination are often mentioned in the same breath as
conservation measures, but these efforts would do little to decrease
energy consumption and may likely increase the energy needed to
produce water for a growing community that has not implemented
reasonable conservation practices. Communities with the desire to
conserve water and save resources (both monetary and natural) would
do well to scrub their land use ordinances for impediments that
prevent citizens and businesses from implementing measures that save
water. Potential regulatory changes should also take into account
measures that would help utilities better utilize their resources.
Encouraging or even mandating the use of recycled water for
irrigation in certain instances is a good example of a practice that saves
the utility money (because recycled water is cheaper to produce than
tap-ready water) and decreases the demand on natural water sources
by using the same water multiple times. By exploring potential
opportunities for water conservation now, communities will be better
prepared to deal with uncertainties in the future."

132. The Rocky Mountain Land Use Institute (RMLUI) is dedicated to
communities that have implemented innovative solutions, not only in the
municipal water use but in all land use contexts, and sharing them with
audience so that communities can learn from one another's successes and
Visit RMLUI at www.law.du.edu/rmlui for more information.
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BOOK REVIEW*
Justice Greg Hobbs, Living the Four Corners: Colorado, Centennial
State at the Headwaters, Continuing Legal Education in Colorado,
Denver (2010); 369 pp; $19.95.**
Reviewed by Tom L Romero Ht
There is a Mexican dicho that says: Cuando el rio suena es que agua
ieva. This proverb translates to: If the river sounds, it is because it is
carrying water. The four great rivers of the American West (the
Colorado, the Platte, the Arkansas, and the Rio Grande) - whose
headwaters sit high in the peaks of Colorado's Rocky Mountains are threatened with silence. Because of industrial mining and largescale irrigation, energy development, rapid large-scale urban growth,
and climate change, these venerable rivers seemingly are taxed beyond
their sustainable limits. Their vulnerability threatens the livelihoods of
millions of people who have long relied on these rivers. Once majestic
and unpredictable bodies of water, the headwaters of the Centennial
State have become tightly controlled, over-managed cisterns on which
every single drop is drained.
Nevertheless, as Justice Greg Hobbs reminds us in Living the Four
Corners, these rivers continue to inspire awe and wonder, perhaps
because of our deep-rooted reliance on the river systems for our
or perhaps because we
economy, politics, and culture simultaneously recognize and take for granted each river's persistence
and durability. Whatever the case, the book reflects the multiple
personas of Colorado's great rivers: they are an old friend, a dear
mother, a tired laborer, a doting father, a righteous advocate, a stoic
craftsman, and a never-to-be forgotten grandchild. In Justice Hobbs's
capable hands, the rivers are alive - in our collective imaginations,
our lived experiences, our cautious myths, our independent politics,
and our innovative law. For this very reason, we should never
underestimate their desire to endure in spite of us.
The protean lives of the headwaters of the American West and, by
extension, the people who have interacted and been influenced by
these rivers are the subject of Justice Hobbs's recent.collection. Those
looking for a linear narrative account about the people, places, and
Reproduced by permission. @ 2010 Colorado Bar Association, 39 The Colorado Lauyer
60 (December 2010). All rights reserved.
" The Colorado Authors' League selected Living the Four Corners as a finalist for its
2011 Colorado Authors' League Awards, under the "Book-length General
Nonfiction." category.
t Associate Professor, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
*
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law that have made up the rivers of the Centennial State will be sorely
disappointed. Much like the lived experience of the rivers and the
people themselves, this is an unpredictable book, not subject to simple
categorization.
It is a collection of poems, oral testimony,
multicultural teaching, inspired reflections, robust exchange, and legal
reasoning about the great rivers and the varied people who comprise
Colorado. The book includes an audio disc that explores both the law
of prior appropriation as captured in Justice Hobbs's Citizens Guide to
Colorado Water Law (3d ed. Colorado Foundation for Water Education,
2010), as well as an oral history of the Cache La Poudre River.
Despite its eclectic nature, there is graceful symmetry in the book's
organization.
As Justice Hobbs's opening essay attests, "we are
standing in the fourth world" (emphasis added). A majority of the
colorful cast of characters detailed in the book inhabit a world that
contains the headwaters of the four great rivers of the American West.
The rivers, in turn, pivot and connect four distinct economic and
cultural orientations: the Rocky Mountains, the desert Southwest, the
Midwestern high plains, and the Colorado River plateau. All have
been forever reconfigured by a legal system that holds the "four
corners of a document" sacrosanct in its interpretation. Justice
Hobbs's collection simultaneously celebrates and criticizes this system
for its capacity to create something as beautiful and pragmatic as the
doctrine of prior appropriation, and for being as divisive and
fundamentally flawed as the U.S. Supreme Court's Dred Scott decision.
Although water is an obvious current that flows throughout this
collection, equally as powerful is the flow of blood, sweat, and tears
that have comprised the history of Colorado and its people. As a state
forged out of the cauldron of the Civil War, Justice Hobbs identifies
the ongoing struggle to align the spirit and values of the Constitution.
President Abraham Lincoln, accordingly, personifies this struggle and
serves as a literal bookend to the collection. From Justice Hobbs's
discussion of Lincoln's influence in the lives of Colorado's Latino,
African American, Japanese American, Native American, and Anglo
communities in the opening pages of the book to his 2010 address
about Lincoln to a local Denver neighborhood Rotary Club in the very
last pages of the collection, President Lincoln is emblematic of the
state and of the nation's chaotic and still unfinished struggle for
equality under the law.
To be sure, it is not Lincoln the man but rather his commitment to
the "rule of law" that floats through these pages. Just as Lincoln - a
one-term Congressman and Constitutional Law scholar suddenly
thrust into the Presidency struggled to reconcile the legal
commitment to equality, the protection of individual civil rights, and a
preservation of the balance of federal and state powers, so too have
Coloradans struggled over these same questions in its water law and
policy. The lively "Dialogue" between Justice Hobbs's "Believer" and
Gary Weatherford's "Skeptic" in the middle pages of the collection
captures the competing and at times irreconcilable visions of land use,
resource distribution, and equal opportunity in the Centennial State.
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indeed, it is our constitutional

to disagree and dissent.

Living the Four Corners is one man's lifelong journey to understand
and come to grips with the wonderful but often inequitable bounty of
Colorado's rivers and its people. Sometimes, the book is an extremely
personal account; other times, it is rich with prose and exegesis; and
still at others, it is surgical and precise in its presentation. Collectively,
the book is a teaching text for all of us practicing, writing, and
thinking about law. It shows us how to breathe life into our endeavors;
it implores us to suck the marrow out of our shared experiences; and it
empowers us to drink liberally from those waters that'have cut such
deep canyons in the history, lives, and culture of Colorado. By "living
the four corners," the rivers can never be silent.

POETRY
JUSTICE GREGORYJ. HOBBS, JR.
In Volume 3 / Issue 2, Volume 5 / Issue 2, Volume 7/ Issue 2,
Volume 9 / Issue 2, Volume 11 / Issue 2, and Volume 13 / Issue 1 of
the Water Law Review, we published selections of poems by Justice
Hobbs. In the tradition of updates to previous publications, we hope
you enjoy this additional selection.

Q
There's a time for planting in the peach half moon,
pull out your milking stool and sit.
Take out your trowel,
the narrow pointed end's for digging
between the handle and this tip:
there's a scoop for loosening and lifting out the soil
sweet woodruff roots will welcome back
before you're done.
You're on the shorter end of a curving path
in the moon of the stone fruit.
Q of a fountain plays the falling water you hear,
and locusts saw in the trees
evenings you have loved:
spring's a quickening kind of planting time
for nursery stock but, oh my this!
the whole wide milky way.

THE SMALLER THE TURTLE
Through the shell of this see-through turtle I can see you.
You nest within your parent. She carries you wherever
the two of you may go.
You began within her. She brought you forth. Every day
and every night on the outside would bring you closer.
You've always been inseparable
359
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Always will, now you're back inside her. She moves,
you move. Right behind her ears you're holding on her
heart. Mom I'm here.

LINCOLN'S CALL
"Let us havefaith that right makes might,
and in that faith, let us, to the end, dare
to do our duty as we understandit."
Abraham Lincoln, Cooper Union,
February 27, 1860
Lincoln didn't crave a fight to make it right,
but couldn't short for standing tall
"all created equal" meant all his might
Would have to mean us all, alright.
The Constitution held for less than all,
Lincoln didn't crave a fight to make it right
But the Declaration had us all in sight.
To believe and live the greater call
"all created equal" means all we might
Not something less, and not not quite.
Life, Liberty, Happiness not written small,
we needn't crave a fight to make it right
Live to make us free, propriety's delight
like him our Nation, standing tall.
"All created equal" means all we might.
Now our constitution might get it right,
due process, equal protection vote for all.
Lincoln didn't crave a fight to make it right
"all created equal" means all we might.

ONE GREEN STONE
I'm the green turquoise stone
that wears me. I am tear-
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dropped shaped.
I'm the thin coiled strip of
hammered ring silver that holds
me fast
to the circle misshapen by wear
encasing my right ring finger.
I am the
Tuba City pawn shop Navajo
who made and wore me before
my Irish
Grandmother found me, a debt
among the multitude of debts
arrayed in
the Trader's big glass case.
How many times I am loaned,
dispossessed, reclaimed
pawned, borrowed, sold,
enslaved I cannot say. I am
forbidden to talk
about the dead. I am treaty
token, made and broken, worn
for the living.
I bear my bearer in and out of
jail, in and out of courthouses.
I am judge,
jury, jailor, prisoner. I'm my
own accuser, my own dear
witness, my son,
my daughter, their sons,
their daughters.
I wear a terrible beauty.
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CURSOR
Cursor pauses at the end of the line waiting for the next word, flashes
off and on, on and off, off and on. Breathe out, breathe in, breathe
out. Unseen, seen, unseen.
A bright usually blinking movable indicator on display
marking the position at which a character can be entered, corrected,
deleted.
A vertical plot line on a page that moves horizontally from beginning
to end.
He wasn't, he.is, he isn't.

INSTRUMENTS
Throats are reeds for humming,
the lungs accordions,
hands for strikers, shakers, bells,
lips for whistling.
Fingers curve for strumming,
feet for tapping time,
tongues for shaping every chord,
legs-are built for dancing.
Ears are made for listening,
each contains a drum within,
notes and tones for every range,
love's the spirit singing.

HAZEL PRONG
He said he couldn't make the boy believe
He could find water with a hazel prongRobert Frost
Some men can learn the boy that's in them by
going outside, listening to the din
and nonsense of crows arguing, then find
a quiet streamside place to contemplate
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why creatures so smart congregate so loud.
Whatever's eating them, or could, appears
to warrant high raucous advocacy.
A man who sets to learning the language
of crows might distinguish between caw and
answering caw-free assembly involves
vigorous feather flapping, jawing, struts,
feints, shrieks and beak rattling. This boy at
the base of the tree, out of the man, chips
resilient wood, a goodly instrument.
(In Celebration of Chips Barry)

WED
Marriage, the ultimate raft trip, the ultimate mountain climb.
Accomplished only through constant attention to preparation and
small details focused on every step of the way.
Enjoy each step of the way! Enjoy each put in. Enjoy each take out.
And, in between, all the tweaks and bends and snags and the roar of
running the really big ones together. And the planting of your flags.
Wrap your brows in bright bandanas!
Celebrate your individual strengths and weaknesses, for you are meant
to complement each other, for one to take the lead and the other to
follow, and then to rest and switch the lead and the followership.
Snuggle much!
Aim for the high passes, but don't forget the mountain meadows.
Peaks are great, but you'll have to hustle off them when storm clouds
grow. Find yourselves a comfortable elevation for laughing and loving!
When hail assails your relationship, as it will, get under the same
canopy and, if you must be silent, let it never be an angry silence but a
time for gathering your lips together for saying once again your
constant vow to each other: "I love you!"

PRISMS
a man sat long with a pool and its prisms
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Carl Sandburg, Pool of Bethesda
Scrolls in the mouths
of fish read pigments of
your rain blouse
like syllables torn
from your mother's blue-gray
eyes
stored in the snows
of Monarch Pass
snowdrifts
also bear a pregnant red
shed from crossing the
Sonoran Desert
gather and contribute their
spring melt voices, their
healing touch.

I'M THE ANGEL OF MERCY
I set up summers in Saratoga Springs, Wyoming. I'm petite, wiry, grew
up on a ranch northeast of Cheyenne, out in one of those deep draws
where the Cheyenne holed in for refuge during a big winter. I'd milk
to the crack of cottonwood branches snapping off in the cold, working
these hands under the warm bellies of mother cows, pulling,
stretching, kneading, coaxing the bucket to fill. I've got real good
fingers. I can make a man moan with a hurt he doesn't know he's
suffered yet. I use the aromatic oils, a blend of Celtic-Turkish music,
always start a foot at a time with the tender under arches of his feet,
work the entire length of him, always finish from behind with the flat
of my palms on his temples, my fingers gently but firmly closing his eye
lids.

CACHE AND CARRY
Next time you plan
to picnic
in the desert
load you pack
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with 120 pounds
of bottled
water. It will
appreciate
the squeeze of
your very last
drop.

TOPKILL
Process by which
state of the art
experts
experiment with
sand shrimpand pelican
feathers.

CHECKING MESSAGES
cleaning windows
sweeping pebbles
pruning words
mowing grass
sticking stamps
bagging scraps
stacking dishes
breaking paragraphs
watering petunias
sealing envelopes
reading briefs
refilling bird seed
hanging pictures
opening attachments
booking tickets
ordering tunes
mopping floors
deleting commas.
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BONE FEATHERS
As light as balsa wood,
skull thrown back of the arching
eye sockets, beak projected out over
the waves like one of those carved figures
bearing a proud clipper ship into
a midnight bout with
dark waters
This navigator of the winds,
this keen night-hunting sailor who hears
every furtive unseen movement, still so very
still and observant in the tall branches
then at once a swooping fury
talons bared for the
unwary.

FISHING NOTS
A fishing knot
my fishing father never
asked me tie,

the liar knot,
hooks the biggest fish
you've been hooking for,
"deep within a liar knot
a piece of line has crossed over
another piece,"
this line you're using,
slipped from my
tackle box,
without attribution,
though buried in your reel,
bears my name,
I
"This will act like a scythe
when the knot is
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jerked tight,"
when the pressure's most on you
the biggest fish of all
does not resist,
truth will out the slacker's knot,
back it lays and plays with you,
(to the Master Poet's credit)
"saliva allows the twists and
turns to slide over themselves
as the knot is tightened,"
spitting on your friend
the double not a true fisherman
will never engage.
(quotes from http://www.bishfish.co.nz/articles/general/notknot.htm)

FIRST LIGHT
Squat on a shaving rock at Zoroaster.
In the gut of the schist gorge,
you cannot see where the sipapu sun
rises to the east this morning
Out of the Little Colorado,
carrying chocolate to the mainstream,
stirs Navajo sandstone and sacred
Hopi salt into the Colorado.
In the minute or so it takes
to extract my razor and cream
from a ziplock TSA hasn't screened,
a turbine-propelled tide from Page eats
at the blue stripes of my $7.00
Cortez Walmart sneakers.
Down in Phoenix and L.A.?
Get yourselves ready for a nice
air-conditioned day!
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I loose my amputated beard
to the current, consign my DNA
to sediment
On some downstream beach
a heron may stand
and fish upon.
Though I cannot see,
I know a few Harvey House
South Rim pilgrims have walked
this very morning
to a ledge high above
the condor's nest,
They see what I see,
wherever the light
touches first
is holy.

NEXT DOOR AMERICA
Happy Birthday balloons
are flying next door
Through the fence,
I spy someone else's
grandnieces
Running round the
back yard of the graying
male couple.

KACHINAS
Spirits of the invisible
forces of life,
dwelling in the lofts
of the San Francisco Peaks,
their sacred home
half the year
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In the kivas and the plazas
spruce bough, deer horn,
eagle feather, corn ear,
turtle shell rattle,
become visible
the other half
Carved of cottonwood root
children play roof top
Hummingbird,
Mouse Warrior,
Corn Maiden,
Wolf
Circle countering
circle, the women sprinkle
corn pollen blessings
on the perfect beat
of their glistening
limbs.

RAINMAKER
When the people suffer
for lack of rain,
tap your terrapin staff.
Beneath the shell
of every creature
a hidden springWill be answering!

IN THE AGE OF RESTORATION
REFRAMING THE QUESTION
Spring rise and Rocky Mountain rise
rolling to the point of confluence
of the Muddy Mo, the Mighty Mississip,
a flash rolling from the Gallatin,
the Jefferson, the Yellowstone
off the glacier and the winds
across the buffalo plains of
Mandan, Sioux, Cheyenne,
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No such thing as an average runoff
rolling down against the warrant given
to Captains Lewis and Clark,
"Find the Continental tie to the Western Sea,"
waves of sediment building, shifting,
scrubbing, transforming sand bars,
opening channels, taking the best
action we can at the time
And tweaking it from the point
of confluence to who we are,
who we might become, fledgling ratios,
a pallid sturgeon feeling our way
upstream to hatch, recover, remain,
sustain our experimental design,
like a metal plate in your leg
bone grows over.

EXCHANGE
An equivalent accommodation
of equal value
arranged before hand
student for student,
teacher for teacher,
within and across borders
to part with,
receive and supply
between two points
without injury to any other,
the bounty of a natural
meander.

CHRISTENING
A Guatemalan Irish American
little Carolina Carys,
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your parents met at Notre Dame,
wedding in Antigua
At the former convent
in the courtyard of the Spanish ruins
built on a Mayan sacred site,
candles lit and birds of paradise
we the visitors in that half of
your homeland ancestors.
Welcome little Carolina Carys;
of all the sacraments
you most favored
are
A vessel of blessed
Rocky Mountain water
dipped in the font
of your downy brown hair
we encircle you,
astonished!

LARGE DOSE
Never shake your finger
at a guy who's beaten you.
Only makes you look
both mad and beaten.
Instead, stick your finger
up your nose. You'll hurt
and bleed remembrance.
When someone else
Bests you by winning one,
grin and congratulate him.
You need his medicine
to return the favor.

WHAT FOLLOWS
This is the season of the impossible assignment, keep from

WATER LAWREVIEW

372

Volume 14

tracking in the leaves when maple, elm and mulberry aren't through
with peeling them off. Broom, rake and blower bring only temporary
relief, like a dose of ibuprofen does a head cold.
I haven't yet adopted the condo solution-sky up where native
willows used to be-enjoy the mountain view and let the city keep
track of its pockets of urban forest.
I remain committed to the gusts that tack the bits of red green and
gold to my feet when I'm entering and leaving.

DARK'S TOPOGRAPHY
Arriving in the dark
I could not tell the green gold of aspen-turnirng
is still out
Scimitar blade of razor-sharpened moon
one star over it
Mt. of the Holy Cross too-just
Beyond the killing edge.
East to west many people praying
in the dark
Who is listening?
Owl on a long limb.
Voices rise into the night sky
no gigantic ear will answer them.
Ears are made for listening
Ah! Night you are so gorgeous for this.
So full of wireless-traveling suggestion
just outside the insistent
Noise of closed interiors.

WE ARE CHILDREN OF THE HEADWATERS
Seeing over our shoulders ancestral Puebloans, Utes, Hispanos,
celebrate a major snowfall load any spot of our territory,
say the San Juans or Maybell, fear a snow-eating wind
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might suck us dry before our canteen aquifers
and beaver reservoirs might sponge and refill,
mourning too many peaks between here and there
a few billion dollars worth of pumps and pipes might fix,
solace our loss by gleefully donning full dry suits at lunch
for playing on a kayak course, counting at launch those
gauge-numbered outflow credits good against the compacts
we sometimes wish were one-way deals flowing back uphill,
engaging our first amendment right to disagree at all times
with another's need while sitting at roundtables, square tables,
rectangular tables figuring how to serve ourselves and our brothers,
sisters, grandchildren who, after this first month of the first year of the
second decade of the 21" century, give way to our
Centennial state's tenacious future amidst these magnificent
prairie mesa canyon cliffs, needing each other's aid and insight,
prayer for relief following our complaints, more agreement, less
contest,
God-willing, your blessing please, upon this food we enjoy, grown by
others, delivered here by fuel and freight and men and women
thankful for the work, for this good company, preserve, conserve,
sustain, inspire.

CURRENTS IN CALIFORNIA WATER LAW: THE
PUSH TO INTEGRATE GROUNDWATER AND
SURFACE WATER MANAGEMENT THROUGH
THE COURTS
JOHN HEDGESt
376
I. Introducing California's water problems.....................................
II. California's complicated water rights and management ............. 379
A. Different rights systems for
379
groundwater and surface water ......................
B. Local groundwater management
.................. 381
varies throughout the state ...........
III. Despite calls for change, the Legislature is unlikely to reform
382
California's groundwater law ......................................................
A. Observers argue that California should have a single
integrated system for groundwater and surface water.......382
B. The Legislature tried to reform California's surface water
system, but is unlikely to disturb the status quo in
..... 385
.............................
groundwater.
1. Mounting problems with California's surface water
385
...............
infrastructure created public outcry..
2. Government leaders seized an opportunity and passed
..... 386
..................
water reform legislation
3. The Legislature's treatment of groundwater is
disappointing to proponents of water law integration. 389
IV. Environmentalists have turned to the courts as agents of
392
groundwater reform ...................................................................
A. The Public Trust Doctrine has emerged as a valuable
392
.................................
litigation tool
B. Environmental Law Foundation v. SWRCB could force the
state to control groundwater under the Public Trust
..... 396
...................
.
Doctrine ..........
400
...........................................
Conclusion
California supports its massive economy, and nearly every other aspect of its society, with a complicated water infrastructure. Alongside
the physical channels that move water throughout the state is an
equally complex water law system. State agencies extensively regulate
use of California's surface water, but the state takes a hands-off approach to groundwater. As a result, a host of local regulatory bodies
assert varying control over groundwater resources. In many parts of
t First year law student, University of Denver Sturm College of Law.
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the state there are no restrictions on groundwater use whatsoever.
Many observers lament the lack of uniform statewide regulation of
groundwater, but the Legislature has been reluctant to assert any control over this resource. Some environmental advocates are now bypassing the legislative process and are wielding evolving legal theories in
California courtrooms in order to change California's system of
groundwater regulation.
Before covering judicial use of the Public Trust doctrine and current groundwater litigation, this report provides an overview of California's water rights system, what local regulations currently apply to
groundwater, and the how the Legislature's water reform of 2009 left
the current groundwater regime largely untouched.
I. INTRODUCING CALIFORNIA'S WATER PROBLEMS

California is home to 37 million people.' It contains three of the
ten most populous counties in the United States, and three of the
most populous cities.3 The state has the nation's biggest economy, responsible for thirteen percent of the United States' gross domestic
product.' California also leads the country in agriculture, with nearly
$34 billion of agricultural production,' and nine out of the nation's
top ten counties for agricultural sales.' California supplies about half
of U.S. consumer's fresh produce, and fifteen percent of the nation's
agricultural exports.
California's extensive urban and agricultural development is at
odds with the state's natural conditions. Most of the state's water is located far from where it is needed. Precipitation patterns vary widely
throughout California, with more than 140 annual inches of precipitation falling in the forested Klamath Mountains in the northwest and
less than four inches in the far southeastern deserts.' Approximately
1. Paul Mackun & Steven Wilson, PopulationDistributionand Change: 2000 to 2010,
U.S.
Census
Bureau,
at
2
(March
2011),
available
at
http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c201Obr-01.pdf.
2. Id. at 9.
3. Id. at 11.
4. The latest data of the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Affairs, for 2009, puts California's GDP at $1.884 trillion, and the total GDP for the
United States at $14.027 trillion. See Gross Domestic Product by State Interactive Map,
BUREAU OF EcoNoMIC ANALYSIS, http://www.bea.gov/regional/gdpmap/GDPMap.aspx
(search by state) (last updated Nov. 18, 2010).
5.

U.S.

DEP'T OF AGRIC.,

NAT'L AcRIc. STATISTICS. SERV.,

2007

CENSUS OF

AGRICULTURE - STATE DATA 276 (Table 1, State Summary Highlights: 2007), availableat
http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2007/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter
2_USStateLevel/st99_2_001_001.pdf.
6. California Dept. of Food and Agriculture, An Overview of California'sAgricultural
ProductionStatistics,http://www.cdfa.ca.gov/statistics (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
7. HEATHER COOLEY, JULIET CHRISTIAN-SMrrH & PETER H. GLEICK, PAC. INST., MORE
WITH LESS: AGRICULTURAL WATER CONSERVATION AND EFFICIENCY IN CALIFORNIA, A
SPECIAL Focus ON THE DELTA 11 (2008), availableat

http://www.pacinst.org/reports/more-with-lessdelta/more..with_1ess.pdf.
8.

DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES,

UPDATE 2003 at 20 (2003), availableat

CALIFORNIA'S GROUNDWATER: BULLETIN 118 -
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seventy percent of the state's precipitation falls north of Sacramento.'
This region is the most rural part of California, with an economy dependent on forestry.'o By contrast, seventy-five percent of the state's
water use occurs south of Sacramento."
The timing of water use is also at odds with natural conditions.
Most precipitation occurs during the winter," and rivers swell with
snowmelt in the spring." Aggravating the supply problems are unpredictable cycles of drought and deluge." As one Southern California
climatologist remarked about the state's notoriously variable weather
patterns, "U]ust when you think you have Mother Nature figured out,
she sticks a finger in your eye.""
Faced with these natural conditions, California's leading status in
both urban development and agricultural production is dependent
upon a massive and intricate system of state and federal waterworks
that stores water and moves water throughout the state."
http://www.water.ca.gov/pubs/groundwater/bulletin_ 18/california's-groundwater
_bulletin_118_-_update_2003_/bulletinl18_entire.pdf [hereinafter BULLETIN 118].
9. Id. at 24.
10. See Total CaliforniaForest Land, CALIFORNIA FORESTRY ASSOCIATION, (Nov. 2008),
http://www.foresthealth.org/pdf/Total%20California%20Forest%2Land%2OMap.p
df.
11. Id. at 24. This figure includes urban and agricultural water use. It does not include "nonconsumptive" use, including environmental use such as minimum stream
flows required for ecological maintenance. Environmental use is increasingly influencing the water policy and politics in California and throughout the West. See, e.g.,
CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, CALIFORNIA'S WATER: AN LAO PRIMER 32 (2008),
at
available
Peter
http://www.lao.ca.gov/2008/rsrc/water-primer/water-primer_102208.pdf;
Gleick, et. al. California Water 2020: A Sustainable Vision, PAC. INST., 23-26 (1995), available at http://www.pacinst.org/reports/california water-2020; Jacob Bornstein, Program Manager, Colorado Water Conservation Board, Needs and Demands: What Does the
FutureReally Look Like?, presentation at the University of Denver Water Law 2011 Symposium, notes available at http://aw.du.edu/documents/water-law-review/JacobBomstein-Needs-and-Demands-What-Does-the-Future-Really-Look-Like.pdf.
12. BULLETIN 118, supranote 8, at 24.
13. This pattern has historically caused widespread flooding in the Central Valley
and other areas throughout the state, with huge and ecologically important wetlands
covering many valley floors for parts of the year. White settlers began the complicated
drainage and channeling system that dried out much of the state, making way first for
agriculture and then for urban development. Most of the natural wetlands are now
gone but the high spring runoff, and the sometimes widespread flooding it causes,
continues to challenge the state's water management systems. On the history of flooding and wetlands drainage, see NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THIRST, CALIFORNIANS
AND WATER: A HISTORY 5-8, 79-84 (rev. ed., Univ. of Cal. Press, 2001). On modern
flood problems, see DEP'T OF WATER RESOURCES, FLOOD WARNINGS: RESPONDING TO
CALIFORNIA'S FLOOD CRISIS 2-10 (2005), availableat
http://www.water.ca.gov/pubs/flood/flood-wamings-responding-to-califomia's-fl
oodcrisis/01 1005floodwarnings.pdf.
14. On historical swings in precipitation, see HUNDLEY, supra note 13, at 8-11; see also
Hector Becerra & Catherine Saillant, Mother Nature Pulls a Fast One on Forecasters, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 21, 2010, http://atimes.com/news/local/la-me-1221-weather-extremes20101221,0,5872898.story.
15. Bill Patzert, a climatologist at the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California, quoted in Becerra & Saillant, supra note 14.
16. University of California Agriculture Issues Center, Water Supply and Demand, at
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Under natural conditions, nearly half of California's runoff would
flow from the mountains primarily in Northern California and the Sierra Nevada, through a network of over 700 miles of waterways in California's Central Valley, and out to the Pacific Ocean via the San Francisco Bay.' 7 The maze of waterways, known simply as the Delta,
embraces 738,000 acres between Sacramento, Lathrop, and the San
Francisco Bay Area." The Delta is the largest estuary on the Pacific
Coast of the Americas, and supports a huge array of plants, animals,
migratory birds, and fish.'"
The Delta also supports California's human population, being the
site of some of the most productive agricultural land in the United
States, home to a growing population, and the hub of California's water infrastructure. 20 Federal, state, and local water projects rely on the
Delta's water.2 ' Many Delta-area farmers pump irrigation water directly from the Delta, and the Central Valley Project, operated by the
federal government, uses the Delta to supply water primarily to agricultural users in the San Joaquin Valley to the south." The State Water Project, the largest water system run by any state, pumps water from
the Delta to supply primarily urban communities in Central and
Southern California. The massive pumps that the state and federal
projects use pump millions of acre-feet out of the southern end of the
Delta every year, directly killing significant numbers of fish and altering the region's ecosystem.
Californians have been paying close attention to surface water recently, with the Legislature passing a major package of water legislation in late 2009.24 Groundwater is also important to California, but
legislative reforms to groundwater management have been timid, at
best.
California leads the nation in groundwater pumping, taking 11 billion gallons of water from the ground each day, which totals more
than thirteen percent of U.S. groundwater extraction.2 ' About thirty
1-2 (2009), available at
http://aic.ucdavis.edu/publications/whitepapers/Water%20Supply%20and%2ODema
nd.pdf; see also Bureau of Reclamation, Central Valley Project,
http://www.usbr.gov/projects/Projectjsp?projName=Central+Valley+Project
(last
updated Aug. 31, 2009); Dep't of Water Resources, California State Water Project Overview, http://www.water.ca.gov/swp/index.cfm (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
17. See Aquafornia Exclusive: Why the Delta Matters to Every Californian, AQUAFORNIA
(Sept. 3, 2007, 11:24 PM), http://aquafomia.com/archives/588.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Where Does California'sWater Come From?, AQUAFORNIA (Aug. 13, 2008, 9:29 AM),
http://aquafornia.com/where-does-califomias-water-come-from.
23. Id.
24. David M. Greenwald; "Historic" Water Deal Draws Both Praise and Criticism,
CALIFORNIA PROGRESS REPORT (Nov. 5, 2009),
http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/site/node/7062.
25. Coming in second is Texas, the other Western state not regulating groundwa-
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percent of the state's water comes from groundwater sources during
an average year, and during a drought the figure rises to forty percent
or more.2 1 Some cities rely on groundwater exclusively, including
Fresno27 , the state's fifth largest city, 28 and other cities throughout the
Central Valley.2"
Despite the importance of groundwater to California, the state
does not regulate groundwater on a statewide level.' This makes California one of only two Western states that do not have state-level
groundwater regulation, Texas being the other outlier."
II. CALIFORNIA'S COMPLICATED WATER RIGHTS AND MANAGEMENT
A. DIFFERENT RIGHTS SYSTEMS FOR GROUNDWATER AND SURFACE WATER

The California Constitution requires that all water use in California be "reasonable and beneficial... in the interests of the people and
for the public welfare." 2 California surface water rights operate under
a "dual system," recognizing both appropriative and riparian rights."
The State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) issues permits for
most appropriative water use, but has no authority over riparian rights
or groundwater." In fact, California law makes a clear distinction between surface water and groundwater.
California law sorts water into various categories. Surface water is
subject to state-level control, but confusingly, "surface .water" includes
some underground water: "subterranean streams flowing through

ter, which pumps more than 8.5 billion gallons daily. JOAN F. KENNY, ET AL., U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, ESTIMATED WATER USE IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2005 at 6, table 1
(2009), available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/1344/pdf/cl344.pdf.
26. BULLETIN 118, supra note 8, at 14.
27. Id.
28. In 2009, Fresno's population was 479,918, according to the Census Bureau's
latest estimates. Geographic Comparison Table, California - Place, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU,

http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/GCTI'able?-bm= y&-geojid=04000US06&_boxhead nbr=GCT-T1-R&-dsname=PEP_2009_EST&- iang=en&-format=ST-9S&sse=on (last visited Apr. 20, 2011).
29. BULLETIN 118, supranote 8, at 14.
30. Ellen Hanak & Caitlin Dyckman, Counties Wresting Control: Local Responses to California's Statewide Water Market, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 490, 491 (2003); Ann J. Stokes,
Comment, On the Brink of Tragedy: Reassessing GroundwaterManagement in California, 18
SAN JOAQUIN AGPic. L. REv. 175, 183 (2009).
31. Press Release, Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Associations, Fishing and
Conservation Groups Sue Over Poor Water Management on Northern California's Scott River
(June 24, 2010), available at
http://www.envirolaw.org/documents/ScottRiverPTDSuit-PressReleaseFINAL.pdf.
32. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; codified in CAL. WATER CODE § 100 (West 2011).
33. People v. Shirokow, 605 P.2d 859, 864-65 (1980) (discussing the dual system in
a concise overview of California's water law history).
34. Ruth Langridge, ConfrontingDrought: Water Supply Planningand the Establishment
of a Strategic GroundwaterReserve, 12 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 295, 303 (2009).
35. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1200,1221 (West 2011).
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known and definite channels."" Water that is not surface water or a
subterranean stream is referred to as "percolating groundwater"" and
is not subject to permitting by the SWRCB or any other state agency.3 8
California's water classifications serve as a crude proxy for a tributary
groundwater classification. The actual classifications, however, are
made based on the underground water's supposed flow characteristics," not on the underground water's actual relationship with surface
water supplies.
Although California leaves regulation of "percolating groundwater" to local governments, several laws exist under which the state
might have the power to control groundwater. The highest authority
is the constitutional "reasonable and beneficial" use requirement. 40
The California Supreme Court, in 1967, held that this requirement
applied to all water in the state, including groundwater.4 1 Additionally,
under the California Water Code, the state has "a primary interest" in
preventing. damage to groundwater basins from overdraft or other
conditions.4 2 The California Court of Appeals held that this interest
gives the state a protectable property interest in all of California's water.43
Other Water Code sections confer on.the state authority to determine which "surface and underground" water will be used, controlled,
or developed for public benefit.4 4 These sections are, however, simply
policies of the state, with little practical effect. The Legislature has
frequently considered groundwater regulation, but so far has left the
task to local governments and the courts.4 6
Commentators often lament California's lack of state-level regulation.47 However, local governments, "special districts," and courts are
all involved in managing groundwater, and some form of local
groundwater regulation covers nearly all of the state.4 ' Adding complexity to California water law, these legal principles applicable to
groundwater vary depending on where the groundwater is used. 9
California was the first state to adopt a system of "correlative
36. Id. § 1200. The legislators enacting § 1200 took the quoted language from Los
Angeles v. Pomeroy, 57 P. 585, 632 (Cal. 1899).
37. For an extended discussion of this distinction and some of the major legal battles it generated, seeJoseph L. Sax, We Don't Do Groundwater:A Morsel of California Legal
History, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 269 (2003).
38. Langridge, supra note 34, at 303; BULLETIN 118, supranote 8, at 3140.
39. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1200, 1221 (West 2011).
40. CAL. CONST. art. X, § 2; codified in CAL. WATER CODE § 100 (West 2011).
41. Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P. 2d 889, 893 (Cal. 1967).
42. CAL. WATER CODE §12922 (West 2011).
43. Selma Pressure Treating Co. v. Osmose Wood Preserving Co., 271 Cal. Rptr.
596, 605 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
44. CAL. WATER CODE. §§ 104, 105 (West 2011).
45. Sawyer v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Napa Cnty., 291 P. 892, 895 (Cal. Ct. App. 1930).
46. Langridge, supra note 34, at 320-21.
47. See BULLETIN 118, supra note 8, at 31-45.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 303.
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rights." o This system gives owners of land overlying a groundwater
basin equal rights to the groundwater, subject to California's "reasonable and beneficial" use requirement, and requires all owners cut back
their use in times of shortage." However, any use of groundwater on
land that does not overly the groundwater source is subject to appropriative priority rights, and groundwater exporters must yield to overlying users during water shortages."
California's multi-layered and complicated system of water management is a continuing source of frustration for practitioners. Two
Southern California water lawyers reflect that "the considerable continuing uncertainty over rights in groundwater in California continues
to bedevil rational water management."
B. LOCAL GROUNDWATER MANAGEMENT VARIES THROUGHOUT THE
STATE

City and county governments have inherent authority to implement groundwater management ordinances." The first county to establish groundwater regulation statutes was Sacramento County, which
enacted its first groundwater ordinance inl952." It took until 1988 for
Mono County to enact the next ordinance, and more counties followed suit in the 1990s. 6 Currently, twenty-eight out of fifty-six counties, overlying the majority of the state's major groundwater resources,
have some kind of groundwater ordinance in place." Although there
is substantial variation in what the ordinances cover, most counties require a permit to export extracted groundwater. Many counties have
not gone beyond requiring export permits, but other common provisions include the establishment of a Technical Advisory Committee to
advise the county on water issues, pumping regulations, and provisions
for groundwater replenishment."
In 1994, landowners challenged county-level authority to regulate
groundwater in Baldwin v. County of Tehama.o In Baldwin, the California Supreme Court held that state law did not preempt the field of
groundwater regulation and that local governments may regulate

50. Joseph W. Delapenna, Quantitative Groundwater Law in 4 WATERS AND WATER
RIGHTS § 21.03 (Robert E. Beck & Amy K. Kelley, eds., 3Vd ed. 2010).
51. Langridge, supra note 34, at 303.
52. Id. Additionally, to a minor degree certain groundwater is subject to prescriptive rights and "pueblo rights." See also WATER AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 50, §
21.03 (b); Sax, supranote 37.
53. Eric L. Garner & Steven M. Anderson, The California Supreme Court Reviews the
Mojave River Adjudication, 2 U. DENV. WATER L. REv. 26, 27-32 (1998).
54. BULLETIN 118, supranote 8, at 36-39.
55. Id. at 39.
56. Id. at 37.
57. See id. at 37. Alpine County enacted groundwater regulations after BULLETIN
118 was published; see ALPINE COUNTY, CAL., CODE, ch. 16.20 (2011).
58. BULLETIN 118, supra note 8, at 39.
59. Id.
60. Baldwin v. Cnty. of Tehama, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886 (Cal. App. 1994).
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61
groundwater through their inherent police powers.
California voters may also establish "special districts" with governmental powers." Almost 5,000 special districts have been established
for a variety of purposes including waste management, hospital operation, and park maintenance.13 Some special districts, like irrigation
districts, are organized for water management.' These water districts
have power to regulate water use, and each asserts varying authority
over groundwater rights." The Legislature has also created some water districts with specific regulatory authority; this authority is typically
broader than that asserted by voter-created water districts."
Finally, courts also regulate groundwater. In some areas, known
as "adjudicated basins," courts oversee water apportionment on an
ongoing basis.' In adjudicated basins, a court-appointed watermaster
manages the allocations under continuing supervision of the court.69
Most of California's adjudicated basins are in urban Southern California,70 and this system provides some of the most rigorous groundwater
management in the state.7

III. DESPITE CALLS FOR CHANGE, THE LEGISIATURE IS UNLIKELY TO
REFORM CALIFORNIA'S GROUNDWATER LAW
A. OBSERVERS ARGUE THAT CALIFORNIA SHOULD HAVE A SINGLE
INTEGRATED SYSTEM FOR GROUNDWATER AND SURFACE WATER.

The patchwork of local regulations results in inconsistent groundwater management throughout the state. Regulatory inconsistency
and increasing influence of. hydrological knowledge has resulted in
calls, going back at least a century, for the state to assert central control of groundwater rights.7 2 Most of the criticism is based on science,
with economists and hydrologists joining legal scholars in arguing that
California's distinction among groundwater, subterranean flows, and
surface water is an awkward legal fiction.
The 1896 decision of Gould v. Eaton illustrates how entrenched in
California law the distinction is, and what absurd results it can create.
61. Id. at 891-92.
62. BULLETIN 118, supra note 8, at 33.
63. JOHN CHAING, CAL. STATE CONTROLLER, SPECIAL DIsTRICTs ANNUAL REPORT FY
at
http://www.sco.ca.gov/Files-ARDavailable
(2010),
vi-vii
2007-08
Local/LocRep/0708specialdistrictosp.pdf.
64. Id. at 329-30.
65. BULLETIN 118, supra note 8, at 33.
66. Id. at 34-35.
67. Langridge, supra note 34, at 327-29.
68. Id. at 327.
69. Id.
70. BULLETIN 118, supranote 8, at 42-43.
71. Id. at 40.
72. See WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 50, § 18.03.
73. Id.
74. Gould v. Eaton, 44 P. 319 (Cal. 1896).
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In Gould, the defendant had no riparian right but dug a tunnel underneath a stream." The porous streambed allowed the stream to percolate through and fill the tunnel." The defendant then diverted the
water from the tunnel for his own use." The court noted the obvious
diminishing effect that the tunnel had on the surface flows, but reiterated the "well established" principle that surface water law is inapplicable to groundwater." The court held that any water that was in the
soil was "part of the soil" and therefore belonged to the overlying
landowner, for use without regard to the effect on riparian rights."
California has clung to its awkward groundwater system, a matter
of property law, despite the long-understood interrelation of groundwater and surface water."0 Joseph Sax, a professor of water law at U.C.
Berkeley, wrote that both hydrologists and legislators have long "understood perfectly well that water [is] a continuum"81 and that the notion that groundwater was, until recently, too mysterious to be regulated "is simply wrong."82
As the decades passed, commentators' pleas to integrate groundwater and surface water law became more frequent. In 1929, eminent
water law scholar Samuel C. Wiel remarked perhaps too optimistically,
"we may reasonably hope that the geologists will get more appropriate
attention from attorneys ... as well as from legislators and voters. "81
Wiel emphatically concluded, "there is always a connection between
surface flow and groundwater; and that legal dispositions in ignorance
or disregard of this connection cannot prosper."
In fact, ignorant legal dispositions did continue to prosper. In
1959, water engineer Abel Wolman emphasized the connection between land and water resources and argued that "water conservation
requires managing the surface and ground waters of a drainage basin
as a unit. "85 In 1973, Vice Chair of the SWRCB Ronald Robie complained of California's "ad hoc" approach to water law that led to "un-

75. Id. at 319.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 319-20. This doctrine is not endemic to California. See, e.g., Greenleaf v.
Francis, 35 Mass. 117, 122-23 (Mass. 1836) ("[T]here is nothing in the case at bar
which limits or restrains the owners of these estates, severally, from having the absolute
dominion of the soil.... [T]he proprietor... may consult his own convenience in his
operations above or below the surface of his ground. He may obstruct the light and air
above, and cut off the springs of water below the surface.").
79. Gould, 44 P. at 320.
80. Sax, supra note 37, at 274, 294.
81. Id. at 291.
82. Id.
83. Samuel C. Wiel, Need of Unified Law for Surface and Underground Water, 2 S. CAL.
L. REv. 358, 369 (1929).
84. Id. at 369.
85. Abel Wolman, Better Ground-Water Management in Water, THE YEARBOOK OF
AGRICULTURE 1955 at 277, 282, quoted in WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS, supra note 50,
§18.03.
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coordinatedadministration of interrelatedresources."8
As California stuck with its uncoordinated system, other states became more aggressive in managing groundwater." Now, most Western
states jointly manage ground and surface water." Arizona, for example, has an integrated water rights system and takes a particularly farsighted approach to water law, requiring water users to demonstrate
that their water use is sustainable." Likewise, Colorado and New Mexico have re-written old water statutes to recognize the interrelationship
between groundwater and surface water."
Colorado statutes differentiate between tributary groundwater,
non-tributary groundwater, and not-nontributary groundwater." Each
of these categories has a different effect on surface water supplies, and
each is subject to varying levels of state regulation." This regulatory
scheme is no less complicated than California's, but Colorado's categories benefit from being scientifically rigorous and uniform throughout the state.
Even some California officials now acknowledge the problems in
California's groundwater law. One judge on the California Court of
Appeal recently described California's separate systems for ground and
surface water regulation as having an "Alice-in-Wonderland quality.""
The judge complained of having to apply archaic legal principles because of the Legislature's refusal to reformulate the law to reflect science.9 5
Officials in the executive and .legislative branches recognize the
problem as well. The SWRCB reported that "the (legal) distinction
between percolating groundwater and subterranean streams is meaningless, or nearly so."9 6 The California Legislative Analyst's Office,
which serves as the Legislature's fiscal and policy advisor, recommends
that the Legislature revise state water law to reflect hydrology and con86. Quoted in Sax, supra note 37, at 301. Robie later became the Director of the
California Department of Water Resources, and later a judge. Since 2002 he has
served on the California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District. Ronald Boyd Robie,
AssociateJustice, CALIFORNIA COURTS,
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/courts/courtsofappeal/3rdDistrict/justices/robie.htm
(last visited May 10, 2011).
87. MAC TAYLOR, LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, LIQUID ASSETS: IMPROVING
MANAGEMENT OF THE STATE'S GROUNDWATER RESOURCES 17-19 (2010), available at
http://www.lao.ca.gov/reports/201 0/rsrc/groundwater/groundwater_03241 0.pdf.
88. Id.; Stokes, supra note 30, at 188.
89. TAYLOR, supranote 87, at 19.
90. Id.at18,19.
91. Luke Harris, Registered Engineer-Intern, Bishop-Brogden Associates, Inc.,
Turning to Groundwater: An Engineering Perspective, presentation at the University of
Denver Water Law 2011 Symposium: A Vision for the Future: Balancing Population
Growth with Increasing Water Demand (Apr. 15, 2011).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. N. Gualala Water Co. v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 821, 831
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
95. Id. at 831-32.
96. TAYLOR, silpra note 87, at 15.
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sider phasing in statewide groundwater permitting." Yet the Legislature has not taken any serious steps to establish a more uniform regulatory scheme for groundwater.
B. THE LEGISLATURE TRIED TO REFORM CALIFORNIA'S SURFACE WATER
SYSTEM, BUT IS UNLIKELY TO DISTURB THE STATUS QUO IN
GROUNDWATER.

1. Mounting problems with California's surface water infrastructure
created public outcry
Recent political and ecological events in California forced major
new legislation to address the state's water problems. The problems
have been mounting for decades, and include aging water delivery and
flood protection systems and adverse effects of California's highly artificial water development."
The Legislature did little to address the problems until a series of
lawsuits focused attention on the ecological impact of the state's water
supply system. In particular, NaturalResources Defense Council v. Kempthorne forced the legislature to address the issue." The massive pumps
that take water out of the southern end of the Delta kill fish, and the
unnatural currents the created by the pumping result in other biological impacts."0o The plaintiffs in NRDC v. Kempthorne claimed that federal and state agencies were not doing enough to protect the Delta
ecosystem."o' The judge agreed and ordered severe cutbacks in the
amount of water pumped out of the Delta in order to protect the rapidly declining population of Delta Smelt.'
The pumping slowdowns coincided with a severe drought, compounding a water shortage and causing major interruptions in the water supply for farmers in the Central Valley and municipal users farther south. 03 Some farmers in Fresno County received less than half
of the water they were expecting, causing widespread fallowing of
During the summer of 2009, one economist estimated
farmland."

97. Id. at 21-23.
98. Aquafornia Exclusive: Why the Delta matters to Every Californian,AQUAFORNIA (Sept.
3, 2007, 11:24 PM.), http://aquafornia.com/archives/588.
99. See generally Natural Resources Def. Council v. Kempthorne, No. 1:05-cv-1207
OWW GSA, 2007 WL 4462395 (E.D. Cal., Dec. 14, 2007).

100. Id. at *1.
101. AQUAFORNIA, supra note 98.
102. Id.; Interim Remedial Order Following Summary Judgment and Evidentiary
Hearing, Natural Resources Def. Council v. Kempthorne No. 1:05-cv-01207-OWW-GSA
(E.D. Cal., Dec. 14, 2007), available at
http://www.waterrights.ca.gov/BAYDELTA/docs/pelagicorganism/pod-doi-att-wang
er.pdf.
103. Alana Semuels, DespairFlows as Fields Go Dry and Unemployment Rises, L.A. TIMES,
July 06, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/06/business/fi-drought6; see also
Voices of the Drought,L.A. TIMEsJuly 19, 2009,
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/19/opinion/oe-millerl9.
104. Alana Semuels, DespairFlows as Fields Go Dry and Unemployment Rises, L.A. TIMES,
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that the water shortage would cost the San Joaquin Valley 30,000 jobs
and more than $900 million in lost farm revenue during that year, on
top of the problems associated with the nationwide economic downturn.105 Irrigators reacted strongly to the cuts,' and farmers complained bitterly of having to "compete with fish" for their livelihood. 0 7
2. Government leaders seized an opportunity and passed water reform
legislation
Meanwhile, Sacramento politicians were weary after an unproductive summer. 08 Legislators and Governor Schwarzenegger faced abysmally low approval ratings following a legislative session that failed to
successfully address environmental problems, prison reform, 109 and a
budget mess that required the state to pay its bills in IOUs. o Eager
for any success, the governor called a special session of the Legislature
to fix the Bay-Delta problems. In November 2009, to much fanfare,
the legislature passed a package of six water "reform bills.""
Politicians praised the legislation as a major step toward solving
California's water problems." 2 Among the goals of the legislation were
halting ecological degradation caused by the state's Delta-centered water infrastructure, increasing water conservation, and providing
needed maintenance and updating of the state's water-delivery system." 3
The same day that the package was approved, the Natural Resources Defense Council released a statement lauding the environmental protections in the package, calling it "the most important state
water reform legislation in a quarter-century.""
July 06, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/06/business/fi-drought6; see also
Voices of the Drought, L.A. TIMEs,July 19, 2009,
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/19/opinion/oe-millerl9.
105. Alana Semuels, DespairRows as Fields Go Dry and Unemployment Rises, L.A. TIMES,
July 06, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/06/business/fi-drought6; see also
Voices of the Drought, L.A. TIMES,July 19, 2009,
http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jul/19/opinion/oe-millerl9.
106. News Release, Farmers Lose Water to Fish, San Luis & Delta Mendota Water Authority (Aug. 31, 2007).
107. Semuels, supra note 103.
108. See Kevin Yamamura, Voters' Ire Fails to Fire up Process, SACRAMENTO BEE, July 8,
2009,
http://www.sacbee.com/2009/07/08/2008373/voters-ire-fails-to-fire-upprocess.html (last modified Sept. 7, 2010, 2:23 PM).
109. Kevin Yamamura, et al., Reduced Prison Plan OK'd by Senate, SACRAMENTO BEE,
Sept. 12, 2009, http://www.sacbee.com/2009/09/12/2177558/reduced-prison-planokd-by-senate.html (last modified Sept. 7, 2010, 2:22 PM).
110. Yamamura, supra note 108.
111. David M. Greenwald, "Historic" Water Deal Draws Both Praise and Criticism,
CALIFORNIA PROGREss REPORT, Nov. 5, 2009,
http://www.californiaprogressreport.com/site/node/7062.
112. Id.
113. Richard M. Frank, A New Dawn for the Sacramento-SanJoaquin Delta, Assessing the
2009 CaliforniaDelta/WaterLegislation, 37 ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 17 (2010), available at
http://elq.typepad.com/currents/2010/03/currents37-03-frank-2010-0317.pdf.
114. Press Release, Natural Resources Def. Council, Historic Water Reform Package
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The centerpiece of the reform package was Senate Bill Extraordinary Session.7-1 (SBX7 1), which created the Delta Stewardship Council (DSC). The DSC is the central planning authority for the Bay-Delta
region,"' and will establish a "Delta Plan" to further the "coequal
goals" of a reliable water supply for California and ecological health of
the Delta."' SBX7 1 requires the Delta Plan to outline policies to protect the Delta region's "cultural, historical, recreational, agricultural,
and economic values."' 17 Once the Delta Plan is goes into effect in
2012, state agencies and Delta-area local governments must conform to
the Delta Plan's policies when conducting management activities that
impact the coequal goals." 8
As of spring 2011, the final Delta Plan is currently being drafted.' 19
The second draft of the plan, released on March 18, 2011, outlines
several objectives to be accomplished by the year 2100. The coequal
goals are paramount, with most of the plan devoted to restoring the
Delta ecosystem and ensuring a more reliable water supply.'" The
draft plan also addresses long-term water efficiency, infrastructure improvements, and the Delta region's economy.
The draft plan does, in fact, address the state's groundwater, calling attention to the current lack of knowledge about groundwater
The drafters of the Delta Plan acknowledge the interrelationuse.'
ship between groundwater and surface water,'12 and they call for sustainable groundwater management.2 2 The draft plan recommends
that the SWRCB assert regulatory control over groundwater .if local
agencies fail to sustainably manage groundwater supplies. "Groundwater and surface water are part of the same system," the recommendation explains, "and failure to integrate management of groundwater
and surface water makes it difficult, if not impossible, to achieve the
coequal goals." 25
The legislation limits DSC's authority primarily to the Delta region, 26 although the DSC may "identify actions to be taken" in other
4,
2009),
(Nov.
Legislature
California
Passes
http://www.nrdc.org/media/2009/091104.asp.
115. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 85200, 85204 (West 2011); Frank, supra note 113.
116. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 85300, 85054.
117. Id. § 85301.
118. Id. §§ 85225, 85057.5.
COUNCIL,
STEWARDSHIP
DELTA
Plan,
Delta
119. See
http://www.deltacouncil.ca.gov/delta-plan (last visited May 10, 2011). The plan will
go through several revisions and public comment periods before it is approved by the
DSC in November 2011.
120. DELTA STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, SECOND DRAFr DELTA PLAN (2011), available at
http://www.deltacouncil.ca.gov/sites/default/files/documents/files/SecondDraftSt
afLf DeltaPlan_2011 03_18.pdf.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 3, 30.
123. Id. at 3.
124. Id. at 4.
125. Id. at 32.
126. CAL. WATER CODE § 85302 (West 2011).
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regions to reduce flood risks within the Delta.'
The DSC may also
"recommend ecosystem projects" in other regions to further the
plan's goals,"1 8 and it may work with other state agencies on highway
and energy projects that affect the Delta.12 9
These authorizations are subject to a variety of interpretations, and
it is unclear how important they will be in the final Delta Plan. The
DSC, interpreting various provisions of the Delta Reform Act, asserts
that its planning vision encompasses "statewide water issues."o30 As a
result, the DSC has established a "secondary planning area" that includes the entire Delta watershed as well as areas that use the Delta's
water; this secondary area includes most of California.'
On April 11, 2011, representatives of fifty-nine organizations representing water agencies, city utilities, business and industry groups, and
agriculture organizations. released a letter addressed to the DSC criticizing the draft plan. 3 2 The letter accuses the DSC of an "overreaching regulatory approach" extending to a variety of regulatory areas, including groundwater, beyond the DSC's physical jurisdiction of the
Delta region.' 33
Nevertheless, based on the early drafts of the Delta Plan, it is clear
that DSC's focus over the next century extends beyond the Delta to the
whole of the statewide water system, including groundwater. SBX7 1
also creates a new state agency to protect Delta resources, and a watermaster to oversee SWRCB policies in the Delta.'34
. The second bill in the package, SBX7 2, authorizes an $11.14 billion bond to fund a variety of projects including ecological restoration
and infrastructure repairs and upgrades.'
The Legislature originally
scheduled the bond to go before the voters for approval in November
2010.1" However, the bond was doomed to fail in that election due to
voter skepticism of the water projects and general debt fatigue, so
Governor Schwarzenegger made a last minute decision to postpone
the bond election until 2012.13
Another bill, SBX7 7, mandates water conservation for urban and
industrial water users,' and SBX7 8 expands reporting requirements
127. Id. § 85307.
128. Id. §85302.
129. Id. § 85307.
130. DELTA STEWARDSHIP COUNCIL, supranote 120 at 4.
131. Id. at 4-5.
132. News release, Placer County Water Agency, Water Leaders "Gravely Concerned"
About Draft Delta Plan (Apr. 11, 2011), availableat
http://www.pcwa.net/level3/pdf/news-releases/041111%20Water%20Leaders%2OCo
neerned%20About%2ODelta%2OWater%20Plan-L.pdf.
133. Id.at4.
134. Frank, supra note 113.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Wyatt Buchannan, LegislatureDelays WaterBond to 2012 Ballot, SFGATE.cOM, Aug.
10, 2010, http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-08-10/bay-area/22212323_1_water-bondbond-measure-reservoirs-and-other-water-storage.
138. Frank, supranote 113.
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for surface water diverters and increases the number of enforcement
staff at the SWRCB." 9
Out of the five bills, the Legislature dedicated one specifically to
groundwater. This bill, SBX7 6, establishes the California Statewide
This program enGroundwater Monitoring program (CASGEM).'
courages counties or other local agencies overlying groundwater basins
to conduct groundwater elevation monitoring programs.14 1 Agencies
that elect to establish monitoring programs must begin monitoring
and providing data to the Department of Water Resources (DWR) by
January 1, 2012.142 The bill also allows the creation of special entities,
called "voluntary cooperative groundwater monitoring associations,"
to conduct the monitoring in lieu of a county government or other enWhere no agency or association steps forward to conduct the
tity.'
program for a particular groundwater basin, the legislation authorizes
the DWR itself to conduct monitoring programs in those areas.4 As
an incentive for local agencies to conduct the monitoring, the bill cuts
off some grants and loans in areas where the DWR is left to monitor
groundwater elevation.'
3. The Legislature's treatment of groundwater is disappointing to
proponents of water law integration
The overall reform package received some positive, if cautious, reviews from legal observers.14 6 One review noted that "[w] hile California's water legislation may only amount to modest reform, its new
agencies and authorities have a tremendous opportunity to build on
existing efforts and help ... to improve the Delta and its ecology." 147
Other reviews criticized the legislation as rushed and laden with
pork-barrel spending,' and for establishing more bureaucratic layers
without real power to solve problems.m

139.
140.

Id.
California Statewide GroundwaterElevation Monitoring(CASGEM), DEP'T OF WATER
(last modified May 4,
RESOURCES, http://www.water.ca.gov/groundwater/casgem/
2011). The CASGEM bill, 2009 CAL. LEGIS. SERv. 7TH Ex. SESS. CH. 1 (S.B. 6) (WEST),
was codified as CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10920-36 (West 2011).
141. See CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10920-21, 10933.7 (West 2011)..
142. Id. § 10932.
143. Id. § 10935.
144. Id. § 10933.5.
145. Id. § 10933.7.
146. See, e.g., Frank, supra note 113; Christian L. Marsh & Peter S. Prows, California's
New Water Legislation: A Bucket of Reform or But a Drop?, 25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T
37.
147. Frank, supra note 113.
148. Christian L. Marsh, Peter S. Prows, California'sNew Water Legislation: A Bucket of
Reform or But a Drop?. 25 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 37 (2010).
149. Matt Weiser, Water Reform Without the Teeth, CAUFORNIA WATER IMPACT NETWORK,
Nov. 15, 2009, 9:12 PM, http://www.c-win.org/news/water-reform-without-teeth.html;
Editorial, Water Reform Legislation Leaves Doubts About Delta Protection, OAKLAND
TRIBUNE, Sept. 6, 2009, http://www.insidebayarea.com/archive-search (search "Water Reform Legislation Leaves Doubts").
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To those calling for state-level groundwater regulation, the reform
package represents a missed opportunity.'
Although the DSC has its
sights set on an overhaul of the state's water infrastructure and advocates integration of groundwater and surface water management, it
does so on a hundred-year timeline. The initial drafts of the plan only
recommend increasing groundwater monitoring efforts, but this recommendation is moot as monitoring is separately required by the
CASGEM bill.
CASGEM is one of the "most modest components" of the water reform package.'"' Although CASGEM marginally increases the state's
involvement in groundwater, the program does not change the direction of California's groundwater management for two reasons. First,
the program will give hydrologists and policymakers a clearer picture
of statewide groundwater use patterns. However, scientists have been
aware for many years that California's groundwater is being depleted precipitously in some areas.'
CASGEM gives policymakers a more
complete and precise picture of where groundwater depletion is most
severe and the specific rates of change over time. But, a clearer view of
the already discouraging picture is not likely to spur any dramatic
change.
Second, CASGEM increases the level of state's cooperation with local agencies' 3 and continues to incentivize local, rather than state-level
management. 54 This entrenches the status quo rather than uprooting
it. Local agencies remain the front-line water managers, with substantial authority to structure their monitoring programs as they see fit.
Under CASGEM, the state remains an advisor and still does not have
the authority to require groundwater permitting or other water management measures.
Groundwater remains a significant water source for many areas of
the state,'5 5 and continuing groundwater overdraft has serious conse150. Peter Gleick, "And During the Wet Years They Lost All Memory of the Dry Years," S.F.
CHRON.,
July
11,
2010,
5:11
PM,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/blogs/gleick/detail?entry_id=67621; Editorial, State Can't Wait 27 More Years to Fix
A Broken System and Save the Delta, SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 20, 2009, at Al2.
151. Frank, supra note 113, at 23.
152. In the San Joaquin Valley near Mendota, California, the ground surface fell
29.6 feet between 1925 and 1977 due to groundwater overdraft. A well-known photograph showing this subsidence is reproduced in GILBERT L. BERTOLDI, RICHARD H.
JOHNSON, & K.D. EVENSON, GROUND WATER IN THE CENTRAL VALLEY, CALIFORNIA - A
SUMMARYREPORT, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, PAPER 1401-A at A32-A33 (1991). For more
information on the severity of overdraft problems, see J.S. Famiglietti, et al., Satellites
Measure Recent Rates of GroundwaterDepletion in California'sCentral Valley, 38 GEOPHYSICAL
RESEARCH LETTERS L03403 at 4 (2011); Gayle Rousey, Comment, Groundwater: Uniform
Controlof a Criticaland Limited Resource, 15 SANJOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REv. 169, 177 (2006).
153. See CAL. WATER CODE § 10931 (West 2011) (mandating that the DWR cooperate
with local agencies in collecting elevation information, and allowing the DWR to recommend improvements to local monitoring plans).
154. Langridge, supra note 34, at 313.
155. Taylor, supra note 87, at 6-7; see S. Zektser, et al., Environmental Impacts of
Groundwater Overdraft: Selected Case Studies in the Southwestern United States, 47 ENV'TL.
GEOLOGY 396, 396 (2005).
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quences, including increased pumping costs, land subsidence,
groundwater contamination, and environmental impacts.'5 6 Pressure
on groundwater supplies will intensify due to increasing regulation of
surface water, population growth, and the predicted effects of climate
change.'57 Local groundwater management is sufficient to stave off political crisis but, according to most commentators, it does not serve
ecological sustainability or legal efficiency. 58
Yet, due to political opposition, the California Legislature is not
likely to pursue wholesale reform of its groundwater regime.'" Central Valley farmers are particularly powerful opponents, both politically
The California Farm Bureau opposed the
and economically.'
CASGEM legislation, fearing a slippery slope of monitoring leading to
regulation.' 6 ' One of the organization's water analysts stated firmly
that "[g]roundwater is not a public trust," but is private property attached to the overlying land.'"' Local government leaders in farming
communities speak in similar terms: the Siskiyou County Board of Supervisors recently issued a statement saying that state regulation of
groundwater would be an "attack on agriculture" and that existing
groundwater rights are protected by the Takings Clause of the U.S.
Constitution."'
The Westlands Water District (WWD) is the state's largest water
district and provides water to more than 600,000 acres of farmland in
the southern Central Valley." The district has faced massive cuts in its
surface water allocation, forcing farmers in the area to rely increasingly
on groundwater.6 5 WWD's manager said that although it would cooperate with groundwater monitoring projects, WWD "would be opposed
156. BULLETIN 118, supra note 8, at 29, 96-100.
157. Famiglietti, supra note 152, at 1, 4.
158. See, e.g., HUNDLEY, supra note 13, at 534-38; Langridge, supra note 34, at 329;
Sax, supra, note 37, at 271; Rousey, supra note 152, at 191-92; Peter Gleick, supra note

150.
159. See Langridge, supra note 34, at 320-21, 324.
160. See, e.g., HUNDLEY, supra note 13, at 530-31; Hank -Shaw, Legislation to Measure
Aquifer Faces Opposition, STOCKTON RECORD (Feb. 19, 2007), available at
Introhttp://sccounty0l.co.santa-cruz.ca.us/eh/WaterResources/070307%20H1.pdf;
ductory Message from the Board of Directors, FAMILIES PROTECTING THE VALLEY,
(last
http://www.familiesprotectingthevalley.com/IntroductoryMessage-i-63-63.html
visited Apr. 4, 2011) (stating that the goal of this organization of farmers is to protect
Central Valley surface and ground water supplies "against appropriation by government agencies or private entities and the elitist position that they have needs superior
to ours.").
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Statement of the Siskiyou County Board of Supervisors (Feb. 27, 2010), available at
http://baydelta.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/state-

mentoftheboard-ofsupervisors_07-27_10final-doc.pdf.
164. Who We Are, WESTLANDS WATER DISTRICT,
2
http://www.westlandswater.org/wwd/aboutwwd/aboutwwd.asp?title=Who% 0We%20
Are&cwide=1366 (last visited Apr. 28, 2011).
165. Felicity Barringer, Rising Calls to Regulate California Groundwater,N.Y. TIMES, May
13, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/14/science/earth/14aquifer.html.
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to the control of groundwater by a state agency."'6
Despite its long-term goals, the DSC currently has no authority to
regulate groundwater outside of the Delta; nor do other state agencies.
Indeed, without strong outside pressure, the Legislature is not likely to
provide any state agency with that authority. In the summer of 2009,
State Senator Pavley, commenting on the "hard fight" she expected
just over the CASGEM, said that "[d] ealing with climate change is easy
compared to this."'"6
Public outcry over the results of lawsuits spurred the Legislature to
take significant action on California's surface water issues. There is
widespread opposition to further state control over groundwater, so
the Legislature will not act on its own to solve the problems. As was
the case with the Bay-Delta reform litigation, change in the groundwater arena is likely to come through judicial pressure.
IV. ENVIRONMENTALISTS HAVE TURNED TO THE COURTS AS AGENTS OF
GROUNDWATER REFORM
A. THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE HAS EMERGED AS A VALUABLE
LITIGATION TOOL

As was the case with the Bay-Delta reform legislation, change in
groundwater law will come from the courts. Litigation is playing an
increasing role in California public policy, especially in the environmental arena.'" State government has been successful in advancing its
own climate change policies through litigation, sometimes in partnership with other states and private environmental organizations. 69 In
the realm of water policy, however, the state remains on the defensive
against attacks from environmental groups.' The success of NRDC v.
Kempthorne and related cases in forcing changes to the California's surface water management encouraged similar efforts with groundwater. 7 1
Central to this trend of litigation is growing use of the Public Trust
doctrine (PTD) in American environmental law. The ancient doctrine
reserved certain property such as highways, rivers, seashore to public
uses like navigation and fishing, and prevented their alienation by the

166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Richard M. Frank, California and the Future of Environmental Law and Policy, 35
ECOLOGY L. CuRRENTs 62, 66 (2008).
169. Id.
170. See, e.g., Cal. Water Impact Network v. Cal. State Water Resource Control Bd.,
filed in Sacramento County Superior Court, Sept. 3, 2010 (No. 34-2010-80000653);
Envtl. L. Found. v. State Water Resource Control Bd., filed in Sacramento County Suavailable at
23,
2010
(No.
34-2010-80000583),
perior
Court, June
https://services.saccourt.com/PublicDMS/Search.aspx (search using case number).
171. Envtl. L. Found. v. State Water Resource Control Bd., filed in Sacramento
County Superior Court, June 23, 2010 (No. 34-2010-80000583), available at
https://services.saccourt.com/PublicDMS/Search.aspx (search using case number).
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Crown.' 7 As adopted in American law, the PTD's traditional and
"quite narrow" use was to make state governments trustees of the
shores of oceans, lakes, and navigable waterways.
Modern use of the PTD is connected with Joseph Sax's 1970 article
The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention.17 1 In this article, Sax reviewed nearly a century's worth of litigation based on public trust ideas. 7 1 Sax argued that the PTD was the
most appropriate theory that would allow private challenges to government action in a time of increasing ecological awareness.'75 Sax's
1971 article and related work, 7 1 thus revived the ancient doctrine and
dramatically re-defined the PTD. 17
As Sax pointed out, public trust principles, with or without the
PTD label, played a role in courtrooms for many years before 1971."7
Several notable cases applied "extended" PTD ideas in the years surrounding Sax's article.' 79 One example Sax noted was Defenders of
Florissant v. Park Land Co.' 8 In that 1969 decision, now hailed as a
groundbreaking application of the PTD,18 a citizen group won a temporary injunction prohibiting a real estate development company from
building a subdivision on a paleontologically significant site west of
Colorado Springs. Congiess quashed the developer's plans shortly after the injunction by passing legislation to preserve the land as the
Florissant Fossil Beds National Monument.18
Environmental advocates quickly latched onto the "new" PTD,ss
172. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in NaturalResource Law: Effective Judicial
Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 475-76, 556 (1970).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 491-545.
175. Id. at 556-57.
176. E.g., Joseph L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrinefrom Its Historical Shackles
14 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 185 (1980).
177. Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, BERKLEY ELECTRONIC
PRESS, at 1 (2003), available at http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss4/art8/.
178. Sax, supranote 172, at 491-545.
179. See, e.g., Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 404 (1971)
(abrogated by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977)) ("The growing public concern
about the quality of our natural environment has prompted Congress in recent years
to enact legislation designed to curb the accelerating destruction of our country's
natural beauty."); Borough of Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 294 A.2d
47, 54 (1972) (protecting recreation on a public beach under the PTD and commenting that the PTD "should not be considered fixed or static, but should be molded and
extended to meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to benefit."); Gould v. Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966) (protecting
public parkland from development as a ski resort).
180. Discussed in Flint Hills Tallgrass Prairie Heritage Found., v. Scottish Power,
PLC, No. 05-1025-JTM, 2005 WL 427503, *3 (D. Kan. Feb. 22, 2005).
181. Jim Burnett, Anniversary of Landmark Environmental Law Case at FlorissantFossil
TRAVELLER,
PARKS
NATIONAL
Monument,
Beds
National
http://www.nationalparkstraveler.com/2009/09/anniversary-landmark4
environmental-law-case-florissant-fossil-beds-national-monument 519 (last accessed
Sept. 8, 2009).
182. See id.; Pub. L. No. 91-60, 83 Stat. 101, 102 (1969).
183. An interesting case that explicitly used the "public, trust" language is Commonwealth v. Nat'l Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, Inc., 311 A.2d 588 (Pa. 1973). In 1971, Art. 1,

394

WATER LAWREVIEW

Volume 14

and have used the PTD as a litigation tool with increasing frequency

since the 1970s.184
In 1971, the California Supreme Court held that the public trust
extended beyond its traditional boundaries and included "lands in
their natural state . .. as ecological units for scientific study, as open
space, [as wildlife habitat], and which favorably affect the scenery and
climate of the area."185
The touchstone PTD case in California water law is National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County.'" Under state-issued permits, the City of Los Angeles was diverting virtually all the water from
the surface streams draining into Mono Lake drainage.'
Mono Lake,
the state's second largest lake, is a unique ecosystem, supporting brine
shrimp and large flocks of migrating birds.' Los Angeles's diversions
caused the lake's water volume to steadily decline, and the increasing
salinity damaged the shrimp population."' As the birds depended on
the shrimp as a food source, the bird population also suffered.'9 0 Falling water levels also reduced the bird population by creating peninsulas out of some of the islands, exposing breeding birds to terrestrial
predators.' 9 ' The court remarked that "both the scenic beauty and the
ecological values of Mono Lake are imperiled" by the water diversions. "
"Attempting to integrate the teachings and values of both the public trust and the appropriative water rights system," the court held that
§ 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution codified the people's "right to clean air, pure
water, and to the preservation of the natural scenic, historic, and esthetic values of the
environment" and charged the Commonwealth with their conservation "for the benefit of all the people." Gettysburg Battlefield Tower held that the constitutional provision
stated only a general principle that could not be enforced without implementing legislation. Nat'1 Gettysburg Battlefield Tower, 311 A.2d at 594-95. Due process and equal protection concerns were of paramount importance to the majority opinion. Id. at 595.
An emphatic dissent argued that the Constitutional provision created a public trust
that the Commonwealth was obligated to protect, and another justice objected that
the Commonwealth possessed "inherent sovereign power to protect and preserve" the
natural environment as parens patriae "or as trustee of the state's public resources."
Id. at 595-96. For contrasting cases that point to the Pennsylvania's judiciary's quick
acceptance of the PTD, see, e.g., Payne v. Kassab, 312 A.2d 86 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973),
affd, 361 A.2d 263 (Pa. 1976). Three years after GettysburgBattlefield Tower, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Payne v. Kassab declared that for Art. 1 § 27, "[n]o implementing legislation is needed to... establish these relationships [between the Commonwealth, as guardian of the public trust, and the people]." Payne, 312 A.2d at 272.
The court then applied a balancing test of the constitutional public trust obligation
with other constitutional and statutory obligations. Id. at 273.
184. See, e.g., Felice Pace, The Public Trust Makes a Comeback in California,THE RANGE
(Sept. 10, 2010, 9:45 AM), http://www.hcn.org/blogs/range/the-public-trust-makes-acomeback-in-california.
185. Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971).
186. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y v. Sup. Court of Alpine Cty., 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983).
187. Id. at 711.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
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water allocation decisions must take into account public trust resources, and that the state must "attempt, so far as feasible, to avoid or
minimize any harm to these interests."'" Most upsetting to the state's
water rights regime, the court ruled that the state has authority to
In other words, it
modify existing rights to protect the public trust.'
is not possible for an appropriative right that harms a public trust resource to vest, because the allocation can always be reconsidered in
light of changing ecological conditions and values.
The City of Los Angeles recognized the significance of National
Audubon and the upsetting effect it could have on water law throughSupported by California water districts and the states
out the West.'
of Wyoming and Idaho", the city appealed the decision to the United
States Supreme Court, which denied certiorari.1
National Audubon was a monumental expansion of the PTD. Despite a delay in implementing the decision,"' National Audubon firmly
established the PTD as a powerful influence in California environmental litigation. Along with the rise of the PTD, the legal legitimization of the "use" of the water by the Mono Lake ecosystem brought
"ecological use" to the table alongside urban and agricultural water
use... Both developments represented victories for environmentalists
and the start of what continues to be major factors in California water
law and politics.
Audubon applied to surface water diversions that affect public trust
resources, but California courts have never specifically addressed
whether the PTD protects public trust resources from the effects of
groundwater pumping.200 The plaintiffs in the ongoing Environmental
Law Foundationv. State Water Resource Control Board case want to change
that.

193. Id. at 7 1 2.
194. Id.
195. HUNDLEY, supra note 13, at 344.
196. Id.
197. Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Nat'l Audubon Soc'y, 464 U.S. 977
(1983).
198. National Audubon only required consideration of the public trust, not an outright halt to water diversions. It took the decision of California Trout, Inc. v. State Water
Res. Control Bd., 255 Cal. Rptr. 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), to actually order a reduction
in to actually order a reduction in Los Angeles's water diversions. The controversy
continued until 1994 when the city and the Mono Lake Committee finally agreed to a
plan for Los Angeles's permanent reduction in water diversions from the Mono Lake
ecosystem. HUNDLEY, supra note 13, at 341-347.
199. See, e.g., CAL. LEGISLATIVE ANALYST'S OFFICE, supra note 11, Peter Gleick, supra
note 11, at 23-26.
200. Dan Bacher, Fishermen, Conservationists Sue to Protect Scott River, INDYBAY.ORG,
AM),
9:23
2010,
25,
(June
http://www.ihdybay.org/newsitems/2010/06/25/18651849.php.
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B. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOUNDATION V. SWRCB COULD FORCE THE
STATE TO CONTROL GROUNDWATER UNDER THE PUBLIC TRUST
DOCTRINE
The Scott River flows for fifty-eight miles through the Klamath
Mountains in Northern California.o' Cattle ranching and dairying
and the associated hay production, dominate the Scott Valley's economy,"' while nearby mountains are devoted to wilderness and commercial forestry. 20s The Scott River is one of four major tributaries to
the Klamath River, with flow patterns typical of many California rivers:
the highest flows occur January through May and the lowest flows occur in late summer. 204 Historical flow averages also reflect high variability, with a high of 1,081,013 acre-feet flowing in water year 1974
and a low of 54,106 acre-feet flowing in 1977.205 Several factors have
caused base flows in the Scott River to decline since the late 1970s.206
These factors include surface diversions, changing vegetation conditions, stream channel aggradation, and increased groundwater pumping in the Scott Valley.207
The state recognizes the interconnectedness of the area's groundwater and the Scott River. 20 s The California Water Code declares that
"it is necessary to include interconnected ground waters in any determination of the rights to the water of the Scott River as a foundation
for a fair and effective judgment of such rights." 20" This is the only instance in which the Legislature has recognized the interconnectedness
of surface and ground water. Hydrologists and legal scholars might
cheer this legislative recognition of the scientific reality but for the
stubborn insistence that the Scott River is somehow unique: Cal. Water
Code § 2500.5(b) specifies that "it is necessary that the provisions of
this section apply to the Scott River only." 20
California groundwater law is thus at odds with science and, under
§ 2500.5, it is also at odds with itself. Environmental advocates, perhaps discouraged by the legislative inaction, have grabbed hold of the
Scott River as a tool to bring about change in groundwater law."
Environmental Law Foundation v. State Water Resource Control Board,
201. THOMAS HARTER & RYAN HINES, UNIV. OF CAL., DAvIs, Scorr VALLEY COMMUNTIY
GROUNDWATER STUDY PLAN 18 (Feb. 11, 2008), available at
http://groundwater.ucdavis.edu/Publications/GWStudy-Plan-2008-02-1 1-H.pdf.
202. Id. at 12.
203. Id. at 17.
204. Id. at 18.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 19.
207. Id. at 20.
208. Id.at 24.
209. CAL. WATER CODE § 2500.5(b) (West 2011).
210. Id.
211. Press Release, Pac. Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's Ass'ns et al., Fishing and Conservation Groups Sue over Poor Water Management of Northern California's Scott
River, (June 24, 2010), available at
http://www.envirolaw.org/documents/ScottRiverPTDSuit-PR.pdf.
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currently before the Sacramento County Court,212 is the first volley of
what will undoubtedly be a long series of battles in California courtrooms to force the state to take greater control of groundwater resources. In this case, the Environmental Law Foundation (ELF) has
joined with salmon fishermen to sue the State Water Resource Control
Board (SWRCB) and Siskiyou County, challenging groundwater manGroundwater pumping near
agement practices in the Scott Valley.'
but
the river is regulated under a1980 SWRCB adjudication,'
groundwater pumping extraction 500 feet or more from the river remains unregulated save for an initial well drilling permit issued by the
County." The petitioners claim that the state and county's regulatory
inaction drives agricultural demand for groundwater," 6 lowering the
water table in the Scott Valley, draining the river, and damaging the
river's overall health. As a result, petitioners allege, fish populations
have been imperiled. 1 Particularly damaging to the petitioning fishermen is the declining ocean populations of Pacific salmon, which reproduce in inland streams such as the Scott River.21s State and federal
Endangered Species Act (ESA) provisions, intended to protect the declining salmon populations, further harm the fishermen by limiting
harvests or completely closing large areas to salmon fishing.219 Respondents argue that reduced salmon populations, and the related
ESA restrictions, are caused by the state and county's failure to manage
the groundwater supplies in in a way that preserves the river's ecological health.22 o
The petitioners do not rely on the simplest legal theory available:
the adjudication and permits violate Code § 2500.5 by not accounting
for groundwater withdrawal's effect on the Scott River. Rather, revealing their broader aspirations, the petitioners bypass Code § 2500.5 and
rely on the Public Trust Doctrine as set forth in National Audubon."'
The petitioners claim that the SWRCB has failed to protect "groundwater with a hydrological connection to public trust waters in the Scott
River Valley."222 Against the County, the petitioners claim that the
County failed to consider the ecological impact on the Scott River
212. Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Envtl. L. Found. v. State Water Resource Control Bd., filed in Sacramento County Superior Court, June 23, 2010 (No. 34-201080000583), available at https://services.saccourt.com/PublicDMS/Search.aspx (search
using case number).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Press Release, supranote 211.
217. First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandamus at 2, Envtl. L. Found. v. State
Water Resource Control Bd., filed in Sacramento County Superior Court, Oct. 15,
at
available
34-2010-80000583),
(No.
2010
https://services.saccourt.com/PublicDMS/Search.aspx (search using case number).
218. HARTER & HINES, supra note 201, at 33-35.
219. First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supranote 217, at 2-3.
220. Id. at 2.
221. Id. at 6, 8.
222. Id. at 9.
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when issuing groundwater extraction permits and failed to continually
monitor ecological impacts and revise its water management policies
in order to protect the public trust resources of the Scott River."
The petitioners originally alleged that the SWRCB and the County
have "identical and concurrent duties" to protect public trust resources."' Petitioners later amended their complaint and softened
their stance by alleging that the government has "authority" to protect
the public trust,2 25 although the amended complaint retains the
stronger language when alleging that the groundwater permits as issued were "contrary to [the County's] duties under the Public Trust
Doctrine. "226
Petitioners seek injunctions preventing Siskiyou County from permitting well drilling beyond the adjudication's boundaries until the
County manages the water in a manner consistent with its public trust
obligations. 2 More importantly, petitioners seek a court order declaring the public trust to extend to all groundwater "hydrologically connected to navigable surface flows" currently protected by the PTD."2
A ruling in favor of the petitioners would reverberate throughout
California water law. The issuance of injunctions would give substance
to the Legislature's recognition of the hydrological reality that all water in the Scott River basin is interconnected, not just the water within
the arbitrary adjudication boundaries.
Regardless of the outcome of the Scott River case, more PTD suits
for other groundwater basins are likely to be filed. A favorable Scott
River decision would speed up that process and add some legal authority to arguments for state-level management of groundwater.
If courts were to generally extend the Public Trust Doctrine to include groundwater, the SWRCB and local water management agencies
would be forced into the re-evaluation process mandated by National
Audubon. This would lead to water-rights chaos throughout the state
and legislature, or more likely, the California Supreme Court would
finally have to toll the death of the separate legal regimes and integrate ground and surface water regulation. In 2000, the California
Supreme Court indicated that it might be willing to do so: in Barstow v.
Mojave Water Agency, 2 1 Justice Chin wrote that courts should be able to
"reduce to a reasonable level the amount the overlying user takes from
an overdrafted basin. "230
However, the isolated effect of a win for the ELF in the Scott River
case would not result in immediate change. The court could bypass
the PTD theory and rule in favor of the ELF based on the Scott River
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

Id. at 11.
Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 212, at 1.
First Amended Petition for Writ of Mandamus, supra note 217, at 1.
Id. at 1 (emphasis added).
Id. at 13.
Id. at 12.
Barstow v. Mojave Water Agency, 5 P.3d 853 (Cal. 2000).
Id.
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Valley's special status under the California Water Code."' The Scott
River Valley's specific protection under the Code lend more weight to
the environmental balancing of the area's groundwater resources, but
it is not certain to have the same impact on other public trust resources not specifically enumerated. Even if the ELF wins the Scott
River case based on the PTD theory, the legislature's express limitation
of the SWRCB's groundwater authority to the Scott River Valley would
give reluctant courts a reason to limit the application of the PTD in
other areas.
The government might emerge from the Scott River case with a
duty to account for groundwater use under the Public Trust Doctrine,
but this would not necessarily curtail groundwater pumping. In a
January 21 decision, Judge Connolly spoke of "a historical struggle
about the ... proper apportionment of water to serve the obviously
legitimate and important needs of the agricultural community in Siskiyou County versus the public trust or resource broader beneficial
uses."1 2 Judge Connolly emphasized that if the Public Trust included
groundwater, this would not require the surrender of private rights to
the Public Trust, but would only require the government to balance
competing interests. Depending on how each judge views the weight
of the competing interests, this balancing could lead to very different
outcomes in different areas.
The Scott River decision might not even reach that far: Judge
Connelly also pointed . out the confusion in the complaint about
whether the government has the duty or merely the authority to protect the public trust."' Judge Connelly made it clear that at least at
this early stage, he views the case as bearing on the government's "authority" over the public trust resources, and not establishing an obligation to protect those resources." Judicial recognition of the government's authority over groundwater would not compel the government
to control groundwater use; it would simply allow the government to
do so.
At the very least, the potential effects of the Scott River case are not
clear because it is still in the very early stages of litigation. The case is
likely to be long and complicated, and it might develop in unpredictable ways. However, even if the direct effect of the Scott River case is
limited, the case is directing more public attention toward groundwater management.
231. CAL. WATER CODE § 2500.5(b) (West 2011).
232. Order Overruling Respondent Siskiyou County's Demurrer, Ex. A at 64, Envtl.
L. Found. v. State Water Resource Control Bd., filed in Sacramento County Superior
Court, Feb. 3, 2011 (No. 34-2010-80000583), availableat
https://services.saccourt.com/PublicDMS/Search.aspx (search using case number).
233. Judge Connolly remarked, "I am unsure at this point given the arguments and
some of the reference in the pleadings whether they are seeking a declaration that
finds that State Water Resources Control Board has that authority, or in the alternative
[they are] seeking the declaration that says that plus they have the obligation to undertake that task." Id. at Ex. A at 63.
234. Id., Ex. A at 67.
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The PTD is making a "comeback" in California in other ways as
well.' Another ongoing case, filed in September 2010 in Sacramento
County Superior Court, seeks to further curtail water pumping in the
Delta under the PTD.23" The increased interest in the PTD, combined
with heightened public and judicial scrutiny of groundwater management, has the potential to result in a substantial expansion of California's PTD into the realm of groundwater.
CONCLUSION

As potentially important as California's recent PTD cases are, they
will not come as a surprise to PTD scholars. In his article, Sax wrote of
the long historical development leading to the modern PTD.23" His
words resound as prescient when applied to current legal developments in California:
The cases present legal theories which are as diverse as lawyers'
imaginations are fertile . .. This diversity is not merely the product of
variant legal skills and attitudes; it is largely attributable to the enormous disparity in legal standards which govern different resource
problems. Our legal system tends to provide specific and limited responses to particular problems ... [but] a hundred other environmental problems will remain untouched until some dramatic event
mobilizes public opinion and leads to legislative and administrative action. 23

Sax explained that, in the face of inconsistency and inaction from
the Legislature and state agencies, people see the courts as a place to
get things done. 3
Sax's explanation of events leading up to 1971 continues to ring
true in the 21st century. ELF v. SWRCB and related PTD cases in California are incremental steps in the long development of what the PTD
proponents see as the consistent overarching answer to our most urgent and important environmental and social problems.
Whatever the outcome of the case, similar lawsuits will follow that
will seek to leverage the inconsistencies in California's water laws and
the public's increasing awareness of the state's water issues. The DWR
has called groundwater "California's invisible resource,"240 and aside
from being unseen, its importance to the state is largely unappreciated.

235. Pace, supranote 184.
236. Verified Petition for Writ of Administrative Mandate and Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Cal. Water Impact Network v. Cal. State Water Resource Control Bd.,
filed in Sacramento County Superior Court, Sept. 3, 2010 (No. 34-2010-80000653)
court filings available at https://services.saccourt.com/PublicDMS/Search.aspx
(search using case number). The complaint alleges that the the SWRCB has an "affirmative duty" to protect the ecosystem of the Delta, under the PTD and other laws.
237. Sax, supranote 172, at 474.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. BULLErlN 118, supranote 8, at 20.
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In the face of powerful political opposition, the California Legislature has consistently been reluctant to remove control over groundwater from local governments. As the litigation surrounding the ecological problems in the Delta demonstrates, the Legislature does respond
to public anger over court decisions. If this recent history is any guide,
the public's decision-making is more likely than anything else to force
the state to seriously address groundwater management in California.

COLORADO SUPREME COURT EVALUATES
CHANGES IN LOCAL WATER RIGHTS
JAMIE LUCKENBILL
In re the Applicationfor Water Rights of Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation
Co., No. 02CW403 (Colo. Water Div. 1 Sept. 5, 2008) (ordering that
multiple irrigation companies' direct flow and storage rights are
limited to no more than their historic consumptive use following a
change application), appeal pending, Colorado Supreme Court Case
No. 09SA133 ("FRICO case").
OVERVIEW OF THE WATER COURT DECISION

This Colorado Water Court case arose from the consolidation of
two separate change in water right applications, one by Farmers
Reservoir and Irrigation Co. ("FRICO"), Burlington Ditch, Reservoir
and Land Co. ("Burlington"), and Henrylyn Irrigation District
The other case
("Henrylyn") (collectively, "the Companies").
involved applications by FRICO and two sanitation districts, United
Water and Sanitation District and East Cherry Creek Valley Water and
Sanitation District ("ECCV") (collectively with the Companies, the
Applicants). Following consolidation, the change of water rights
analysis focused on the preclusive effects of previous litigation, the
historical consumptive use ("HCU") of the Burlington and FRICO
water rights, proposed limitations on the storage rights, and alterations
to Burlington's point of diversion.
The pertinent water rights involved in the change application
included both Burlington's 1885 direct flow rights for 350 cubic feet
per second ("cfs") and 1885 storage right for 11,081.23 acre feet
("af") as well as FRICO's 1908 and 1909 direct flow and storage rights.
The water court found that FRICO's involvement with the Burlington
system in 1909 expanded Burlington's direct flow water right use. The
Burlington headgate on the South Platte River constituted the original
point of diversion for the Burlington rights. The construction of the
Globeville Flood Control Project, designed to help prevent flooding,
modified the channel of the South Platte River in the area of the
headgate. Additionally, Denver contracted with the Companies in
1968 to build pumps ("Metro Pumps") to bring water back into the
Burlington Canal that the construction of a Denver wastewater
treatment plant then diverted around the headgate. No water court
decree approved either of these as alternate points of diversion.
Among numerous surrounding issues, the water court decreed that
all of the applicants' water rights were absolute and limited by the
HCU, including those rights of the Companies not included in the
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applications.
The applicants claimed that two prior Colorado Water Court cases,
Case No. 54658 and Case. No. 87CW107, precluded the water court
from considering any limitations on the 1885 Burlington right. The
water court found that neither case met two of the four required
elements of issue preclusion, allowing the water court to contemplate
the reduction of the 1885 right. Specifically, the water court stated
that the prior cases did not actually determine the quantity of the
rights, nor did the parties in the prior litigation have a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the 1885 rights quantity.
Regarding the modifications to the point of diversion, the water
court held that the HCU could not include the water transferred into
the Burlington Canal by the Metro Pumps because the Metro Pumps
are an undecreed point of diversion. The water court found it of no
matter that the construction of the pumps intended to ensure that the
wastewater plant would not alter the use of Burlington and FRICO
water rights. Additionally, the water court found that the Globeville
flood control project constituted a change in the point of diversion,
and that the change adversely affected other users. The judge
reasoned that the new point of diversion was 900 feet from the
headgate prior to the project and allowed for the diversion of a greater
volume of water. Thus, the Companies may not divert any more water
than what was available prior to the project's construction.
The water judge further ordered that the HCU shall not include
the seepage of water back into the Burlington and FRICO systems,
reasoning that seepage and return flows are subject to the
appropriation system. This effectively barred reuse of the seepage
water without an additional decree. To subtract the seepage from the
HCU, the court assessed a fifty-three percent conveyance efficiency to
the release of Burlington and FRICO waters. For similar reasons, the
water court also rejected the inclusion of seepage recovered by toe
drain systems installed in the Barr Lake dam to remove seepage from
the structure and place it into the canal. To account for the toe drain
seepage, the water court reduced the HCU by fifteen percent of the
water delivered to shareholders.
I Additionally, the water judge had to decide whether the applicants'
proposed storage rights should be limited by HCU, or whether these
rights should be determined by the amount needed to fill the storage
The water court
facility once each year (the "one-fill" rule).
determined that the actual HCU limits applied, and therefore refused
The water court found that the
to apply the "one-fill" rule.
application of the "one-fill" rule in Westminster v. Church, 445 P.2d 52
(Colo. 1968) was overruled by the Water Right and Determination and
Administration Act of 1969, C.R.S. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (2010). Any
expansion over the HCU would cause injury to other users, thus a
decree could only change the right within HCU limitations.
As a result of these findings, the water court limited the Burlington
1885 right to 200 cfs, 150 cfs lower than the use since 1909. The case
also established that the storage facilities may only be filled according
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to the HCU of the companies, which is only a fraction of the acre-feet
previously available under the "one-fill" rule.
ORAL ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE COLORADO SUPREME COURT

On appeal to the Colorado Supreme Court, the applicants
challenged the water court's decisions regarding the above findings.
Instead of hearing the oral arguments at the Supreme Court's
temporary chambers, the University of Denver Sturm College of Law
("SCOL") hosted the arguments in a large lecture hall. Students and
community members filed into the room anticipating the importance
of the appeal, filling every seat. After a brief introduction from
SCOL's Dean Martin Katz and a briefing on the court rules, the
arguments began with each side rising to outline their time allotments
and participating attorneys.
Attorney Brian Nazarenus rose first on behalf of the appellants in
their attempt to reverse the water court's findings, focusing his
arguments on the water court's rejection of the "one-fill" rule for
storage rights and the court's findings of expansion of use., He
asserted the appellants' position that Colorado law grants an inherent
right without limitation to a storage right holder to fill to. the full level
of the right each year ("one-fill" rule). The Supreme Court justices
interjected with numerous questions throughout Mr. Nazarenus'
arguments, including inquiries regarding HCU as a limitation on
storage rights. Mr. Nazarenus answered each question in turn and
held firm to his argument that historical use should not limit the
diversion flow for a storage right.
William Hillhouse followed Mr. Nazarenus for the applicants. He
argued that the Colorado Water Court's findings in Case No. 87CW107
precluded the water court from re-determining the HCU of the 1885
direct flow right and from excluding the water from the Metro Pumps
in the HCU analysis. Additionally, Hillhouse asserted that the water
court should have respected the earlier case's finding that the HCU
was approximately three acre feet per acre (compared to the water
court's actual finding of only one acre foot per acre). At the
conclusion of Mr. Hillhouse's argument, one justice inquired about
what should be done about Judge Klein of the water court's finding
that No. 87CW107 had not been litigated, and thus could not be issue
preclusive. Mr. Hillhouse emphatically responded, "Judge Klein was
wrong, he thought the whole thing was stipulated, and it wasn't, it was
litigated."
Attorney Steven Sims spoke first for the appellees, explaining that
this is simply a change case, reliant on the specific facts deliberated
upon by the water court in making its decision, and that this decision
should be granted great deference. Mr. Sims pointed out that
FRICO's initial involvement in 1909 greatly expanded the acres served
by the 1885 right, the right's headgate, and the amount of water
diverted from the stream. Mr. Sims further argued that No. 87CW107
and the decree only affected use above Barr Lake and not those rights
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below Barr Lake, which are the rights at issue in this appeal.
Regarding the "one-fill" rule, Mr. Sims asserted that HCU limits
any changes to a storage right. At the time of Westminster v. Church, the
"one-fill" rule was sufficient to prevent injury, but in the present day,
the "one-fill" rule serves only as a minimum check to prevent injury.
If the "one-fill" rule insufficiently prevents injury, however, Mr. Sims
argued that the court must use express volumetric limitations. Finally,
regarding the toe drains, Mr. Sims stated that the applicants attempt to
"double dip" by both including the recovered water in the HCU while
they are already diverting extra water to account for the losses before
recovery.
David Hallford provided the appellees' position regarding the
Metro Pumps dispute. He stated that the "applicants cannot take
credit from an undecreed point of diversion when calculating
historical use of their water rights being changed," regardless of
whether a private agreement had been made with the city of Denver.
Under Mr. Hallford's argument, the applicants should have gone to
the water court to get their alternate point of diversion approved.
John Akolt closed the arguments, focusing the applicants' rebuttal
on the Globeville Flood Control Project. After explaining that the
point of diversion had not been altered by the project, Mr. Akolt
presented the applicants' position: "we ask that the amount of water
that was historically discharged above the ditches ... would be part of
the source of supply that could be called upon, as it was historically, to
meet the demands of the Burlington Canal."
The justices then retired to deliberate, leaving the parties to
anticipate the court's issuance of the opinion several months down the
road. The case will have considerable effects upon all the parties'
water rights, but the appellees and appellants disagree over the
implications for the broader status of water law in Colorado. Steve
Sims for the appellees does not believe that any of the issues involved
are cutting edge or controversial. He explained that this is a simple
water right change case involving parties that have been "diverting
water illegally for years and realizing when applying for a change that
they can't do it. The 'one-fill' rule is just an old-fashioned term and
condition that is no longer effective in preventing injury."
In contrast, the appellants contend that if the Supreme Court
upholds the rejection of the "one-fill" rule, Colorado storage rights
will be extensively limited below the current standard. According to
the appellants, this could even lead storage right holders to wastewater
to increase HCU. However, both sides agree that the amount of
available water is the central issue. Star Waring, attorney for the
appellants, elaborated that while the court's ruling on the "one-fill"
issue will determine how changes in storage rights will be quantified in
Colorado, the primary concern of the parties is that "they want to
protect their vested water rights."
David Dechant, a FRICO shareholder and farmer, echoed these
sentiments: "Engineering figures show that we could lose half of our
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water if we lose on all the issues today. That will directly cut down on
the water flow to my farm." Mr. Sims has concern for his own clients'
water, articulating that if the applicants' change is permitted, "there
would be much less water available to downstream users ... we want
[the applicants] to play by the same rules the rest of us have to play
by."
The Supreme Court justices will have to weigh these concerns in
their ongoing deliberation. The water at issue is vitally important to all
the parties involved, leaving the Colorado Supreme Court in the
difficult position of determining who shall hold the rights to it.

BOOK NOTES
Karen Bakker, Privatizing Water: Governance Failure and the World's
Water Crisis, Cornell University Press, New York (2010); 303 pp;
$24.95; ISBN 978-0-8014-7464-4; paperback.

In Privatizing Water: Governance Failure and the World's Urban Water
Crisis, Karen Bakker presents a historical analysis of why privatization
emerged as an increasingly widespread mode of water supply
management. The author's analysis focuses on the inability of public
approaches to provide an adequate supply of water. In addition,
Privatizing Water investigates the limitations of privatization and puts
forth an alternative framework for addressing water supply problems,
which incorporates a human right to water, community participation,
and ecological governance.
Privatizing Water consists of two parts. Part One, Development,
Urbanization, and the Governance of Thirst, offers a historical analysis of
privatization, including a case study of Jakarta, Indonesia. Part Two,
Beyond Privatization: Debating Alternatives, addresses limitations of
privatization, the partial retreat of private participation in the
management of water supply, and viable alternatives to privatization.
The introduction lays out the current debate over privatization.
Proponents of privatization assert that private companies perform
better, are more efficient, provide more finance, and mobilize higherquality expertise than their government counterparts. Opponents of
privatization argue that government-run water supply systems, when
properly supported and resourced, are more effective, equitable, and
perform just as well as their private-sector counterparts. Moreover,
opponents of privatization often argue that water is a substance
essential for life and human dignity, and therefore, proponents who
wish to profit from water are unethical. The author attempts to
illustrate that both private and public approaches have serious flaws
and that we must reform the dualistic framework of debate in order to
allow for alternative methods of remedying the urban water supply
crisis.
Chapter One, titled Governance Failure, explores the interaction of
three types of water supply governance, which are municipal hydraulic,
State
market environmentalism, and community artisanal.
involvement in the creation and management of water supply
infrastructure characterizes municipal hydraulic. The core of market
environmentalism consists of three processes: the privatization of
resources, the commercialization of environmental management, and
409
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the liberalization of governance. Privatization of resources entails the
transfer of ownership or management of resources to private persons.
Commercialization of environmental management entails the
incorporation of market-oriented institutions, such as rules, norms,
and customs, in resource management. Liberalization of governance
involves the retreat of government from water supply decision-making
through deregulation, devolution, and decentralization.
Finally,
community artisanal involves local labor and participation, and often
exists where formal supply networks are insufficient to meet the needs
of the community, such as in lower- and middle-income countries.
Chapter Two, Material Emblems of Citizenship, presents a historical
on urban water supply, beginning with the
perspective
industrialization of water supply that took place over the course of the
late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The author explains that the
large-scale hydraulic works advanced by development agencies often
produced highly inequitable, indebted, and poorly-functioning water
supply systems because the focus of aid neglected issues of distribution,
management and equity. The author argues that the urban watersupply crisis is in part the result of the application, and mishandling,
of this municipal hydraulic model. The resulting problems were a
central driver for the resurgence of water privatization in the late
twentieth century.
The third chapter, Watering the Thirsty Poor, examines the
expansion of the private sector in urban water supply in the late
twentieth century. The author explains that by the final decades of the
twentieth century the conventional paradigm for managing water, i.e.
the municipal hydraulic paradigm, had begun to attract significant
criticism for its failure to extend the water supply universally.
Governments responded by adopting market environmentalism.
Private sector participation increased throughout the 1990's; however,
during the following decade, market environmentalism began to slow
as private companies began to show an increasing reluctance to
engage in long-term concession contracts. Relatively few cities were
sufficiently large, with adequately developed water supply utilities and
a large enough middle class able to support cost recovery to attract
private sector interest. Private companies chose the more desirable
cities early on. Consequently, private sector participation failed to
achieve some of the key results promised by proponents, and a
consensus developed by the middle of the decade that the role of
private capital in urban infrastructure would be more limited than had
been expected.
The fourth chapter, Citizens without a City, examines the
fragmentation of water supply networks through a case study of
Jakarta, Indonesia. The author suggests that both public and private
providers contributed to the disintegration of water supply access. In
Jakarta, colonial powers implemented a system of unequal access to
the water supply network. The colonial water supply system sought to
provide free water to the Europeans, while deliberately excluding
native residents. The postcolonial governments gave low priority to
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increasing the water supply network, and large tracts of the poorest
areas of the city remained without access altogether. In the mid-1990's
private companies largely took over the management of water supply
in Jakarta. Although they installed new connections, most were
directed toward middle- and upper-income households. The author
explains that this failure to connect poor households undermined the
central justification for involving the private companies.
The fifth chapter, Protesting Privatization, documents the
transnational campaign for a human right to water as an alternative to
privatization. Beginning with protests against privatization in the late
twentieth century, an international movement emerged, bringing
together development-focused aid watchdogs, such as the United
Kingdom's World Development Movement, mainstream international
organizations, such as the World Health Organization and
environmental and consumer groups. A human right to water creates
legal avenues, enabling citizens to use legal means to compel states to
supply basic water needs. There are many difficulties, however, in
successfully implementing a human right to water. Many activities
require water, such as food production and preparation, industrial
production, and environmental protection, and therefore, addressing
these broader issues requires a flexible definition. Furthermore, the
author notes that there is a potential problem with enforcement.
International law is likely to treat a human right to water as soft law,
easily trumped by the hard law requirements of bilateral trade and
investment treaties.
Soft international law is non-binding, and
therefore, governments can decide to voluntarily implement a human
right to water, but international law will not enforce it like a binding
contract. Finally, environmental issues present another source of
concern. Critics view a human right to water as anthropocentric, and
as a result, countries may over-allocate water at the expense of the
environment. Even though it is difficult to define and implement, the
author believes a human right to water is a useful tactic for those
without water to legitimize their struggles and, therefore, it provides a
strategy for creating the context in which people can pursue claims for
social justice.
The sixth chapter, Commons versus Commodities, focuses on the role
of community control of water supplies. Community control often
arises when there are no other means of distributing water to people,
and for this reason it is a valuable institution of water deliverance.
However, the author points out some limitations of communitycontrolled water supplies. Collective ownership often entrenches the
fragmentation of the water supply system through the creation and
support of parallel networks, which leads to the establishment of two
tiers of service with vastly unequal state funding and water quality. In
addition, the establishment of a two-tier system of water supply risks
condoning rather than addressing governance failure. The author
explains that an equitable and universal water supply system requires
community governance as part of a cohesive water management
scheme, rather than community control of a separate water supply
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network.
In the final chapter, Politics and Biopolitics, the author proposes a
This concept views water in
concept of ecological governance.
ecological terms in addition to seeing it as a resource input to water
supply systems. The most widely-promoted alternatives to privatization
- the human right to water and various forms of community watersupply management - address redistributive concerns in economic
and social terms. They overlook, however, important environmental
aspects of the urban water crisis: water scarcity, threats to water quality,
and ecological sustainability. The author argues that policy makers
must take these environmental issues into account in order to
successfully address the urban water crisis. Environmental concerns
are central to the livelihoods of the urban poor because degraded
environmental quality is costly in both health and economic terms.
Ecological governance, therefore, incorporates environmental
concerns to better remedy both the social-economic and the ecological
injustices suffered by the urban poor.
Privatizing Water offers novel insight into the contemporary debate
over urban water supply management. The first part of the book
provides an analysis of the conventional public-versus-private delivery
models and examines the limitations of both models. The second part
of the book puts forth a new framework for examining the urban water
crisis that incorporates a human right to water, community
participation, and ecological governance. The book would be an asset
to policy makers involved in urban water issues and to anyone
interested in water law and environmental justice.
RichardLynch
Aline Baillat, International Trade in Water Rights: The Next Step, IWA
Publishing, London (2010); 242 pp; $142.20; ISBN 978-1-84339361-0; paperback.

Aline Baillat holds a Ph.D. in International Science from the
Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in
Geneva. She developed the thesis for this book during her doctoral
The book explores the
research from 2003 through 2008.
consequences of classifying water as an economic good in domestic
water policies and the subsequent effect on international watercourse
management.
The Introduction discusses the effect of property regimes on
international watercourse management. Baillat states that water is a
multi-property regime resource because multiple users, both public
and private, compete to use watercourses for a multitude of purposes.
Baillat focuses on the question of how to allocate property rights
among competing users, particularly for international watercourses.
She argues that a lack of clearly-defined water rights along
international watercourses could lead to an inequitable distribution of
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water resources. Finally, Baillat lays out her research method and
divides the book into three parts: Water as an Economic Good in Domestic
Water Reforms, Trade in Water and International Water Laur, and MarketBased Solutions alongInternationalWatercourses.
Part One, Water as an Economic Good in Domestic Water Reforms, tracks
the worldwide trend of treating water as an economic good.
Chapter One, The InternationalRecognition of Water as an Economic
Good, discusses the recent trend in watercourse management of
moving away from the historical view of water as a basic human right to
treating water as an economic good. Baillat explains' that this
paradigm shift resulted from a change to demand management
policies. Historically, societies attempted to move water from waterrich areas to places where water was scarce. However, these practices
became overly expensive and damaging to the environment.
Economic models were developed to meet these challenges; however,
the models have failed, due largely to the difficulty of accurately
calculating the cost of water. One example is the calculation of
opportunity cost. Opportunity cost is the value of water at its highest
alternative use. The calculation produces the cost associated with
scarce water resources.
In the water market approach, which places water in a
commodities-type trading system, the introduction of opportunity costs
help to regulate demand and ensure efficient allocation of resources.
The current trend in water market pricing models is to now include
However, challenges exist in determining
opportunity cost.
opportunity cost across different water users, like agricultural and
retail water. Essentially, these disparate users are not comparing the
same product. Therefore, in these cases, policy makers should use the
net marginal benefit calculation (marginal benefits minus marginal
costs) to derive a figure more representative of actual opportunity cost.
Baillat points out that the World Bank seems to endorse opportunity
cost price models, and the leading trend in water markets is toward the
formalization of water rights and the introduction of trading systems.
Chapter Two, Evolution of Water Rights and Domestic Water Reforms,
begins by tracking the evolution of water law through Roman, English,
French, and American courts. Baillat next discusses possible domestic
water reforms, which treat water as an economic good through license
Licensing and pricing policies require a
and permit systems.
comprehensive approach and usually use an advanced administrative
method to fix prices. However, administrative pricing models do not
incorporate opportunity cost, which means the model fails to account
for the scarcity of the resource. International watercourses compound
these challenges. Baillat suggests that policy makers, increasingly, have
presented water markets and tradable water rights as the most
appropriate vehicles in international water reform.
Chapter Three, Water Market Systems, compares characteristics of
water markets throughout the world. A water market is an institutional
design that facilitates the reallocation of water among different uses
through voluntary exchanges between buyers and sellers of water
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rights. Baillat uses the following criteria to characterize and compare
different water markets: (1) issuance of water rights; (2) definition of
water rights; (3) water reduction risk assignment; (4) procedures in
case of a shortage; (5) transfer procedures; (6) environmental
protection; (7) right to return flow; and (8) dispute over water uses.
Baillat concludes that the water reforms implemented by most
countries are insufficient because water resources are not easily
measurable, or controllable. She notes, further, that U.S. policies
treating water as an economic good have been associated with the
inclusion of water resources into the public domain of the state. As
such, policy makers who wish to establish water markets at the
international level would require states to recognize international
watercourses as common property.
Part Two, Trade in Water and InternationalWater Law, focuses on the
principles governing international watercourses and international
trade law's interference with using international watercourses for nonnavigation purposes.
Chapter Four, The Property Regime of International Watercourses,
focuses on identifying the property regime of international
watercourses using existing international water law. Baillat first argues
that international water law is not adequately developed. Specifically,
she explains that not enough countries have ratified the 1997 United
Nations Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of
International Watercourses, the most significant attempt at defining
the property regime of international watercourses.
Further, the
current body of international law has failed to address issues like
priority of use, compensation, and future use. In addition, the
international water agreements that do exist are deficient because they
do not represent all affected riparian states or they lack adequate
enforcement mechanisms.
Baillat next delves into international water transfers by examining
a proposed transfer agreement between Turkey and Israel. If the
countries consummate the agreement, it will be the first international
agreement for the sale of bulk water. Baillat then contrasts the
Lesotho Highlands Water Project, a non-commoditized international
water transfer agreement between the Kingdom of Lesotho and South
Africa. She concludes the chapter by stating that the increasing need
for nations to transport water over large distances at great cost signals
a growing water scarcity and shows that nations have begun treating
water as an economic good. Accordingly, she states that it is prudent
to develop a property regime for international watercourses that
incorporates water rights for all upstream and downstream riparians to
ensure equitable apportionment.
Chapter Five, The Relationship Between International Trade Law and
International Water Law, states that international trade law ("ITL")
conflicts with international water law ("IWL") when a common
property regime for an international watercourse is not established.
International trade law is ill equipped to deal with the nuances of
water transfers because it disregards the complex web of public
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interests associated with natural water, unlike a readily tradable
commodity, which requires no such evaluation. Baillat highlights the
conflicts created when international trade law and international water
law intersect by analyzing water transfer controversies in the Great
Lakes region of the U.S. She first lays the groundwork of international
water law in the region by describing the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty
("BWT"), which established the International Joint Commission
("IJC") to control matters that affect the flow and use of the Great
Lakes. Second, Baillat examines the differing opinions between the
Great Lakes Governors and the IJC on water trade. She notes that the
IJC makes a clear distinction between water in "its natural state" and
water "entered into commerce," but the IJC still fails to make such a
distinction between trade in water and trade in water rights. Finally,
Baillat shows how the 2005 Great Lakes-Saint Lawrence Agreement
and Compact ("2005 Agreement") wrestled control of the Great Lakes
Basin away from the IJC and, in the process, empowered the regional
states and provinces. Baillat concludes that shifting power to the
regional authority was an effective way to avoid potential future
diversions of Great Lakes waters to the United States' Southwest under
the United States' Dormant Commerce Clause.
Baillat emphasizes how the case, Sporhase v. Nebraska, illustrated a
poorly defined property regime that created a conflict between state
and federal public interests. In Sporhase v. Nebraska, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that water is an article of commerce;
however, water's special characteristics exempt it from scrutiny under
the Commerce Clause. Baillat analogizes the holding in Sporhase to
her previous discussion of the 2005 Agreement, concluding that the
2005 Agreement establishes a clear property regime, which vests water
rights in the regional public interest.
Baillat next discusses water rights at the international level in a
case between Texan irrigators and Mexico filed under Chapter 11 of
the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement, concerning the Rio Grande
Basin. Over a period of ten years, Mexico withheld water of which the
Texan irrigators claimed they were investors. At arbitration, the
tribunal decided in favor of Mexico because the Texan irrigators were
not investors in Mexico. Baillat contrasts this case with the Great Lakes
case. The Texas case highlights the many layers of decision-making
and management rules for an international watercourse, which
ultimately led to a poorly constructed property regime. In the Rio
Grande Basin, each country maintained water rights over the water
within its borders, whereas in the Great Lakes Basin, the U.S. and
Canada defined the property regime in favor of the public interest.
Baillat ultimately concludes the chapter by stressing that clearly
defining the property regime for international watercourses is
important to avoid clashes between international water law and
international trade law.
Part Three, Market-Based Solutions along International Watercourses,
presents two domestic water market case studies, the Colorado River
Basin and the Murray-Darling Basin, as bases for applying water
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markets on the international level. Baillat uses domestic case studies
because an international water market does not yet exist.
Chapter Six, Economic Approaches to International Water Disputes,
begins by presenting Franklin M. Fisher's idea that conflict resolution
in Israel and Palestine may be possible by monetizing the water
resources there. Baillat criticizes Fisher's theory for failing to (1)
recognize the substantial effect of agricultural subsidies; (2) address
transactional costs; and (3) provide institutional and regulatory
Baillat recommends a broad property regime be
approaches.
established that includes a common decision making body with a
preference for water use rights instead of ownership rights.
Chapter Seven, ColoradoRiver Basin Case Study, examines what form
an interstate water market in the Rocky Mountain region might take
and discusses the legal, environmental, and social consequences of
such a market. The chapter begins with a description of the Colorado
River Basin and then moves on to discuss the "Law of the River,"
which divides the basin into two sections: the Upper Basin (Colorado,
Wyoming; Utah, and New Mexico) and the Lower Basin (Nevada,
Arizona, and California). The 1922 Colorado Compact, the first water
compact in U.S. history, allocated water equally between the Upper
and Lower Basins. In 1990, the Lower Basin states exceeded their
.water allocation for the first time, which prompted negotiations over
interstate transfers and a water bank. In response, Arizona created the
Arizona Water Banking Authority ("AWBA") to secure Arizona's
unused apportionment of the Colorado River, which it intended to sell
to California and Nevada. The AWBA scheme seemed to contradict
the beneficial use doctrine included in the Law of the River; however,
the federal mandate of Intentionally Created Unused Apportionment
("ICUA"), created after the AWBA under the Secretary of the Interior,
specifically counts water banking as a consumptive use. Further, ICUA
allows the sale of water between states without Federal approval. As
Baillat points out, the ICUA allows beneficial use to now be
interpreted as commercial use, which is far from being widely
accepted.
Next, Baillat discusses the Basin's drought plan and concludes that
the negotiations concerned ownership rights as opposed to authorized
uses. Baillat states that private ownership of unused water on the
Colorado River is evidence of the lack of a common property regime.
In addition, Baillat proposes a more equitable calculation of water
deliveries to Mexico but states that the Bureau of Reclamation's
preferred alternative recommendation is to let Mexico participate in
ICS is a
the Intentionally Created Surplus Program ("ICS").
conservation program that augments water storage in Lake Mead,
allowing different entities to bank credits for later use. ICS can be
created by tributary conservation, importing water into the system, and
through system efficiency. Baillat believes that if Mexico is allowed to
participate in ICS the Colorado River Basin could become the first
international water market. Finally, Baillat states that the ICS program
will provide more flexibility in the management of the Colorado River
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Basin and that ICS credits may become tradable. However, in order
for this market-based scheme to work, Baillat recommends that
Colorado River water be defined as common property and a
permanent decision-making authority be implemented to govern the
entire Basin.
Chapter Eight, Murray-DarlingBasin Case Study, contrasts Australia's
interstate water trading system with that of the Colorado River Basin.
The chapter begins with a description of the Murray-Darling Basin
("MDB"). The most significant accomplishment of the 1915 MurrayDarling Basin Agreement ("1915 Agreement") was establishing a
commission to regulate the flow of the river. The 1915 Agreement,
modified in 1992, brought about significant institutional reforms. In
1994, national reforms incentivized increased interstate competition in
the areas of energy, water, and public works. Thus, water trading
across state lines became a new standard in the MDB.
The Commission created a pilot water trade program, which the
Commission reviewed in 2000. The review noted slow growth of water
trading because of administrative problems and drought. In response
to the National Water Initiative, an attempt to revive the 1994 reforms,
the Commission expanded the pilot program. However, the states
could not agree on a standardized system for interstate trading. The
deadlock resulted in federal intervention through the Water Act of
Under the Act, the Federal government wrestled
2007 ("Act").
management of the MDB away from the states. Baillat found that
excessively-liberal water rights contributed to overuse of water
resources in the MDB. Moreover, establishing a water market did not
bring consumption rates back to sustainable levels.
In fact,
introduction of the water market increased water use. Baillat predicts
the imposition of the Federal government into the MDB will create
uniformity in the system and accelerate trading. Baillat concludes that
the new Federal plan will likely lead to better outcomes than before,
and Australia will remain an interesting vehicle by which to study the
evolution of water markets.
The chapter concludes with an application of the lessons learned
from the comparison of the CRB and MDB to international
watercourses. First, Baillat notes that changing the definition of
previously-allocated water rights in the CRB presents a significant
obstacle to water reform because the 1922 Compact granted many
water rights in perpetuity. Further, the lack of a unified governing
body in the CRB substantially impairs the region's ability to create
cohesive reforms. Conversely, the MDB did not grant water rights in
perpetuity. In addition, the MDB more clearly defined its participants'
water rights and did not face the obstacle of prior appropriation as in
the CRB. However, water markets should not be expected to reduce
consumption. Rather, Baillat states the lesson to draw from the
aforementioned comparison is that policy makers must base interstate
water markets on sustainable, scientific basin plans. Baillat doubts this
lesson could apply to an international watercourse.
The final chapter, Conclusion, asserts that defining the property
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regime around international watercourses is an essential step to
resolving water conflicts. The distinction between trade in water and
trade in water rights is critical. International watercourse governance
requires a common property regime and strong institutional
framework; without these in place, a sustainable water plan is unlikely
to proceed.
InternationalTrade in Water Rights: The Next Step tackles the complex
notion of international watercourse management in a comprehensible
way. Baillat cohesively links the theme of property regime to each
theory she discusses in the book. She argues effectively that water use
rights are better suited as a basis for water markets than ownership
rights. Baillat's case studies of the CRB and MDB ameliorate the
principal weakness of the book, the world's lack of an existing
international water market to study. The book is a must-read for
practitioners in the CRB and MDB and those interested in the future
of international water markets.
Dustin Charapata
The World Economic Forum Water Initiative, Water Security: The
Water-Food-Energy-Climate Nexus, Island Press, Washington D.C.
(2011); 248 pp; $30.00; ISBN: 1597267368; paperback.

The World Economic Forum Water Initiative's Water Security: The
Water-Food-Energy-ClimateNexus ("Water Security") captures the progress
of the call to action, initiated in 2008, by business leaders and the
world's governments to engage in a discussion of the
interconnectedness of water, economic growth, food, energy, climate,
Water Security addresses the global water
and human security.
of collaborative work and debate among
on
years
based
challenge
and
fifty public and private actors, such as
hundred
than
three
more
scientists, and international officials.
heads,
CEOs, water experts, NGO
outlook on the world's water
a
troubled
Water Security provides
water
practices around the world
current
that
stressing
situation,
or else much of the world
two
decades
next
cannot continue for the
human
well being, and national
growth,
may suffer harm to economic
outlook, and case
a
positive
also
offers
security. However, Water Security
forward.
the
way
studies that serve as examples for
The Introduction lays out the basic problem: the world is running
out of water. It also provides an overview of relevant data. For
instance, the author states that global demand for food, water, and
energy will increase due to population growth, economic growth, and
urbanization in the next two decades. By 2030, two-thirds of the
world's population could experience high water stress if current trends
continue. The Introduction also discusses the effects of climate change
on food supplies, employment, and income linked to the agricultural
sector. The Introduction further explains that each of the first stine
chapters provides a forecast and implications of the water crisis if the
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status quo does not change. These chapters also explore options and
solutions for how to overcome the water-shortage challenge, including
perspectives and commentary from leading social, academic, NGO,
and business actors involved in the Forum's Water Initiative and other
related programs. The final three chapters of the book discuss what
policy makers can do to work toward a solution with a focus on
coalition-building between public and private actors that will create
opportunity rather than conflict.
Chapter One, Agriculture, focuses on the water-food nexus. The
author points out that food production is expected to double in the
next forty years, so agriculture must become much more water
efficient. If population growth overshoots planetary limits, a collapse
of natural resources may affect commodity markets and food prices.
Some problematic trends include changes in consumer diets causing a
rise in demand for livestock and milk, cultivation of biofuels as an
alternative to petroleum, and the fact that water withdrawals for
agriculture are already greater than natural replenishment levels. If
there is no improvement in efficient use and management of
agricultural water, then areas of the world may run out of water and,
thus, be unable to provide food to a growing population. The author
suggests improvements in modern agricultural technology, including
engineered crops, attaching a price to water, creating incentives for
farmers, and refocusing crop production towards those locations that
are best suited to grow the world's food.
Chapter Two, Energy, discusses the water-energy nexus. The
productions of natural gas and liquid fuels, as well as the
transformation of raw materials into electricity are water-using
processes. The International Energy Agency predicts that the world
economy will demand at least forty percent more energy by 2030. The
author suggests that the foremost challenge is to meet this growing
energy need without increasing greenhouse gas. emissions while
increasing the efficiency of water use. However, several clean energy
sources use a significant amount of water, including evaporation from
hydropower, irrigation for biofuels, water use required for
concentrated solar thermal plants and nuclear power plants, and
hydraulic fracturing to develop shale gas, which has the potential for
water contamination. If a country switches from dependence on
foreign oil to a dependence on clean energy and, thus, domestic water,
that country will be required to consider water resources as part of its
It is apparent that policy makers cannot
policy considerations.
overlook the connection between energy and water.
Chapter Three, Trade, explores the water-trade relationship. In the
context of increasing demand for food and decreasing supply of water,
trade in food supply will become increasingly important. Trends
suggest that, by 2030, nearly fifty-five percent of the world's population
will rely on food imports because of insufficient domestic water. The
problem is that, based on recent trends, agricultural exports are
decreasing. Moreover,. climate change may reduce agricultural yields
across many countries. Another trend involves land grabs, or water
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grabs, where countries are leasing land elsewhere to grow the crops
they need.
Because of these trends, the author suggests that
relationships between nations will become unilateral rather than
multilateral, and this risks creating a neocolonial system. Finally, Water
Security suggests following the lead of the ancient Aflaj water rights
exchange system, or the more modern ownership systems of northern
Chile, eastern Australia, or the Western U.S. because trading schemes
like these promote efficiency by providing economic value to water.
Chapter Four, National Security, considers national security and
water. Access to freshwater is important for economic growth and to
attract investment and remain competitive in the global market. The
trend towards more wealth across the world will lead to a higher
demand for water. The World Bank predicts that, by 2030, the
number of middle class people in developing countries will be 1.2
billion, which is a 200 percent rise from 2005. As a result, a new
economic world order will evolve. For example, large multinational
companies may begin to relocate away from nations with poorlymanaged water resources. Water-blessed countries such as Brazil,
Canada, Iceland, northern Europe, and Russia could emerge as
powers, analogous to the 2 0 th century geopolitics dominated by the rise
of oil-rich states. While Water Security states that the world will face a
forty percent gap between global water demand and available
freshwater supply by 2030, which will create trans-boundary tensions,
the author suggests that the world does not need to be overly
concerned about water wars. However, Water Security forecasts that
entire states, such as Yemen, could disappear because of failed water
systems if the world does not maintain a sufficient trade system.
The author also forecasts large-scale migration and states that
there are already twenty-five to fifty million climate change and water
refugees. 150 million environmental refugees could exist by 2020.
Water Security suggests that good national and international governance
can address the water scarcity issue. Governments can establish legallyprotected, clearly-defined, and economically-transferrable water rights,
similar to the systems developed in Spain and the western U.S., leading
to greater efficiency.
Chapter Five, Cities, explores the water-urbanization nexus. The
author predicts that the world will experience a nearly nine-fold
increase in urbanization from 1950 to 2050.
Urbanization has
important implications related to water because much of the success of
a city and quality of human life depend on how well a city manages its
water. Much of the poor population in cities in the developing world
relies on water vendors rather than municipal water supply. This
population often pays more money for poorer quality water than the
wealthier populations. Likewise, there are few, if any, wastewater
treatment facilities in these types of cities. Because of the high cost of
urban water and sanitation services, many cities in developing
countries have no choice but to directly discharge untreated
wastewater into water bodies. The author believes this trend will likely
continue and worsen.
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However, with increasing urbanization, there is a large and
growing potential market for urban water and wastewater services.
Water Security suggests that private-sector capital needs to become part
of the developing world's urban water infrastructure market to pay for
the high cost of water and wastewater services because public funds
alone will not do the job. This will lead to a wide range of publicprivate partnerships. If urban areas want to see economic growth, it is
essential for them to have good water quality and an ample, efficient
water supply. There are NGOs and organizations working to develop
methods and regulatory structures for delivery of water and sanitation
services to poor populations.
Chapter Six, People, discusses the relationship between water,
people, health, and livelihoods with a focus on developing countries.
The international community has set a target to improve water
conditions for the world's poor. To meet this goal by 2015, it would
cost the international community approximately $10 billion annually.
Another problem is the aging water infrastructure in many developed
countries. In 2009, there were more illnesses in the U.S. caused by
aging water infrastructure than HINI caused worldwide. There was a
meeting at the United Nations in September of 2010 to assess the
progress of the goals for improved living conditions. The assessment
determined that it is possible to achieve the drinking water goal by
2015. However, the assessment also recognized a number of problems
and concluded that because half the population in developing regions
do not have sanitation the 2015 target appears to be out of reach. The
assessment pointed to the practice of open defecation as the greatest
threat to human health and focused on southern Asia as a key
battleground area. Water Security suggests that meeting the water and
sanitation goals makes economic sense because for every U.S. dollar
spent in the water and sanitation sector, the U.S. saves eight U.S.
dollars. If the international community does not meet its goals, largescale illness caused by poor sanitation in cities could be a political
trigger for change. Public and private investment is necessary to avoid
these problems. The author emphasizes that change is possible and
there are many investment-partnership opportunities out there.
Chapter Seven, Business, and Chapter Eight, Finance, both overlap
to further explore public-private partnerships and investment
opportunities. These chapters discuss the increasing levels of privatesector involvement with the global water challenge. Businesses are
starting to view water as a strategic issue and are becoming part of the
solution, helping to set the wider agenda on water. Business leaders
are becoming aware of water security risks within their companies, and
investors are becoming concerned about how businesses are managing
the water issue. Business is increasing and becoming more profitable
for companies that provide water supply and waste water services.
However, from the perspective of a CEO with operations in a waterstressed country, if water security issues do not improve, there will be
loss of revenue. The company may first react to find platforms that
enable the company to work with others to help support the
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government in water reform processes. If this is unsuccessful,
multinational companies may begin to relocate from countries with
poorly-managed water resources to better-managed countries. On the
other hand, governments that make it a priority to focus on water
policy reform will likely retain and attract companies, attract more
inward investment into water infrastructure, and enjoy a strengthened
economy.
Chapter Eight adds a finance perspective to the above discussion.
Water is a unique commodity with no substitute or alternative, a high
future demand, and low price volatility. Water index and hedge funds
track performance in both the water manufacturing industry and
companies that deliver water and provide wastewater services around
the world. There are numerous new technologies and business models
in the water sector. Many analysts view this sector as an attractive
investment opportunity. Goldman Sachs estimates the total global
market for water services at $400 billion a year. Analysts expect the
desalination market to grow 20 percent annually, or more, in China,
India, Australia, and the U.S. through 2015 and then accelerate. Some
commentators now see water funds as a better investment opportunity
than oil because water prices are less volatile because governments run
the water market. Water Security suggests that it is unlikely that by 2030
water will become a globally tradable commodity because water does
not have a global trading platform of its own.
Chapter Nine, Climate, examines climate change and water. The
author predicts climate change may significantly change the space and
time distribution of water availability and increase the likelihood of
floods, which could trigger migration and conflict. In addition, it will
be difficult for decision-makers to develop any specific adaptation
strategy because there is not enough solid information or climate
change modeling available.
Water Security suggests that the most
important issue facing the world with regard to climate change is water
storage. The most serious water supply-demand imbalance is expected
to occur in much of eastern, southern, central, and western Asia, in
much of Africa, the Middle-East, southern Europe, the American
Southwest, Mexico, the Andean region, and northeastern Brazil. The
author predicts that governments may be pushed to provide additional
entitlements and subsidies related to water to the large, rural,
impoverished population base in developing countries. Water Security
also highlights that the climate change debate is drawing attention to
the water crisis, which is providing a global opportunity to address
water management.
Chapter Ten, New Economic Frameworksfor Decision-Making,discusses
approaches to a comprehensive economic analysis of the water
challenge based on a global study undertaken for the first phase of the
Water Resources Group. The objective of the World Economic
Forum's project is to work closely with several governments to develop
more focused economic fact bases to address the water challenge. The
focus then shifts to how governments can utilize this information to
develop water resource management systems. Once investors have a
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consistent basis' for economically-rational decision-making and
governments have a fact-based vision for water resources, governments
and businesses can make progress toward addressing water
management issues at local and global levels.
Chapter Eleven, Innovative Water Partnerships, focuses on how to
create public-private-community partnerships to make progress
towards addressing the water challenge of water shortage. The chapter
discusses work undertaken between 2006 and 2009 by the first phase of
the World Economic Forum Water Initiative in India, South Africa,
and Jordan. The global water challenge presents the issue of how to
develop public-private partnerships that create opportunity rather
than conflict. To build these multistakeholder coalitions, the project
used a brokerage concept, providing an entity that could facilitate
relations among relevant stakeholders by matching people, resources,
and projects to increase and improve the emerging water initiatives. A
key lesson arising out of the project is the need to develop a common
understanding of the water problem among parties. Water Security
suggests that a long-term approach is required to fulfill the goal of
meeting the needs of multiple water users with fewer water resources
and provides some strategic elements as a basis for action. The World
Economic Forum determined that the combination of using economic
analysis to develop a fact base together with the formation of
mulitstakeholder coalitions that would work with governments could
achieve the goal of a comprehensive water-sector reform process.
The Conclusion summarizes the "Davos Proposition," which
resulted from the 2010 World Economic Forum Annual Meeting. The
Davos Initiative, which generated the Davos Proposition, considered
how to generate dialogue, economic analysis, and coalition-building
and how to provide support to governments to achieve water reform.
The Conclusion provides a viewpoint from Jordan, one of the pilot
governments, and discusses how the Initiative will work. The objective
of the Davos Initiative is to prove that a public-private-expert coalition
working in the context of economic growth strategies can achieve
practical, national water reform. The project will create a new global
entity that will be available to assist governments in developing
improved water strategies.
Water, Security would appeal to an audience in the private water
sector. In addition, the world's governments, especially in water-scarce
regions, stand to benefit from the ideas put forth by the World
Economic Forum Water Initiative and would benefit from reading
Water Security. NGOs, academic institutions, and international law
practitioners could also learn more about how to get involved in water
policy reform around the world by reading Water Security.
Mariel Yarbrough

CONFERENCE REPORTS
THE FIFTY-THIRD ANNUAL CONVENTION OF THE
COLORADO WATER CONGRESS
January 26-28, 2011

Denver, Colorado

CLIMATE AND WATER POLICY: WHEN IS THE RIGHT TIME TO
ADJUST COURSE?

This session focused on adapting water policy to meet the needs of
population growth, economy, diverse human values, and climate
change. Engineers and policy makers who were influential during
Australia's recent water crisis highlighted some of the challenges
Colorado may face due to climate change.
Marc Waage from Denver Water began the session by explaining
that climate change is happening, but it is unclear at what rate or how
high temperatures will reach. Based on current models showing the
evaporative effect of warming temperatures, Denver could expect a
significant supply gap by 2050. To plan for a multitude of scenarios,
Denver Water uses a modeling formula that projects present, nearterm, and long-term scenarios against a variety of future uncertainties.
Waage also discussed possible solutions, which include new supply
development, efficiency, reducing population growth, and reducing
agricultural transfers.
The next speaker, Mark Pascoe from the International Water
Centre in Queensland, Australia, stated that Australia's climate
models, like Denver's, also show a supply gap in 2056. Pascoe talked
about Urban Heat Island Effect, which shows a city's interior is, on
average, four degrees hotter than the outer edges. He suggests
keeping water in the cities to produce a cooling effect and using cities
as supply catchments because Australian cities are capable of collecting
as much water as they consume.
Mark Pifher from Aurora Water spoke next about the need for
regulatory schemes to adapt to an environment with higher
temperatures and less water. Increased temperatures will affect the
biological integrity of watercourses because cool water species will die.
In addition, future reduced flow and increased temperatures will affect
chemical integrity by increasing salinity and lowering dissolved oxygen
content. Thus, the regulatory scheme for effluent limitations will have
to adapt and consider low flow averages to be the norm instead of the
exception.' Some organizations, like the Association of Metropolitan
Water Agencies, have recognized that new institutional structures may
be necessary to handle the challenges presented by climate change.
425
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Although the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) recognized in
its 2010-2011 Key Action Update that regulatory programs might
require modification due to climate change, the EPA has yet to
communicate a clear policy that adapts the regulatory scheme to
climate change. Pifher concluded by stating that regulatory reforms
must adapt to reflect reality because the consequence of inaction is too
great.
Scott Ashby, a policy-maker from Adelaide, Australia, spoke last
about the challenges of water management during Australia's recent
drought. Ashby began by stating that analysts have historically based
water management policy on average flows, but with the reality of
climate change, these policies will need to adjust to take account of
extreme flow variation. He spoke about the difficulty of reaching an
agreement between states concerning water rights in the MurrayDarling Basin, a situation geographically and hydrologically similar to
the Colorado Basin. In a last ditch effort to prevent Adelaide from
running out of water at the height of the drought, the city resorted to
developing a desalinization plant.
At the end of the session, the speakers fielded questions from the
audience. The audience directed many of the questions at Ashby and
Pascoe regarding the government's reaction during the drought.
Dustin Charapata
TAKING CARE OF BUSINESS: BUILDING AND MAINTAINING OUR

WATER INFRASTRUCTURE
Peter Binney of Merrick & Co. moderated the panel. He began
the session by discussing the deterioration of America's water
infrastructure and the need for billions of dollars in improvements to
bring it back up to modern standards. He noted that users' cost of
water service will have to go up or the level of service will fall.
The first panelist, David Downie, general manager for the
Department of Sustainability and Environment in Victoria, Australia,
began with background information about Victoria. He explained that
in Victoria, the public owns utilities, including water, but there is
Downie emphasized the community
ample private participation.
involvement in the utilities-business-plans, and that the overriding
policy goal is to have users pay the full cost of their services, which
includes infrastructure building and repair. He noted that it was a
challenge to explain to users that prices must be set in terms of
infrastructure. Their cost of service needed to reflect the costs
involved in capturing and transporting the water, not just the cost of
the water itself.
The second panelist, Peter Sutherland, Business Leader - Water
Resources for GHD in Sydney, Australia, presented a slide show
entitled: Taking Care of Business: The Searchfor Water Security in Australia.
Sutherland reiterated Downie's point that, as the cost of water and the
necessary infrastructure continues to increase, users should expect to
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pay more, particularly after a drought or flood. He explained that
global climate change would cause Australia's already unpredictable
climate to undergo greater extremes. He stressed that diversity in
sources of supply was necessary in order to ensure that the country will
have sufficient water in both times of drought and times of flood.
Sutherland suggested supply alternatives, including surface water,
recycling, desalinization, rainwater tanks, managed aquifers, and ruralurban trade. He analyzed public perception in terms of these sources
and concluded that, while different cities have different strategies, they
are all looking forward and preparing for their future water needs.
The third panelist, Mike Brod of the Colorado Water Resources
and Power Development Authority (Authority), spoke about the
funding available to water and wastewater utilities in the state of
Colorado. He explained the process by which communities apply for
loans from the Authority, which includes presenting an approved
water conservation plan. Colorado cities, towns, counties, water
districts, and water and sanitation districts are all eligible to apply for
loans. Brod then talked about the three main types of loan programs:
drinking water, wastewater, and small hydropower. He concluded by
commenting on points made by the first two speakers and discussed
some similarities and differences between Australian and American
water policy.
The final panelist, Tim Freehan of the Colorado Water
Conservation Board (CWCB), showed a slide show entitled: Meeting
Colorado's Future Water Needs: CWCB's Loan Program. He discussed the

seven sections within the CWCB and each section's role in operations
and planning. Freehan then spoke about projects in both the loan
and grants programs and what funding was available. He noted that,
due to the current economic climate, funding is not as readily
available as it once was, but the CWCB still has enough money to make
loans to qualifying applicants.
The session ended with a few questions from audience members
about price setting and water recycling in Australia.
Leigh Auerbach
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THE TWENTIETH ANNUAL ROCKY MOUNTAIN LAND
USE INSTITUTE CONFERENCE
Denver, Colorado

March 3-4, 2011

WATER: BEYOND DAMS AND DIVERSIONS
[A Panel Session Sponsored by the University of Denver Water Law
Review]
As moderator for the panel discussion, Peter Pollock of the
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy posed the question of how we get
beyond the current. solutions to water management and land use in
the West when there is such a poor link between the two. Water
conservation, new technology, and integrated planning will have to
offset the need for new water supply and diversion projects in the
future.
Tom Romero, professor at the University of Denver, Sturm College
of Law, spoke first about the effects that racial and social inequality
have on water planning. Romero explained that, as Denver expanded,
the city moved from a largely white to a multi-racial city. Many
minority groups concentrated closer to the city and the Caucasian
population concentrated largely outside the city. The housing
industry also enforced racially-discriminatory covenants until Shelley v.
Kraemer, the Supreme Court decision in 1948. Romero described that
this led to minority groups living in older homes with poor
infrastructure. Denver's "blue line" limit on water delivery fueled
preexisting anger due to educational desegregation between the city
and suburban populations. Romero concluded that there is a need to
understand the relationship between racial segregation and social
inequality in water development. He argued that, when approaching
water planning, color-consciousness, rather than color-blindness will
produce the most equitable and beneficial results.
From the Center for Natural Resources and Environmental Policy
at the University of Montana, Sarah Bates discussed assured-supply
laws. The common practice of states requiring assurance of a secure
water supply for new development is almost universal in the West but
not common in the rest of the United States. The key goals of basic
assured-supply laws are consumer protection, secured predevelopment funding for infrastructure, and environmental
protection.
Colorado's basic "show me" law, for example, started as a
subdivision law to assure a quality and quantity of water capable of
servicing the subdivision. Bates explained that this gave a great deal of
discretion to developers to decide what was adequate. Another
problem with the existing assured-supply laws is that they vary widely.
from state to state. Many states do not define what is adequate. Some
states also have a threshold of fifty or more units allowing
circumvention of the regulation for smaller developments.
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Despite the shortcomings of current assured-supply laws, Bates
maintained that they do encourage better protection of homeowners,
higher quality planning, and incentives to reduce water demand. If
regulation expands assured-supply laws that are not accurate enough,
increased costs for homebuyers and false assurances of the water
supply may result. However, the distinct areas for improvement are
applying the regulations to all developments and addressing possible
limitations on sprawl. Bates stressed that assured-supply laws are not
the only way to approach water use issues but they can strengthen
comprehensive community plans in a number of ways.
Peter Mayer, Vice President of Aquacraft, presented on the
potential for water conservation to meet the West's water demand.
The 1.2 million acre-feet per year demand currently in Colorado is
expected to increase to anywhere from 1.7 to 2.1 by 2050. Mayer
predicted that the natural replacement of conservation fixtures would
only have a passive savings of roughly 150,000 acre-feet per year.
Mayer's suggestion to make up for the large gap in increased water
demand is to pursue water conservation because it is the easiest, least
expensive way to use already-existing water sources.
Mayer suggested four conservation best practices developed by
Colorado Water Wise: metering all users, developing a rate structure,
repairing utilities' water leakage, and increasing public information
and educational campaigns. By implementing these strategies, Mayer
projected a high potential for savings of 615,000 acre-feet per-year.
Conservation cannot be the only solution to increased water demands
in the West, but it can be a significant contributor to stabilizing the
problem.
Finally, Mayer suggested that the use of a water budget can be very
effective, especially when implemented with a rate structure. Mayer
stated that the use of a water budget can be the ultimate meeting of
land use planning and water conservation. A water budget, whether
generous or conservative, gives the customer vital information to help
conserve wherever possible.
Next, Abigail Holmquist, Professional Engineer and Recycled
Water Program Manager for Denver Water, discussed water reuse from
the municipal perspective. Holmquist explained that the United
States only reuses five to six percent of the thirty-five billion gallons of
reusable wastewater effluent per day. Therefore, there are abundant
potential applications for this effluent in municipal, industrial, and
private drain water settings.
Holmquist explored several local reuse trends throughout the
Rocky Mountain region. Arizona, for example, is pursuing a program
where they will inject effluent into the ground to recharge
groundwater levels. Policy considerations will ultimately drive the
development of reuse projects in the future. Holmquist noted that the
benefits of water reuse will become more recognizable because water
reuse lessens the load on the drinking water system, delays the need
for new drinking water supplies, and is reliable and consistent.
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Finally, Jim Holway, Director of Western Lands and Communities
Program at the Sonoran Institute, wrapped up the discussion with an
overview of water use in the West. Holway defined the driving forces
that will be important in the future: population growth, climate
change, increasing demands for energy, agriculture, and maintaining
the natural environment. The problem in the West, described by
Holway, is that the location of water is almost certainly in a different
place than the demand for that water.
Holway contends that water managers must embrace and plan for
uncertainty in this new era. The twenty to thirty year planning
horizons are not enough; plans need to encompass long horizons and
include many people with different backgrounds to reach the most
comprehensive plan. This concept, Holway described, comes down to
democratization. He maintained that local governments wield too
much when there should be wider-ranging state standards.
Water infrastructure is very important because it shapes growth
patterns of communities. Holway concluded that there should be a
comprehensive management plan for water infrastructure that
includes system optimization of groundwater, surface water, and
effluent use that all comes together under one cohesive plan.
Joseph Norris

WATER IAW REVIEW 2011 SYMPOSIUM: A VISION FOR
THE FUTURE: BALANCING POPULATION GROWTH WITH
INCREASING WATER DEMAND
Denver, Colorado

April 15, 2011

NEEDS AND DEMANDS: WHAT DOES THE FUTURE

REALLY LOOK LIKE?

Jacob Bornstein, program manager at the Colorado Water
Conservation Board (CWCB), presented the first session of the day on
possible solutions to Colorado's growing water demands.
Bornstein began his presentation with the following questions:
* How many of you drink tap water, shower, or do laundry?
* How many of you enjoy skiing and other amenities of the
state?
* How many of you come from farming or ranging
communities?
* How many of you consume Colorado beef, lamb, produce,
and wine?
The purpose of his exercise was to illustrate that water is not just
about politics but that it is personal. Because each one of us uses water
each day in so many different ways, water is personal and, therefore,
contentious.
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Bornstein then discussed the, role of CWCB in addressing
Colorado's water demands. First, he stated that Colorado faces
significant and immediate water challenges. Bornstein noted that
Colorado expects its population to double within the next forty years,
which may result in a significant transfer of water out of the state's
agricultural communities in order to satisfy urban needs.
This,
Bornstein asserted, would not be acceptable, and Colorado, therefore,
needs to implement a mix of strategies concurrently to ensure
adequate water supply. Next, Bornstein gave an overview on how the
CWCB identifies Colorado's water needs. The CWCB works with the
nine basin roundtables to define Colorado's consumptive and nonconsumptive water needs. Bornstein explained that consumptive
needs include water uses for agricultural, municipal, and industrial
Non-consumptive needs refer to environmental and
needs.
recreational needs. The roundtables also look at water availability, as
well as projects and methods implemented to meet the identified
needs.
As part of CWCB's efforts to address Colorado's water demands, it
developed the Statewide Water Supply Initiative 2010 Mission
Statement (SWSI 2010). The mission of SWSI 2010 is to meet
Colorado's water management objectives by implementing a mix of
This includes local water projects and
solutions concurrently.
processes, conservation, reuse, agricultural transfers, and the
development of new 'water supplies to ensure adequate water for
Colorado citizens.
Next, Bornstein shared some key findings from SWSI 2010. First,
the report identified 33,000 miles of streams and lakes that have
important environmental and recreational attributes, such as
endangered species, that the basin roundtables deemed important to
protect. The report also showed that only one-third of the 33,000
miles of focus areas has some sort of project and method to protect the
attributes. In addition, the CWCB ran statistical analysis to determine
the types of attributes that are protected by these projects. Because of
these findings, the CWCB worked with government agencies and nonprofit organizations to add to the list of seven hundred projects and
methods already in place.
Bornstein then discussed two impacts that the projected
population growth would have on Colorado's agriculture economy.
He noted that by 2050, Colorado could lose 500,000 to 700,000
irrigated acres primarily due to urbanization and urban transfers.
Urbanization results from an increase of communities built on
agriculture lands. Urban transfers result from the purchase of
agricultural water rights and transfer of those rights to municipal water
use for Colorado's population. An increase in population would,
therefore, result in a decrease of agriculture. Bornstein elaborated on
this concern and noted that half of Colorado's population growth
results from an increase in births over deaths. He mentioned that
some studies have recommended increasing education and job
opportunities as a way to slow population growth because a healthy
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economy generally results in fewer children.
Finally, Bornstein . talked about the relationship between
Colorado's population and its water demands. First, he noted that
between the year 2000 and 2010, the statewide water usage rate
decreased by 18 percent. The reason and permanence of this
phenomenon are unknown. He then stated that Colorado currently
uses 1.1 million-acre feet per year (afy) of water for its municipalities
and industries. By 2050, Colorado will need an additional 600,000 to
one million afy of new water. Bornstein concluded his presentation
with four solutions that, in his opinion, would best help prevent dire
consequences in the State of Colorado. He proposed the following:
agriculture transfers, new supply water development, both active and
passive conservation methods, and implementing local water projects
and processes.
JessicaLin

SOURCES OF WATER: WHERE WILL OUR WATER COME FROM AND
How ARE WE GOING TO HARNESS IT?

Eric Kuhn, Colorado Water Conservation District general
manager, and Eric Wilkinson, Northern Colorado Water Conservancy
District general manager, discussed the future of water supply and
demand in the Colorado River Basin, including the past and present
multi-state planning efforts and roundtables, possible new water supply
sources, and inherent uncertainties with an emphasis on Coloradospecific issues. Both speakers encouraged statewide plans because the
majority of scientific studies agree that supply is decreasing, while on
the demand side, the population in Colorado is expected to double in
the next forty years.
The speakers stressed that the major problem in Colorado is
getting the available water to the population. Both speakers pointed
out that eighty percent of Colorado's water is located west of the
continental divide, while eighty-five percent of the population resides
east of that line. In the Colorado River Basin, ninety percent of the
natural flow occurs above 9,000 feet in the mountainous regions of
Colorado. Further, almost all of the water comes from only five
percent of the drainage area. Therefore, efficient use, transportation,
and storage are important issues.
Eric Kuhn first discussed the history of the Colorado Compact of
1937 (Compact) and its implications on Colorado's future water
availability. The Compact formed a non-state agency to deal with the
allocation problems in the Colorado River Basin and split the affected
states into upper and lower divisions. Wyoming, Colorado, New
Mexico, and Utah form the upper division, and Nevada, California,
and Arizona form the lower division. These states agreed to negotiate
with each other for the following reasons. On the one hand, the
upper division states were expanding more slowly and did not want the
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interstate application of the prior appropriation doctrine to allow the
lower states to acquire a majority of the water rights. On the other
hand, lower division states sought approval for building large-scale
water projects, namely the Hoover Dam. The Compact was reasonably
clear on the protection of existing water rights, but other provisions
that guarantee the lower basin states and Mexico a minimum flow of
water have a varied interpretation throughout the compact states.
Adding to the uncertainty, no state has attempted to exercise these
rights, which should concern Colorado's water supply planners.
Colorado's remaining Compact entitlement is about half of the
overall water available for upper basin states' consumptive use, which is
approximately 500,000 acre-feet per year. Future demands creating
pressure on this supply include population growth, municipal and
industrial development, oil shale development, and climate change
induced increases; higher temperatures would increase consumption
because more water is required during a longer growing season.
Recent research has focused on the inevitable supply and demand
gap, which shows that Colorado's water supply will only meet one to
two thirds of future water demand. One important element of
reducing this gap is conservation, which includes passive and active
efforts. For passive measures, a consumer who needs to replace a
broken water device, which used old inefficient technology, can.only
buy the new efficient products on the market. Examples of possible
active measures include tiered billing systems or paying residents for
lawn removal.
Current planning will look at the overall amount of available water
to decide the best way the state should utilize it. Specifically, Eric
Wilkinson addressed the history of the Statewide Water Supply
Initiative, which conducts roundtables tasked with identifying a
Colorado plan. After local communities recently recognized these
supply problems, the communities have exchanged their "leave us
alone" attitude to one that embraces a big-picture approach.
Based on these efforts, the initiative prioritized (1) conservation,
(2) Identified Projects and Processes (IPP) implementation, and (3)
agricultural transfers. Further, the speakers argued that Colorado
should exhaust all other project opportunities before paying farmers
However, the speakers stated that a
to harvest their water.
continuation of the current trends would lead to a large transfer
outside of agriculture. Because of the time delay in implementation,
the state should implement all IPPs available, including re-use of
water, consumptive use credits, new trans-basin development, and
more development of current resources like the Colorado River.
Finally, even if the State succeeded in a one hundred percent
implementation of IPPs it would only meet half of the supply need in
the future, so the state must encourage conservation efforts and use
In planning project
agricultural transfers as a supplement.
implementation, the state must look at the quality and quantity of
water sources because, for example, Arkansas River water is available in
quantity, but water quality issues make the unit cost of that water far
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more expensive than smaller projects.
With a plan in place, the state can be more confident about their
supply, but at some point of consumption, the risk of running out of
water even with a plan in place becomes too much. Eric Wilkinson
used as an example the historical level of water at Lake Mead, a high
use reservoir, which has gone through draughts and re-fills in the past,
but in the last 15-20 years has experienced a steady decline without any
major re-fills. Even though the upper basin has had wet years the last
six of seven years, the lower basin states' increased use has depleted
most reservoirs. Therefore, all regions should be concerned with what
happens when the next draught reduces runoff and water flows.
In conclusion, both speakers acknowledged that there is not a
simple supply-side solution for the dramatic population increases in
the region. In addition, there are future, unsolved legal issues
regarding curtailment if the upper basin falls below their Compact
obligations, which are vastly different depending on each compact
state's interpretation. Colorado should utilize all the possible statewide
supply options with agricultural transfers as a backup because variable
hydrology and drier years ahead mean a decline in available runoff.
David Baker

TURNING TO GROUNDWATER: AN ENGINEERING PERSPECTIVE

Luke Harris, Daniel Niemela, and Christopher Sanchez, employees
with Bishop-Brogden Associates, Inc., a water-consulting firm based
out of Englewood, Colorado, discussed different classifications and
legal issues concerning groundwater in the Rocky Mountain region
and its effects on the residents of Colorado.
Harris started by explaining the difference in classification of
groundwater between tributary and non-tributary aquifers and how
both can potentially effect the doctrine of prior appropriation. He
also discussed well augmentation plans and their purpose in
administering tributary water wells, as well as how credits, water
storage, and other measures restore future depletions. Harris then
provided an informative legislative background into Colorado
groundwater legislation, explaining how certain statutes helped define
water rights to tributary water and established water permits. He also
covered various provisions that encompassed banking, well fields, and
gravel pits.
Next, Niemela discussed the basic aquifer types found in Colorado
and how the geological features of these different aquifers effect the
flow of groundwater. First, Niemela discussed alluvial aquifers, which
consist of loose sands and gravels and run sub-parallel to streams. He
also noted that, typically, the specific yield of alluvial aquifers is ten to
twenty percent. Due to the large capacity of alluvial aquifers, recharge
plans are effective because a large amount of surface water can be
stored in alluvial aquifers. Second, Niemela talked about sedimentary
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bedrock aquifers, which are comprised of sandstone and can be
hundreds to thousands of feet deep. The specific yield of bedrock
aquifers is typically lower than alluvial aquifers because the sands and
stones in sedimentary bedrock aquifers are more compacted. A
unique aspect of sedimentary bedrock aquifers is that artesian
conditions are likely to be present, meaning that water in the aquifer is
stored under pressure. Niemela also referred to the term "specific
storage," which is the amount of water stored under pressure within an
artesian aquifer.
Not only do these aquifers provide access to
groundwater, but they also have the ability to play a role in surface
water storage.
Aquifer storage recovery is an emerging technology through which
non-tributary aquifers store surface water for later uses. This can be
beneficial because evaporated losses decrease in storage aquifers when
compared to other storage sites, like reservoirs. Key geological factors
of sedimentary bedrock aquifers are dipping beds, faults, and
In addition,
fractures, all of which control groundwater flow.
sedimentary bedrock aquifers have different layering of rocks where
the degree of layering controls the vertical flow of groundwater.
Finally, Niemela spoke about hard rock bedrock aquifers that are
typical tributary aquifers.
The permeability is usually through
fractures, which is also known as secondary permeability. With these
types of aquifers, specific yield is low due to limited groundwater flow
through the fractures. Thus, hard rock bedrock aquifers are unable to
sustain high density well development. Niemela also talked about the
kinds of processes engineers and hydro geologists use in evaluating
users' groundwater resources.
Finally, Sanchez spoke about the various regulatory agencies and
how they have an impact on the development of groundwater supplies.
Sanchez explained that prior appropriation creates an important
safeguard for existing users, but that it also has increased stress on the
system. Sanchez discussed the importance of the Division of Water
Resources, which administers water rights decrees, augmentation
plans, and well permits for exempt, non-exempt, and headgate wells.
Further, Sanchez emphasized that counties also play an important role
through zoning of different residential areas and by coordinating with
the state engineers' office to determine whether water supply is
Sanchez continued by discussing the positives of
sufficient.
He explained that groundwater is usually
groundwater usage.
economically available, drought tolerant, and of good quality due to
the natural filtration by sands and stones contained within aquifers.
Some municipalities actually pump surface water into aquifers because
of the filtration benefits provided by aquifers. Sanchez concluded by
stating that, in the planning stage, it is important to consider the
availability of groundwater, to drill and test for the presence and
quality of the water, and to understand the current regulatory
framework, so one knows what water rights are available.
Joseph Murphy

436

WATER LAW REVIEW

Volume 14

CONSERVATION: RESPONSIBLE PLANNING FOR A BALANCED
FUTURE
Drew Beckwith is the Water Policy Manager with Western Resource
Advocates. His presentation focused on how water conservation is a
powerful solution, which can meet urban water needs. He divided his
presentation into three topics: first, the evolving science of
conservation; second, policy level implementation; and, third, local
In discussing the evolving science of
level implementation.
conservation, he used the Colorado Water Conservation Board
The CWCB, in conjunction with the
(CWCB) as an example.
Statewide Water Initiative, have taken leaps and bounds in the last five
years in water conservation planning.
Water conservation methods are diverse and varied. By prioritizing
their efforts, Agencies can determine the best water conservation
Beckwith illustrated this through a Silo of
methods to use.
prioritization: a graphic of a cylinder divided into four levels. The
bottom level of the cylinder was the foundation of water conservation
activities, which included leak detection, rates, and tracking. These
foundational practices focused on water sources, water transport, and
water consumers. There were three additional levels on top of the
foundational activities that were each divided into three areas. He
identified these as Education, Ongoing Water Programs, and
Ordinances and Regulatory. The advanced tiers of water conservation
all rested on the three foundational practices.
He explained that the CWCB has been successful because they
have integrated their work. To implement these ideas, the CWCB, in
collaboration with Colorado Water Wise, have produced a best
practices manual entitled: The Guidebook of Best Practicesfor Municipal
Water Conservation in Colorado. The manual has provided the best
conservation practices, including the necessary foundational practices
regardless of size, location, and cost. In addition, it has described the
best practices for upper level conservation, how to implement the
practices, what kind of savings to expect, the cost, and local examples
in the state.
This guidebook helped the CWCB to produce The State Wide Water
Supply Initiative of 2010 (SWSI 2010). SWSI 2010 takes the foundation
of technical water conservation analysis and incorporates it into the
statewide study describing how much water Colorado needs in the
future and the strategy to meet that future need.
The water
conservation strategy of SWSI 2010 has high, medium, and low
components. In a high conservation area, it has estimaded a thirtyfour percent reduction in per capita water usage. However, such
reductions will involve a significant amount of effort. Although it is
possible, there will likely be a number of legislative issues and policy
implications.
In the policy realm of water conservation, Western Resource
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Advocates collaborated with Trout Unlimited and the Colorado
Environmental Coalition to release a report called: Fillingthe Gap. This
report talks about the current water supply, the growing demand, and
how Colorado can meet those future needs. The report discusses their
ideas on how to fill the gap. They believe in keeping the waters in the
streams because of all the benefits the state receives from the water.
Using SWSI 2010, they focused on the Front Range counties of the
South Platte Basin, which contains the majority of the population in
Colorado.. Given a medium population growth scenario, there will be,
by 2050, an increase in demand of about 365 thousand-acre-feet of
water. The report talks about how to fill this gap and provides about
200,000 acre-feet in excess of demand needs. Although many people
believe that additional trans basin diversions are the answer to future
water needs, this report shows that water conservation is an answer as
well.
There are many tools for water suppliers to conserve, including
rates, rebates, retrofits, and land-use planning. Moreover, public
Energy
norms are an interesting area for water conservation.
providers have successfully done this through bills that show how
much a customer is using compared to surrounding neighbors. If
Colorado can change the social norms regarding water use, there is
significant potential for accelerating water conservation.
Beckwith concluded by stating that water conservation could help
meet future water needs in Colorado. There are multiple examples of
states in similar situations that have had success through conservation.
There will be similar success in Colorado, as the state implements
programs that focus on continuing water conservation.
Collin Zundel

ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF WATER LAW

John J. Cyran, First Assistant Attorney General for the Water Rights
Unit at the Colorado Office of the Attorney General, presented on
ethical issues pertaining to legal conflicts between past, current, and
future clients in the practice of water law in Colorado.
But first, John Cyran talked about balloons. Cyran analogized river
systems in Colorado to a pressure-filled balloon: a squeeze on one end
will inevitably affect the pressure on the other end. Cyran used this
analogy to show that a water user's application for, or change to a
water right affects other users in a water system. For example, in a
situation where a lawyer's current client, Client A, owns water rights on
River 1, the lawyer may encounter a conflict in representing future
Client B on River 1, or even River 2, in a change application if the
water systems are at all connected.
Throughout his presentation, Cyran referred to CBA Ethics
Opinion 58: Water Rights, Representation of Multiple Clients.
According to Rules of Professional Conduct 1.7(a), a conflict of
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interest exists if (i) the representation of one client will be directly
adverse to another client; or (ii) there is a significant risk that the
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the
lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a former client, or third
person. Cyran, in discussing the CBA Ethics Opinion, focused on the
language "directly adverse" and whether the lawyer's representation
"may be materially limited" by representation of two water users.
Cyran explained that this question must be answered on a case-by-case
basis according to whether the water right will actually be impaired.
At one point, Cyran presented the following scenario: counsel has
a current Client A with water rights on one river, and potential Client
B seeks junior water rights on another river. However, a stream
connects the two water supplies, and there is a senior User C upriver
that is calling water from both rivers via the connected stream. Using
the balloon analogy, Cyran indicated that advising Potential Client B
could result in water use that affects the water rights of current Client
A because squeezing the balloon on potential Client B's end will affect
current Client A. This situation could constitute a conflict under
1.7(a) because the representation of potential Client B could
materially limit the lawyer's responsibilities to current Client A.
Particularly where change cases affect entire divisions (such as
transmountain augmentation plans), the situation becomes even more
complicated. If a potential Client B, a junior water rights holder,
wants to apply for an augmentation plan on the same stream as
current Client A, the lawyer must be concerned with the chance that
the augmentation plan will be executed improperly, effectively
injuring Client A.
Cyran then expanded his geographical range.Because Colorado is
the "Most Compacted State" in America (Colorado has entered into
seven different compacts, or agreements, with surrounding states that
limit water use in order to promote conservation; these agreements
have been codified into state law), removing large amounts of water
from, for example, the Colorado River also has ethical implications as
it pertains to out-of-state water users. Because under its many
compacts Colorado has agreed to draw a limited amount of water from
the Colorado River, increased water use from Colorado water users
could affect the amount of water available to Colorado users in the
future.
Cyran explained that, while there are many ethical pitfalls for
water lawyers when it comes to representing multiple water userclients, there is hope. According to the CBA Ethics Opinion, Cyran
noted that 1.7(b) allows a lawyer to get informed consent from his or
her client if the lawyer believes he or she can still provide diligent
representation. Cyran made clear that when obtaining consent from
potentially conflicting clients, "informed" is the critical word. The
client must understand what he or she is consenting to, particularly
where the water right is located on the same or connected stream as
the new rights applicant or change applicant.
When a lawyer considers whether to take on a new client whose
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water use may affect an existing client, the lawyer must engage in a
fact-specific inquiry. This inquiry must consider all circumstances:
connections on the stream, what the potential client is retaining the
lawyer's services for, and what impact such actions might have on
current clients. After doing so, if the lawyer feels that he or she cannot
provide diligent representation with informed consent, or that taking
on potential Client B will be directly adverse to Current Client A, the
lawyer must decline representation.
Chelsea L. Huffman

AN UPDATE ON THE COLORADO WATER CONGRESS AND CURRENT
WATER LEGISLATION

Doug Kemper, the executive director, former president, and
twenty-one year member of the Colorado Water Congress (CWC),
Mr. Kemper
concluded the symposium with his presentation.
provided a brief historical introduction of the CWC followed by an
overview of its inter-workings. Mr. Kemper explained that the CWC
represents water interests in the state and has existed for fifty-three
years. It was originally created by Democratic Governor of Colorado,
Stephen McNichols, and Republican Attorney General of Colorado,
Duke Dunbar. The goal was to facilitate statewide representation of
water interests. The CWC's 350 members consist of representatives
from law firms, engineering firms, and environmental interest groups.
The members meet twice a year for a conference. The largest
conference is in January, which took place in Australia this year. The
other conference meets. in August. This year, it was in Steamboat
Springs. The CWC has a bicameral legislature of one-hundred
members with sixty-five in the house and thirty-five in the senate.
Members of the CWC form committees. The House Agricultural
Committee or the Senate Agricultural Committee typically hears water
related legislation. The most active committee is the State Affairs
Committee (SAC), which has 190 members. During legislative
sessions, the SAC meets Monday mornings at eight o'clock in the
morning to review, introduce, and take positions on legislation. There
are more than five legislators and between seventy and eighty attorneys
at the Monday meetings. The SAC takes positions on about twenty
bills and tracks about forty bills annually. Thirty to forty bills typically
make adjustments to Colorado water law each year. In the last thirty
years, almost no bill the SAC opposed was signed into law, and about
eighty-five percent of the bills it supports are signed into law.
After an overview of the CWC's infrastructure, Mr. Kemper
discussed some current legislation while guiding the audience through
the Colorado Water Courts website and demonstrating the site's
features. The website provides complete access to all information
without a login or fee. Users can track and read current legislation as
well as listen to audio recordings of discussions of the bills. One
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section of the site contains spreadsheets listing all the current bills and
the various stages of the process each bill was in. Mr. Kemper
discussed four bills. Two bills the SAC opposed dealt with increased
costs to water rights owners (HB-1165) and reduced access to ditches
(HB-1289).
The SAC is tracking two bills as well; one concerns
endangered species of fish (SB-203 or HB-1177) on the Western slope
and the other involves funding for water projects (SB-226).
The presentation took a different tone as Mr. Kemper concluded
his lecture on the CWC and invited his audience to analyze the impact
of water on the society in which they live. He showed drought patterns
and current drought conditions in the continental United States with
Mr. Kemper discussed the greatest
special focus on Colorado.
challenge with water, which is to maintain low water prices for
consumers and sufficient reserves while simultaneously reducing
demand through innovative conservation and accommodating an evergrowing population. This challenge, he explained, was for the next
generation of professionals to solve. And with those words, he opened
the door to the many law students in attendance, and invited them to
play a role in the future of Colorado water.
Sean Carnahan

INTER-BASIN COORDINATION

Ted Kowalski, Chief of the Interstate and Federal Section at the
Colorado Water Conservation Board (CWCB), and Peter Fleming,
General Counsel at the Colorado River Water Conservation District,
discussed coordination among the Colorado River basins.
Kowalski's presentation focused on the interbasin coordination
across state lines and with Mexico. He began by giving an overview of
how various compacts allocated the Colorado River.
First, he
mentioned that the Colorado River Compact of 1922 established the
upper and lower basins. The Boulder Canyon Project Act further
established lower-basin allocations in 1928, while the Upper Colorado
Basin Compact established the upper-basin allocations in 1948. A
treaty with Mexico in 1944 further allocated a portion of the Colorado
River. In sum, the Colorado River allocates up to 17.5 million acre-feet
(maf) of water, with 7.5 maf going to the Upper Basin, 8.5 maf to the
Lower Basin, and 1.5 maf to Mexico. Kowalski mentioned that it is
important to note there is approximately 15 maf of average annual
runoff. Therefore, the Colorado River is over allocated.
Kowalski next discussed the benefits of interstate compacts for
water allocation. First, the compacts could serve Colorado because
negotiated compacts are better than equitable apportionment. He
explained that because downstream states such as California and
Nevada are developing at a faster pace, Colorado would lose out in the
race to appropriate senior water rights based on its development.
Another benefit of negotiated compacts is that they allow states to
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draft the terms, rather than turning the decisions over to the Supreme
Court or special masters. Interstate compacts are also less costly and
require less time to negotiate compared to interstate litigation over
water rights. Finally, interstate compacts can provide certainty for
both upstream and downstream states. Kowalski then highlighted
provisions under Article III of the Colorado River Compact of 1922 in
detail and noted that the Mexican treaty obligation is a potential
source of interstate litigation.
Kowalski went on to talk about recent hydrology and stated that
the period between the years 2000 and 2010 has been the driest
eleven-year period in the one hundred-year historical record. Last
year, Lake Mead dropped to an elevation of 1,082 feet. This is
significant because an elevation of 1,075 feet marks the start of water
shortages in the lower basin. While this creates a lot of concern in
lower basin states, Kowalski noted that it is critical to point out the
situation may not necessarily be a hydrologic driven emergency but an
emergency driven by use and overuse in the lower basin states. He also
stated that of the 8.23 maf released each year, the lower basin states
receives 7.5 maf. However, taking into account evaporation and other
tributary uses, the allocation exceeds 8.23 maf and is closer to 10 or
even 10.5 maf. As a result, it is likely that the elevation at Lake Mead
will continue to drop.
Next, Fleming talked about interbasin coordination within the
state of Colorado. He gave three examples of situations where risk and
-uncertainty in the use of water present opportunities for conflict but
also opportunities for cooperation.
He began with a discussion of the West Slope's mediation with
Denver Water. He noted that several circumstances gave rise to
conflict in this case, especially the pending litigation on Denver's Blue
River System. The Blue River System includes the Dillon Reservoir and
Roberts Tunnel, and the problem stems from the fact that a portion of
Roberts Tunnel remains conditional. Fleming explained that this
means Denver has not used the full capacity of the tunnel and,
therefore, has to file for diligence to show that it is thoroughly
developing that water right. The decree for this water right contains
some conditions. One of the most critical conditions is that Denver
cannot use that water anywhere except in the Denver metropolitan
area. The decree defines the "Denver metropolitan area" as areas that
are reasonably integrated with the city and county of Denver. Fleming
pointed out that the definition is ambiguous at best, and the West
Slope entities and Denver Water have yet to agree on the scope of the
water service area. In addition, while this litigation was pending,
Denver proposed to enlarge its Moffat Project by requesting water
from the Frasier River to be put in the Gross Reservoir. In response, a
large group of the West Slope entities decided to make a joint
proposal to Denver Water. It took one and a half years just to put
together a proposal. The parties have since opted to negotiate with
the assistance of a mediator and have made more progress. Fleming
expects a public roll-out of the agreement at the end of April.
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However, he notes that there would still be a lot of phases to
implement before the agreement can go forward.
Next, Fleming talked about a proposed alternative management
plan for the wild and scenic process in the Upper Colorado River. The
Wild and Scenic Act tasks the Bureau of Land Management (BLM)
with the responsibility to determine land and rivers that are eligible for
designation under the act and are, therefore, entitled to a higher level
of protection. An eligibility report for designation determined that
eighty-five miles of Colorado's rivers are eligible. Fleming noted that if
a BLM suitability analysis finds the rivers to be suitable for protection,
it would begin to implement protective measures for managing these
resources. This creates uncertainty among upstream stakeholders
because they are unsure of the kinds of impacts on their present and
future operations. The uncertainty incentivized these stakeholders to
create the Stakeholder Group Alternative Management Plan. This
plan is currently under way with hopes of obtaining formal approval in
the near future. The goal of the plan is to balance a permanent
protection of resources with certainty for stakeholders, water project
yield, and flexibility for water users. To achieve this balance, the plan
proposed the following: CWCB instream flow, delivery of water to
downstream demands, cooperative measures of water providers, and
creation of resource guides.
Finally, Fleming discussed the Colorado River Compact
Curtailment Water Bank (Curtailment Plan). Fleming explained that
there is tremendous uncertainty surrounding the lower basin states'
possible curtailment of Colorado and other upper basin states' use of
post-compact water rights. The purpose of the curtailment would be
to satisfy the upper basin states' development limitation commitment
under the Colorado River Compact of 1922. Fleming pointed out that
almost all transmountain diversions are post-compact water rights.
Therefore, in the event of a curtailment order, transmountain
diversions would be cut off because they are junior to rights under the
1922 compact. This event would cause significant disruptions to the
economy and daily lives. The goal of the Curtailment Plan is,
therefore, to develop Colorado's remaining compact entitlement while
minimizing risk, avoiding compact curtailment, and preserving
Colorado's pre-compact rights.
JessicaLin

FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.,
130 S.Ct. 2592 (2010) (holding that a state supreme court did not
engage in an unconstitutional taking of littoral property owners' rights
to future accretions by upholding a state decision to restore eroded
beach by filling in submerged land).
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. ("Corporation") was a
nonprofit corporation formed by people. who owned beachfront
property in Destin and Walton County, Florida. The Corporation sued
the Florida Department of Environmental Protection ("Department")
in the Florida District Court of Appeal for the First District ("district
court") to challenge the Department's decision to give permits to a
proposed project that the local government instituted. The district
court reversed and remanded the agency's decision to grant the
permits and certified a question to the Florida Supreme Court, asking
whether the Beach and Shore Preservation Act unconstitutionally
deprived upland owners of littoral rights without just compensation.
The court answered the certified question in the negative and denied
request for rehearing. The United States Supreme Court ("Court")
granted certiorari.
The state of Florida owned the land permanently submerged
beneath navigable waters as well as the foreshore, which was the land
between the low-tide line and the mean high-water line. Accordingly,
the mean high-water line was the ordinary boundary between private
beach front, or littoral property, and state-owned land. Littoral owners
had special rights with regard to the water and the foreshore.
Specifically, littoral owners had right of access to the water, the right to
use the water for certain purposes, the right to an unobstructed view of
the water, and the right to receive accretions and relictions to the
littoral property.
Accretions are additions of sand, sediment, or other deposits to
waterfront land. Relictions are lands once covered by water that
become dry when the water recedes. Both relictions and accretions
occur gradually and imperceptibly. For simplicity, the Court referred
to accretions and relictions collectively as accretions and the process
whereby they occur as accretion. Conversely, an avulsion occurs when
a sudden or perceptible loss or addition to land occurs. The littoral
owner automatically takes title to dry land added to his property by
accretion. However, land added by avulsion continues to belong to
the state. Significantly, when avulsion occurs, adding a new strip of
land to the shore, the littoral owner has no right to subsequent
443
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accretions.
In 1961, the Florida Legislature passed the Beach and Shore
Preservation Act ("Act"), under which a local government could apply
to the Department for funds and permits to restore a beach. When a
project involves placing fill on the state's submerged lands, the state
sets an erosion control line. This line replaces the mean high-water
line as the boundary between privately owned littoral property and
state property. Thus, when accretion to the shore moves the mean
high-water line seaward, the occurrence does not extend the property
of beachfront landowners to that line but remains bounded by the
permanent erosion-control line.
In 2003, the city of Destin and Walton County applied for permits
to restore beach within their jurisdictions. The permits would add
approximately seventy-five feet of sand seaward of the mean high-water
line, to later be designated the erosion control line. The Department
issued a notice of intent to award the permits, and the state approved
the erosion-control line. The Corporation brought an unsuccessful
administrative challenge to the proposed project. Thereafter, the
Department approved the permits. The Corporation challenged that
action and this suit followed.
After granting certiorari, the Court considered whether the Florida
Supreme Court violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution by
permitting the beach restoration project. The Takings Clause bars the
state from taking private property without paying for it regardless of
which branch was the instrument of the taking.
The Court determined that unless the Corporation could show
that its rights to future accretions and to have littoral property touch
the water were superior to Florida's right to fill in its submerged land,
there could be no taking. The Corporation was unable to make that
showing. In examining this issue, the Court relied on two principles of
Florida law. First, the state, as owner of submerged land adjacent to
the littoral property, had the right to fill that land so long as it did not
interfere with the rights of the public and the right of littoral
landowners. Second, if an avulsion exposed previously submerged
land seaward of littoral property, that newly exposed land belonged to
the state even if it interrupted the littoral owner's contact with the
water.
The Court reasoned that Florida law allowed the state to fill in its
own seabed, and Florida law treated the resulting sudden exposure of
previously submerged land as an avulsion. The right to accretions,
therefore, was subordinate to the state's right to fill. Accordingly, the
Florida Supreme Court did not abolish the members' right to future
accretions but merely held that the beach-restoration project did not
implicate the right because the doctrine of avulsion applied.
Subsequently, the Court affirmed the Florida Supreme Court decision.
Molly Callender
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT
Klamath Irrigation District v. United States, 2011 WL 537853 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (holding (1) that further proceedings consistent with a
certified decision from the Oregon Supreme Court are necessary to
ascertain any property interests that farmers and irrigation districts
acquired in Klamath Project water in order to determine whether a
taking occurred, and (2) that courts should consider the impossibility
of performance as a factor to be taken into account under the
sovereign acts doctrine).
The Federal Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau") manages the
Klamath Project, which stores and supplies water for farmers,
irrigation districts, and Federal wildlife refuges in the Klamath River
Basin. As a result of drought conditions, the Bureau withheld delivery
of water to farmers and irrigation districts in order to make water
available for three species of endangered fish. The farmers and
irrigation districts ("Plaintiffs"), who claimed a property right in the
water, brought an action in the United States Court of Federal Claims
("claims court") alleging that the United States took their property in
violation of the Fifth Amendment, and in the alternative, that the
United States breached its contractual obligation to deliver the water.
Regarding the takings claim, the claims court granted the government
summary judgment because Plaintiffs failed to assert a cognizable
property interest in Klamath Project water. With respect to the breach
of contract claim, the claims court found that the sovereign acts
doctrine foreclosed the government's liability to plaintiffs. The claims
court entered judgment in favor of the government and dismissed the
complaint.
Plaintiffs timely appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit ("circuit court"). The circuit court found that
Oregon property law was germane to the question of whether plaintiffs
possessed property rights in the Klamath Project water. Therefore, the
court certified three questions to the Oregon Supreme Court.
The circuit court's first question was whether, under the 1905
statute, the Oregon legislature intend to preclude persons putting the
water to beneficial use from acquiring a property interest in the water
right? The court's answer to this question was no, because after the
final appropriation required by the statute occurred, the United States
was deemed the "appropriator" of the water and thus held the water
in trust for the Plaintiffs, which created a derivative property interest.
The circuit court's second question was whether beneficial use
alone is sufficient to acquire a beneficial or equitable property interest
in a water right to which another person holds legal title. The court
again answered no, because it has previously held that beneficial use is
a necessary, but not sufficient condition for obtaining a property
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interest in a water right held by another person. Whether a property
interest exists also depends on the nature of the relationship between
the appropriator and the user of the water right, as well as any
contractual agreements between them.
The Federal Circuit's third question was, with respect to surface
water rights appropriated under Oregon law prior to February 24,
1909, whether Oregon State law recognized any property interest in
the use of the Klamath Basin water that is not subject to adjudication
The court's answer to this
in the Klamath Basin Adjudication?
question was yes. The court concluded that because water right
adjudication is comprehensive, persons holding derivative rights are
not claimants within the meaning of Oregon statute and need not file
a claim in the water rights adjudication.
Plaintiffs argued that, in light of the Oregon Supreme Court's
answers, the Federal Claims Court decision as to the takings claim was
based on two erroneous rulings: (1) that Plaintiffs did not have a
property interest under Oregon law; and (2) that the 1905 Act
precluded Plaintiffs from acquiring property interests in the water.
Plaintiffs argued that there is no evidence in the record that they
bargained away their vested water rights. In support of this argument
Plaintiffs turned to a statement in the Oregon Supreme Court's answer
to question two that discusses whether Plaintiffs had contractually
given away any of their water rights could not be determined because
the court lacked records of contracts to that affect. Plaintiffs also
argued that the Oregon Supreme Court's answer to the third question
compels the conclusion that the property rights at issue were not
involved in the Adjudication.
The United States argued that by restating the second certified
question and answering it in the negative, the Oregon Supreme Court
rejected the Plaintiffs' arguments on appeal because they were
inconsistent with the three-factor test for property rights advanced by
the Oregon Supreme Court. Therefore, a remand to consider the
three-factor test is inappropriate because the test rests on a theory that
is fundamentally different from the one previously advanced by
Plaintiffs.
The circuit court concluded that the Oregon Supreme Court's
answers to the certified questions warranted further proceedings. The
circuit court did not agree with the United States that Plaintiffs should
be barred from proceeding under the Oregon Supreme Court's threefactor test because Plaintiffs had consistently argued that property
rights to project water arose by operation of Oregon state law.
Further, the Oregon Supreme Court's answer to the third question
made it clear that Plaintiffs may assert property interests in the project
water without adjudicating the claims.
Regarding the takings claims, the circuit court remanded to the
claims court for: (1) determination, based on the Oregon Supreme
Court's answers to the certified questions, of any outstanding property
interest; and (2) determination on the merits of all surviving takings
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claims. In doing so, the circuit court directed the claims court to
proceed by applying the three-factor test articulated by the Oregon
Supreme Court, with special focus on the third factor. It is the
government's burden to show with specificity how the rights of one or
more Plaintiffs have been clarified, redefined, or altered.
As to the breach of contract claims, Plaintiffs argued that the
claims court erred in finding that impossibility of performance is not a
threshold requirement the government must meet when asserting the
sovereign acts defense. The United States responded that the claims
court correctly held that the sovereign acts doctrine provides a
complete defense, and that the ESA compelled the Bureau to reduce
the amount of water delivered to the farmers and irrigation districts.
The court first outlined the two-part test that must be satisfied in
order for the United States to invoke the sovereign acts defense: First,
the court asks whether sovereign act is simply one designed to relieve
the government of its contractual duties, or is it a genuinely public and
general act that only incidentally falls upon the contract? If the act is
sufficiently general and public, the court will next ask whether that act
renders the performance of the act impossible under ordinary
principles of contract law.
The circuit court found that although the claims court did not err
in ruling that the Bureau's withholding of the water was a general and
public act, the claims court failed to undertake the second part of the
sovereign acts doctrine, which implicates the impossibility of
performance component of the sovereign acts defense.
Accordingly, the court remanded the case so that the government
may carry the burden of showing that performance of the contracts at
issue was rendered impossible.
Toby Weiner

STATE COURTS
CALIFORNIA
Sonoma Cnty. Water Coal. v. Sonoma Cnty. Water Agency, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 616 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (holding that a county water
agency's management plan was supported by substantial evidence and
did not need an alternative plan for diverting water under California's
Urban Water Management Planning Act).
California's Urban Water Management Planning Act ("UWMIPA")
required California urban water suppliers to adopt water management
plans every five years. In this case, the Sonoma County Water
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Coalition ("Coalition") challenged the adequacy of the Sonoma
County Water Agency's ("Agency") 2005 Urban Water Management
Plan ("Plan"). The Agency was a wholesaler of water from the Russian
River watershed in Northern California. The Agency served water to
its customers pursuant to an agreement that extended to 2040; the
agreement set the maximum amount the Agency must supply to its
customers. The California Department of Water Resources approved
the Plan.
The Coalition challenged the Plan under the UWMPA,
claiming that: (1) the Agency failed to coordinate with relevant
agencies; (2) the Plan failed to include a proper degree of specificity
in regards to water quality and quantity; and (3) the Plan failed to
consider environmental impacts on endangered, salmonid species.
After hearing the case solely upon the administrative record and the
pleadings, the Sonoma Superior Court ("trial court") held that the
Plan was not supported by substantial evidence and failed to comply
with statutory requirements. The trial court reasoned that the Plan
was invalid because the Agency did not identify alternatives to lessthan-certain assumptions made in the Plan. The Agency appealed to
the California First District Court of Appeal ("appellate court").
The appellate court noted that the Plan relied on certain
assumptions in projecting its water supply. The key assumptions were:
(1) the listing of three salmonid species as threatened or endangered
would not reduce the water supply; (2) the local power company's
federal energy license would not modify the amount of available water;
(3) the Agency would construct facilities described in the Plan; and (4)
the Agency would obtain additional water rights on the Russian River.
The appellate court reviewed the Plan under an abuse of discretion
standard and looked at whether substantial evidence supported the
Agency's decisions. The substantial evidence standard required the
appellate court to defer to reasonable Agency determinations and not
substitute its judgment for that of the Agency. The appellate court
noted that a possible negative outcome was not enough to invalidate a
management plan or to require a contingent water supply plan if
Agency experts thought that outcome was unlikely.
First, the appellate court found that the Plan properly
considered the presence of threatened and endangered salmonid
species listed under the state and federal Endangered Species Act.
The Agency did not expect that the presence of the salmon would
affect the amount of divertable water from the Russian River. The
appellate court held that this conclusion was supported by substantial
evidence because the Agency conducted a Biological Assessment that
indicated structural changes would both protect the salmon and
maintain water flows.
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Second, the Plan also acknowledged that the power company's
energy license could be changed and, thus, impact the amount of
water diverted from the river. However, the Agency assumed the
power company's impact would be unchanged due to the current
energy demand. The appellate court held it was reasonable to assume
diversions would remain uninterrupted similar - to the past one
hundred years.
Third, the appellate court noted that the Plan did not have to
show with certainty that arrangements to expand transmission and
diversion facilities would obtain future approval under the California
Environmental Quality Act. The UWMPA only required the Plan to
describe expected future projects because long-term water planning
The appellate court also
involves expectations, not certainties.
rejected the Coalition's argument that the UWMPA required the
Agency to describe alternatives. It reasoned that implementing an
alternative plan would also require the Agency to describe uncertain
contingencies that may never arise.
Fourth, the appellate court accepted the Agency's conclusion
that the Agency did not expect any water quality deficiencies in the
subsequent twenty-five years. Despite the Coalition's concern that a
nearby city's discharge of wastewater would adversely affect the water
quality, the Agency's experts analyzed the Coalition's concern and
concluded that the wastewater did not present a threat to the water
quality. The appellate court noted that the UWMPA required the
Agency to update its plan every five years, which gave the Agency an
opportunity to respond to any future risks that might materialize in
connection to water quality.
Fifth, the appellate court held that the Plan properly addressed
water conservation. The UWMPA required the Agency to include an
estimate of water savings. The appellate court noted that the Agency's
participation in the California Urban Water Conservation Council
satisfied its conservation requirement because the organization
required a good-faith effort to implement conservation measures.
The final issue was whether the Agency coordinated with the
proper agencies in formulating the Plan. The UWMPA required
coordination with other water suppliers who shared a common source
of water; the appellate court held that the Agency consulted with the
proper agencies. The other agencies identified by the trial court were
not water suppliers that shared a common source, and the UWMPA
did not require consultation with an agency just because it may have
regulatory authority affecting the Agency's resources.
Accordingly, the appellate court reversed and remanded.
Erik Lacayo
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Cal. Farm Bureau Fed'n v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 51 Cal. 4th
421 (2011) (holding that revenue collected from water rights services
was a fee and not a tax and that the state agency did not violate the
Constitutional Supremacy Clause by collecting fees from federal
contractors).
Under Proposition 13, passed in 1978, any tax increases in
California required a two-thirds vote of the state legislature. Until
Proposition 26 passed in 2010, fees were not subject to the two-thirds
requirement. With tax increases a virtual political impossibility, and
California facing a chronic budget crisis, the legislature turned to fees
to offset losses in revenue to the general fund. In 2003, by a simple
majority vote, the legislature passed a law ("2003 law") cutting funding
to the State Water Resources Control Board ("SWRCB") and
instructing SWRCB to replace the revenue through the imposition of
fees on all water rights holders subject to its jurisdiction.
California had a hybrid water rights system of both riparian rights
and prior appropriation. California law grandfathered all existing
riparian rights, pueblo rights, and other appropriative rights in
existence in 1914. These represent about thirty-eight percent of state
waters and were not subject to SWRCB jurisdiction. Most rights
acquired after 1914 were subject to the doctrine of prior appropriation
and to SWRCB jurisdiction. The federal government and Native
Americans hold much of the remaining twenty-two percent of state
waters outside of SWRCB jurisdiction because of sovereign immunity.
Thus, only about forty percent of the waters in the state were subject to
SWRCB jurisdiction and, therefore, the 2003 law fees.
Under the 2003 law, SWRCB would assess an annual fee on water
rights holders and charge additional fees for water rights applications,
change of use applications, and registration of stock ponds, to name a
few. The fee amounts were set based on the operational needs of
SWRCB. SWRCB would no longer receive revenue from the general
fund. In 2003, the SWRCB budgeted 4.4 million dollars for its
operational needs. It determined that it would be unsuccessful in
collecting fees from a significant numbers of parties (approximately
forty percent), so it adjusted its revenue target to 7 million dollars to
offset the likely losses from those parties who fail to pay. Furthermore,
knowing that it could not levy a direct fee on the federal government,
SWRCB assessed fees on private parties contracting with the federal
government.
California Farm Bureau Federation ("Farm Bureau") and multiple
other parties challenged these new fees. These parties represented
persons who contracted with the federal Bureau of Reclamation
("Reclamation") for use of water from the Central Valley Project,
which diverts water for flood control, hydroelectricity, storage, and
wildlife protection. At trial, Farm Bureau argued: (1) the fees were an
illegal tax because it did not receive a two-thirds vote in the legislature;
(2) the fees were unconstitutional, as applied, because only forty
percent of water rights holders were responsible for 100 percent of the
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costs of the water rights program; (3) a fee on water rights amounts to
an illegal tax on real property; (4) the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
Constitution gave sovereign immunity to the federal government from
taxation (and imposition of fees) by states, and this sovereign
immunity extends to private parties who contract with the federal
government; and 5) the fees were unconstitutional as applied because
contractors were responsible for the fees on all federal water despite
only receiving a small proportion of that water.
Both the Superior Court of Sacramento County ("trial court") and
the Third Appellate District of the Court of Appeals ("court of
appeals") held that the fees were not a tax because the amount
reasonably related to agency operating costs and was, therefore,
constitutional. However, the court of appeals ruled that the fees on
federal contractors were unconstitutional because they violated the
sovereign immunity doctrine. The parties appealed the decision to the
California Supreme Court ("court").
The court noted that while it is not always clear what the difference
between a fee and a tax is, there are some important distinctions. In
general, taxes are for revenue collection, while fees cover the cost of
providing a specific benefit or service, or regulatory enforcement. In
addition, taxes are compulsory, whereas fees are optional and there is
no requirement to purchase the service. There may be an actual
benefit to the payers, but that was not a requirement. The amount of
the fee must reasonably relate to the cost of the program for which the
fee is charged. However, the relationship does not have to be exact a fee that produces a surplus in revenue may still be valid so long as
the government does not divert the revenue to the general fund.
The court held that the state legislature did not intend to impose a
tax. In this case, SWRCB held all fee revenue in the Water Rights
Fund, completely separate from the general fund. SWRCB used that
revenue in the Water Rights Fund to completely support its operations
and administrative costs. Therefore, the court held that the fees were
not an illegal tax.
Farm Bureau's second argument challenged the constitutionality
of the fees as applied. While SWRCB provided a benefit to all water
rights holders, only forty percent were subject to its jurisdiction and its
fees. Since SWRCB met 100 percent of its budget needs through fees,
those forty percent of water rights holders ended up paying for 100
percent of the program costs. Hence, Farm Bureau argued that the
fees were unreasonable because they were disproportionate to the
benefit they provided to those forty percent. According to Farm
Bureau, an unreasonable fee was actually a tax. SWRCB countered
that the fee was appropriate because about ninety-five percent of the
program costs related to providing services for those forty percent that
were subject to the fees.
The court held that the amount of the fees must reasonably relate
to the cost of the activity regulated - but that was a matter of fact for
the trial court to decide. Therefore, the court remanded that question
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for the trial court to determine.
The third argument by Farm Bureau was that imposing fees on
water rights amounted to a tax on real property and was, therefore,
unconstitutional. The court rejected the argument, stating that water
rights were not real property and the right is usufructuary only.
California owned the water itself for the benefit of its citizens.
In the fourth argument, the Farm Bureau claimed that the
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution prevented states from
imposing taxes or fees on the federal government and that the
prohibition extended to private parties who contracted with the
federal government. Under the 2003 law, SWRCB could collect fees
from any party who contracted with Reclamation for use of a water
right that would otherwise be subject to fees. Essentially, this means
that SWRCB was transferring the fee burden for each federal water
right from Reclamation to the private contractors who used those
rights. The court held that the fees were appropriate, so long as their
application was limited to the extent of the use right that the private
Therefore, the fees did not violate the
contractor possessed.
Supremacy Clause.
Finally, the court addressed the argument that the fees, as applied,
violated the Supremacy Clause because private contractors were
responsible for 100 percent of the fees imposed on Reclamation's
water rights. Reclamation held 116 million acre feet in water rights
from the Central Valley Project but only delivered 6.6 million of that
for use by private contractors. However, the private contractors were
responsible for the full amount of the fees assessed on the 116 million
acre feet. Thus, according to Farm Bureau, the fee assessment was
highly disproportionate. In order for a fee on contractors to be
reasonable, it must be limited to the beneficial interest that party has
in the property. SWRCB countered by stating that while the assessed
federal rights far exceeded the actual delivery, other factors affected
that amount, such as evaporative losses, diversions for storage, and
water releases for wildlife. In addition, SWRCB said that its fees were
appropriate because the cost was discounted fifty percent to reflect the
fact that Reclamation diverted about half of the water for
hydroelectricity. According to SWRCB, the fee amount should take
into consideration the benefit derived from the use of a whole federal
water project and not just the actual amount successfully delivered.
SWRCB reasoned, therefore, that the fees appropriately considered
the total amount of Reclamation's water rights minus the amount
diverted for hydroelectricity.
The court agreed with SWRCB but noted that the trial court had
not made a factual determination as to how much of the water
Reclamation consumes during delivery to the contractors. The court
remanded back to the trial court to determine whether SWRCB made
a fair determination of the beneficial interest of the contractors.
Therefore, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part,
remanding to the trial court to make the appropriate factual
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determinations.
Michael L. Downey

COLORADO
Cherokee Metro. Dist. v. Upper Black Squirrel Creek Designated
Ground Water Mgmt. Dist., 2011 WL 382377 (Colo. Feb. 7, 2011)
(holding that a district's failure to comply with a stipulated decree's
filing deadline to perfect its conditional groundwater rights resulted in
abandonment of those rights).
Cherokee Metropolitan District ("Cherokee") and Upper Black
Squirrel Creek Ground Water Management District ("UBS") entered
into a stipulation on January 25, 1999, concerning Cherokee's use of
two sets of wells in the Upper Black Squirrel Creek Designated Ground
The water court incorporated the
Water Basin ("the Basin").
stipulation into a conditional water rights diligence decree
("stipulated decree") in March of 1999. The stipulated decree
required Cherokee to file an application to perfect its conditional
groundwater rights in the Basin within a two-year period after diverting
and applying the water to a beneficial use.
Cherokee first applied water from well 14 to a beneficial use in
December of 2000 and applied water from wells 15 and 16 to
beneficial use in April of 2002. Cherokee did not file an application to
make absolute its conditional rights to these wells, which had been
applied to beneficial use, until February of 2005. Cherokee applied
water from well 17 to beneficial use on April 28, 2006. The parties
disputed whether Cherokee filed to make a portion of well 17 absolute
on April 30, 2008, when Cherokee filed its motion to amend its
application, or on May 30, 2008, when Cherokee filed the amended
application.
UBS and the Bookers ("the Objectors") filed a motion to dismiss
Cherokee's application to make portions of wells 14-17 absolute in the
The water court ordered
District Court, Water Division 2.
abandonment of the conditional portions of wells 14-17 and awarded
attorney fees. Cherokee then appealed to the Colorado Supreme
Court ("the court").
The court held that the Objectors' motion to dismiss was not
subject to the three-year statute of limitations that governs contracts
because the Objectors filed the motion in response to Cherokee's
failure to comply with a stipulated water court decree. The court also
held that Cherokee stipulated away a sexennial schedule of filing
deadlines, notice prior to cancellation, and the ability to file within the
same month of diversion when it entered the stipulated decree.
The court further held that Cherokee did not comply with the two-
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year period when it filed -to perfect a portion of its conditional rights
to wells 14-17. Cherokee was approximately two years and two months
tardy in filing to perfect well 14 after diversion, approximately ten
months tardy in filing to perfect wells 15 and 16, and at least two days
tardy in filing to perfect well 17. Therefore, the court held that the
water court correctly determined that Cherokee abandoned only the
portion of its conditional rights to wells 14-17 for which it untimely
filed to perfect under the stipulated decree.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the water court's order of
abandonment of only the conditional rights to wells 14-17, but
reversed the water court's award of attorney's fees because it
determined Cherokee's argument that a contract remedy should apply
to be rational.
CarolinePowers

HAWAII
In re Water Use Permit Applications, No. 28108, 2010 WL 4113179
(Haw. Oct. 13, 2010) (holding that Hawaii's Commission on Water
Resource Management: (1) could prioritize between trust resources
and allocate non-potable water over potable water for irrigation; (2)
had sufficient findings for Interim Instream Flow Standards; but (3)
had erred by failing to consider new evidence regarding a particular
application for water use permit).
This is the third appeal of a case hearing before the Hawaii
Commission on Water Resource Management ("Water Commission")
regarding waters distributed by the Waiahole Ditch System ("Ditch")
in Oahu, Hawaii. The Hawaii Supreme Court remanded the first two
Waiahole cases for further findings by the Water Commission. This
appeal involves the Water Commission's third decision, entitled
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision and Order ("D&O
III"). There are three issues on this appeal: (1) the water use permit
to the Estate of James Campbell ("Campbell Estate"); (2) the water
use permit to Pu'u Makakilo, Inc. ("PMI"); and (3) the Interim
Instream Flow Standards ("IFFS").
The Waiahole Ditch collects fresh surface water and dike
impounded ground water from windward Oahu and delivers it to
leeward Oahu. In 1992, existing users of Ditch water were required to
apply for water use permits. In 1993 Oahu Sugar Company ended its
operations, making available a large amount of ditch water. Soon
after, the Water Commission admitted twenty-five parties and
commenced a combined contested case hearing for all applications
and petitions.
In D&O III, the Water Commission considered evidence of five
groundwater sources from the Waipahu-Waiawa Aquifer ("Aquifer")
for construction of a new well to irrigate Campbell Estate's lands as an
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alternative to Ditch water. The Commission concluded that the
Aquifer was not a practicable alterative to the Ditch water because it
was potable and its highest and best use was as drinking water.
Conversely, the Ditch water was non-potable, with its best use as
agricultural irrigation. With respect to PMI's permit application, the
Hakipu'u 'Ohana and Ka Lahui Hawaii ("Windward Parties") filed a
motion to deny the application due to new evidence that PMI's golf
course was no longer in operation, and therefore did not need as
much water as they originally requested in their permit application.
The Water Commission refused to consider the merits of the motion
and denied it as being outside the scope of the court's remand. To
determine the IIFS, the Water Commission found that the United
States Geological Surveys ("USGS") supported its finding that the base
flows of windward streams had remained stable since the 1960's and
then amended the IIFS to higher levels.
Hawaii's Thousand Friends ("HTF") joined the Windward Parties
to appeal D&O III. The parties argued .that the Water Commission
erred in: (1) issuing a water use permit to the Campbell Estate when
an alternative ground water source was available; (2) refusing to
consider the merits of Windward Parties' motion to deny the water use
permit application of PMI; and (3) setting IIFS for the windward
streams not supported by sufficient data and failing to include water
that remained unpermitted in the IIFS.
The court first considered Campbell Estate's permit and the
alternative Aquifer water source. The court concluded that it was not
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion for the Water
Commission to prioritize between trust resources and allocate nonpotable Ditch water for agricultural needs instead of potable Aquifer
water needed for the public's future drinking needs. The court
further stated that the Water Commission made a policy choice
consistent with the analytical framework established by the Supreme
Court. Additionally, the policies and guidelines set forth by the Water
Commission did not constitute rulemaking even though they may
affect future cases involving Ditch water. The Water Commission's
designation of Aquifer water as fit for domestic -use was not a
reservation of that water as defined by the State Water Code.
The court next considered the Water Commission's failure to
consider new evidence that Windward Parties submitted at the hearing
on PMI's behalf. The court held the Water Commission was not
precluded from considering the new evidence in the Windward
Parties' motion and erred in refusing to consider the motion. On
remand, the court's mandate for further findings and conclusions on
the practicability of alternative water sources was only one component
of the State Water Code's reasonable beneficial use standard and the
Water Commission was free to decide issues not covered in the
mandate.
Regarding the IIFS, the court concluded that the Water
Commission had set forth sufficient findings to quantify the windward
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streams' flow in the 1960's and support its conclusion that the current
IIFS flow was more than in the 1960's. Additionally, the Water
Commission did not err in relying on USGS data or establishing the
amended IIFS for the windward streams. The Water Commission also
did not err in failing to include the unpermitted water in the amended
IIFS because the Water Commission could support its conclusion that
the current IIFS flow was greater than in the 1960's.
Accordingly, the court vacated PMI's water use permit and
remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the
opinion.
Kelly Miller

IDAHO
SRBA v. City of Oakley, 237 P.3d 1 (Idaho 2010) (holding that the
Appellants had not established a right to the City's water through prior
appropriation and could not acquire a right by prescription).
Bruce and Jared Bedke ("Appellants") paid the City of Oakley
("City") to use water from its pipes. However, Appellants claimed that
they owned two distinct rights to the water. Appellants claimed that
the first right had a priority date of 1955 and the second right had a
priority date of 1964. Appellants used the water continuously from
those appropriation dates until 1991. At that time, the City cut and
capped the pipe and proposed a new agreement for the use of the
water with Appellants.
Appellants did not sign the agreement.
Appellants then ceased payment and use of one of the alleged rights
but continued use and payment of the other. In 2004, the Idaho
Department of Water Resources recommended disallowing both of
Appellants' rights. Appellants objected, arguing that they had met all
the requirements for establishing water rights. The City responded to
the objection, arguing that the basis for Appellants' alleged rights was
their act of taking water from the city pipe, which was a claim to rights
that actually belonged to the City.
A Special Master heard the dispute and rejected Appellants'
argument. The Special Master recommended disallowing Appellants'
rights and an award of attorney's fees to the City. Appellants appealed
the Special Master's recommendation. On appeal, the District Court
for the Fifth Judicial District of Idaho ("district court") rejected the
challenge to the Special Master's recommendation as untimely and
adopted the Special Master's recommendation of attorney's fees. The
district court later rejected Appellants' motion to reconsider.
Appellants then appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court ("court").
Appellants raised several issues on appeal. First, Appellants argued
that the district court erred when it rejected the challenge to the
Special Master's recommendation of disallowing the water rights as
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untimely. The court disagreed, holding that the district court did not
abuse its discretion when it did not find cause to justify an extension of
time for confusion because the procedural instructions were clear.
Second, Appellants argued that the district court erred in adopting
the recommendation of the Special Master to disallow the Appellants'
water rights. In Idaho, the doctrine of prior appropriation requires
that a party divert water and put it to beneficial use in order to take
ownership of a water right. Any diversion work must belong to the one
claiming a right. Appellants argued that they established water rights
by appropriating spring water from the same spring as the City. The
Appellants' theory was that they appropriated water from the spring
through the City's diversions works (the pipes), the water then
comingled with the City's water, and Appellants reclaimed it when they
removed the water on the other end. Appellants had not constructed
any points of diversion of their own; they were reliant on the City's
diversions. Nonetheless, Appellants argued that a point of diversion is
not necessary, citing to Joyce Livestock Co. v. United States, 156 P.3d 502
(Idaho 2007), where the court upheld water rights without a physical
diversion. However, the court rejected this argument, holding that
Joyce Livestock created a narrow exception in which an actual point of
diversion was not necessary for in stream livestock watering on the
theory that livestock were diverting the water directly to themselves.
This exception did not apply to Appellants because they were not
claiming in stream livestock watering use. Accordingly, because
Appellants could not demonstrate that they had diverted the spring
water, the court held that the district court did not err in disallowing
Appellant's water rights.
The court then addressed the Appellants' alternative theory, which
was that the Appellants' had acquired a prescriptive right to the water.
In Idaho, a private party cannot acquire an interest in property held by
a municipality through adverse possession or prescription. Therefore,
the court ruled that Appellants could'not acquire a prescriptive right
to the City's water. In addition, the court reasoned that Appellants'
use of the water was with the City's permission, as evidenced by
Appellants' voluntary payment of fees in exchange for use of the water
before 1991. Thus, the court held that Appellants did not acquire a
prescriptive right to the water.
Finally, the court reviewed the award of attorney's fees, finding
that Appellants' claims were frivolous. Appellants did not cite any
legal theory to support their claim that they could establish a right
through the diversion works of another party or for the claim that they
acquired a prescriptive right to the City's water. The court also added
attorney's fees for all costs related to defending the appeal.
Michael L. Downey

458

WA TER LA WRE VEW

Volume 14

KANSAS
Nelson v. State Dep't of Agric., 242 P.3d 1259 (Kan. Ct. App. 2010)
(holding that growing alfalfa did not constitute diversion or beneficial
use of a water right; economic reasons such as cost of lifting, fuel, and
pumping did not constitute a due and sufficient cause for nonuse;
adequate rainfall was not due and sufficient cause for nonuse; and low
river flows was not a due and sufficient cause for nonuse).
The chief engineer of the Kansas Division of Water Resources
("DWR") issued an agency order declaring Norman and Gloria
Nelsons' ("Nelsons") water right abandoned. After DWR denied their
administrative appeal, the Nelsons appealed to the District Court of
Russell County ("district court"), which found that substantial
evidence did not support the agency's declaration of abandonment.
DWR appealed, and the Kansas Court of Appeals ("court") reversed
and remanded with directions for the district court to adopt the order
suspending the water right.
In 2004, the Nelsons purchased agricultural land and the
associated water right from Otto C. Eulert ("Eulert"). Before the
purchase, the Nelsons contacted DWR to check on the status of the
water right. DWR advised them of a potential abandonment issue due
to Eulert's nonuse. The Nelsons purchased the land and submitted a
letter to DWR with three explanations for the nonuse: (1) it was too
expensive and labor-intensive to divert; (2) alfalfa, which was the crop
rotation, did not require irrigation; and (3) that upstream users'
diversion left little water to use.
Based on Kansas's system of prior appropriation for water rights,
the failure of a water right holder to put his or her water to lawful,
beneficial use, for any five consecutive years, in the absence of due and
sufficient cause, leads to termination of the right. A due and sufficient
cause must be one that precludes irrigation or facilitates production of
a normally irrigated crop without irrigating. The question before the
court was whether substantial evidence indicated that Eulert failed to
put his right to lawful, beneficial use for any five consecutive years
without due and sufficient cause.
The court first determined that there was no lawful, beneficial use.
The Nelsons argued that the consistent cropping of alfalfa should
constitute beneficial use under the water right because alfalfa crops
draw from groundwater with the same supply source as the water right.
The court deemed this argument moot because there was no evidence
that a point of diversion existed. Diversion is the act of harnessing and
distributing water via a well, pump, dam, or other viable irrigation
device. Sub-surface irrigation by natural absorption requires no
control of water through any of these devices, and the court held that
it was not diversion. Ultimately, the court found no beneficial use and
next looked at whether due and sufficient cause for nonuse existed.
The court also held that there was no due and sufficient cause for
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nonuse. First, the court found that the Nelsons' economic reason for
nonuse, prohibitive pumping costs, did not constitute a due and
sufficient cause. Instead, Eulert merely opted not to irrigate because it
was too expensive to divert the water. These economic reasons did not
actually prevent irrigation. Next, the court contemplated the Nelsons'
argument that adequate rainfall alleviated the need to divert the water.
The Nelsons argued that because Eulert's alfalfa crops relied on
groundwater they did not require full or partial irrigation. However,
the court found that this was not due and sufficient cause for nonuse
because adequate rainfall is only an acceptable cause where a crop
requires full or partial irrigation. Irrigation was only necessary to start
an alfalfa crop, and because alfalfa did not require irrigation in
subsequent years, adequate rainfall was not an acceptable reason for
Finally, the court looked at the
not irrigating in those years.
unavailability of water due to low flows. When Eulert filed reports of
low flows, the court found either: (1) the reports were not the sole
reason for nonuse because they accompanied claims of nonuse due to
economic reasons, or (2) Eulert did not start alfalfa crops in those
years, which rendered irrigation unnecessary because those crops had
already rooted to groundwater and suggested that low flows did not in
fact prevent irrigation because there was no need to divert water.
The court concluded by finding that the agency provided
substantial evidence to support their findings of fact and conclusions
of law. The court reversed and remanded with directions to reassign
the order terminating the Nelsons' water right.
JonathanKing

NEBRASKA
Cent. Neb. Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist. v. N. Platte Natural Res.
Dist., 788 N.W.2d 252 (Neb. 2010) (holding that litigants, including
public power and irrigation districts, without a substantial interest in
the outcome of a case and who assert a claim based on third parties'
interests and rights do not have standing).
Central Nebraska Public Power and Irrigation District ("Central")
claimed that, under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), the
North Platte Natural Resources District ("NRD") erroneously
implemented new rules that lowered ground water allocation from
fourteen inches per acre to twelve. Central asserted that a lower
ground water allocation would decrease surface water in Pumpkin
Creek, which, in turn, would not feed as much water into the North
Platte River and deplete the amount of water available for storage in
Lake McConaughy. Central managed Lake McConaughy and supplied
water for irrigation and power stations, using water to produce power.
It petitioned the Scotts Bluff County District Court ("district court") to
require NRD to reverse the new regulations for ground water
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allocation and to promulgate new rules for ground water allocation to
restore historic surface water flows. The district court dismissed
Central's petition for lack of standing, which Central then appealed to
the Supreme Court of Nebraska ("court").
The court first examined whether Central was an aggrieved person
within the meaning of the APA. It held that Central was not an
aggrieved person because Central was outside of NRD jurisdiction, and
although Central was a surface water appropriator, NRD's rules would
not directly affect Central's appropriations. Central could not sue on
behalf of the public interest or assert claims based on third parties'
interests and rights because it did not have a legal or equitable right in
the subject matter of the controversy.
Next, the court determined whether Central met the three-part
test for standing: injury in fact, causation, and redressability. The
court found that Central did not prove injury in fact because Central
had no right to the water in the creek or river that fed into Lake
McConaughy. The court further reasoned that, although Central did
have water use interests and served the public through diverting,
storing, transporting, and delivering water, the injuries it alleged were
to its constituents, not itself.
The court also held that Central did not prove causation. The
court found that the causal link for which Central argued was too
attenuated. The court held that it was too weak a link to connect
NRD's regulation changes to what Central hyperbolized as the
destruction of Lake McConaughy due to lower water levels.
Next, the court held that Central did not meet the redressability
requirement for standing. A party shows redressability by showing that
a court can provide a meaningful remedy. The court reasoned that a
favorable ruling for Central would result in restored water flows, which
would help other interested parties with valid appropriation rights.
Central did not have appropriation rights to the subject water.
Therefore, a favorable ruling would not benefit Central.
Finally, the court did not find Central's action against NRD to be
frivolous. Accordingly, the court did not grant NRD's cross-appeal for
attorney's fees. However, the court affirmed the district court's
dismissal of Central's petition due to lack of standing.
Amanda Becker

NEVADA
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Ricci, 245 P.3d 1145 (Nev.
2010) (holding that a tribe did not have an implied right to basin
groundwater and, therefore, did not have priority over a company's
change use application, and that the change use application did not
affect a tribe's water rights in the Truckee River or harm the public
interest).
The Nevada Land and Resource Company, LLC ("NLRC")
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applied for a change to its water rights in the Dodge Flat Basin
("Basin") groundwater from a temporary use in mining and milling to
a permanent use for industrial power generating purposes. After the
State Engineer granted the application, the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe
of Indians ("Tribe") filed a petition for review in the Second Judicial
District Court in Washoe County ("district court"). The district court
denied the petition, and the Tribe appealed to the Supreme Court of
Nevada ("court"). The Tribe argued that the State Engineer erred by
granting the change use application without taking into consideration
the Tribe's current use of the Basin groundwater. Specifically, the
Tribe opposed NLRC's application on three grounds: (1) there was no
unappropriated water at the Basin; (2) groundwater pumping from
the Basin would. interfere with the Tribe's senior water rights in the
Truckee River; and (3) further groundwater pumping from the Basin
would be detrimental to the public interest.
First, the court found that the Tribe did not have an implied right
in the Basin groundwater. The Orr Ditch Decree, which granted the
Tribe two senior claims on the Truckee River, did not include any
implied water rights for the Tribe. Consequently, the Tribe's use of
the Basin groundwater, based on its belief that it had additional
implied water rights, was unauthorized. Accordingly, the court held
that the State Engineer appropriately excluded the Tribe's
unauthorized use to determine that the Basin contained
unappropriated water available for NLRC's permanent use.
Next, the court rejected the Tribe's claim that groundwater
pumped from the Basin would affect the Tribe's rights in the Truckee
River due to a hydrological connection between the Basin and the
Truckee River. The court based its finding on the Tribe's own
evidence that the change use application would not affect its senior
water rights in the Truckee River. Accordingly, the court held that the
State Engineer correctly concluded that NLRC's application would not
affect the Tribe's existing water rights.
Finally, the court held that the change use application did not
threaten to prove detrimental to the public interest by reducing the
Truckee River's water quality and threatening native fish habitats.
NLRC's change use application permitted the company to pump water
only up to the amount of unappropriated perennial yield, a limitation
the State Engineer imposed to protect the Truckee River water quality
and native fish habitats. Therefore, the court concluded that any
potential threat to the public interest was not the result of NLRC's
proposed, change but, rather, the consequence of the Tribe's
continued unauthorized pumping of the Basin groundwater.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the State Engineer's ruling.
Jessica Lin
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OREGON
Klamath Irrigation Dist. v. United States, 227 P.3d 1145 (Ore.
2010) (answering certified questions arising from a dispute over water
rights in the Klamath Basin and concluding Oregon state law does not
preclude acquiring an equitable or beneficial property interest in a
water right held by the United States and, once acquired, the equitable
or beneficial property interest is not subject to state water rights
adjudication).
The Oregon Supreme Court accepted three certified questions
from the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
concerning a dispute over water rights in the Klamath Basin. Before
answering the questions, the court first outlined the procedural
posture of the dispute and discussed the common law and statutory
context of the Oregon statute in dispute.
Plaintiffs ("Klamath users") are farmers and irrigation districts that
use water from the Bureau of Reclamation's Klamath Project, which
stores and supplies water in the Klamath Basin. In 2001, drought
conditions forced the Bureau of Reclamation to withhold the delivery
of water to the Klamath Basin users to ensure water was available for
three endangered fish species. Klamath Irrigation District claimed a
property right to the water and brought an action in the United States
Court of Federal Claims alleging a Fifth Amendment taking and
breach of contract. Assuming the United States holds legal title to the
water rights, the claim was solely for the taking of an equitable or
beneficial interest in the water rights. The Court of Federal Claims
held that federal law did not define the scope of an equitable or
beneficial water right and the state law did not allow a property
interest without written consent from the United States; therefore, the
court granted summary judgment for the United States.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit stated that the takings issue
depended upon Oregon property law and certified three state law
questions to the Oregon Supreme Court. In answering the questions,
the court considered a 1905 Oregon statute: Oregon General Laws,
Chapter 228, section 2 ("the Statute"). In addition, the court assumed
that the United States held legal title to the water rights.
The first certified question asked whether the Statute precluded
the landowners and irrigation districts from acquiring a beneficial or
equitable property interest in the water right acquired by the United
States. The court found that the Statute did not preclude the Klamath
users from acquiring a beneficial or equitable property interest held by
The Statute stated that the United States
the United States.
appropriated water that was not under the control of the state.
However, the court determined that the term "appropriation," as used
by the state legislature, did not express an intent to preclude a
beneficial or equitable property interest in the appropriated right.
Additionally, the Oregon legislature enacted the Statute in response to
the Reclamation Act of 1902, and the court found that the state
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legislature authorized the United States to appropriate water under
the Statute for the benefit of those users who would put the water to a
beneficial use. Therefore, the court held that the Statute did not
intend to preclude the Klamath users from acquiring a beneficial or
equitable property interest held by the United States.
The second question asked whether the beneficial water use by
landowners and irrigation districts was sufficient to grant a beneficial
or equitable property interest in the water. right legally held by the
United States. The court found that while a beneficial use alone is
insufficient, there are three factors persuasive for determining whether
the Klamath users acquired a beneficial or equitable property interest.
The first factor was whether the beneficial use resulted in the water
becoming appurtenant to the land. The second factor the court
considered was whether the United States acquired the water right for
the benefit and use of the Klamath users. Analyzing these two factors,
the court found that the Klamath users had acquired a sufficiently
beneficial or equitable property interest in the United States' water
right because the Klamath users put the water to beneficial use by
applying it to their land. Addressing the third factor, the court
considered whether any contractual agreements between the United
States and the Klamath users would change the relationship. Here,
the court declined to give an answer because it did not have access to
all the necessary documentation of contractual agreements.
The third question asked whether Oregon state law recognized any
legal or equitable property interest in the use of water in the Klamath
Basin that was not subject to adjudication with exceptions for pre-1909
surface water appropriation and previously adjudicated rights. The
court first looked to the Oregon Revised Statute section 539.210
("adjudication statute") which governs the adjudication of pre-1909
water rights. The adjudication statute requires that all claimants to a
water right appear for adjudication. According to the court, the
statutory context of the term "claimant" refers to a person who has
appropriated a water right or who has legal title to a water right. The
court found that by seeking only beneficial or equitable property
rights, the Klamath users were not "claimants" under the adjudication
statute who would be required to appear for adjudication of the right.
The court held that the beneficial or equitable property interests in a
water right legally owned by another are not subject to state water
rights adjudication.
In conclusion, the court answered the three certified questions
presented by the Federal Circuit and found that Oregon state law does
not preclude acquiring an equitable or beneficial property interest in a
water right held by the United States and that interest is not subject to
state water rights adjudication.
Jessica Bidgood
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SOUTH CAROLINA
M & M Corp. of S.C. v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 701 S.E.2d 33 (S.C.
2010) (holding that rain water directly channeled into an unfinished
storm water drainage system and intentionally discharged onto an
insured's property was not surface water or flood water for the purpose
of insurance policy collection).
In the process of road improvement, the South Carolina
Department of Transportation installed an underground drainage
system. However, before the completion of the project, about four
inches of rain fell. M&M Corporation ("M&M") owned a hotel that
suffered significant damage due to the rainwater draining onto the
Auto-Owners
property from the incomplete drainage system.
Insurance Company ("Auto-Owners") had insured the property, and
M&M filed an action seeking recovery under the policy for the water
damage. Auto-Owners denied coverage based on the surface water
and flood exclusions included in the policy. Both parties filed for
summary judgment, and the district court determined that the
outcome of the case rested on the definitions of "surface water" and
"flood" within the policy. The district court certified three questions
to the South Carolina Supreme Court: (1) whether rainwater collected
and channeled in the collection system constituted "surface water"
under the policy; (2) if the water was not surface water, could it
become surface water once it left the collection system, and if so how;
and (3) whether the rainwater was "flood water" under the insurance
policy?
The court had to determine whether collected rainwater that an
incomplete drainage system channeled onto another's property
constituted "surface water" or "flood water" under the policy, because
the policy did not explicitly define the terms. Generally, courts
interpret insurance policy language in light of its plain meaning and
construe the policies in favor of coverage. South Carolina law defined
surface water as having a vagrant character, with no distinct course,
banks, or channels. Additionally, surface waters included waters
derived from rain and melting snow. The court held that, although
the rainwater was initially surface water, once it was deliberately
contained and directed onto a neighboring property, it was no longer
naturally flowing and diffuse water, and therefore, the concentrated
rainwater from the collection system was not surface water.
Next, the court considered whether the water reverted to surface
water after it exited the collection system. The court held that the
water did not become surface water again for the purposes of the
policy after it has left the collection system. Essentially, because the
water only got to M&M's property due to the deliberate containment
and directing of the water, the water could not regain the classification
of surface water under the policy.
Finally, the court addressed whether the water is "flood water"
under the insurance policy. Previously, South Carolina law had not
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defined flood water, although here, the court suggested that flood
water must breach its containment, either due to a natural occurrence
or due to a failure in a man-made system. The court held that the
collection system purposely directed the water onto M&M's land, and
was therefore not "flood water" under the policy because it did not
breach any containment.
In summary, the court answered all three certified questions in the
negative; namely that the collected rainwater was not surface water,
that it could not regain its status as surface water after exiting the
collection system, and that it was not flood water under the policy.
SarahStout

UTAH
Bingham v. Roosevelt City Corp., 235 P.3d 730 (Utah 2010)
(holding that Roosevelt City's diversion of water and the resulting
lowering of the surrounding water table did not constitute a taking or
interference under the Utah and U.S. Constitutions; however,
Roosevelt City's diversion did give rise to a negligence claim with
regard to the City's duty to the landowners).
Several property owners in the North Hayden Area ("Group")
appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment. The Group
alleged that nearby Roosevelt City ("City") diverted water from the
the
which lowered
("Aquifer"),
Aquifer
Neola-Whiterocks
surrounding water table and soil saturation levels. The Group claimed
that this caused higher irrigation costs and impairment of their ability
to raise crops and livestock.
In 1983, the City had purchased property including two wells and
the associated water rights in the North Hayden area. Soon after, the
City filed applications with the Utah State Engineer to change the
point of diversion for two of its existing water rights to the location of
the two wells. The City also deepened the two wells and drilled three
additional wells, known collectively as the Hayden Well Field.
Although the Group protested the applications and the drilling of the
additional wells, the State Engineer granted the applications.
The Aquifer below the Hayden Well Field is an unconfined shallow
Unlike confined aquifers, where less permeable stone
aquifer.
separates the water from the adjacent soil, unconfined aquifers draw
Consequently, unconfined
water. through the surrounding soil.
aquifers can cause a drop in the water table should water be extracted
more quickly than replenished. Historical data indicated that since
the creation of the Hayden Well Field, the water level had dropped
dramatically. As a result, Group members were unable to irrigate their
crops. The Group asserted that beneath the unconfined Aquifer laid a
confined aquifer from which the City could extract its water without
affecting the surrounding water table.
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The Group filed suit against the City seeking damages and
injunctive relief.
The Group asserted three causes of action:
interference with water rights, takings, and negligence. Notably, the
Group did not allege that the City used a water right or source without
the State Engineer's approval, nor did it assert a claim for any of the
City's water rights. The City -movedfor summary judgment, arguing
that the takings clauses of U.S. and Utah Constitutions did not protect
the Group's property interests; the Group could not prevail on their
claims because the City lawfully appropriated the water; and the City
did not owe the Group any duty to preserve the water table. The City
also argued that the Governmental Immunity Act of Utah ("Act")
barred the interference claim and the Statute of Limitations barred all
of the Group's claims. The Eighth District Court in Utah granted the
City summary judgment, ruling in favor of the City on all the issues.
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court ("court") first considered
whether the Group had suffered a taking because of the City's Hayden
Well Field. The court held that in order to find a taking under the
Utah Constitution, the Group must have had a protectable interest in
property. The court looked to the type of interest the Group had in
the property rather than the interests attached to the property. The
court found that in order to enjoy protection under the takings clause,
an alleged property interest must be more than a unilateral
expectation of continued privileges. Here, the Group argued that the
level of soil saturation was a component of its lawfully appropriated
water rights. The court disagreed noting that the Group's claims were
analogous to the unilateral expectation of continued privileges, and
the level of soil saturation underlying the Group's land was not a
protectable property interest. Furthermore, because the Group did
not lawfully appropriate the water, it lacked a lawful claim to the
continued presence of water in its soil and, therefore, did not fall
within the takings protection of the Utah Constitution. As for the U.S.
Constitution, the court held that the constitutional provisions do not
protect against all government action that might negatively affect the
value of the land, and because the Group had no protectable interest
in the water table underlying the land, it did not deserve protection.
The court then considered the Group's interference claim and
held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment.
However, the court disagreed with the district court on the issue of the
Act, concerning the Group's interference claim. The court held that
the Group's allegation that the City's activities manifested knowing
and reckless indifference for and disregard of property rights
encompassed an allegation of negligence. Therefore, the claim fell
within the waiver of governmental immunity for negligent acts or
omissions under the Act. Accordingly, the court held that the Act did
not bar the Group's claim for interference; however, the court upheld
the district court's granting of summary judgment for the Group's
interference claim because the Group did not have an established
right to the water in the soil, as discussed in the court's analysis of the

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

467

Group's takings claim.
Next, the court held that the statute of limitations did not bar the
Group's negligence claim, and the City owed the Group a duty of care
with regard to the method the City used to divert water pursuant to its
established water rights. The court further held that the City's
continued negligence was a natural extension of the continuing tort
doctrine and, therefore, tolled the statute of limitations. In addition,
the lawful appropriation of the water right did not relieve the City of
its obligation to exercise care in obtaining its water. Accordingly, the
court found that the City owed a duty of reasonable care to the Group.
Finally, the court elaborated on the Group's recommendation that
the City use the alternative confined aquifer instead of the unconfined
aquifer. It noted that, if viable, the Group could prevail on its
negligence claim and it would be unreasonable for the City not to
implement the change.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment with regard to the Group's takings and
interference claims, reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment with regard to the Group's negligence claim, and remanded
for further proceedings.
Kelly Miller

WASHINGTON
Lummi Indian Nation v. State, .241 P.3d 1220 (Wash. 2010)
(holding that statutory amendments to the state's water law act that
alter the requirements for private water rights to vest do not facially
violate due process or separation of powers).
To acquire water rights in Washington, a prospective user first
must submit an application specifying a proposed beneficial use to the
If the Department
Department of Ecology ("Department").
determines the proposed use is beneficial and water is available, it
issues a permit that quantifies the user's water right and identifies all
permitted uses. This permit represents a conditional right that is
perfected when the user applies the water to its designated beneficial
use. If the user perfects the right with reasonable diligence, the
Department issues a certificate relating back to the time of application.
Since the 1950s, the Department and its predecessor quantified
numerous certificates based on need and capacity rather than actual
beneficial use, contrary to case law. In 1998, the Washington Supreme
Court held in Departmentof Ecology v. Theodoratus that new private water
rights do not fully vest until the water is put towards an actual
beneficial use, not when the capacity to use the water was built. The
court held that because the private developer in that case was not a
municipal water supplier, his conditional water use permit should be
quantified based on actual beneficial use, not capacity. The court
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made clear that Theodoratus applied only to private water rights and did
not extend to municipal water rights.
In 2003, in order to calm concerns in the wake of Theodoratus
about current municipal water rights based on capacity, the legislature
significantly amended the water law act ("2003 amendments"). In
2006, two groups of challengers argued that various sections of the
2003 amendments were unconstitutional. The trial court consolidated
these cases and agreed that the challenged amendments violated
separation of powers. The trial court did not address the substantive
due process challenge to the provisions and rejected the facial
procedural and substantive due process challenges. The court granted
review on the motion of all parties.
Lummi Indian Nation made two facial separation of powers
challenges to the 2003 amendments. It contended that the definition
in the 2003 amendments of municipal water suppliers including
private developers whose projects include more than fifteen houses
violates separation of powers by overturning Theodoratus. According to
Lummi Indian Nation, this definition is broad enough to include the
private developer in that case. Lummi Indian Nation also contended
that an amendment declaring certificates issued to municipal water
suppliers under the capacity standard were in good standing also
violated separation of powers. Lummi Indian Nation argued that this
amendment vested water rights in municipalities that would not have
vested under Theodoratus. The trial court held that the amendments
violated separation of powers by making a legislative determination of
adjudicative facts relating to the 'good standing' of certain water
rights.
To resolve the separation of powers question, the court had to
determine if the actions of one branch interfered with or undermined
another branch. In general, the legislature violates separation of
powers whenever it adjudicates facts and makes a legal conclusion. For
example, retroactive legislation that interferes with vested rights
established by judicial rulings may violate separation of powers. Under
this standard, however, the court found no facial violation of
separation of powers created by these amendments. The court
overruled the trial court and held that the legislature did not
adjudicate facts. Rather, the court held that the amendment simply
confirmed that the water certificates issued under the pipe and pump
standard before Theodoratus continued to be valid and that Theodoratus
did not divest any rights.
Lummi Indian Nation also made several facial due process
challenges to the 2003 amendments. One of these challenges was
based on a likely detrimental effect on any junior water rights holder
whose rights vested between Theodoratus and the 2003 amendments.
Lummi Indian Nation claimed that the 2003 amendments improperly
expanded water rights held by municipalities by "resurrecting"
certificates issued before Theodoratusbased on capacity.
The court recognized that vested water rights cannot be deprived
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without due process of law. However, the court also noted that junior
water rights holders take their water subject to senior rights.
Therefore, junior water rights holders are subject to the risk there will
not be enough water to fulfill their rights. The court held that the
amendments did not facially violate due process despite the increased
probability of injury to a group of hypothetical water rights holders.
Lummi Indian Nation also contended that one of the 2003
amendments was facially unconstitutional because it allowed for
municipal water users to change the place of use with approval from
the Department of Health or local legislative body. The Department
of Ecology must approve changes in place of use for non-municipal
users. Lummi Indian Nation argued that this might allow municipal
users to change their place of use to the detriment of other water
rights holders without. proper notice or an opportunity to comment.
However, the court rejected this argument because it felt Washington
law provides those who hold water rights sufficient process. The court
reasoned that any impact on the rights of others would be collateral
and indirect, that the provision applies prospectively, and that it would
deal with any injuries on a case-by-case basis.
Finally, Lummi Indian Nation argued that two of the amendments
allowing municipalities to increase the population served did not
provide other water rights holders sufficient notice and an opportunity
to comment. The court held that these provisions do not violate due
process because they only apply to future applications and integrate
the provisions into the current regulatory system. Furthermore,
municipalities were never limited to a maximum number of clients
prior to the 2003 amendments, and their plans are reviewable by the
Department of Health.
The court overruled the trial court's determination that the
amendments violated separation of powers because they overruled
Theodoratus and affirmed the rejection of the other constitutional
challenges. However, the court emphasized its ruling on these facial
challenges does not foreclose an as applied challenge in the future.
John Lahner
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Geringer v. Runyan, 235 P.3d 867 (Wyo. 2010) (holding that the
abandonment of a water right is determined by whether an aquifer has
a limited amount of water available, not whether the right is limited by
a shared flow rate of the well).
The Geringers ("Plaintiffs") petitioned the Wyoming State Board
of Control (the "Board") to have their neighbors' ("Appellees") water
rights from particular wells declared abandoned. Prior to their
ownership, the Plaintiffs' and Appellees' lands were held in common
ownership. At that time, the state adjudicated additional supply water
from the Leonard No. 1 Well and Chamber No. 2 Well to irrigate what
is now the separate lands of the Plaintiffs and Appellees. The Plaintiffs
claimed that their use of the wells was hindered because the Plaintiffs'
pivot irrigation system requires the full authorized flow rate from the
well right; however, the Plaintiffs could only obtain full water flow
when the Appellees did not use the wells. The Board denied the
Plaintiffs' petition on the grounds that the Plaintiffs lacked standing
because they failed to prove a required element. The Board reasoned
that the Plaintiffs must show that the water in the aquifer is limited;
however, the Plaintiffs only showed a limitation on the water flow, not
on the water available in the aquifer. The Plaintiffs appealed to the
District Court, Platte County, which affirmed the Board's decision.
The Plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court of Wyoming ("the
court"); the court reviewed the issue de novo. The court stated the
petitioners applying for water right abandonment must prove three
elements: (1) the petitioner has a valid water right equal to or junior
to the water right sought to be declared abandoned; (2) the water
right the petitioner holds must be from the same water supply he or
she petitioned the court to declare abandoned; and (3) the petitioner
will benefit if the Board declares the water right abandoned or the
petitioner will be harmed if the water use is resumed. The first two
elements went undisputed; the court focused on the third element.
While the court disagreed with the Board's factual finding, the
court agreed with the Board's overall decision. The Board, without
sufficient supporting evidence, found that the Plaintiffs were taking
excess water based on the amount of water needed for their crops.
However, the court affirmed the Board's decision because the
Plaintiffs were confusing the issue; abandonment of water rights turns
on whether an aquifer is limited by the amount of water available in
that aquifer, not whether, as the Plaintiffs claimed, the water is limited
by the flow rates of wells. Therefore, the Plaintiffs lacked standing
because they did not prove they would be harmed or benefited by the
Board's denial or approval of their petition for abandonment of a
water right.
In summary, the court affirmed the district court and Board
decisions that the Plaintiffs lacked standing to petition for an
abandoned water right because Plaintiffs did not prove they would be
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harmed or benefited from a declaration of water right abandonment.
Therefore, abandonment of a water right turns on whether an aquifer
is limited by the amount of water available in that aquifer, not whether
the water is limited by the flow rates of wells
Nicole Tachibana

Wilson v. Tyrrell, 246 P.3d 265 (Wyo. 2011) (holding that (1)
section 41-3-613 of the Wyoming Statutes Annotated did not require
the State Engineer to mandate the installation of a headgate at the
point where water rights holders diverted water, and (2) the scope of
an easement used to transport water is defined by its historic use).
This case involved three different consolidated cases concerning a
quiet title action brought by the landowners ("Wilsons") against
Lucerne Canal and Power Company ("Lucerne") and Mr. Tyrell, the
Wyoming State Engineer. In general, the Wilsons challenged the
scope of an easement owned by Lucerne, which provided for the
transport of water from the North Platte River and a right-of-way access
across the Wilsons' property to the headgate of the Lucerne irrigation
system. Toward this end, the case involved seven issues appealed from
three prior district court orders and decisions of the State Engineer.
The
Lucerne perfected the water right involved in 1893.
adjudicated point of diversion was a headgate that drew water from the
eastern branch of the North Platte River. The river divides upstream
of the headgate, and in 1913, Lucerne constructed a diversion dam on
the main channel of the river in order to maintain a sufficient flow to
his headgate on the eastern branch. Ultimately, the eastern branch
maintained its flow only because of Lucerne's diversion dam.
However, the watercourse of the eastern channel transversed the
Wilsons' property and created an island between the eastern channel
and the main river course.
. Prior Wyoming Supreme Court ("court") decisions (Wilson I &
Wilson II) decided several issues critical to the disposition in this case.
First, the court resolved Wilson I through the issuance of a. consent
decree recognizing the existence of Lucerne's easement and right-ofway across the Wilsons' property. Second, in Wilson II, the court
determined that the eastern channel no longer remained part of the
river and that the main channel of the river was the actual boundary of
the Wilsons' property now subject to Lucerne's easement. The subject
case decided four water law issues dealing with the extent of Lucerne's
easement.
First, the court determined that the State Engineer's decision not
to require Lucerne to install a headgate at its diversion dam satisfied
the requirements of section 41-3-613 of the Wyoming Statute. The
Wilsons claimed that the statute required a substantial headgate at the
diversion dam built on the main channel to direct water into the
eastern channel. However, the court found that the statute gave the
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State Engineer discretion to require a headgate. Because the State
Engineer determined the existing headgate was sufficient, the court
held that nothing in the statute required Lucerne to build another
headgate.
Second, the court determined that the State Engineer's decision
not to require a headgate at the diversion dam was not arbitrary and
capricious. The court found that the State Engineer considered
Lucerne's water right, the easement granted in previous decisions, the
factual circumstances on the property, and treated the diversion as it
would any other in the state. For these reasons, the court held that the
State Engineer's decision was not arbitrary and capricious.
Third, the court determined that the District Court of Goshen
County ("district court") substantially complied with its mandate in
Wilson II to locate the easement. The court again remanded the issue
of quiet title on the Wilsons' property. It directed the districtcourt to
issue an order quieting title on the property subject to the Lucerne
easement and enter an order of the location of that easement. The
district court had previously issued an order of location after Wilson II
and that order of location is the substance of the following issue on
appeal.
Fourth, the court determined that the district court's order of
location and extent of the easement was not clearly erroneous. The
court speculated that the issue of location could be broken down two
ways. Lucerne contended that whatever amount of water wherever
flowing at any given time defined the historic use of the eastern
channel. On the other hand, the Wilsons argued that where the water
usually flows in the channel defined the easement. The court found
that the Wilsons, as a practical matter, attempted to reargue an issue
barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel because Wilson I had
already determined the historic use of the easement. In Wilson I, the
court determined that the historic use was to be wherever the channel
was.
The court, therefore, affirmed the district court's finding on all
issues but the quiet title issue, which the court remanded to the district
court with the mandate to order the quieting of title on the Wilsons'
property and to issue an order of location of Lucerne's easement.
RichardNeiley

